

# Deposition Testimony of:

## **Nick Watson**

Date: July 14, 2011

Created by:



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Page 8:08 to 8:13

00008:08 Okay. Are you still working for  
09 Transocean?  
10 A. Yes, sir.  
11 Q. Okay. How long have you worked  
12 for Transocean?  
13 A. Three years.

Page 9:13 to 9:20

00009:13 Q. All right. Now, when you  
14 applied for Transocean to -- I'm sorry. When  
15 you applied for a position with Transocean,  
16 did you apply for a specific job or was it  
17 just applying for any employment?  
18 A. Labor job, just a roustabout.  
19 Q. All right. Obviously, you were  
20 hired.

Page 22:07 to 22:23

00022:07 Q. Now, you -- you -- you  
08 constantly said in answering some of these  
09 questions that was a long time ago. Are you  
10 still a roustabout?  
11 A. I'm still working for  
12 Transocean. I'm still employed, so . . .  
13 Q. Yeah, I know. But are you --  
14 are you working?  
15 A. No, I'm not working.  
16 Q. Okay. So you haven't worked  
17 since April?  
18 A. Yes, sir.  
19 Q. Okay. I'm sorry. I didn't -- I  
20 didn't understand that.  
21 And that's because you've  
22 sustained some injury?  
23 A. Yes, sir.

Page 70:10 to 70:14

00070:10 Q. You and -- you and -- who's  
11 "him"?  
12 A. The crane operator.  
13 Q. What's his name?  
14 A. Dale Burkeen.

Page 74:18 to 74:19

00074:18 Q. Okay. All right. Now, so tell  
19 us what happened next that evening.

Page 77:24 to 85:18

00077:24 At this point I stood over by  
25 the -- I want to say the Oceaneering, by  
00078:01 their -- by their lab or their equipment.  
02 And I noticed maybe what I thought was rain  
03 at one point. And I looked up, and I just  
04 thought it was raining. And I noticed -- I  
05 saw it getting a little bit thicker, so I  
06 looked up again, and I saw that it was mud.  
07 And so I said, Hey, Dale. And he said, you  
08 know, Come on, Boo, because just -- we was,  
09 like, pretty good close friends. And he  
10 said -- and I said, Man, it's mud coming up  
11 from the rig floor. And he stepped off, and  
12 he saw that it was coming down.  
13 And then it got to the point  
14 where I couldn't see anything through my  
15 glasses. My glasses was just full of it.  
16 And I looked, and Dale was turning the crane  
17 around, you know. And that -- then after  
18 this you could hear -- you could hear -- you  
19 could hear the sound coming from --  
20 Q. Do you want a break?  
21 A. (Moving head side to side.)  
22 I heard a sound coming from the  
23 starboard side from the exhaust which  
24 normally has barite. And -- and it sound --  
25 sounded like (indicating). And these hoses  
00079:01 are normally facing toward the ocean floor.  
02 These -- these hoses were parallel. There  
03 was so much force coming through it. I  
04 didn't know what it was, but I felt  
05 uncomfortable. And I could see Dale, you  
06 know, continue doing his job, swinging the  
07 crane around. And I felt uncomfortable right  
08 there. It was so much noise there. So I  
09 headed over -- I moved toward the -- the  
10 bridge, you know. But to go back -- I  
11 heard -- when I told Dale that -- that mud  
12 was coming down, I didn't know if the  
13 bridge -- we was on the -- still on the same  
14 channel, and I looked to see if they knew.  
15 And I could see the bridge looking up at the  
16 rig floor too. So I headed over there toward  
17 the bridge, and I stood outside it, and it  
18 was coming down heavy.  
19 At one point I saw the company  
20 man come out. I was standing here at the  
21 bridge. You go down this passage, and you  
22 come out the living quarters. And the  
23 company man came out. He -- there was so  
24 much mud, he fell down, and that probably --  
25 maybe saved his life from -- I don't -- I  
00080:01 can't speculate.  
02 The next point, we had a

03 blackout (indicating). The next thing you  
04 know (indicating), that blast knocked me  
05 down, shook me up. I mean, I had to get  
06 myself together. Once I got myself together,  
07 I got up, disoriented, looked around. People  
08 were running past getting -- you know, stuff  
09 falling down.

10 I looked for Dale. I looked and  
11 Dale was trying to -- trying to get out of  
12 the crane because fire -- the -- the blast  
13 came out -- the heat, which I thought  
14 engulfed me because I felt it on my neck, I  
15 thought was coming my way. I thought I was  
16 burned up. But it just came up -- came my  
17 way and went up. But where Dale was, where  
18 that force was, it shot up like an inferno  
19 toward him, and I was just hollering, Dale,  
20 get out of there, get out of there.

21 And he was trying to get around  
22 the stairs, spiral stairs, where he lost his  
23 hat. And, you know, I watched him clear down  
24 the stairs until he got below that deck. And  
25 I just thought he made it. And I said --  
00081:01 once I saw that he -- where I thought he  
02 made -- made it, only then I went down those  
03 stairs, and I said -- because it was still  
04 exploding. I went down the stairs, and they  
05 were telling us to get on the lifeboat  
06 deck -- on lifeboat. And one of my helpers  
07 was saying, you know, Nick, man, let's -- you  
08 know, are we going to fight this fire? I  
09 said, Man, there's nothing we can do. It's a  
10 roustabout's job to suit up and go fight the  
11 fire. And I said, Man, there's nothing we  
12 can do for that.

13 So we got in the boat. They  
14 were telling us to get on. And it wasn't  
15 normal, but it was so much chaos, people got  
16 on. And then we was told to get right back  
17 off of it maybe two or three times, losing  
18 valuable time, because the AD would normally  
19 be there directing, you know, checking off  
20 names, but it was so much chaos. It was  
21 just, you know, no order.

22 So people were -- you know, I  
23 don't know what was going on outside, because  
24 at that point, you know, I was inside.  
25 Because you had to go around and fill up  
00082:01 every -- every seat, and there was some empty  
02 spaces. So, you know, I don't know what was  
03 going on, but, you know, it took a while.  
04 The explosion was just getting closer and  
05 closer to us. And finally people were saying  
06 launch the boat. And the personnel from the  
07 bridge were -- you know, he was under so much  
08 duress from people, you know, hollering at

09 him to launch the boat. And, you know, he  
 10 asked the AB, because the ABs are -- pretty  
 11 much on Sundays trained with the AD. So he  
 12 got up there and helped him and calmed him  
 13 down. And we prayed. We lowered the boat.  
 14 We disconnected and made sure the D-ring  
 15 wasn't attached, and we headed out.

16 I asked did anybody have a radio  
 17 and called the BANKSTON and headed that way.  
 18 We finally attached to the BANKSTON. It took  
 19 forever. We was just bamming against it.  
 20 The seas were calm, but they were just -- I  
 21 don't know if the BANKSTON just -- you know,  
 22 we were just bouncing against it and finally  
 23 locked up.

24 We had injured people onboard.

25 Us -- people -- you know, there were -- it  
 00083:01 was so much -- it was so tight in there. You  
 02 know, I'm sure people were being -- you know,  
 03 just hurting because you had to try to move  
 04 them around. You know, I know they were just  
 05 hurting, you know.

06 We got them -- got -- we were  
 07 thinking about getting -- I think he was a  
 08 VIP -- try to get him out first, but it was  
 09 just -- we knew we was probably just going to  
 10 hurt this man, so we just -- he was out --  
 11 taken out last, if I can remember.

12 There was an elderly  
 13 woman. She worked with the catering crew.  
 14 She was hurt. She asked me -- you know, she  
 15 said she couldn't walk, so I helped her off.  
 16 Helped her up the net to climb that ladder to  
 17 get up to that boat. It's kind of high, she  
 18 couldn't do it.

19 And behind me those  
 20 guys were helping that VIP off, you know.  
 21 They got him up. And we got on the boat.  
 22 And I got up there. And, you know, my -- the  
 23 other -- the other crane operator said, You  
 24 know -- you know where Dale?

25 I said, You know,  
 00084:01 I -- he was in -- he's in that lifeboat. He  
 02 was in your lifeboat. Because I'm in No. 1,  
 03 and he would be in the other one. Because  
 04 that's the only reason I went down, because I  
 05 thought he just made it safe.

06 He said, No, I hadn't  
 07 seen him yet. So I didn't think nothing of  
 08 it and then started -- you know, I started  
 09 looking around. And I went over to the side,  
 10 you know, see what's -- you know, to see  
 11 where -- maybe he was in the other lifeboat,  
 12 because there was some more people. And  
 13 everybody was aboard.

14 And I -- I think, if

15 I can remember the chief mate, you know, he  
 16 told me that he saw him on the deck dead, you  
 17 know, so . . .  
 18 He said that --  
 19 Q. Go ahead.  
 20 A. He said that he tried to get  
 21 him. You know, I said, I wish I had known.  
 22 I would have tried to help you.  
 23 So after that pretty much our  
 24 crew just spaced out. We watched that rig  
 25 burn. You know, guys on there just watching  
 00085:01 them burn, so . . .  
 02 And the Coast Guard came. You  
 03 know, fly -- people started flying overhead.  
 04 You can see boats coming in.  
 05 And, you know, we was just, you  
 06 know -- I just was in my -- you know, just --  
 07 just some -- another world.  
 08 And people wanted -- the Coast  
 09 Guard dropped a guy in the water. He came  
 10 aboard. He -- from the back he went up there  
 11 and talked to the boat captain and -- I'm not  
 12 sure what was said. And then they started  
 13 taking off injured people, you know, mangled  
 14 or whatever.  
 15 And from that point we sat there  
 16 and just watched -- watched that rig burn.  
 17 You know, that was rough. You know,  
 18 everybody just sat there.

Page 128:22 to 129:23

00128:22 Q. All right. Okay. So I'll ask  
 23 you about another sentence on this document.  
 24 You see down towards the bottom where it says  
 25 QHSE?  
 00129:01 A. Yes, ma'am.  
 02 Q. And, again, this is  
 03 Exhibit 3928. There's a statement,  
 04 "Participate in emergency drills and respond  
 05 to emergency situations as per designation  
 06 on" the "station bill"; is that correct?  
 07 A. Yes, ma'am.  
 08 Q. Did you participate in emergency  
 09 drills?  
 10 A. On Sundays. Everyone did drills  
 11 every Sunday.  
 12 Q. Okay. Did -- did you have any  
 13 role in emergency response?  
 14 A. No. Like you said, that station  
 15 bill tells you what your job bills, your  
 16 tasks and who -- the people that are in  
 17 charge, what are their jobs as well.  
 18 Q. Okay. So did you have any role  
 19 in firefighting?

20 A. Firefighting --  
21 Q. You did?  
22 A. -- as a roustabout, you would be  
23 required to fight the fire.

Page 136:08 to 138:22

00136:08 Q. Did you ever -- did you -- did  
09 you feel comfortable reporting safety issues  
10 to your supervisors?  
11 A. Yes, ma'am.  
12 Q. Did you ever feel pressure not  
13 to report a safety issue?  
14 A. No, ma'am.  
15 Q. Did you ever fear any  
16 consequences if you were to report a safety  
17 issue either to a Transocean employee or to  
18 be a BP employee?  
19 A. No, ma'am.  
20 Q. Now, the sentence right below  
21 that on Tab 1 says, "Attend the weekly safety  
22 meetings. Actively participate in all  
23 pre-job meetings as required."  
24 Now, these weekly safety  
25 meetings, are those the drills that we were  
00137:01 talking about earlier or is it something  
02 different?  
03 A. Well, you have -- I don't  
04 understand. I can't say what that meant.  
05 But on our rig we had as a crew a safety  
06 meeting amongst ourselves -- that might be  
07 that weekly one -- to discuss issues or  
08 incidents, whatever we may have seen or go  
09 over incidents around the fleet and just  
10 learn from those problems as a group. Daily,  
11 just, you know, morning safety meetings.  
12 Q. Okay. Getting back to the --  
13 the possibly weekly safety meetings that you  
14 just mentioned, who conducts those meetings?  
15 A. We do it as a group. Anyone --  
16 it can be myself or anyone can -- you know,  
17 the crane operators sit in. They act as like  
18 overseers. They let us, you know, take  
19 charge. They just sit back, and they may  
20 come in on an incident around the fleet, and  
21 we just go and get incidents from off the  
22 board and find what happened, bring it in  
23 there. And we would read over them just to  
24 learn from mistakes that may have happened.  
25 Q. Okay. Who would attend these  
00138:01 meetings?  
02 A. Crew members, crane operators.  
03 And the deck foreman could, you know, come in  
04 there at -- you know, if it was day or night.  
05 Sometime it would be nighttime, you know.

06 Q. Okay. You just talked about  
07 getting incidents off the board. What --  
08 what does that mean?

09 A. Things that may have happened  
10 around the fleet or -- you know, it depends  
11 on what happened. So, you know, whatever  
12 happened. RSTC would put them on the board,  
13 and we would just see what happened. We  
14 would go over those same incidents in the  
15 meeting -- daily meetings also. But we would  
16 just get those off, go over them, talk about  
17 them. In our paperwork the OIM would read  
18 over them, and this would go probably to  
19 the -- you know, from my understanding, even  
20 the rig manager in town would, you know, see  
21 that we went over those alerts or whatever  
22 problems.

Page 154:04 to 156:08

00154:04 Q. Okay. All right. I'll turn you  
05 to Tab 14. I will mark this as Exhibit 3933.  
06 (Exhibit No. 3933 marked for  
07 identification.)

08 EXAMINATION BY MS. BRANSCOME:

09 Q. This is actually a few documents  
10 together, but if -- we'll look at the last  
11 page first. It goes in -- in sort of reverse  
12 order, so if you'll look at the last page of  
13 the documents.

14 And this is an e-mail on  
15 February 1, 2010, from John Guide to  
16 Paul Johnson; is that correct?

17 A. Yes, ma'am.

18 Q. And this is talking about a  
19 bonus that was awarded to the HORIZON rig  
20 crew for safe delivery of the Kodiak well; is  
21 that right?

22 A. Yes, ma'am.

23 Q. And in this e-mail from  
24 John Guide, it talks about BP wanted to  
25 reward both safety and performance. Do you  
00155:01 see that?

02 A. Are you talking about the  
03 \$2,000?

04 Q. Yes.

05 A. Yes, ma'am.

06 Q. And the last sentence of that  
07 first paragraph, John Guide writes, "I am  
08 extremely pleased with the HORIZONs  
09 operational performance on Kodiak #2, more  
10 over, the safety culture has taken the next  
11 step to ensure every task is incident free."

12 Is that correct?

13 A. Yes, ma'am.



14 Q. And you received a \$2,000 bonus  
15 from BP?  
16 A. I received a lot of bonuses. I  
17 can't really say. I mean, if it's here I  
18 guess it's true.  
19 Q. Well, sure. If you'd like to  
20 look, it's on -- the page ending in 638,  
21 about three-quarters of the way down, still  
22 in the same tab.  
23 A. So we're -- okay.  
24 Q. And you understood when you  
25 received that bonus from BP that they were  
00156:01 awarding safe operations at the Kodiak well;  
02 is that correct?  
03 A. Yes, ma'am.  
04 Q. And that the bonus could be  
05 reduced if there were any safety violations  
06 that occurred while you-all -- all were on  
07 the Kodiak prospect; is that right?  
08 A. Yes, ma'am.

Page 161:11 to 162:05

00161:11 Q. I just have a few more questions  
12 for you, Mr. Watson.  
13 When you were on the rig, do you  
14 understand that you had the authority to stop  
15 a job if you were to see anything that was  
16 unsafe about that job?  
17 A. Yes, ma'am.  
18 Q. Do you understand that to be an  
19 obligation, that you actually should stop a  
20 job, not just that you have the right to do  
21 it?  
22 A. I can't say I heard it in that  
23 phrase, but I just know I have the right to  
24 stop it.  
25 Q. Well, I'll ask you personally.  
00162:01 If you were to see a job being done and there  
02 was any safety concerns in your mind about  
03 the way the job was being done, would you  
04 stop that job?  
05 A. Yes, ma'am.

Page 168:08 to 169:12

00168:08 Q. If I told you, sir, that the --  
09 the -- the letters "TOFS" stood for "time out  
10 for safety," does that sound like it's  
11 something that would stand for to you, sir?  
12 A. It does now.  
13 Q. Okay. And you've heard the  
14 phrase "time out for safety"; is that right?  
15 A. Yes, sir.  
16 Q. And I think you were just asked

17 some questions about the authority to stop a  
18 job?  
19 A. Yes, sir.  
20 Q. And that's referred to as a time  
21 out for safety on the rig; isn't that right?  
22 A. Yes, sir.  
23 Q. And that was a policy on the  
24 rig, wasn't it, Mr. Watson?  
25 A. Yes, sir.  
00169:01 Q. That was something that you and  
02 everybody else was empowered to do. If you  
03 saw something was unsafe, you could call that  
04 timeout for safety; isn't that right?  
05 A. Yes, sir.  
06 Q. And you had seen that be -- been  
07 done by other people; isn't that true?  
08 A. Yes, sir.  
09 Q. And if you saw something unsafe,  
10 you wouldn't hesitate to call a timeout for  
11 safety; isn't that right?  
12 A. Yes, sir.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

IN RE: OIL SPILL ) MDL NO. 2179  
BY THE OIL RIG )  
"DEEPWATER HORIZON" IN ) SECTION "J"  
THE GULF OF MEXICO, ON )  
APRIL 20, 2010 ) JUDGE BARBIER  
MAG. JUDGE SHUSHAN

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VOLUME 1

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Deposition of JAMES ANGUS  
WATSON, IV, taken at Pan-American Building,  
601 Poydras Street, 11th Floor, New Orleans,  
Louisiana, 70130, on the 19th day of  
December, 2012.

1 THE STATE OF LOUISIANA :  
 2 PARISH OF ORLEANS :

3 I, PHYLLIS WALTZ, a Certified Court Reporter,  
 4 Registered Professional Reporter, and  
 5 Certified Realtime Reporter in and for the  
 6 State of Louisiana, do hereby certify that  
 7 the facts as stated by me in the caption  
 8 hereto are true; that the above and foregoing  
 9 answers of the witness, JAMES ANGUS WATSON,  
 10 IV, to the interrogatories as indicated were  
 11 made before me by the said witness after  
 12 being first duly sworn to testify the truth,  
 13 and same were reduced to typewriting under my  
 14 direction; that the above and foregoing  
 15 deposition as set forth in typewriting is a  
 16 full, true, and correct transcript of the  
 17 proceedings had at the time of taking of said  
 18 deposition.

19 I further certify that I am not, in any  
 20 capacity, a regular employee of the party in  
 21 whose behalf this deposition is taken, nor in  
 22 the regular employ of his attorney; and I  
 23 certify that I am not interested in the  
 24 cause, nor of kin or counsel to either of the  
 25 parties.

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND AND SEAL OF OFFICE, on  
 this, the 19TH day of DECEMBER, 2012.

*Phyllis Waltz*

PHYLLIS WALTZ, RPR, CRR  
 TEXAS CSR, TCRR NO. 6813  
 Expiration Date: 12/31/13  
 LOUISIANA CCR NO. 2011010  
 Expiration Date: 12/31/12  
 NEW MEXICO CCR NO. 610  
 Expiration Date: 12/31/12



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1 I, JAMES ANGUS WATSON, IV, have  
 2 read the foregoing deposition and hereby  
 3 affix my signature that same is true and  
 4 correct, except as noted above.

5 James A. Watson IV

6 JAMES ANGUS WATSON, IV, VOLUME 1

7 STATE OF ~~LOUISIANA~~ )  
 8 PARISH OF Dist of Columbia

9 Before me, \_\_\_\_\_,  
 10 on this day personally appeared JAMES ANGUS  
 11 WATSON, IV, known to me, or proved to me  
 12 under oath or through Govt ID )  
 13 (description of identity card or other  
 14 document)), to be the person whose name is  
 15 subscribed to the foregoing instrument and  
 16 acknowledged to me that they executed the  
 17 same for the purposes and consideration  
 18 therein expressed.

19 Given under my hand and seal of  
 20 office on this, the 25 day of JANUARY,  
 21 2013.

22 Cheryl V. Brown

23 NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR THE  
 24 STATE OF LOUISIANA

25 My Commission Expires:

CHERYL V. BROWN  
 NOTARY PUBLIC  
 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
 MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: MARCH 14, 2013

Name of Deponent	Title	Date	Vol	Citation	Statement	Correction
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	13:19-20	He is currently attorney at the U.S. Coast Guard headquarters.	He is currently <u>an</u> attorney at the U.S. Coast Guard headquarters.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	21:16-17	No. I was -- I was two jobs for part of that time.	No. I was -- I was <u>holding</u> two jobs for part of that time.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	43:9-11	The -- there -- the NIC received some authorities, not all, that were assigned by the Secretary of Homeland Security.	The -- there -- the NIC received some <u>FOSC</u> authorities, not all, that were assigned by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	46:11	also placed the <u>FOC</u> in charge of	also placed the <u>FOSC</u> in charge of
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	54:16-17	It's -- it's hard for me to say any.	It's -- it's hard for me to say any <u>important decisions</u> .
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	57:16-17	-- of any RP, not including BP	-- of <u>a RP, including BP</u>
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	59:11-12	there <u>was</u> different priorities and different resources	there <u>were</u> different priorities and different resources
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	62:8-9	incident commander <u>in</u> the FOSCR	incident commander <u>and</u> the FOSCR
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	65:21-22	His <u>was</u> similar to my duties as deputy.	His <u>duties were</u> similar to my duties as deputy.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	78:25-79:4	I can recall there <u>was informal discussions</u> , but I can't re- -- <u>that ultimately didn't</u> result in resources, but I don't recall specifically what they were right now.	I can recall there <u>were informal discussions that ultimately didn't</u> result in resources, but I don't recall specifically what they were right now.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	85:7-8	There <u>is</u> probably a couple of reasons that come to mind.	There <u>are</u> probably a couple of reasons that come to mind.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	85:14-17	And I had recently participated in an exercise that early spring <u>as the National Incident Commander in the National Incident Commander</u> role during the exercise.	And I had recently participated in an exercise that early spring <u>in the National Incident Commander role</u> during the exercise.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	94:12:00	There <u>was</u> a lot of people	There <u>were</u> a lot of people
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	123:10-13	because there <u>was</u> situations that occurred on a periodic basis in which it was the only method that we -- we had to deal with an oil slick.	because there <u>were</u> situations that occurred on a periodic basis in which it was the only method that we -- we had to deal with an oil slick.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	134:9-13	There was a <u>concerned</u> expressed by the parish presidents, and it was also a -- an interest of, I think, the deputy secretary that we establish better communications with the parish presidents.	There was a <u>concern</u> expressed by the parish presidents, and it was also a -- an interest of, I think, the deputy secretary that we establish better communications with the parish presidents.



Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	135:9-16	Well, there -- there was an interest in making sure that the parish presidents were not surprised by media news, and so by this time there had been established that -- that liaison network to -- it was -- evidently I was requesting him to set up a telephone conference call, to use that structure to <u>communication</u> that information that night.	Well, there -- there was an interest in making sure that the parish presidents were not surprised by media news, and so by this time there had been established that -- that liaison network to -- it was -- evidently I was requesting him to set up a telephone conference call, to use that structure to <u>communicate</u> that information that night.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	152:6-8	Well, we were always interested in having <u>a</u> end state where the well was sealed.	Well, we were always interested in having <u>an</u> end state where the well was sealed.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	165:20-22	We were, <u>you know</u> , also concerned about what -- you know, <u>having single</u> means of failure.	We were <u>also</u> concerned about having <u>a single</u> means of failure.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	176:6-11	well, primarily the government people overseeing that developed usually fairly thick pages of thick booklets, a lot of them came <u>in in</u> binders like this, which were very detailed procedures that would ultimately get up to the FOSC level	well, primarily the government people overseeing that developed usually fairly thick pages of thick booklets, a lot of them came <u>in</u> binders like this, which were very detailed procedures that would ultimately get up to the FOSC level
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	177:19-21	we got concerned that we -- that what was provided <u>previous</u> was based on a lower flow estimate	we got concerned that we -- that what was provided <u>previously</u> was based on a lower flow estimate
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	183:1-3	I don't know specifically, but the overall intent of all the federal actions <u>were</u> to stay coordinated.	I don't know specifically, but the overall intent of all the federal actions <u>was</u> to stay coordinated.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	193:15-20	Well, as I -- as I described before, I -- my concern was that we -- we stick to a Unified Command type of a -- of a process that <u>involved de- -- deliberate</u> planning and sequence of -- that the engineers were already involved in.	Well, as I -- as I described before, I -- my concern was that we -- we stick to a Unified Command type of a -- of a process that <u>involved the deliberate</u> planning and sequence of -- that the engineers were already involved in.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	200:12-20	and you say in this email, <u>my initial read... to come up with anything</u> . Did you see that?	and you say in this email, " <u>my initial read... to come up with anything</u> ." Did you see that? (quotes added)
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	201:20-21	paragraph, I had hoped... kill line.	paragraph, " <u>I had hoped... kill line</u> ." (quotes added)
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	207:11:00	<u>weren't</u> thinking	<u>were</u> thinking
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	215:7-8	At some point in time, yes, I <u>do</u> .	At some point in time, yes, I <u>did</u> . (The question was in past tense)
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	220:21-23	And after some questions and <u>answered</u> , I felt like the -- the risks were acceptable.	And after some questions and <u>answers</u> , I felt like the -- the risks were acceptable.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	221:22-25	Well, I think that that goes into <u>a whole nother</u> level of analysis as to whether you actually were going to use the capping stack to shut in the well.	Well, I think that that goes into <u>a whole other</u> level of analysis as to whether you actually were going to use the capping stack to shut in the well.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	224:21:00	<u>that, had</u> been proposed	<u>that which</u> had been proposed
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	227:22	I don't <u>think so he</u> overtly	I don't <u>think he</u> overtly



Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	233:8-9	Well, there was -- there <u>was</u> two reasons.	Well, there was -- there <u>were</u> two reasons.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	237:12-14	Well, this was probably a -- one of -- I did -- we had a lot of <u>correspondents</u> about dispersants.	Well, this was probably a -- one of -- I did -- we had a lot of <u>correspondence</u> about dispersants.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	244:3-7	paragraph, My approval...into the GOM	paragraph, "My approval ...into the GOM" (quotes added)
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	245:16-18	It was just <u>mixed in the with</u> the air -- it was a surface dispersant application.	It was just <u>mixed in with</u> the air -- it was a surface dispersant application.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	246:24:00	<u>FOC</u>	<u>FOSC</u>
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	248:24 - 249:4	There -- there were constant improvements to our processes, and the quantity thing more had to do with -- with process and communications than -- Q. What do you mean by that? A. -- any kind of <u>deliberate or misapplication</u> .	A. -- any kind of <u>deliberate act or misapplication</u> .
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	249:14-15	there was <u>a</u> over application beyond the final approval.	there was <u>an</u> over application beyond the final approval.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	254:2-3	And I would make a <u>decision communication</u> that back to Houma.	And I would make a <u>decision and communication</u> that back to Houma.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	256:20-22	Not on every application, but on a certain percentage of the applications there <u>was</u> boats.	Not on every application, but on a certain percentage of the applications there <u>were</u> boats.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	265:6-9	I had conversations with the incident commander, and I was assured that there <u>was</u> protocols in place on the quantity of dispersants.	I had conversations with the incident commander, and I was assured that there <u>were</u> protocols in place on the quantity of dispersants.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	267:20-21	I don't <u>know</u> I would characterize it.	I don't <u>know how</u> I would characterize it.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121219	I	270:22 - 271:2	And then sometimes they realized that they had used up their limit earlier in the day for some other operation and then were -- and then were -- had shut down, but couldn't <u>sustain that without the VO</u> -- they saw the VOCs going up.	And then sometimes they realized that they had used up their limit earlier in the day for some other operation and then were -- and then were -- had shut down, but couldn't <u>sustain subsea dispersants being shutdown without the VO</u> -- they saw the VOCs going up.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121220	2	327:23-24	A. And I'm sure there <u>is</u> many others.	A. And I'm sure there <u>are</u> many others.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121220	2	358:17-19	There <u>was</u> other VoQs that might have been used just as a single vessel working with, say, in situ burning.	There <u>were</u> other VOOs that might have been used just as a single vessel working with, say, in situ burning.
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121220	2	401:20	taking <u>anything</u> you said	taking <u>anything</u> you said
Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121220	2	471:18-19	A. Oh, the incident command posts <u>was</u> at Houma and Mobile.	A. Oh, the incident command posts <u>were</u> at Houma and Mobile.

Adm. James Watson, IV	Director of BSEE, DOI	20121220	2	495:7-12	This -- this was an area that there <u>was</u> people that were very dedicated to getting dispersant applications right because it was a -- an issue that involved trading off environmental damage, basically.	This -- this was an area that there <u>were</u> people that were very dedicated to getting dispersant applications right because it was a -- an issue that involved trading off environmental damage, basically.
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