

**BP Supporting Evidence - Scenario #1**

1	Supporting evidence consistent with Defining Observations 1 & 4
2	Need 78 bpm to flow up combination of drill pipe and ram bypass. Pressure drop indicates max flow up drill pipe ca. 25 bpm, therefore, ca. 50 bpm bypass at rams
3	Inconsistencies: Not consistent with Defining Observations 2 & 3 (at high rates); Massive flow past rams would expect significant erosion

Table 2: BP Supporting Evidence - Scenario #1

**Scenario #1 Assessment**

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Looking at the data and BP's interpretation, Scenario #1 reflects a realistic case that accounts for all the evidence, although it requires "[m]assive flow past [the] rams" to the sea without effectively killing the well. This reveals that BP acknowledged that the low Top

no longer anchored and is allowing hydrocarbon to flow up the annulus when there is no pumping. When pumping starts, the Production Casing Hanger sets back down due to the pressure from above, and little mud is able to get into the Production Casing Annulus. As soon as pumping stops, and the BOP pressure drops, the Production Casing Hanger lifts back off the seat, both Casing Flow and Annular Flow resume, and hydrocarbons are seen exiting the riser. The collapse disks are assumed not to be open in this scenario. This scenario is consistent with the "Defining Observations" as described in Table 3<sup>67</sup> depending on how the Production Casing Hanger was sealing and how much fluid was being lost through the BOP. These two aspects could not be determined based on the data available during the Response.

<sup>66</sup> *Id.* at 7449.

<sup>67</sup> *Id.* at 7450.