


DRAWINGS PROVIDED IN INTERVIEW

By: John MacDonald
Person Interviewed: David Young
Date of Interview: June 1, 2010

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
INSTRUCTIONS	
Name & Company	TO, BP, TP, BPP
Color Code	Injured Person
	Uninjured Person

Yancy: Cur
Bence?
Life?
OK



Wyman
question
ASK
thru
g

WRE BECAUSE
Randy Egan
Leaving?
maint. spc.
GENERAL NOTES
1. ACCIDENTALITY
9 - 1 MAN ROOMS = 38 PERSONS
9 - 2 MAN ROOMS = 18 PERSONS
1 - 1 MAN ROOMS = 1 PERSONS
SECOND DECK = 65 PERSONS



DRAFTS OF INTERVIEW

Provided by:
Person Interviewed:
Date:

John MacDonald
David Young
June 1, 2010

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DRAFT

**Interview with David Young, Chief Mate
Transocean Office
Tuesday, June 1, 2010**

Interviewer: John MacDonald

Note taker: Diane Willey

Start time: 1:30 p.m.

Stop time: 5:15 p.m.

David arrived on the rig floor at approximately 9:30 p.m. He was talking with to Caleb Holloway (floorhand), Jason Anderson (roustabout), and Dewey Revette (driller) about differential pressure issues. Vince Tabler, a cementer with Halliburton, walked in but there was no conversation in front of or with him. They asked Caleb to bleed the stand pipe and shut it in. David then left that area. Jason walked out the rig floor door toward the rig floor. He went to the starboard side of the bridge. He told Curt Kuchta, the rig's captain, that it would be a while before the cementing job would be started because there was "an issue on the floor." He noticed that BP guys were on the bridge at that time. David went downstairs into the subsea office with Chris Pleasant (subsea engineer) and Allen Seraile, AD. Chris and Allen flipped through the channels on the CCTV.

Allen saw water coming through the rotary, but David did not notice it. Approximately one minute later he heard gas emitting and he went back to the bridge via the door which was on starboard side of the bridge was was on the port side of the vessel. There was an explosion and he heard the engines over speed. He was not sure if that is what he heard but after speaking with others, it is what he thought he heard. Initially there was gas and gray mud ("the color of cement"). David could smell gas and the rig was getting covered in mud which was coming through the crown. All of the decks were being covered too. He saw an explosion and then fire on the starboard side forward of the rig (a large area on fire). All power to the rig went out. After the explosion it was just the derrick that was burning. David said he called the bridge many times and tried to keep his radio with him all the time.

After the explosion David was in and out of the bridge many times. He said that the radio was working, but the bridge was very hectic (he changed his term) because lots of people were taking actions. Since he had just arrived on the bridge he did not know who was doing what so it seemed confusing until he was brought up to speed. People were yelling and it was very loud, however, Yancy Kepplinger and Andrea Fleytas were remaining calm. At some point he does remember hearing a general alarm going off while he was on the bridge and he was able to hear the PA system.

David came out of the bridge and went to his muster point, which was fire locker #1 (the emergency gear locker). There should have been eight people at the locker, but only Chris Choy, roustabout, showed up. Chris' second muster point was fire locker #2, but he couldn't get there. There was a camera at the muster station, but no one could see the CCTV. He said that there was no time to refer to the emergency manual. (It is the AD's responsibility to muster the boats but there was no time to muster while on the rig and there is no "t-card system." They finally did muster once they arrived on the Bankston.) He also said that Patrick Morgan, the AD, did write down people's names though.

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The life boat that David was assigned to had already loaded. David had a chance to board it but decided to stay and help those going to the liferaft.

Someone told David that Dale Kepplinger was down. David made it over to Dale, where he was face down against the crane pedestal. David put his hand on Dale's shoulder. The back of Dale's coveralls was not burned at all. David is almost positive that Dale was already dead by the time he got to him because there was a very large amount of blood coming from his head. He noticed that the crane was not into the rack all the way. David later heard from others that Dale got blown out on his way down from the crane, but he does not know if this is correct or not. He speculated that Dale could have fallen or climbed out and then fallen to the main deck. David said that the decks were extremely slippery and Dale weighed at least 300 pounds, so one man alone would not have been able to carry him.

David returned back to Chris Choy and Chris Pleasant. He thinks Chris Pleasant did have on a life jacket at that time. He told Chris Pleasant to go get help for Dale immediately after the explosion, but Chris got consumed by the bridge and was unable to return. He did not see Chris Pleasant again. He speculated that he possibly went to the boats.

David spoke to Jimmy Harrell (OIM) who said he could see straight through four entire rooms in the living quarters because the ceiling and bulkheads were knocked down. He said that later when he saw Jimmy he was hurt, could not hear, and was very disoriented.

David noticed diverter gas coming out of the diverter. There was a fire over the cement room, which was over the rig floor, and the flames were blazing over David's head.

David got Mike Mayfield (SDPO) to go to boat #2 and wait. He was supposed to stay at the boats while David went to the gear locker to get more people. David heard more explosions at that time.

David noticed the gas in the transit room. He went to the bridge (he thinks). He told everyone that "it's time to go." Captain Curt said to go to the AFT boats, but they were already gone at that time. He could not get to the back deck or port side because it was extremely dangerous.

He saw people carrying Buddy Trahan (operations manager asset) and Wyman Wheeler (toolpusher) out on stretchers. Steve Bertoni (maintenance supervisor) and Stan Carden (electrical supervisor) were at the other end of the stokes litter. Per David, Chad Murray (chief electrician), Randy Ezell (toolpusher) and possibly Steve Bertoni were the ones who saved Buddy and Wyman. Wyman was brought from the tool pusher room area. Chad handed Buddy to David. Buddy and Wyman were put on the boat deck. He then told people to put Buddy's stretcher in the back of the life boat.

David used a life jacket and did have fire gear on. He was unable to notice, however, if any other people had the smoke hoods on or not. He said it was very difficult to convince people not to jump overboard. There was extreme panic with lots of yelling and other loud noises, especially from the guys who were unable to get themselves off the rig.

David is pretty sure that Andrea used her best judgment and was the one who sent the mayday to the Coast Guard and other vessels, because of the severe situation.

David advised Curt that "it was time to go" based on what he had seen on the bridge and his travels throughout the rig. Andrea got David a life jacket. Everyone followed.

He said the people who did jump overboard were Yancy Kepplinger, senior DPO, Curt Kutchta, captain Matt Hughes, floorhand, and maybe Mike Williams, chief electronic technician but he was not positive.

David was the first one to get to a raft. He thinks that Randy Ezell was next in the boat behind him. While it was inflating, he was preparing it to load it with people then deploy. He expressed that the raft was very hard to get because it had to swing over the davit then pull it over the rail. He also said that the chains were in a bad location. (David recommended improving the lift raft deployment design.)

He did not see Buddy being loaded into the raft. He did say that the captain, Curt Kuchta, was flustered at the rafts.

When David initially got into the raft there was no smoke. At that time he looked for the brake handle and initially grabbed it. The raft then got extremely smoky. He and others pulled Wyman into the raft, but he was unable to find the brake handle again. The knife was where it was supposed to be but it was very hard to find at the time. It was hard to keep the raft straight while getting people in. He pulled Andrea into the raft by her life jacket and she landed on top of Wyman. He thinks that Yancy Kepplinger, Senior DPO, or Curt might have raised counterweight or pulled the brake to let the raft go down. While the raft was being lowered down to the water, it was at a 90 degree angle (toward the outboard side). It went right side up into the water, however.

After the raft was deployed he could hear the crown hit the deck and saw the draw work's wires break. He was told that some people jumped from the helicopter deck, but he isn't sure who. He encouraged people not to jump overboard because they might be hard to locate afterward. He said that the fact that since the boats were located on the deck, it did prevent people from jumping overboard.

He is not sure who gave the order to lower the life boats...maybe boat someone on #1, Don Winslow (operations manager performance) or Darren Lipenski (the Coxsen). He said that Darren helped people get into the boat and might have driven the boat away, but he was not sure. He said that Don and Darren were the ones to close the doors to the boat.

Personnel on David's raft included Randy Ezell, Chad Murray, Stan Cardin, Steve Bertoni, Andrea Floetis, DPO and Wyman Wheeler.

Once people got out of the raft, David, Randy and Stan stayed on the raft with Wyman so they could get him staged in order for get onto the Bankston. They cut the support straps of the raft to get Wyman out. They then pulled Wyman's stretcher from the raft into the boat.

Initially David rolled out of the raft (with his life jacket on) and swam away from the raft. The vessel order for how the vessels were lined up during the offloading of personnel was raft, life boat, rescue boat, then the Bankston. He said that there were Coast Guard personnel already on the Bankston when he got on board.

They had a full muster before midnight. They did not leave for town until after sunrise. David said that they had to make several stops, one to pick up BP personnel and also to drop off Don Winslow (operations manager), Chris Pleasant and Mark Hay (subsea engineer).

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Once they arrived on shore, David said that BP people were waiting at the dock and police and additional Coast Guard personnel escorted them to the Crown Plaza. There were given telephones to make phone calls right away then everyone had to take a urine test. They were provided clothing, but all of it was sized XXXL, so he was unable to fit into anything. Transocean personnel greeted them and had medical assistance available (including counselors), food, a hotel room, travel arrangements to get home, and cash to travel with. David even said that somehow they got by the TSA with no problems at all.

Paul Johnson (rig manager) told everyone to go home.

They then loaded into busses and taken to the airport. He then flew home.

Since David has been back home he has gone to his own doctors. He was unable to hear for about a week. He will continue to follow up with his doctors. He said that Shuman called and asked if they could set up psychiatrist appointments for him. (He did not mention if he scheduled any or not.) He also said that Shuman mailed him a waiver to sign, which he did not do. He did, however, sign a witness statement for the Coast Guard.

Other information

David cannot recall hearing an EDS order. He said to ask Mike Mayfield about it. He said that "anyone who is near the button" can sound the general alarm bell.

David got burned on the arm and forehead. Andrea Fleytas got burned on her leg.

David attended a maritime academy and also took an advance firefighting class. He said that he has participated in Transocean's drills/exercises on the rig and thinks the quality of the drills is good. He has never conducted drills at night or during bad weather because he did not want to take such a risk. He said that the only person allowed to excuse personnel from participating in the drills is the captain. Personnel are required to attend water survival and basic fire training.

He said that between shift changes, the on-duty personnel would call the off-duty personnel or leave handwritten notes to inform them of important information they needed to know. David said he kept notes in his tally book, but he does see the value of keeping daily notes in the RMS. (are you sure he said that?)

David stated that Carl Taylor (radio operator) did a great job mustering.

Final thoughts/recommendations

David was upset that he did not have a knife in his pocket because he could have used it to cut the stretcher for Buddy, used it in the life raft to expedite things, getting the stretcher out of the case, etc. He said there were many uses for the knife, but he did not have one.

David said the main recommendation of improvement would be the life raft deployment as well as maneuverability. David said the quality of the way he loaded and got people loaded into the life boat was "decent" but one person had to stand inside the raft and one person halfway in the raft and halfway

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on the rig. David also recommends putting individual hand cranks for each function in each life raft davit. Also install the cradles at the proper height they need to be deployed at so boarding the raft is easier.

David also recommends installation of Jacobs ladders on board. He did say that the Horizon did not have scramble nets, but they could have used them if they had them. He said the crew has had desktop training on how to escape using sea ladders, however.

He also said that it is very important for trained personnel to hold the boats and rafts. Some people had to be physically restrained in these vessels and it is important for someone to evacuate properly as well as promptly. He also said that there was neither dehumidifier nor any fixed radios on the life boats.

He said that it was clear who was in charge, but it changes between the captain and the offshore installation manager. The captain did know he was in charge of the emergency situation.

He subsequently heard that the life boat deployment went smoothly. He said the sprinkler system did come on in one boat but he was not sure about the other boat.

When speaking about the 60 Minutes interview with Mike Williams, David wanted to correct some things that Mike said on the show. First of all, Andrea did not jump overboard. She left the rig in a life raft. David also said that he was the last one into the boat and that Mike was already in there when he arrived. David stated that Mike said that he had to report to the bridge "for duties" but actually he did not help or lead any part of the evacuation.

QUESTIONS FOR INTERVIEW

The attached questions were brought to this interview by John MacDonald

Person Interviewed: David Young
Date of Interview: June 1, 2010

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David Young

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DEEPWATER HORIZON EER QUESTION BANK - OFFSHORE

1. What formal emergency response training have you received
2. Who was your Supervisor
3. Did you receive an Induction/Orientation when you joined the rig *yes*
4. What was your primary muster point, was it available, how did you reach it
5. What was your secondary muster point
6. If you were a senior member of crew did you use the rigs ER Manual, if yes were the procedures useful
7. When you went to muster could you see you reach your muster point i.e. *was* the emergency lighting working
8. Was the rig on main or emergency power when you went to muster
9. Have you participated in drills/exercises on the rig, if yes describe your impression their quality
10. How well could you hear the
 - Alarms
 - PA's if yes what were the quality of the instructions
11. Did you use any of the personnel escape equipment provided (Smoke Hood, Gloves, Torch/Flashlight and Lifejacket), if yes:-
 - Were they readily available
 - Did they work as you expected, and
 - Were they effective
12. If you jumped into the sea describe why, what happened and how you were rescued and by who and what treatment did you receive
13. What was the quality of the muster
14. What were the quality of the instruction you received like at your muster point and how controlled was the muster process
15. Describe the quality of the loading of the lifeboat
16. Was there a stretcher in your Lifeboat, if yes how was that managed
17. Was there sufficient room in the Lifeboat for you/others
18. Describe the quality of the instructions from the Coxswain
19. Describe what happened once the lifeboat was clear of the rig, including how long you were in the lifeboat
20. If you were in the water how were you rescued & by who
21. How did you reached the shore, if via a vessel how did you get from the Lifeboat to the vessel
22. Who meet you when you reached the shore
23. How were you treated when you reached the shore
24. Were you "debriefed" when you reached the shore and did you give a statement to anyone from Transocean/BP, if yes can you remember who
25. What were the "reception" facilities for you when you reached the shore
26. How did you get home
27. What follow up have you received since you got home
28. What things do you think went well during the evacuation/escape and rescue
29. What do you think could be improved
30. Anything else you would like to add
31. Did your vessel ever conduct F&B drills during night time hours?

32. Is there a clear understanding on your vessel who the Person in Charge is, does it change?
33. If you jumped into the sea, did you jump in with your life jacket on?
34. If because of the gas threat your primary muster point was inside the quarters; how was word passed that the muster points had been destroyed or unavailable?
35. During your drills did 3rd party personnel participate with the same earnestness as Transocean personnel?
36. Where there personnel that were panicking how were they handled?
37. Are you aware if after Emergency Drills if improvement opportunities were captured in the report and entered in the management system?
38. Were the doors of the lifeboat closed? Sprinkler started? Air System started?
39. Did emergency lighting or glow in dark markings help guide you? Were they necessary?
40. How did you manage to get from the life boat/liferaft/water to the work boat?
41. Who took the muster at your boat station?
42. What boat station did you muster at? Was that boat assigned to you on the station bill?
43. Did you see anyone jump over board?
44. Do you know the name of anyone that jumped over board?
45. What was the best technique you noticed to keep personnel calm?
46. Were you asked to sign a release form or any other type of document?
47. Who asked you to sign it?
48. Did you sign it?
49. If so, when? How many hours had you been awake?
50. Did the boat's crew tell you why they did not go directly to town?
51. Scramble nets, where they available? Were they used?
52. Would you rather use lifeboats or life rafts during this type of event? Why?
53. Did people on board ever question the usage of a designated lifeboat as the FRC?
54. Do you see value in having a designated FRC?
55. Escape shoots – have you used them for escape? Would they be valuable or practical on a vessel like the Horizon during this type of evacuation.
56. Did you feel that the situation's emergency situation was so colossal and time constrained because of potential explosions that it made you feel that there was not enough time to wait for a muster?
57. Do you know who issued the EDS order?
58. Do you know who issued the order to lower the life boats?
59. Do the Horizon's lifeboats have stationary radios? Do you know why not?
60. Do the boats have dehumidifiers? Do you know why not?
61. Did raft tip 90 degrees as written here?
62. Painter caught? On what? How did that happen?
63. Who gave order to send MAYDAY?
64. What damage did you see on board the vessel?
65. Who can sound general alarm bells?
66. Are any personnel excused from Fire and Boat Drills?
67. Do all third party personnel have BOSIET?
68. What kind of handover is done between you and your relief?
69. From the first explosion until boats were lowered – how much time elapsed?
70. The liferaft with the 6 or so people started to go down before captain and others were loaded – why and how?

71. Was the raft in the water before personnel jumped into the water?
- 72.

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HANDWRITTEN NOTES

By: Diane Willey
Person Interviewed: David Young
Date of Interview: June 1, 2010

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Ref:

Interviewing Form

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Page 1 of

Interviewee Name David Young

Job Title Chief mate

Company TRANSOCEAN

Contact Details

Work Address

.....

Tel Cell

Home Address.....
.....

Tel Cell

Notes Keith Lamb Diane Willey

Interviewers
John MacDonald

.....

.....

Date (D,M,Y) 6/1/2010 Start Time 1:30 pm Stop Time 5:15 pm

Was documentation taken to interview? Y/N

Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N

Are documents attached to this form? Y/N

General - J.B.
STATION Built

Details of documents, drawing, photographs or other supporting materials taken to interview:

.....

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Interview Plan

Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc:

.....

.....

.....

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.....

Add additional pages as necessary and to ensure that nothing is omitted or lost please follow numbering convention as above.

Beginning Overview -

Finney
Hurrell
Don Wilson

talked
to

On rig floor - 9:30pm started -
talking re differential pressure issues -
call - Jan Anderson + Denny + Vince
Tables (cement) w/ Halliburton - had
Call Halliburton bleed stand pipe + shut it in
as he left. Jan + walked out rig floor
door toward ~~rig floor~~. Allen went to
bridge on starboard side. Told Kent we
be while for cement job, b/c had "issue a plan!"
B.P. guys on - bridge. Came down stairs into
subsea ops w/ Chris Pleasant + Allen

rolled in but no
conversation

on port
side on
starboard
side of
bridge

after

Sunell. They ^{Chris + Allen} flipped channels ~~ETOT~~ CCTV.
Allen saw water coming thru rotary. He
didn't notice. ~~at~~ Head the gas. Went back
to bridge (1 min later) explosion. Head
engines are speed. Initially gas + mud (color
of cement - grey) could smell gas + ^{was} getting
covered in mud coming from - crown. All
decks getting covered. Engines overspilled.
Saw exply fire starboard forward. ~~in the~~ going.
After xplor just turn - derick After XP was
in + out of bridge a lot. Came out of bridge to
oversee ~~the~~ locker
gear

Did not get burned

Fire team #1
(muster stay)

R.

Continued on Page Number

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Someone told him Dele was down. ^{shd his head} 8 ppl & locker. Had 1.
Should his been 2 fire team #2 - no one showed up.
Chris Choy.

Slipping decks
300+ lb
man
1 person
couldn't
not
drag
him

He only person to get to Dele ^{hand on his shoulder} - face down against crane
pedestal. Crane not into rack all - way. Heard
get blown out on his way down - lot of blood.
Thinks dead already.

(*)
Came back to Chris Choy & Chris Pleasant ^{had life jacket on} (thinks)
Stayed back.

Noticed diverter gas coming out v ^{diverter} ~~diverter~~. Fire over
cannon room over his floor. Flares over his head.

Told Chris P. to get help for Dele (crane operator).
Didn't see C. Choy again - [↑] ~~maybe~~ went to boats.
nonstop

Told Chris P. to get help right after XP - Chris P. got cornered
by bridge.

Got Mike Mayfield to help - supposed to stay at
boats - they went to gas locker & ^{more} ~~head~~
XPLs.

West

Do not know how Dale got there - fell or climbed out.
~~there. ^{that} ~~bag~~ said the same for~~ Back of his coveralls looked
fine. ^{(not) ~~himself~~ ^{David}} He presumes Dale came from Crane & may be
duped 2 main deca.

Mike Mayfield went to boat #2. David went to bridge (he thinks)

Wynman ^{wheeler - Toolpusher} or stretcher, Buddy ^{Buddy} ~~came from next to Toolpusher~~
~~run alone. Brought him out~~
 Put Buddy & Wynman ^{on the deck} ^{boat}
^{or stretcher}

head ^{Murray (Chief electrician)} ^{rescued Wynman}

Buddy was first to come out ^{on stretcher}. Told them to put stretcher in back & life boat. ^{Buddy's}

#2 bridge, David told everyone ^{time} to go. Kent said to go to aft ~~#~~ boats, which were gone. ~~to go to the boats~~

There was a camera @ muster station. No one could see TV though.

He was 1st to raft ^{with inflating} & got ready to deploy. Hard to sit

(in & out of bridge 4-5 times)

raft to ^{swing over davit} ~~inflate~~. Have to pull raft over the rail. Chains were @ ~~wrong height~~ a bad location.

~~He recommends putting a stopper in cable to help w/~~
~~boarding height. Otherwise too low~~

David demands psaltics & improving ^{life raft} ~~life raft~~ deployment design

Ready to
rescue from
Bertoni

R. .

Continued on Page Number

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^{helped}
The job Ready Engell was next behind him. Chad
Murray saved Buddy & Wynan. Chad helped David
Buddy. He Chad told him he helped save Wynan.
Steve Bertoni & Star ^{Carden} ~~Carton~~ were at other end of
Stokes ~~litter~~. He didn't see Buddy get put into ^{life boat} ~~raft~~.
Capt Captain fastened 2 rafts (Kurt Gutta), and Kuchta

Raft filled w/ hot smoke. Got burned on arm & forehead.
Andrea got burned on ~~her~~ leg.
Fleytas

When it was smoky, he looked for brake handle & grabbed
it ^{David} ^{pulled} ~~in~~ ^{Wynan} in. He couldn't get brake handle again.
Hard to keep raft straight & get ppl in. He pulled
Andrea in on top of Wynan into the raft.
by her life jacket

Th Yaney ^{Keppel} ^{Senior Ops}
Raft on Kurt might have ^{raised} ~~pull~~ ^{counterweight} on
the brake to let raft go down.

~~Yaney~~ ^{Yaney} ~~Keppel~~ ^{Keppel} ~~Senior Ops~~ ^{Senior Ops}
~~Yaney~~ ^{Yaney} ~~Keppel~~ ^{Keppel} ~~Senior Ops~~ ^{Senior Ops}
~~Yaney~~ ^{Yaney} ~~Keppel~~ ^{Keppel} ~~Senior Ops~~ ^{Senior Ops}

He initially got into raft w/ no smoke - grabbed handle of
brake to see what it was.

Knife was where it
was supposed to be but not easy to find

R.

Continued on Page Number

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Left ^{balling outboard side} going down - 90° - all got into dromedary & it went
life side up - ^{lowered} fell into water correctly.

Some left raft & swam ^{toward} to rescue boat.

Upset he didn't have a knife in his pocket - could he
used to cut Buddy, used in life raft, get stretcher out of case,
stretch for
many many uses for knife

~~He worked on raft~~ ^{individual} ^{for each function}
Recommend putting ~~a~~ ^{individual} had cranks in each
life raft davit. Also put cranks a height they
need to be deployed at so a right height for
boarding the raft. Could put them on a ~~crank~~ ^{crank} to
the raft.

Couldn't get to back deck & port side very dangerous.

Buddy

Pole - not saved

Wynne

Andrea got David a life jacket - Andrea sent the
Mayday - ~~but was yelling it~~.
Call to Coast Guard & other vessels

MEM =
Major Emergency
Mgmt

R. ?

Continued on Page Number

He did not pay attention while to see what going on
2 last time there.

first decision? David ^{advised} ~~said~~ ~~that~~ Kent it was fine, & everyone followed.

AD's take matter of the boots
responsibility

Q's (sheet)

1. Went to Martin already - took ^{advised} ~~in~~ ^{down} ~~the~~

~~TIPS~~

2.

3.

4.

^{was at fire locker #1}

Master point - normally wd be the scene to assess it

2nd master point wd be fire locker #2 but doesn't know how to get there

5. No - did not open the emergency response manual

6. Could get to master point - not sure if lights working
→ main or emergency power? No power

9 - Yes - good qual

10 - heard general alarm while he was on the bridge ^{door to the} ~~for~~
(SVC making lot of noise)
did hear the PA's

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11. - used life jkt & had fire ^{gear} on. Did not notice if ppl had the smoke hoods on or not.
David spoke to a person who could see 4 rooms b/c
(Jimmy)

bulkheads were knocked down & ceilings came down.

12. Initially ~~stayed~~ swam away from raft - other ppl held on side of raft. ^{when raft was being towed}
raft → life boat → rescue boat → Barkston
he. Rudy & Star stayed on raft w/ Wynna so they could get him staged for Wynna to get on Barkston.
They cut support straps to get Wynna out, pulled stretchers from raft into rescue boat.
13. Quality of water - no water until they got to Barkston
They have No. 1 Card system.
(Hard to talk to ppl & convince them not to jump overboard.
Extreme panic ^{esp} for guys who couldn't get themselves off.
Yelling b/c of noise & panic)

14. N/A

15. Quality - decent had to have person in boat & 1 1/2 in

16. N/A

17.

18.

19.

20.

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9.00

- 21.
22. met him & shoe - BP people & dock - Police scout to Cam Playa
23. gave them phones, put in buses, had a VA &
24. debriefed? gave no statement but at Coast Guard in Baltimore Paul Johnson (performance mgr) said to "go home"
25. reception - did VA, had clothes (XXXL) - TO supplied medical setup, counselors, food, money, travel arrangements, cash to travel, got thru thru a TSA
26. Flew home
27. flu given him - saw our doctor (couldn't hear for a week) needs to flu - Shuman called & wanted to set up Psychiatrists
- 28.
29. improved? Use of life raft deployment - head life boat deployment went well - due to fear for life, fire, noise, etc. inpatient for trained ppl to hold the boats - ppl were physically held in boats. ppl on boats saw ~~that~~ & could hear alarm hit the deck, ~~some~~ draw works wires were breaking
30. No - not in bad weather - don't want to work
31. Yes, it changes b/w DIM & Captain. The master did know he was in a very emergency situation. Jimmy (well control) was hurt & couldn't hear - very disoriented.

Kurt jumped from
m5

R :

Continued on Page Number

David tried to call - bridge
all the time

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David tries to keep radio at all times. He ~~thinks~~ ^{thinks}

~~practically~~

33. Yes - he rolled out of raft

34. He was to muster inside - he was trying to get ppl inside -
was initial announcement to muster inside.

↑ x (He noticed gas in transit room)

35. No - very seldomly

36. Pushed ppl - ^{headbutted that people} physically held back, yelled at

37. Improvements were "improving" muster times. Crew operators
(fire team leaders) not aware of no radios. PPL not fully
prepared. No fixed radios on life boats or dehumidifiers.

38. He thinks radios worked but bridge was ~~Chaos~~ Chaos.

Yancy & Andrea were calm on bridge.

39. One sprinkler system did work on 1 boat - not sure of other

life jackets lights helped a lot.

40. (previous)

41. boat he was assigned to muster left already.

(Patrick Morgan AD - wrote down ppl names)

jumped

Matt Hughes, forehand

Gary Keppler Sr. DPO

Kurt Cook -

Mik Williams (thinks) (60 minute guy) - interviewed)

Curt Kuchta

Q: Did you work with ~~that thing~~ in this? Did u agree / disagree w/ anything he said?

Mike said Andrea jumped but she was in raft.
Said he was 1st one off - he was in rescue boat
b4 David got there. He said he had to hang to get
to bridge for duties but actually did not help / be a
leader. He told ppl he jumped for the ~~hals deck~~.
(helicopter)

David
He does question & some things Mike said

47. ~~Shuman~~ ^{Shuman} asked him to sign waivers

49. They mailed to his home (He did sign witness Coast Guard
statement)

50. No - had full muster before midnight - didn't
leave for town until after sunrise. Stopped 2 rigs
to pick people (BP) - dropped off Don Winslow (ops mgr)
Chris Pleasant & Mark Hay (st sub sea engineer)

51. ^{saw} Scramble nets? No. He recommended to put Jacobs ladders
on board - Recmdy - does say to put jac. ladders
Could use the scramble nets if had them.

Did we train using ~~columns~~
do desktop an scope to see ladders

S2 life boat

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53. Life boat was designated ~~FBC~~ thin rescue craft.
~~53~~ ^{most} ~~more~~ dangerous to ~~put them~~ use
hi off water
no way not maneuverable to get raft away from rig
hw prop rather than jet drive - a actual propeller
- 54.
55. Escape shoots - use for then? don't wait to encourage
ppl to jump in water - would have been harder to see
ppl if they were in water. too dangerous.
56. There was time ^{wasnt} for a muster but others did not
cooperate b/c of chaos. Carl Taylor did great job
mustering. (radio operator)
57. EDS order - he didn't hear it - not sure - ask Mike
Mayfield
58. Not sure - maybe boat #1 - Don or Darren Lipinski (Coxen)
59. Darren helped ppl get in boats + maybe drove boat away.
Don & Darren closed the doors.
60. Sea Painter hooked the raft (thinks)
61. got secured getting raft to load along side
61. thinks Andrea just sent mayday - she used her
bd judgment b/c v severe situation

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62. damage - debris in transit room (insulation) center wing
A demolished (15-20' from ^{base of} denick) engulfed in flames,
61. anyone near the latter
- 66/62. Yes - excused for dolls - Captain ^{only} could excuse
- 67- Bosiet - he to go to water survival & basic fire
68. Call each other if something big if Charles &
handover notes - started using RMS for notes
Kept notes in his tally book - sees value in
keeping notes in RMS daily
69. first reply = gas (shook rig) Kurt saw can for
port side - David saw for starboard side.
70. life raft had ppl

lowered to life raft

David

Randy Ezell

Chad Mung

Stan Lardin

Steve Bertoni

Andrea Floetis

Wyma

71. He thinks, yes

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by boats being on deck, helped for ppl jumping o/board

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