


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Interviewing Form

Interviewee Name:	Randy Ezell
Job Title:	Senior Toolpusher
Company:	Transocean
Contact Details:	
Work Address:	
Work Telephone:	
Work Cell:	
Home Address:	Redacted
Home Telephone:	Redacted
Home Cell:	
Interviewers Present:	Bob Scott, Wes Bell
Date:	May 28, 2010
Start Time:	4:00 p.m.
Stop Time:	5:00 p.m.
Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N	No
Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N	Yes
Are documents attached to this form? Y/N	Yes
Details of documents, drawing, photographs or other supporting materials taken to interview.	Seawater Displacement Graph; BP Macondo Well Graph

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<p>Interview Plan</p> <p>Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc:</p>	<p>Can you remember and describe the sequence of events that took place the afternoon of the incident up to and after the explosion?</p> <p>When did you become aware there was a problem in the hole?</p> <p>Who in Transocean is in direct communication with the company man on the rig on well matters?</p> <p>When did you see the P&A program for the well?</p> <p>Did you have any concerns with the program? (If yes, what were they and how were they resolved?) (Were there any parts of the P&A program that were new or novel to you?)</p> <p>Was there a meeting to discuss and advise everyone on the negative testing to take place and the displacement of the hole to water prior to the cement job?</p> <p>What is expected of the driller if he experiences well bore fluids flowing above the rig floor from the rotary table?</p> <p>Did you have any concerns of the 9 7/8" casing job?</p> <p>Did BP discuss with TOI why they did not want to circulate all the way round prior to the cement job on the 9 7/8" / 7" casing?</p> <p>There was a problem noted in the IADC reports about a problem with the allomom equipment prior to cementing the casing.</p> <p>Where was the rig crew located prior to the explosion?</p> <p>Who from TOI checks the displacement figures given by the BP rep?</p>
<p>Interviewers: Bob Scott Wes Bell</p> <p>Note taker: Diane Willey</p> <p>Start time: 4:00 p.m. Stop time: 5:00 p.m.</p> <p>Randy started speaking about when he was interviewed by the USCG/MMS. He said he explained the incident exactly the way it happened. Randy explained that he has been away from all records</p>	<p>Telephone Interview with Randy Ezell, Toolpusher May 28, 2010</p>



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for a long time and has not looked at an IADC report for 37 or 38 days, but he would speak from his recollection.

Derek Hart was with Randy and provided him diagrams of the rig to look at.

Wes explained that we are trying to figure out what happened during the last 9 hours on April 20, 2010.

Randy said that from 3:00 p.m. until 17:30 p.m. the well was being displaced with a 16 pound spacer. He said that there is data that shows that 220 barrels were pumped before they started the spacer. He had a conversation with Jimmy Harrell about the negative test that was going to be done.

Randy ate at approximately 6:30 p.m. in the galley.

He made a call to Jason Anderson at approximately 9:20 p.m. and then asked how the negative test went. Jason said they had a full stop and would discuss and figure out how to proceed. Jason told Randy that the negative test went great. He was told that they bled down and observed for 30 minutes and had no flow. Jason said that approximately 1400 psi bled off through the side entry sub to Halliburton. (Jason would always stand by the Halliburton personnel when they checked the flow so he could see for himself.) Randy asked Jason how the displacement did and Jason replied "good" and that the spacer would be back soon. He asked Jason if he needed help, and Jason replied that he did not need any.

At 9:20 p.m. there was no indication of any problems that anyone noticed, they did the displacement and that "everything looked well." During the negative test, normally the BP company man would have the sheet and calculate the exact barrels to pump and to do the negative test. He said that the BP man would take responsibility for the displacement. Randy said that Bob Kaluza had been on the rig for three days and was a competent leader, but Randy was not sure about his knowledge of our operations and how we did the negative test, the displacement and pumping the spacer. Wes asked if Murray or Ronnie would calculate the strokes. Randy said yes, that Ronnie would not take anyone's answer. Ronnie would measure everything and he never left until it was done. He said "Murray and Ronnie are our two best well site leaders."

Randy explained that Dan Vidrine was not a "people person" and would not share information with anyone. He said it was hard to get to know him and he wasn't on the rig long. He left things up to the rig to figure out.

Bob asked if a mud logger helped with the displacement. Randy answered "no." Bob asked how they would track the volume of the displacement. Randy said there were 4 transfers between 21:10 p.m. and 21:35 p.m. and the displacement went to two pits. [Drawing/chart Randy refers to actually show 20:10 p.m. and 20:35 p.m.] There was no way to monitor the volume of what was dumped overboard. We needed to know when the spacer came back for the sheen test. If it was okay, it meant it was okay to dump overboard.

We had a HITEC sensor on the flow line. Sperry Sun feeds from our HITEC equipment. Steve or Tony (electrical supervisor) pulled all data for HITEC, which is read from the sensors. Their data is captured from the rigs and "sent to town." The flow sensor on the flow line was located to the right of the driller's work station. The hatch was down below by the return flow paddles. We had problems for a year or more though, which are inherent to that type of sensor, Randy said.

Randy had asked Jason how soon the results were provided once the sheen test had been done. He

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said 10 to 15 minutes. He said it boils down to compliance hand doing the sampling. He said between 13,000 and 14,000 strokes he would catch the sample. At 21:16 p.m. they caught the sample for the sheen test and everything looked good. The strokes and visual tied in with the chart. No mud was supposed to be in the wellbore at that time. The stroke count would be off if there was. They would get a signal off of a spacer if something went wrong. This was 9:16 p.m. on his watch.

At 9:20 p.m. the sheen test was not back yet. He said he was looking at recorded data and they were transferring fluids.

At 21:00 p.m. they could see flow in the riser pipe, boost pipe and stand pipe. They displaced mud and fluid in the riser and pressure dropped as you would expect. They slowed the pump again. The flow down went up. The other times it would drop.

Bob stated that at 20:58 p.m. they slowed pumps (riser and stand pipe). Instead of decreasing, it jumped and pressure rose. It should have fallen to 500 psi. Randy agreed. Randy said that Dewey asked Caleb Holloway to bleed off the pressure and close it back, which he did.

Bob said at 21:37 p.m. we think they bled off. When it closed, the pressure comes up and drops off again. Randy said if it doesn't bleed off, the pressure continues to rise. Bob asked Randy about the flow line, and asked why the flow dropped to zero around 9:10 p.m. If the sensors were seeing flow, we should see flow. There was no flow when they were doing the static sheen test. Randy stated that there were no issues with the sensors. He thinks that Dewey opened the diverter.

Randy said Jason was going to shut the well in on the annular and he told Steve Curtis to call me, which he did.

Bob asked Randy if it was possible to be diverted to another line. Randy said he could not give a good answer but would like a copy of the data point and reported information to study how they react. (Derek said Randy could have his copy.) Randy said he would like to think and figure out what his interpretation is.

Wes asked Randy who was in the driller's chair. Randy said that Dewey Rivette was, until the incident. Curtis was in the AD chair. Dan Clark was on the bucking unit and preparing the BHA.

Randy said that he was told that in the final moments Curtis and Jason were shutting it in and Dan ran to the floor.

Bob asked Randy if he knew anything about the pop off valve. He said that Chad Murray, the chief electrician, should know that information.

If there was low pressure, was it normal for the pop off valve to go off? Randy said no, that would not be normal. Lower pressure should not have done that.

Bob asked if the water-tight doors were being left open. They had to remind them to dog the doors when/if they left them ajar. The alarms would sound, so they were typically kept closed.

Bob stated at the time the incident occurred you could see the flow line and the pit kicks, which is confusing. There was no flow prior to it, then it becomes active. Randy said if it blew so much from the gumbo box mud would be all over the floor. It could have gotten returned to the pits then totally out of control.

Randy explained that Curtis' reading of 8,636 feet of sea water was very accurate. He said mud was blowing to the crown. If the wellhead equipment blew it would have filled to annulus. Randy said if it was severed, there would be mud on the back side and cement on the Bankston. He initially thought that the seal assembly gave up because gas did not migrate. It changed place with the fluid in the riser. He said it was the "Wrath of God" type of release.

Randy said that the majority of everything happened in the last 5 to 10 minutes. He said that the guys are highly trained (referring to Dewey and Jason). He said that they knew what he (Randy) knew. He said he thinks the seal assembly gave way. Randy said perhaps there was no cement behind the pipe and it came quickly. The other way if the casing was full and it collapsed, which would have released the well immediately.

Randy said Jimmy Harrell was the one who always did the negative testing. He said that the negative test is not mandatory, but Jimmy Harrell did them.

At 5:34 p.m. they did the displacement.

He said that Greg Magee told him that he had a similar situation where a driller was doing a displacement but couldn't get it back down, but could go up. Randy stated that the most dangerous time is when you are doing a displacement.

Randy said that these two guys were very different of the company man. If Ronnie had been there this would not have happened. Bob Kaluza was filling in for a couple of days. Randy said if he had to pick a partner to do battle with, it would be Ronnie Seperlvado. He said Ronnie "is the best because he does it all himself." He said there must have been the wrong combination.

He stated he had 100% confidence in Jason. Randy said "I would trust my life with him." Bob stated that until the last part, all was well. Randy said he doesn't think he has picked up on anything either. He said they shut down and started going to the pits at that time.

Randy stated that BP is sketchy about their information with us. He said that he recommended to BP that they run 21 centralizers but they cut back to only 6. He said that BP does not discuss cement volumes with us (pump time/set up time). He said the toolpushers would know on the rig floor.

Derek stated that there have been many discussions with Mark Hapley, but he did not add anything. There was a lot of pressure, so why didn't they run CBL or a temperature log. Said it was not necessary. The commissioner said it is possible to identify cement behind a 7" casing. It is unusual to pump nitrogen cement at this depth. It is done regularly on surface holes. Maybe one or just a few have been done on a depth of this hole. Randy was asked "why did they?" Randy said he needed the transcript. It was in the early stages of the well and was done with 20" and shallow water floor. You don't have to go nitrogen to use a good slurry.

Wes asked how much gas and mud cut during the last trip. Randy said 1800 units come to mind but he was not sure about the entire well. Slumberger didn't share cuts with us.

