

Lee Lambert 17 May 10 Cowie, Guillot, Anderson

to rig floor - around or before noon - cement job night before til 0300hrs, back up til 1830-1900hrs
 doing pos pressure test, everything looked good - to 2500psi
 went into rig up for neg test - rigged up cement kelly (already rigged up for pos test)
 displaced booster, choke and kill
 displaced down DP and closed in at stack
 bleeding off, etc, pressure on DP, not on kill line, kept bleeding off trying to get press down to 0,
 stabilized at 1400, with 0 on kill line - monitored for negative test
 involved in discussions around pumping spacer - not really no, 'this is what's going to be pumped' and
 pumped it

why using LCM as spacer - leftover heavy LCM fill instead of dumping it, used as spacer
 mtg on rig floor about talking about displacement with Leo and Kaluza - no, doesn't remember

May have been up there, mud eng has given them sheet, step by step, doesn't recall mtg
 don't recall who was leading mtg
 conversations about transferring mud to boat - yes that was plan, while monitoring negative test
 enough room to finish displacement without having to displace to boat

mud engineer was one who managed pit
 consult with WSL - yes
 group of people should have known, or wsl - yes they should have
 levels being monitored - monitor all pit vols, mud to boat from pit not lined up on hole to quantify what
 was going in/out
 cleaning trip tank during this time - not aware
 negative test - who running test - shared between TP and Kaluza

bob there all the time - yes
 cement stand - rigup on rig floor - cement kelly with TIW above and below, low torque valve on side
 entry sub - yes
 accessible from rig floor, reachable from there - don't recall reaching from standing there, don't recall
 how high
 how pressures being read - from halliburton unit - kill line from choke manifold
 halliburton has display on floor for monitor pressures
 closed annular for neg test - did annular leak - yes it did, don't recall how many bbls to fill hole - about
 20-25
 how was that done - I think from trip tank, not for sure
 discussion about pressure on DP, who gave instructions to bleed off - couldn't remember, a lot of
 discussion around it between Kaluza, TP, driller and subsea engineer

2400psi on first shut down, bled to 1200psi equalized with kill line, then bled down - yes, displaced
 boost, choke and kill, 1200 on kill line, after displaced, 2400, then opened lower kill valve
 when bled volume down from 2400 to 1200 - don't recall, but in other interviews I think 25bbls, but
 don't recall

where did that fluid go - seawater bled to halliburton unit, once their tanks filled up (20bbls) they would
 have dumped to sea (over 20bbls, remember them calling saying they were dumping)

EXHIBIT # 12
 WIT: _____

Vince or young guy - young guy, was Ryan, not 100%
equalized and bled off 2nd time - don't recall, given #'s to other group, but don't recall now, maybe
65bbbls
count as it being bled off, or did someone tell you - couldn't count as I was on rig floor, was writing
notes down, couldn't remember. 65bbbls being total bleed off

total before you went to bed - yes

pressure to 1260 just after and held for awhile, Kaluza came to floor and asked to bleed off - how
many bleed offs - couldn't give exact number, but several, at least 3
small bleed off through kill line - yes, back through degasser, but don't know how many bbls
through choke manifold - yes
during bleed offs, aware of anything going to trip tanks - anything from DP to cement unit
neg test also pumped down kill line, any pressures or volumes - didn't take any fluid, pressured up
immediately

discussion around annular compression/bladder effect - your mud in riser above stack with annular
closed will push on annular, be more of bladder/diaphragm, transmit press down hole and back up
through DP, thinks you should get pressure up kill line - that's how it was explained
bleed off through kill line to degasser - correct
2 poor boy degassers/gasbusters - don't believe so, but not sure
morning calls held - 0730
earlier call before that, john guide call - up for cement job for most of night, wasn't awake
if in general, yes guide calls before call
TP and driller issued daily instructions - depends on wsl on duty - don't believe Kaluza gives daily other
than what is discussed in daily meeting
risk assessments completed for that task that day - TO's JSA yes
any for operational pieces - not that I'm aware of
Ops notes, how much detail - no not aware
MOC processes - not involved
last 20 minutes - conversations on boat - what phone calls received - only things heard were with ML,
didn't see any pit gain, everything looked normal, just erupted
call to Sr TP once taking kicks, having trouble, mud everywhere, told them to shut in, were trying, but
wouldn't shut in
from time pumps stopped til blowout, trying to shut it down - trying to shut in, yes - don't know if Sr TP
was waiting for permission or what - couldn't get it shut in
how were laid out with lines - double dutch with ITW above and below, stand to top drive, treating lines
to halliburton
side entry halliburton to - back to halliburton unit
HB inside DP, bleed back through there - yes
top of cement stand - bleed back through what manifold - top TIW closed
treating line, cement manifold on floor - yes, permanent, tied into there
start negative test, driller located out to make sure space out correct - yes I was there, don't recall him
pulling on it
before neg test, detailed procedure from town - not that I saw
when word to do neg test, anyone question depth - what was explained was reason there was that's
where isolation plug was going to be set after. Better luck with plugs being set there, why displacing
down to that depth - not aware of anyone questioning
numbers from neg and differential all cacluated - only number given was when seawater displaced up
stack
number came from town, not sure which engineer

no discussion with WSL, TP, anyone on how to be laid up, pressures expected - not aware of, might have happened, majority of my time on floor
shutting well in, having problems, exact conversation - speaking to randy ezell, Sr TP, received phone call from ast driller, needed help, mud everywhere, through rotary table, shut it in, trying to shut it in at the time, was on his way
imply they were having problems - thinking rationally wouldn't have happened if he wasn't having trouble - they would shut it in and not call and wait for permission
any leaks on stack that you know of - not any that I'm aware of
do recall talking to subsea eng about yellow pod and why we're using blue pod - couldn't remember how much leak was, but just know they were going to change it out
ideas on what happened - negative test I've seen, a lot of questions - don't understand why pressure on DP but not on kill line - don't know if I believe bladder effect especially to 1400lbs
why it blew out, don't know why - a lot of strength to liners, why seal assmby gave, I don't know
cement job went smoothly, pumped on time, floats held
hit button on EDS, everything turned red - did not disconnect, Captain said
driller needed help, couldn't get shut in

Interview of Lee Lambert

Interviewees: Jim Wetherbee, Steve Robinson, Kevin Fontenot

Location: Lee's House in Chandler, Texas

10am April 29, 2010

Currently Well Site Leader of the Future Cadre 1

Been going offshore since October of 2009

Watched running of casing

Observed negative test, displaced drill pipe, closed bag 2350psi on drill pipe,

1200psi on kill line

bled 25bbl off drill pipe to 1200 to have same

opened kill valve, kill line pressure dropped to 700, drill pipe increased to 1700psi

bled drill pipe, thought heavy fluid in kill line, took drill pipe and kill line to 0

total vol bled 65bbl

opened lower kill valve, 1200-1400psi on drill pipe not sure which, 0 on kill line

asked TP Jason and Bob where pressure coming from, they thought kill line Utube

to drill pipe, attempted to fill kill, but pressured up right away

Opened kill no fluid back, lined up on trip tank

drill pipe at 1400psi

asked again about press on drill pipe, TP Jason said bladder effect, annular

element would transmit pressure, this was normal

since kill line was open this did not make sense

discussed with Bob, Bob said it was possible that it could happen

I'm a trainee, they're training me. I believed them, it didn't seem right, and looking

back it probably wasn't right, this is the first time I've done a negative test'

Don came up about the time the kill line being filled, about 1710hrs, Lee left floor

about 15 mins into monitoring kill line, went to office to finish paperwork

spoke to don in office about operations coming up in next day about lock-ring

installation, told him he wanted to be up to see it

left office between 1930-2000 to quarters

bled 5bbl back after bumping plug, didn't know pressure

Vince Tabler pumped the job, I remember 7bbls base oil ahead, don't know of

anything behind. It doesn't make sense to put it behind.

Kill line line up on trip tank, drill line on Halliburton

15bbls on kill line, wasn't sure where these went

AD monitoring trip tank (steve curtis) on screen from cabin

asked about rig floor discussion, 3 things 1) could there be heavy fluid in kill line? 2)

APD required monitoring on drill pipe, 3) bladder effect

Jason Anderson relieving Wylon (Wylon may have been there), Jimmy Harrell

(possibly), Randy Ezell may have been there, couldn't remember, Bob Kaluza, Don

Vidrine, Dewey Sevette, Steve Curtis, Mud engineers Blair and Gordon Jones

Mainly Jason discussing bladder effect in meeting

Bob questioned Jason why pressure was building in drill pipe

Asked about BP LT coming through

Answer - believes it was before the conversation about the bladder effect, and they were there momentarily

Asked about sheen test, how would they know if well was flowing or not - he was in bed, he expected the AD Steve to be monitoring the flow line from cabin

Joe ML would be monitoring from his screens in his unit

AD had camera

ML would be watching flow out and PVT

asked about flow in and out data at 2110 "looks like well is flowing"

said he had conv with Joe on boat, Joe asked Lee what might have happened, offered Joe said 'it happened so quickly, and everything looked fine'

Discussion of event

Bed 2000-2015 room 238

Went to office and did paperwork

Went to bed at approximately 8pm

Sleeping room was 238 near medic room
awakened by blast

Woke up and initially thought it was someone moving drill pipe on deck

Second blast blew me out of bed; not sure if physically blew me out of bed or just caused me to jump out of bed

On floor and slightly confused, dazed

grabbed clothes, opened door, debris in hall, smoke

Alarm was sounding - no damage inside room
Exited the room and there was grey smoke head high and above in the hall (duck down to breathe)
smoke burned eyes and lungs while inside

Exited bldg and could see fire half way up derrick - panic everywhere

could not see fire down low due to living quarter blocking view
Fire appeared to be on rig floor and on starboard side of deck (forward)
heard alarms, announcement 'get to muster, not a drill'
Did not notice smoke while at muster point
went to boats, taking roll, Jimmy came out, said his eyes were burning
Lee told AD to load boats, people trickling in until half full, LB #1
People started getting out in fear of getting trapped, I didn't want to be in there either
Saw two guys climbing over handrail in preparation to jump; talked them back onto deck
After a short while began to re-load life boat
Helped Trahan (burned) into lifeboat
OIM last into life boat and gave order to launch life boat

Radios on boat, radioed DB supply, came up starboard side, tied up, offloaded
Went to crew boat, mud on back
After 3rd Roll call Don Winslow requested that I go to bridge to scribe Pat O'Bryan has log
Conversation with Randy Ezell on boat, Randy said Steve Curtis called him and said 'there's mud everywhere and we need help' Randy told him to shut it in, and he said they were already shutting it in

Asked about mud on the Bankston, definitely synthetic mud, rescue swimmers had trouble walking around it was so slippery like synthetic, could smell
Spoke to Brandon and Greg Mesh on boat, they jumped from smoke deck (about 50') and were on boat in time to watch life vessels lower to water
Rig floor fire got worse by time he loaded onto Bankston. First it wasn't intense, but it appeared fueled - other fires appeared secondary
asked Lee's opinion on what happened - said he wasn't satisfied with negative test, didn't understand why pressure on DP and not on kill line, reiterated the fact that he was a trainee
said this was immediate, so it had to come from shallow, from seal assembly which put gas/fluid directly into riser
I thought we would have time unless we were ignoring flowing