Deposition Testimony of:

Brian Morel

Date: July 21, 2011

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Page 6:08 to 7:21

Q. Okay. Would you state your name for the record, please.
A. Brian Morel.
Q. Okay. Mr. Morel, my name is Scott Bickford. I rep -- I'm an attorney. I represent the plaintiffs' steering committee in the -- this DEEPWATER HORIZON matter.
The -- I'm going to ask you a series of questions today. If you don't understand the question I ask you, please stop me and I'll try to rephrase it so that you do. I'm not a petroleum engineer, so some of the questions I may ask may be ill formed, but hopefully not.
This is your deposition. If you need to take a break, please tell me. I'll -- we'll be happy to go that -- the way the deposition works is that we have to break every hour due to the tape that we're running. They get changed once an hour, so we have that break coming up each hour.
Have you ever been deposed before?
A. No.
Q. No.
And again, if you need to talk to your counsel or anything, please let me know, and we'll stop and let you do that.
Can you give me your address, please.
A. It's [redacted]
Q. And how old are you, sir?
A. 31.
Q. And are you married?
A. Yes.
Q. To whom?
A. Jade Morel.
Q. Okay. And what is your educational background, sir?
A. On advice of my counsel, I invoke my constitutional right not to be a witness against myself and decline to answer.

Page 8:09 to 8:20

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, can you tell me what your first job was?

A. Same answer.
MR. MEHTA: Put on the record and get agreement from counsel that when Mr. Morel says "same answer," he's incorporating or referring to the same answer he just previously -- that he gave to the previous question.
MR. BICKFORD: I understand that.
MR. MEHTA: All right.
MR. BICKFORD: And that's in -- that's in the Court's order.

Page 8:24 to 9:10

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Have you ever been convicted of a crime, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. By whom are you presently employed?
A. Same answer.
Q. What is your present position, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. What is your present posting, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. What are your present responsibilities, sir?
A. Same answer.

Page 9:13 to 10:17

Sir, do you know whether or not you are the subject of a grand jury investigation?
A. Same answer.
Q. Are you?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you know whether or not you are a target of a grand jury investigation?
A. Same answer.
Q. Are you?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. Mr. Morel, did you ever provide any testimony to the joint investigative committee of the U.S. Coast Guard and the Bureau of Oceans Management -- sorry, Ocean Energy Management?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. Were you ever interviewed by that joint investigative body?
A. Same answer.

Q. Were you ever interviewed by the Presidential Commission investigating the DEEPWATER HORIZON incident?
A. Same answer.
Q. Were you ever interviewed by individuals that made up what is known as the Bly Commission at BP?
A. Same answer.
Q. Were you independently interviewed by anyone at BP for the -- in connection with this incident?
A. Same answer.

Page 11:06 to 11:21

(Marked Exhibit No. 4500.)
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, is this your personal data page from BP?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. I'd like to turn to Exhibit No. -- Tab No. 24. I'm sorry. Go back. Turn to Tab No. 25.
(Marked Exhibit No. 4501.)
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, have you ever seen this document before?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, does this document represent an interview that you gave post April 20th, 2010, regarding the casing and cement job performed on the DEEPWATER HORIZON?
A. Same answer.

Page 11:25 to 14:08

Q. Are the facts set forth in Exhibit No. 4501 true?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you disagree with any of them?
A. Same answer.
Q. I ask you to turn to Tab No. 26.
MR. BICKFORD: We'll mark that as Exhibit No. 4502.
(Marked Exhibit No. 4502.)
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, this document purports to be a transcription of Brian Morel interview notes from an interview that was

commenced at 10:40, April 27, 2010, before a panel of Rex Anderson, Pat Lucas, Jim Wetherbee and Warren Winters.

First of all, have you seen this document before, sir?

A. Same answer.

Q. Sir, are the facts set forth in this document facts that you gave to Messrs. Anderson, Lucas, Wetherbee and Winters?

A. Same answer.

Q. Do you disagree with any of the facts that are set forth in this document, sir?

A. Same answer.

Q. Sir, did you -- was there anyone else in this interview?

A. Same answer.

Q. How long did the interview last, sir?

A. Same answer.

Q. Who are Mr. Anderson, Lucas, Wetherbee and Winters?

A. Same answer.

Q. I'd ask you to turn to Tab No. 27.

MR. BICKFORD: I'll go ahead and mark that as Exhibit No. 4503.

(Marked Exhibit No. 4503.)

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, this document purports to be notes by Jim Wetherbee of an interview taking place on April 27th, 2010. Have you seen this document before?

A. Same answer.

Q. Who is Mr. Wetherbee?

A. Same answer.

Q. Are the -- are the facts that Mr. Wetherbee has set forth from the interview information that you provided him?

A. Same answer.

Q. Is it accurate, sir?

A. Same answer.

Q. Turn to Tab No. 28, sir.

MR. BICKFORD: I'm going to go ahead and mark this as Exhibit No. 4504.

(Marked Exhibit No. 4504.)

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, do you recognize this document?

A. Same answer.

Q. Have you ever seen this document?

A. Same answer.

Page 14:12 to 17:13

The document purports to be notes from an interview of you on April 27th, 2010. Do you believe that to be true?
A. Same answer.
Q. Is this information that you gave in an interview on April 27th, 2010?
A. Same answer.
Q. Is the information you gave true and correct, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Turn to Tab No. 30, sir.
MR. BICKFORD: I'm going to go ahead and mark that as Exhibit 4505.
(Marked Exhibit No. 4505.)
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, have you seen this document before?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, this document purports to be notes from Jim McKay taken of a -- of you during an interview on May 10th, 2010. Have you ever seen this before?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did you meet with Mr. McKay?
A. Same answer.
Q. Who is Mr. McKay?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did the information that you provided Mr. McKay -- is the information that you provided Mr. McKay accurately set forth in his notes?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you disagree with any of his notes?
A. Same answer.
Q. Turn to Tab 31, sir.
(Marked Exhibit No. 4506.)
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Marked as Exhibit 4506. Mr. Morel, this document purports to be notes of a May 10th, 2010, interview. Do you recognize the handwriting?
A. Same answer.
Q. Is the information that is set forth in this document accurate?
A. Same answer.

Q. Do you know who you met with on May 10th, 2010, besides Mr. McKay?
A. Same answer.
Q. Other than those interviews, sir, have you given an interview to anyone else after the incident of April 20th, 2010, regarding the Macondo Well? Excluding your attorneys, of course.
A. Same answer.
Q. Who were present during those interviews, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Were the statements you gave in those interviews true and correct, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. Have you been interviewed by any state or federal prosecutor -- prosecutorial agencies?
A. Same answer.
Q. The U.S. Attorney's office?
A. Same answer.
Q. Any state's attorney's office?
A. Same answer.
Q. Have you been interviewed by any federal or state agencies?
A. Same answer.
Q. Such as the FBI?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. EPA?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. Sir, have you been subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury?
A. Same answer.
Q. Have you testified before a grand jury?
A. Same answer.

Page 17:19 to 18:24

Have you been offered immunity against prosecution for testimony that you've given in connection with the DEEPWATER HORIZON Macondo Well?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. Do you have -- have you been given and -- and accepted immunity for any testimony that you have given or may give as a result of the

DEEPWATER HORIZON Macondo Well incident?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, as a result of the Macondo Well incident, have you been reprimanded by BP?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. Sir, did you receive a bonus payment for the year 2010 from BP?
A. Same answer.
Q. What was that bonus payment --
A. Same answer.
Q. -- predicated on?
You have to let me finish, then answer.
Sir, your position during the years 2009-2010 at BP had been on a well design team; is that correct, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you and your team were responsible for designing the Macondo Well, were you not?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. And, sir, you, in fact, were the principal person in designing the casing of that well, were you not?

Page 19:01 to 19:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And you and your team approved of the design of the cementing of that well, did you not?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you and your team monitored the well as it was being drilled, did you not?

Page 19:14 to 19:19

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Do you know what the term "monitor data from a well" means?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. Sir, you and your well team monitored the well as it was being drilled, did you not?

Page 19:21 to 19:25

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, you and your team oversaw and approved procedures such as cement bond logs, negative tests, positive tests and other well integrity tests, did you not?

Page 20:02 to 20:06

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, it was part of your responsibility to make sure that in designing this well, that the rig itself was kept safe; is that correct?

Page 20:08 to 20:11

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) It was part of your responsibility in designing this well that its personnel was kept safe; is that true?

Page 20:13 to 20:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, sir, it was part of your responsibility to make sure in designing this well that the environment was kept safe; is that correct?

Page 20:19 to 20:24

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, sir, it was part of you and your team's responsibility to prepare reports and permits to the MMS, both for approval and to keep the MMS apprised -- apprised of the well operations; is that correct?

Page 21:01 to 21:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, you knew for some time that this well was very problematic, didn't you, sir?

Page 21:06 to 21:06

A. Same answer.

Page 21:10 to 21:11

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, this well was problematic, wasn't it?

Page 21:13 to 21:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) You had a lot of problems with it, didn't you?

Page 21:17 to 22:18

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir -- in fact, sir, you referred to this well as a nightmare well, did you not?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. Sir, I'd ask you to turn to Tab No. 19 in the white book. And, sir, this document, Bates -- with an ending Bates No. 7582 is, in fact, an E-mail chain between you and your wife, is it not?
(Marked Exhibit No. 4507.)
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And in this E-mail chain, you tell your wife that -- "Sorry you-all have" -- "having" -- "Sorry, you-all are having" -- I'm sorry.
Your wife tells you, "Sorry you-all are having well issues again. This has been a nightmare well. You are smart to," quote, "'let it go,'" close quote, "since you won't be involved in all the conversation over the weekend. They can live with the consequences if they are poor."
Is that a discussion between you and your wife, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. In fact, you did believe this was a nightmare well, didn't you, sir?

Page 22:20 to 23:12

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, in fact, you also referred to this well as a "well from hell," did you not, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. And in E-mails to and from your wife, you referred to this privately with her as a "well from hell," did you not?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did other people at -- on the drill team at BP refer to this as a "well from hell," too?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did people on the rig, to your knowledge, refer to this as a "well from hell"?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, this history -- this -- the Macondo Well had a history of well control problems, did it not?

Page 23:14 to 23:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, in fact, in March of 2010, the well experienced a very bad kick, did it not?

Page 23:19 to 24:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) I direct your attention to the Bates stamp which ends in 504. It is an E-mail purportedly dated March 9th from you to Jade Morel; and it states: "We took a bad kick last night. Been in the ops room all day trying to figure out what to do."
Did I read that correctly, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. And that's what you informed your wife on that day; isn't that correct, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. So, you did take a very bad kick, didn't you?

Page 24:09 to 24:14

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, in fact, the --

this was a situation where the kick actually caused the drill pipe to become stuck, and you couldn't circulate because the formation had collapsed around it; is that correct?

Page 24:16 to 24:19

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, in fact, sir, your team was having a number of organizational problems at the time, was it not?

Page 24:21 to 25:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, I direct your attention to the Bates stamp number ending in 541, which is Page 4 of this exhibit. This is a -- purports to be another E-mail from you, sir, to your wife dated Thursday March 11, 2010, quote: "Our team is out of control. Management is being superconservative beyond belief. Now, the lounge lizard is going to help us out. I can't take it; so, I am staying away from the issues today."
Did I read that correctly, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Is that what you wrote your wife on March 11th, 2010?
A. Same answer.
Q. In fact, the -- the lounge lizard, sir, was Mr. Guide?

Page 25:14 to 25:25

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And did you get along with Mr. Guide, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you were not -- you were not personally pleased that Mr. Guide was not participating in the well design team, were you, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. And the damages from this kick in March of 2010 cost millions of dollars in equipment and delay, did it not?

Page 26:02 to 26:02

A. Same answer.

Page 26:11 to 29:09

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Have you kept -- you kept having problems with the ECD on this well, didn't you?
A. Same answer.
Q. I direct your attention to what is Bates stamped 5 -- 7547, which is Page 9. This is an E-mail purportedly dated March 22, 2010, from you to your wife, Jade Morel, and you state, quote: We got another curve ball today. 14.71 ECD supposed to be 13.8 max (overburden is a 14.5). The Tiger team is scratching their heads. Just keeps throwing us curve balls."
Is that what -- did I read that correctly, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. And is this what you wrote to your wife on March 22, 2010, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. And the Tiger team, sir, is an elite team of well control experts at BP; is that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, the well continued to keep giving you problems after this date, did it not?
A. Same answer.
Q. I direct your attention to an E-mail which is 7424.
MR. MEHTA: Do you have a page number for that, Brian?
MR. BICKFORD: I'll get it to you in just a second. Here it is. Page 10.
MR. MEHTA: 7524?
MR. BICKFORD: Yes, 7524, Page 10.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, this is an E-mail chain dated one day later on March 23rd, 2010; and you, in writing to your wife, Jade Morel, state: "Never stops with this well. Just keeps throwing us curve balls and making me work. When I haven't been in meetings, I've been struggling to get everything done we need to get done."

Is that what you wrote your wife on March 23rd, 2010?
A. Same answer.
Q. And the well was continuing to give you problems, was it not, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, sir, the demands on your time of this well kept growing and growing, didn't it?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, I direct your attention to Bates 7467, Page 11.
Sir, this is -- purports to be an E-mail chain dated March 30th, 2010, some six days after -- seven days after the E-mail that we just looked at. Quote: "My day is already busy. People wanting to know more and more as we get close to the target."
Is that what you wrote your wife, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, going to Page 12, on April 5th, you had yet another well control problem, did you not?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, you wrote your wife on that day that, quote: "In another well control situation with total loss returns. So, today should be a busy one."
Is that what you wrote your wife, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. "Total loss returns" is not a good thing to happen when drilling a well, is it, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. It meant more costs to this well, sir, did it not?

Page 29:11 to 29:14

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) But this well was supposed to be a big payday for you and BP, wasn't it?

Page 29:16 to 30:04

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) But isn't that what you meant, sir, when you E-mailed your wife? And I direct your attention to the April 5th, Page 13, quote: "Not too bad. Just spend the morning trying to figure out what to do. I think we have a good plan. Didn't take much of convincing -- didn't take much convincing of anyone, and I just sent out the procedure to the rig. So, hopefully we can start working on getting it done and getting this well over with. People are happy about the sand we've seen so far, but that's on the down low -- down low."
Did I read that correctly, sir?

Page 30:06 to 30:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, sir, people were happy about the sand they had seen so far because BP thought this was a big well, didn't they?

Page 30:11 to 30:14

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, sir, because it was a big well with a high payout, you-all were willing to take some risks, weren't you?

Page 30:16 to 30:18

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) But, sir, you were still worried about well integrity, weren't you?

Page 30:20 to 32:02

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) On May -- on April 13th, you considered not running casing or running -- or running a liner because of the well integrity, did you not?
A. Same answer.
Q. Let me direct your attention to 7550 at the bottom of Page 16, E-mail purported to be between you and your wife dated April 13th of 2010: "We are considering not running casing or

running a liner because of integrity issues. So, I have a 4:00 p.m. meeting which might" -- it looks like -- "got until 5:00 p.m. Hopefully, we can knock it out quicker."
Did I read that correctly?
A. Same answer.
Q. Why, sir, were you considering not running a case -- running casing or running a liner because of integrity issues?
A. Same answer.
Q. What were the integrity issues that you were concerned about in April 13th, 2010, some seven days before this well blew up?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, then, right as this well was supposed to be finished, there was a change-out of personnel of BP on the rig, was there not?
A. Same answer.
Q. And Mr. Koluza was sent to the rig, was he not?
A. Same answer.
Q. And Mr. Koluza wasn't really trusted by the people in your section, was he?

Page 32:04 to 32:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) You knew that Mr. Koluza was a subpar well site leader, didn't you?

Page 32:09 to 32:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Did your drilling team know that he was one of the least rated well site leaders by BP in the Gulf of Mexico?

Page 32:14 to 32:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Mr. Koluza didn't know anything about this well, did he?

Page 32:18 to 32:22

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And you were so concerned about that that you went out to the rig to oversee operations yourself, personally, did you not?

Page 32:24 to 33:22

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Okay. I direct your attention to Page 17 of the exhibit, sir. Another E-mail purportedly from you to your wife Jade; is that correct, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, sir, in writing this E-mail, you wrote: "Yah, really busy, got the long-string" -- looks like -- "to design. So, we will be running that but will have to work the liner for a contingency. I have to go offshore. Our normal WSL" -- that's well site leader, correct, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. -- "is heading in, and the new guy is good but not in tune with the well. So, I need to go out there and make sure they follow every step as any deviations could lead to us not getting a good cement job and having to do a lot of remedial operations. Am all right going. Don't plan to stay long. Running casing, then heading home."
Did I read that correctly, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, you-all knew that Mr. Koluza didn't have any experience with this well, correct?

Page 33:24 to 34:03

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And you knew, sir, that -- did you know, sir, that he also didn't have any long-term experience in deepwater operations?

Page 34:05 to 34:11

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And isn't it true, sir, that nobody on the -- your drill team prepared a

packet of information to give Mr. Koluza to orient him as to the issues on this particular well prior to him going to the DEEPWATER HORIZON; is that correct, sir?

Page 34:13 to 34:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And that's something that probably should have been done, in hindsight, wasn't it, sir?

Page 34:18 to 35:22

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Excuse me just a second, Mr. Morel.
Sir, turn to Tab 24, please, in the white book. Sir, this purports to be a nomination for promotion. Have you seen this document before?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, sir, one of the reasons that you had been nominated for promotion within BP --
MR. BICKFORD: And I'm going to mark this as Exhibit No. 4508.
(Marked Exhibit No. 4508.)
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) One of the reasons that you had been nominated for promotion with BP was for saving BP money, was it not?
A. Same answer.
Q. In fact, it was listed as the "wise decisions" on your nomination for promotion, sir; isn't that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And if I -- in fact, they cite you as saving $500,000 in one instance; is that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, they cite you as saving $2 million in another instance; is that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. So, when it got to the Macondo Well, you were eager to save money on that well, too, weren't you, sir?

Page 35:24 to 36:03

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) In fact, in all of your employment evaluations at BP, the fact that you had been saving the company money were prominently mentioned, weren't they?

Page 36:05 to 36:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And you've been praised for that; isn't that correct, sir?

Page 36:09 to 36:18

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Did you get this promotion, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, wasn't it a fact that, as of the spring of 2010, the Macondo Well was far behind schedule?
A. Same answer.
Q. Wasn't it a fact, sir, it was far for cost?

Page 36:20 to 36:24

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And you knew your drill team, sir, was anxious to plug and abandon this well and move to the next project; is that correct, sir?

Page 37:01 to 37:08

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And that was the Nile project; is that correct, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. And so, sir, when it came to April of 2010, your team was concerned about saving as much time and money as possible on this well; is that correct?

Page 37:10 to 37:14

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, sir, by not placing 21 centralizers in the well, despite the strong recommendations of Halliburton, time and money were saved, were they not?

Page 37:16 to 37:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And by not waiting for the results of the foam stability test on the cement slurry that was actually used on the well on or about April 19th, 2010, time and money was saved, were they not?

Page 37:23 to 38:01

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And by not running a cement bond log, time and money were saved on the well; is that correct?

Page 38:03 to 38:08

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And by using a spacer made of a combination of loss circulation materials to avoid transporting that material off the rig and disposing it as hazardous waste, you-all saved BP time and money, did you not?

Page 38:10 to 38:13

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) By displacing the mud in the riser before setting the surface cement, you saved time and money, didn't you?

Page 38:15 to 38:19

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) By setting the cement plug at 3,000 feet below the mud line and seawater, you saved time and money, didn't you, sir?

Page 38:21 to 38:25

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) By not performing well integrity diagnostic in light of troubling and unexplained negative pressure tests, you saved time and money, didn't you?

Page 39:02 to 39:14

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And you would agree with me, sir, that the negative pressure test results that were made on the DEEPWATER HORIZON on April 20th, 2010, were, in fact, anomalous?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you'd agree with me, sir, that those anomalous results should have been fully reported to the shore; is that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you would agree with me, sir, that those anomalous results were completely misinterpreted, were they not?

Page 39:16 to 39:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And by bypassing the pits and pumping mud directly to the DAMON BANKSTON on April 20, 2010, BP saved time and money, did it not?

Page 39:23 to 40:01

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) By not running a top-to-bottom circulation, BP saved time and money, did it not?

Page 40:03 to 40:06

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) By using a long-string versus a liner and tie-back, BP saved time and money on the Macondo Well, did it not?

Page 40:08 to 40:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) In fact, some $7- to $10 million were saved, is that correct?

Page 40:12 to 40:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir -- if a liner and tie-back were used, sir, there would have been a lower ECD, correct?

Page 40:17 to 40:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, sir, having a lower ECD would have likely provided you with a better cement job; isn't that correct, sir?

Page 40:22 to 41:01

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, sir, in addition, had you used a liner and tie-back, that would have acted as an additional annual -- annular barrier, sir, once the tie-back had been run?

Page 41:03 to 41:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, sir, what was the total savings of time and money that you and your team accomplished by using a long-string, not using 21 centralizers, not doing a bond log, using up the LCM spacer on the rig, and not running a top-to-bottom circulation?

Page 41:11 to 43:01

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir -- isn't it a fact, Mr. Morel, that you stated in the E-mail on March 12th that they were trying to push casing points -- that "trying to push casing points has been getting us into trouble"?

A. Same answer.
Q. I direct your attention to Tab No. 9 in the black book.
MR. BICKFORD: I'm going to go ahead and mark that as Exhibit No. 4509.
(Marked Exhibit No. 4509.)
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, this is an E-mail chain with an attachment. And the E-mail chain purports to be from you to Mark Hafle, Brett Cocales, David Sims, and Gregory Walzs, CC'ing Rodolfo Rivera and John Guide.
First of all, who are each of those people?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, sir, did you state in your initial E-mail on March 12th, 2010, at 4:52 p.m.: "We do not feel following the MMS design in reality is a good option unless something changes in this well to indicate the margins have opened more and we are back on track with the initial pore pressure estimates, as trying to push casing points has been getting us into trouble."
Did you write that, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Is that what you believe, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did BP modify trying to push casing points after that period of time?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, sir, did the BP side track options in your primary design differ from the MMS filings that you were making?
A. Same answer.
Q. If so, the MMS filings would have been false; is that correct?

Page 43:03 to 43:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Now, sir, isn't it true that there were no clear instructions for negative testing of well displacement?
A. Same answer.
Q. And isn't having clear instructions for such tests considered a process safety issue?

Page 43:11 to 43:11

A. Same answer.

Page 43:16 to 43:18

Sir, is it true that on several occasions fast drilling resulted in ECD's exceeding leak-off pressures in this well?

Page 43:20 to 43:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And isn't it true that those incidents were not reported to the MMS as required?

Page 43:25 to 44:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And isn't it true, sir, the ECD versus leak-offs often violated BP's written plans and procedures in drilling -- in the drilling program?

Page 44:06 to 44:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, isn't it true that

Page 44:10 to 44:12

Sir, isn't it true that the top hydrocarbon zone was actually sand at 17,476 feet containing free gas and not at 18,260 feet?

Page 44:14 to 44:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, isn't it true that there were fluid losses of 3 to 9 barrels during the primary cementing operation?

Page 44:19 to 44:22

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And isn't it true, sir, that these losses were -- would have been indicators of a compromised cement job?

Page 44:24 to 45:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, isn't it true that the Tiger team warned your drill design team against fast drilling and overrunning your ability to interpret realtime data on this well?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, in -- at BP in your drilling programs, isn't it true that all MOCs, management changes, require risk assessments?

Page 45:09 to 45:14

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Was there a Management of Change for the failure to achieve planned depths on casing seats at 36 inches, 28 inches, 22 inches, 18 inches, 16 inches, and 13 and five-eighths inches?

Page 45:16 to 45:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Were manage- -- Management of Changes were not filed for the scope of those changes, were they?
A. Same answer.
Q. Were Management of Change orders filed for failure to achieve margins exceeding leak-off requirements while drilling?

Page 45:25 to 46:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, is it true that your BP drill team identified an uncontrolled blowout as a moderate risk -- moderate risk?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, is it true that your BP drill team identified the cost impact as only the impact of an uncontrolled blowout and chose to eliminate the

13 and five-eighths inch intermediate protective string on cost alone, ignoring process safety in HSSE?

Page 46:12 to 46:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, the Macondo Well employed a long-string design, did it not?
A. Same answer.
Q. And the well design had been changed several times prior to the final design, had it not?
A. Same answer.
Q. And the fact that your team eventually decided to employ a long-string well design should have put the well site leaders on added vigilance for cement failures; is that correct?

Page 46:25 to 47:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And you should have briefed the people on -- the drillers on the TransOcean rig as to that concern, shouldn't you have?

Page 47:06 to 47:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And the drillers on the -- the TransOcean drillers were not briefed on that concern, were -- were they?

Page 47:11 to 47:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) It should have been your concern that the cement job was not properly performed, given the well design that you chose, isn't that correct?

Page 47:17 to 48:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, I ask you to look

at Exhibit No. -- Tab No. 47, which is a previous exhibit, which I'm going to re-mark today and I'll -- as Exhibit 4510.

(Marked Exhibit No. 4510.)

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, do you recognize this document?

A. Same answer.

Q. Sir, this is a -- purports to be a production casing report prepared for you on April 15th, 2010, by Halliburton?

A. Same answer.

Q. And, sir, you reviewed this document, didn't you?

A. Same answer.

Q. And sir, you knew that as of -- for the well design -- for the casing design that your team had intended to use on the DEEPWATER HORIZON, that Halliburton had made -- was asked to make specific cement recommendations; is that correct?

A. Same answer.

Q. And, in fact, these are the cement -- cementing recommendations or cementing program that was submitted by Jesse Gagliano to you on behalf of Halliburton, correct?

A. Same answer.

Q. And, sir, this particular program made the assumption that there would be a number of centralizers used in the well space, did it not?

Page 48:23 to 49:01

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, in fact, Jesse Gagliano proposed that 21 centralizers be used; is that correct?

Page 49:03 to 49:08

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, in fact, in response to that particular recommendation, your well team went out and found the added centralizers that it needed to meet the Halliburton recommendations, did it not?

Page 49:10 to 49:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, sir, those centralizers were actually delivered to the rig, were they not?
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And the purpose of having the centralizers in the well was to ensure a good cement job; is that correct?

Page 49:19 to 49:25

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And the purpose of having those centralizers in the well, sir, was to prevent channeling; isn't that correct, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. And had channeling occurred, it would have compromised the cement job; is that correct, sir?

Page 50:02 to 50:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, sir, isn't it true that had 21 centralizers been utilized, that it was Halliburton's opinion that there would have been minor gas flow problems on this particular well, sir?

Page 50:09 to 51:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, sir, you actually viewed the centralizers on the rig, did you not?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. And, sir, it was you that reported back to shore, sir, that the centralizers that had been sent out to the rig were, in fact, different than the centralizers that shore thought was on the rig; is that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, sir, they weren't, were they?
A. Same answer.
Q. You made a mistake, didn't you, sir?
MR. MORRISS: Form.

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) As a result of that mistake, sir, isn't it a fact that Mr. Guide directed that that centralizer -- that 21 centralizers not be used on the well; is that correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Okay. And, sir, eventually, only seven centralizers were used; is that correct?

Page 51:11 to 52:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, sir, you agreed with that decision, did you not?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, sir, can you tell me what type of centralizers were actually shipped to the DEEPWATER HORIZON?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, you were aware, on April 18th -- and turn to Tab 57 -- excuse me. I'm sorry. It's 58. This has been previously marked as an exhibit.
MR. BICKFORD: For today, I'm going to mark this as 4511.
(Marked Exhibit No. 4511.)
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, have you seen this document before?
A. Same answer.
Q. It purports to be a casing production report prepared for you, submitted by Jesse Gagliano of Halliburton --
A. Same --
Q. -- dated April 17th, 2010. Have you seen this document before?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did you-all ask Mr. Gagliano to run an -- alternate reports on the cement job with only six or seven centralizers being used?
A. Same answer.
Q. Who asked him to do that?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. Did you also receive, on the 18th of April, a casing design report stating that if

only seven centralizers were used, that there would be a severe gas flow problem?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. But you knew that, didn't you, sir?

Page 52:23 to 53:14

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Did you make any attempts to stop the job on the rig because of the lack of centralizers, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. In fact, you agreed that the centralizers weren't necessary, didn't you, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. In fact, you thought gravity would keep the pipe straight in the hole, didn't you, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Isn't that what you wrote Mr. Hafle?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, you realized that this well, under your plan, was going to be severely underbalanced, didn't you?

Page 53:16 to 53:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And the fact that this well was going to be underbalanced, the well at one point was going to be relying on the cement job as the only barrier to the influx of hydrocarbons into the well; is that correct?

Page 53:23 to 53:23

A. Same answer.

Page 54:10 to 56:04

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Okay. Mr. Morel, your counsel indicated to me at the break that I -- that you perhaps might want to answer some questions regarding your background. And I'm going to go back and ask you -- re-ask a question concerning your educational background.

Can you tell me what your educational background is, sir?
A. I have a BS in mechanical engineering from Rice University.
Q. And when did you obtain that degree, sir?
A. 2005.
Q. And besides that degree, do you have any other degrees?
A. No.
Q. Okay. And can you tell me, outside of any employment that you may or may not have had with BP, what jobs you have had?
A. I did an internship in college with Wyman-Gordon at Aluminum Foundry, and I also did an internship in college with Harley Davidson, as a frame designer.
Q. Have you had -- excluding any job you may or may not have had with BP, have you ever had a job within the petroleum industry?
A. No.
Q. Sir, what is a "negative test"?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. Sir, is it true that a negative test tests the integrity of a -- a well?
A. Same answer.
Q. Can it be used to test the integrity of a cement job on a well?
A. Same answer.
Q. Can it be used -- it is, in fact, used to test the integrity of a well to prevent the influx of hydrocarbons through a cement job? Is that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, as of April 20th, 2000 -- as of April 20, 2010, did BP have a standardized method to conduct a negative test on a deepwater rig?
A. Same answer.
Q. Isn't it true that BP didn't have such a test -- standardized test?

Page 56:06 to 56:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And isn't it true that TransOcean did not have a -- such a standardized test?

A. Same answer.

Page 56:14 to 56:16

Sir, is it -- isn't it a fact that you were charged to go out and find a procedure to conduct a negative test?

Page 56:18 to 57:05

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, sir, where did you find that procedure?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, sir, was that procedure communicated to the rig?
A. Same answer.
Q. And who did you discuss that procedure with?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, sir, did you discuss your -- what the results of that procedure should have been with that rig?

Page 57:07 to 57:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Did you discuss it with Mr. Kaluza?

Page 57:11 to 58:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, have you ever been trained to interpret a negative test?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, had anyone on your drill design team been trained to interpret a negative test?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, in all of your education, both in college and at BP and in any courses that you've attended, have you ever heard of some -- something called a "bladder effect," which would apply to the interpretation results of a negative test?
A. Same answer.
Q. In fact, you have not, have you?

A. Same answer.
Q. So when you were actually sent an E-mail asking you -- well, you were actually sent an E-mail asking you how to conduct a negative test, were you not?

Page 58:06 to 59:22

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And you sent an E-mail out to your drill team and others asking if anyone else knew how to conduct a negative test; is that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, had you conducted -- had you asked that negative tests be conducted in any other drilling programs that you had been involved in?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, had you ever been on a drilling project where a cement plug was set some 3,000 feet below the mud line?
A. Same answer.
Q. Had you ever been on a drill project where there was a displacement of mud above a cement plug at 3300 feet?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, I'd like to direct your attention to Tab 19 in the black book.
MR. BICKFORD: We'll go ahead and mark this as Exhibit 4512.
(Marked Exhibit No. 4512.)
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Okay. Sir, this is -- purports to be an E-mail chain from a Robert -- Robert Bodek. And it includes an E-mail from a Jonathan Bellow, dated March 18th and March 12th, 2010. Have you seen the E-mail from Mr. Bellow?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. And this has been previously marked, I'm sorry, as Exhibit No. 214.
Sir, you're copied on this particular E-mail from Mr. Bellow, are you not?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. And what Mr. Bellow is stating in this E-mail was thoughts on the Macondo Well, was it not?
A. Same answer.

Q. Okay. And as of March 12th, 2010, he is concerned about how you-all went about evaluating the pore pressure on the Macondo type of well; is that correct?

Page 59:24 to 61:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And turning to the -- to the second page of the E-mail, sir, he points out, does he not, that, "..the DEEP-" -- and this is the third line down -- "...the DEEPWATER HORIZON" -- I'm sorry. "We have been spoiled in exploration on the DEEPWATER HORIZON with having wells like Tiber, Freedom, Kodiak, Big Kahuna, and Kaskida that have had salt sections thick enough to allow us a luxury of a wider drilling margin. We are very, very good at solve exit now. We have not drilled a huge number of these 'no salt, narrow drilling window' wells."
Sir, is it true that you didn't have any experience in drilling a no salt, narrow drilling window well?
A. Same answer.
Q. And isn't it true, sir, that none of -- no one on your team did, either?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, how many wells that had a no salt narrow drilling window had the people on your drill team drilled?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. In fact, was BP competent to drill a Macondo-type well?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did the BP drill team have the experience to drill these type of wells?
A. Same answer.
Q. Didn't Mr. Bellow find that one of the problems leading up to the March incidents on the Macondo Well were, in fact, that you were drilling too fast?

Page 61:09 to 62:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) This document is part

of what's called a "lessons learned," is it not?
A. Same answer.
Q. Were any of the lessons learned in this document employed between March and April 20th, 2010, on the Macondo Well?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, a couple of questions about the cement slurry that was used on the Macondo Well. Isn't it true, sir, that there were three cement lab tests that were performed on the nitrogen cement design?
A. Same answer.
Q. And isn't it true that one was performed on February 13th, 2010?
A. Same answer.
Q. Wasn't a second test performed on February 17th, 2010?
A. Same answer.
Q. And wasn't a third test performed on April 12th, 2010?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, you knew that the February 13th, 2010, test was -- that the cement slurry failed due to a nitrogen breakout; is that correct?

Page 62:12 to 62:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Okay. You knew, sir, that the February 13th, 2010, slurry could not have been used in the DEEPWATER HORIZON well at the completion of the well, sir; is that correct?

Page 62:19 to 62:25

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Okay. You knew that it -- that cement, as it was designed on February 13th, 2010, and tested, would not have isolated the hydrocarbon zone from the well at the completion of the well on April 20th, 2010, did you?

Page 63:03 to 63:08

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, you knew that the slurry that was tested on February 17, 2010, would not have -- if used, would not have created a good cement job as of the state of the well on April 20th, 2010; is that correct?

Page 63:11 to 63:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Okay. And that -- the results of that test were reported to you, were they not?
A. Same answer.
Q. And the results of those tests were reported to members of your team; is that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And isn't it a fact, sir, that there were abnormal results as of April 12th, 2010, on the nitrofied cement?

Page 63:24 to 64:05

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And isn't it a fact, sir, that the nitrofied cement, as it was mixed in a slurry as of April 12th, 2010, would not have created a good cement job at the bottom of the DEEPWATER HORIZON well as it -- the Macondo Well as it stood on April 20, 2010?

Page 64:07 to 89:06

MR. SCHWARTZ: Objection; form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Isn't it true, sir, that the cement slurry that was actually used on or about April 19th, 2010, on the Macondo Well was not -- that you did not see a lab test on that cement prior to the cementing job?
A. Same answer.
Q. Isn't it true that you've never seen a lab test on that cement, even after the cementing job?
A. Same answer.
Q. Isn't it true that no one on your well team saw a result of a lab testing on that cement slurry that was used on April -- on or about

April 19, 2010, prior to the cement job?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. Sir, have you ever cemented a -- have you ever participated in a well where you did not receive the lab tests from the cement slurry used on the final cementing job of the well?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, does that violate BP internal drilling policies?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Do you think that's something that you should have asked for, sir?
A. Same answer.
MR. MORRISS: Form.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Why didn't you ask for it, sir?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Why didn't members of your drill team ask for it, sir?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, what should the compressive strength of the slurry have been, given the conditions downhole on the Macondo Well?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, did you know what the conditioning time of the cement slurry was that was introduced in the final cement job on April 19th, 2010?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. Would it have been important for you to know what the conditioning time was prior to running a positive test on the well, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. What would the effects have been of running a positive test, sir, on the well had the cement not fully conditioned and cured?
A. Same answer.
Q. Wouldn't the effects have been channelling, for one?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
MR. BICKFORD: How much time?
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: I'm sorry. Give me one second. I apologize. 16 minutes, you've

used --
MR. BICKFORD: Pardon me?
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: 16 minutes, you've used --
MR. BICKFORD: Okay.
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: -- on this tape.
MR. BICKFORD: Got it.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, it was your -- you participated in the decision to use a spacer made from a combination of lost circulation materials that was onboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON, did you not?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. And, in fact, on -- did you know the effects of using that spacer on the well?
A. Same answer.
Q. Had any testing been done on the combination of spacers used that were put into the well?
MS. SCOFIELD: Objection; form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Would that have been a prudent thing to do prior to introducing the spacer into the well?
MS. SCOFIELD: Objection; form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Do you know what effects that spacer would have had on the negative pressure test that was done thereafter?
MS. SCOFIELD: Objection; form.
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, would you agree with me that one of the principal causes of the blowout at the Macondo Well was a failure of the primary cement job?
MR. SCHWARTZ: Objection; form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, you -- did you participate in the decision to send the Schlumberger crew home off the rig?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. You were aware that there was a Schlumberger crew onboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON prepared to do a cement bond log, were you not?
A. Same answer.

Q. Okay. You were aware that the -- that they did not perform the cement bond log, were you not?
A. Same answer.
Q. Would a cement bond log have shown where the true top of the cement was?
A. Same answer.
Q. Would the cement bond log have shown the integrity of the cement job?
A. Same answer.
Q. Would the cement bond log have indicated whether or not there had been any channelling during the primary cement job?
A. Same answer.
Q. How far above the top of the hydrocarbon producing zone was the cement -- was the top of the cement on the final cement job?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. In fact, it was only about 500 feet above that zone; is that correct, sir?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, in fact, if it was less than a thousand feet above that zone, BP procedures -- practices and procedures called for you to run an objective -- an objective cement integrity test, did they not?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And there was no objective cement integrity test performed, was there?
A. Same answer.
Q. But had the cement bond log been run, that would have qualified as an objective integrity test, would it have not?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, was the -- the 7-inch production casing put in an 8 and a half by 9 hole?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, sir, that gave you 1 and a half inches around the pipe; is that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, sir, did a 1.5 hole with a 7-inch

production casing meet API RP 65, best practices?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, why wasn't a 5-inch casing run at the bottom of the hole?
A. Same answer.
Q. Was it because the well couldn't produce enough to justify its cost with a 5-inch casing at the bottom of the hole, sir?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Had you requested of anyone at BP to run a 5-inch casing at the bottom of the hole, sir?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, I've asked you questions concerning the design of the DEEPWATER HORIZON Macondo Well. If I continue to ask you questions concerning the manner which you designed -- you and your team designed the well, is it your intention to continue to invoke your right not to answer the questions under the Fifth Amendment?
A. Yes.
Q. Sir, I've asked you questions about your employment at BP, your evaluations, your promotions, who you worked with. If I continue to ask you questions concerning those matters, is it your intention to continue to invoke the Fifth Amendment -- your Fifth Amendment right not to answer those questions?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Sir, I've asked you questions concerning your participation in designing and implementing a negative pressure test utilized aboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON in connection with the Macondo Well. Is it your intention -- if I continue to ask you questions on that subject, is it your intention to continue to invoke your right not to answer questions under your right under the Fifth Amendment?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Sir, I've asked you questions concerning the cement that was utilized on the DEEPWATER HORIZON, when it was utilized, the type

of cement that was utilized, the design of the cement, and the design of the centralizers that were placed onboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON. If I continue to ask you questions concerning the cement design, the type of cement, the cement testing, the cement slurry used, is it your intention to continue to invoke your right not to answer such questions predicated upon your rights under the Fifth Amendment?

A. Yes.

Q. Sir, I've asked you questions concerning a number of E-mails that we've looked at. If I continue to show you E-mails purportedly authored by you in connection with the Macondo Well, is it your intention to refuse to -- is it your intention not to testify concerning their identification or content predicated upon your rights under the Fifth Amendment?

A. Yes.

MR. BICKFORD: How much time?

THE VIDEOGRAPHER: You've been on the record 25 minutes.

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) I'm going to try to go through some documents to get them into evidence, sir.

Let's start with Tab No. 51, which I'm going to mark as Exhibit 4513.

(Marked Exhibit No. 4513.)

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, this is an April 16th, 2010, E-mail from you to Mr. Sepulvado, Kaluza, Lambert, Guide, Hafle, Cocales, Walz, concerning updated procedures and concerning your current plan. Did you author this document?

A. Same answer.

Q. Okay. Is -- does -- was this -- is this document the plan that was in place for completing the Macondo Well?

A. Same answer.

Q. Okay. And does it detail the production casing operations that were to take place on the Macondo Well?

A. Same answer.

Q. Does it detail where the surface cement plug was to be placed?

A. Same answer.

Q. Does it detail the cementing production casing procedures?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. Was this approved, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did this go through a Management of Change order, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Was it submitted to the MMS --
A. Same answer.
Q. -- for approval?
Sir, I direct your attention to Exhibit No. 52 -- I mean, Tab No. 52, which I'll mark as Exhibit 4514.
(Marked Exhibit No. 4514.)
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, this purports to be an E-mail chain ending on April 16th from John Guide to David Sims attaching an E-mail chain. I think this has already been introduced as an exhibit.
Sir, have you ever seen this document before?
A. Same answer.
Q. The -- well, sorry, it's Exhibit No. 2579. So we'll save that.
You were never shown this document, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do -- were you aware of Mr. Guide's opinion regarding the additional centralizers?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, when Mr. Guide said, "I just found out the stock collars are not part of the centralizers," you stated: "Also will take ten hours to install them. We are adding 45 pieces that can come off as of last -- off as a last-minute addition. I do not like this; and as David approved my -- in my absence, I did not question; but now I'm concerned about using them."
Were you aware that Mr. Guide was concerned about using the centralizers, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. And was that based upon your information back to the shore about what centralizers they were -- what type of centralizers they were?
A. Same answer.

Q. Go to Tab 53.
MR. BICKFORD: Which, now, I'll mark as Exhibit 4514.
(Marked Morel Exhibit No. 4514.)
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) This purports to be an E-mail chain from Brett Cocales to you and then from you to Brett Cocales. Sir, in fact, you wrote Brett Cocales concerning the centralizers on April 16th, 2010, did you not?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you stated, quote: "If we think that the hole is relatively straight, what if you place them every three joints from the shoe, which almost gets you to the top of the cement. You should maintain the pipe standoff between the centralizers, the exception -- with the exception if the hole is too washed out to move up or down a joint. Just my thoughts on the physics of it."
Was that your E-mail to Mr. Cocales?
A. Same answer.
Q. In fact, previous to this E-mail on Page 2, you were questioning Mr. Gagliano's centralizer requirements, weren't you?
A. Same answer.
Q. And in fact, you didn't understand why he wanted to use so many centralizers, did you?
MR. MORRISS: Object to form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And, in fact, Mr. Cocales said that -- corrected you and told you that, quote: "Even if a hole is perfectly straight, a straight piece of pipe, even in tension, will not seek the perfect center of the hole unless it is -- unless it has something to centralize it."
Did I read that correctly?
A. Same answer.
Q. Was he disagreeing with you, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. But at that point, Mr. Cocales didn't seem to care about whether or not there were going to be centralizers; isn't that correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Didn't he write you: "But who cares? It's done. End of story. Will

probably be fine and we'll get a good cement job. I would rather have to squeeze than get stuck above the WH. So, Guide is right on the risk/reward equation."

Did I read that correctly, sir?

A. Same answer.

Q. Was that your opinion, that you'd "probably be fine"?

MR. MORRISS: Form.

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Were you willing to risk the lives of the men and women on that rig as -- as a probability, sir?

MR. MORRISS: Form.

MR. MEHTA: Objection.

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And was there a risk assessment done as to how "probably fine" you'd be with that cement job?

MR. MORRISS: Form.

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And you had an option to stop that job out there, didn't you, sir?

A. Same answer.

MR. BICKFORD: Tab No. 54. We will mark it as 4515.

(Marked Exhibit No. 4515.)

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, this purports to be a series of E-mails from you to a representative of Halliburton; is that correct, sir?

A. Same answer.

Q. Dated April 16th, 2010; is that, sir?

A. Same answer.

Q. And you're communicating information regarding the well, sir?

A. Same answer.

Q. And why are you talking with Halliburton about this information, sir?

A. Same answer.

Q. Isn't it a fact, sir, that you were confused as to the information that Halliburton was sending you?

MR. MORRISS: Form.

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, the next tab is

55. It's already marked as Exhibit No. 203. Are you there, sir?
A. Yeah.
Q. Sir, this purports to be an E-mail from you to Mr. Cocales and from Mr. Cocales back to you. Sir, did you think that the centralizers as they -- as you had centralized the -- strike that.
Sir, was it your opinion that the centralizers at that point were adequate for the particular sands that you were trying to centralize the pipe?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, flip to -- sir, Tab No. 59 is Exhibit No. 130 -- 1390. Sir, have you seen this document before?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did you author this document, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, is this the -- is this the E-mail where you requested from Mr. Hafle, Mr. Walz, Mr. Cocales, and Mr. Guide whether or not there were any MMS requirements for a negative test?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did anyone respond that they had found a -- MMS requirements for a negative test?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, all you were able to find, sir, was a -- a negative -- regarding a negative test was the CFR 30, 250, Doc 422; is that correct, sir?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) And you set forth that in your E-mail, did you not?
A. Same answer.
Q. And did you communicate that information to the rig?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did you communicate that information to Mr. Kaluza?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did you communicate that information to any TransOcean employees on the rig?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did you communicate that information to Mr. Vidrine?

A. Same answer.
MR. BICKFORD: At this time, I'm going to stop and I will reserve the rest of my time. How much do I have?
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Just give me a minute. We'll go off the record, and I'll be able to tell you.
Off the record at 10:16 A.M., ending Tape 2.
(Break from 10:16 a.m. to 10:25 a.m.)
THE VIDEOGRAPHER: On the record at 10:25 A.M., beginning Tape 3.

E X A M I N A T I O N

BY MR. UNDERHILL:
Q. Mr. Morel, my name is Mike Underhill. I represent the United States.
Mr. Morel, you were aware that cementing the Macondo Well was a safety-critical operation, were you not?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you understood that, if the well wasn't cemented properly and safely, that it posed the risk to the rig, to its crew, and to the environment, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And you also understood that Halliburton was going to be the contractor for BP that was designing the cement job, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. You also understood that Halliburton would be performing some tests. We won't detail them now, but they would be performing some tests that would indicate whether the cement design was proper and safe, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you personally knew Jesse Gagliano, the representative for Halliburton dealing with BP for the cement job on the Macondo Well, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, you had personal -- I should say -- strike that.
You had business dealings with Mr. Gagliano concerning the cementing of the Macondo Well, correct?

A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, you specifically had dealings with Mr. Gagliano from Halliburton on cementing the production casing for Macondo Well, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. You were aware that Mr. Gagliano was -- or either himself or somebody at Halliburton was performing some tests concerning the cement design for the production casing on Macondo, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. In fact, you had concerns about Mr. Gagliano's competency to perform the cement design and related duties for the production casing on Macondo Well, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
MR. SCHWARTZ: Objection; form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) In fact, you put your concerns in writing to an E-mail from one of your colleagues at BP, Mark Halfe, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. In fact, you did so on April 17th of 2010, which is three days before the blowout aboard DEEPWATER HORIZON, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Directing your attention and other counsel to Tab 8 in the Government's binder previously marked as Exhibit 1396; further drawing your attention to the bottom of that E-mail string on the second page, which is BPHZN2179MDL00315412.
At the bottom of that page, there is an E-mail from you, Mr. Morel, to Mark Halfe sent Saturday, April 17th, 2010, correct?
MR. MEHTA: Sorry to interrupt. Let's just get Mr. Morel to the right exhibit number and tab number and page again.
MR. UNDERHILL: Tab 8, the second page, bottom of the page.
MR. MEHTA: Thank you. That's fine.
MR. UNDERHILL: Sure.
A. Okay.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And do you need the answer or the question again?
A. Yes.
MR. UNDERHILL: Could we have it read

back, please? Just to make it easy. Let's make it easy.

Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) At the bottom of that page, Bates stamp I read into the record previously, there is an E-mail from you to Mr. Mark Halfe at BP sent April 17, 2010, which is three days before the DEEPWATER HORIZON blowout, correct?

A. Same answer.

Q. The title or the subject matter of the E-mail, according to what's written here, is, quote, "Lab Tests," close quote, correct?

A. Same answer.

Q. I'd like you to tell me if I read this into the record correctly; and I'm quoting from the E-mail, yours to Mr. Hafle on April 17th of 2010. Quote: "I'm about to send this to John and Greg, but wanted to send it past you first to make sure I'm not being out of line. Jesse isn't cutting it anymore."

Continuing on to the next page, quote: "John and Greg, I need help next week dealing with Jesse. I asked for these lab tests to be completed multiple times early last week; and Jesse still waited until the last minute, as he has done throughout this well. This doesn't give us enough time to tweak the slurry to meet our needs.

"As a team, we requested that he run another test with 9 gallons on Wednesday. I know the first test had issues, but I do not understand what took so long to get it underway and why a new one wasn't put on right away. There's no excuse for this as the cement and chemicals we are running has been on location for weeks.

"Thank you, Brian," close quote.

Did I read that E-mail correctly?

A. Same answer.

Q. Did you, in fact, send that E-mail to Mr. Hafle on April 17th of 2010?

A. Same answer.

Q. On April 17th, 2010, were you acting within the course and scope of your duties, your professional duties as an employee of BP?

A. Same answer.

Q. And, in fact, let's say any time in which

you dealt with any subject matter concerning the Macondo Well, you were, in fact, acting within the course and scope of your duties as an employee of BP, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, on April 20th, 2010, you were acting within the course and scope of your duties at an employee of BP, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Back to the E-mail. To the first page of that exhibit, please, 1396, bottom of the page, an E-mail string from Gregory S. Walz, W-A-L-Z, to you, Mr. Morel; to Mr. Hafle; to Mr. Cocales; to Mr. Guide, "Subject: Lab tests," sent Sunday, April 18th, 2010, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. The response from Mr. Walz to you and the other gentlemen I referred to in the E-mail, quote: "John and I already have a meeting with Halliburton scheduled tomorrow afternoon," period, close quote.
Did I read that correctly?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did you, in fact, receive that -- strike that.
You, in fact, did receive that E-mail on or about April 18th of 2010, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. In fact, during the performance of the cement job on the Macondo Well for the production casing, you were actually aboard DEEPWATER HORIZON, were you not?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you were there specifically to oversee, among other things, the performance of the cement job on the production casing, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And you were there as a BP employee acting within the course and scope of your duties to assist in, among other things, overseeing the performance of the cement job on the production casing, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) In fact, you

personally observed all or portions of the cement job on the production casing for the Macondo Well, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And, in fact, prior to the actual performance and completion of the cement job for the production casing on the Macondo Well, you, as a BP employee, were fully aware that BP had not received all of the lab tests concerning the final slurry mix that was pumped for the production casing, correct?
A. Same answer.

Page 89:08 to 89:10

Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You were aware that that was an unsafe practice, correct?
A. Same answer.

Page 89:12 to 89:16

Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You were also aware that that was in conflict with BP's internal guidelines, instructions, and/or mandatory requirements, correct?
A. Same answer.

Page 89:18 to 90:05

Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) In fact, you were aware that it was a requirement within BP that lab tests be reviewed before a cement job was pumped, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And yet, nevertheless, you, among others, allowed the cement for the production casing to be pumped and performed and allegedly completed without first receiving and reviewing all of the lab tests for the production casing, correct?
A. Same answer.

Page 90:07 to 90:12

Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And, in fact, had you demanded and/or required receipt of all lab tests for the cement job on the production casing on the Macondo Well, you would have, in fact, been aware that some of those tests either had not been completed or, in fact, had been canceled, correct?

Page 90:15 to 90:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And you're aware that, had the cement job been properly performed and completed on the Macondo Well with respect to the production casing cement job, this accident, this tragedy, the DEEPWATER HORIZON, would not have occurred, correct?

Page 90:25 to 91:06

Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) In fact, the failure of the cement job for the production casing on the Macondo Well, that failure led directly, along with other factors, to the DEEPWATER HORIZON tragedy that commenced on April 20th of 2010, correct?
A. Same answer.

Page 91:17 to 91:21

Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And again, you're aware that had the production job -- production casing cement job been performed properly, the blowout on April 20th and all its consequences would not have occurred, correct?

Page 91:23 to 92:02

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And you were aware, as of April 20th of 2010, that the cement job performed on the production casing was an essential safety-critical job, correct?

Page 92:04 to 92:10

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And prior to April 20th, 2010, BP did not, in fact, remove Mr. Gagliano from his duties with respect to either designing or making recommendations concerning the cement job of the production casing for the Macondo Well, correct?

Page 92:12 to 92:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And BP did not require Mr. Gagliano to produce all of the tests applicable to the cement job for the production casing on the Macondo Well prior to the time the cement was actually pumped?

Page 92:19 to 92:19

A. Same answer.

Page 93:15 to 94:19

Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) Turn to Tab 16, please. Tab 16 has been previously marked as Exhibit 570.
For the record, it's an application for a permit to modify the Macondo Well dated on or about April 16th, 2010.
You were aware, sir, that on or about April 16th, 2010, BP submitted to the Minerals Management Service an application for a permit to modify the Macondo Well, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you were aware that within that document, Exhibit 570, BP provided to MMS a Temporary Abandonment Procedure for the Macondo Well, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And turning to the third page of Exhibit 570, there is, in fact, a procedure called, quote, "Temporary Abandonment Procedure," close quote, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, that Temporary Abandonment Procedure includes, among other things, a procedure for a negative test to be performed on

the Macondo Well, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you were aware that BP had provided to MMS within Exhibit 570 the procedures it specified to use concerning the negative pressure test, correct?

Page 94:21 to 98:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) If you could turn to, please, Exhibit -- pardon me, Tab 12, Exhibit 97. Tab 12 has been marked as Exhibit 97 in a prior deposition.
Exhibit 97 is an E-mail string containing two E-mails, both from you, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. The first E-mail is from you, Brian Morel, dated Tuesday, April 20th, 2010, the date of the DEEPWATER HORIZON blowout, sent to yourself, Don Vidrine, Robert Kaluza, Lee Lambert, and Earl Lee, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Also was copied to John Guide, Mark Halfe, Brett Cocales, and Greg Walz, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. The subject of the E-mail sent on April 20th, 2010, as part of Exhibit 97 is titled with a subject, quote, "Ops Note," closed quote, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And the op note sent to the rig on April 20th by you -- strike that.
This ops note was sent to the rig on April 20th of 2010, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And two of the individuals on that E-mail sent April 20th, 2010, to the rig -- two of the individuals that it was sent to are Don Vidrine and Robert Kaluza, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Robert Kaluza and Don Vidrine were the well site leaders aboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON on April 10th -- strike that -- April 20th, 2010, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And, in fact, Don Vidrine and Robert Kaluza, both well site leaders for BP aboard DEEPWATER HORIZON performed or assisted in performing the negative pressure test conducted on the Macondo Well that day, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And this ops note sent by you to Mr. Vidrine and Mr. Kaluza, among others, on April 20th, 2010, specified the temporary abandonment procedures to be used aboard the rig that day for the Macondo Well, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, the ops note sent to the rig and its well site leaders on April 20th, 2010, contained a Temporary Abandonment Procedure that the well site leaders were instructed to use, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, the Temporary Abandonment Procedure contained in your ops note as part of Exhibit 97 differed from the Temporary Abandonment Procedure that had been approved by MMS in Exhibit 570, correct?
A. Same answer.
MR. MORRISS: Form.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) That was, in fact, a violation of the permit to modify the well submitted to MMS on or about April 16th of 2010, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And for clarification, the permit I'm referring to is Exhibit 570.
That, in fact, was a violation of the permit. That is, the ops note in which the Temporary Abandonment Procedure was sent to the rig was in violation of the permit approved by MMS, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And you are aware that that was a violation of the permit, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You were aware of -- that the negative pressure test that was performed on the Macondo Well on April 20th, 2010, was a safety-critical procedure, correct?

Page 98:09 to 98:14

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And, in fact, that was the final test to be performed to assure that hydrocarbons were not flowing into the Macondo Well prior to the temporary abandonment of that well, correct?

Page 98:16 to 98:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And you were aware that, because it was the final test to assure the integrity of the well prior to temporary abandonment, it was especially safety-critical, correct?

Page 98:23 to 99:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And the ops note sent to the rig as part of Exhibit 97 was sent by you to the rig and its well site leaders knowing that it was a violation of the MMS permit to modify the well; that is, the permit which is Exhibit 570, correct?

Page 99:06 to 99:11

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) The ops note sent to the rig on April 20th of 2010, which is part of Exhibit 97, was, in fact, also approved by, among others, the well team leader for Macondo Well, John Guide, correct?

Page 99:13 to 99:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) It was also approved

by Mark Hafle, another BP engineer in Houston, correct?

Page 99:18 to 99:24

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And prior to sending out the ops note which is part of Exhibit 97, nobody from BP, including but not limited to, Mr. Guide, David Sims, Mr. Walz, or Mr. Hafle -- objected to the procedure or instructed you not to send it, correct?

Page 100:01 to 101:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And specifically, on April 20th, 2010, when you sent the op notes to the rig, which is contained in Exhibit 97, you were acting within the course and scope of your duties as a BP employee with respect to the Macondo Well, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Also part of Exhibit 97 at the top of the string is an E-mail from you to Cynthia M. Holik, H-O-L-I-K, copied to Gregory Walz and Doug Chester on April 26th of 2010, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And the title of that E-mail was also called, quote, "Ops Note," close quote, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. I'll read the E-mail into the record and I'd ask you to tell me whether I've read it correctly.
Quote, "Here is the negative test procedure," period, close quote.
Did I read that correctly?
A. Same answer.
Q. And the negative pressure test procedure referred to in your E-mail to Ms. Holik is, in fact, the negative test procedure contained in the ops note sent to the rig on April 20th, 2010, which is also a part of Exhibit 97, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Had the negative pressure test been performed correctly and identified that, in fact,

hydrocarbons were flowing into the well on April 20th, 2010, the DEEPWATER HORIZON blowout never would have occurred, correctly?

Page 101:11 to 101:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) Or at least the rig crew, including but not limited to its well site leaders, would have been aware that the well did not have integrity such that they then could have taken remedial actions to prevent a blowout, correct?

Page 101:19 to 102:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And, in fact, they interpreted the negative pretest -- negative pressure test as being, quote, "successful," close quote, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, it was not successful, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, the failure to interpret and conduct a test properly led directly to the DEEPWATER HORIZON blowout, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) It also led to the -- in turn, the Gulf oil spill, correct?

Page 102:11 to 102:13

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) Also led directly to the 11 deaths aboard the rig, correct?

Page 102:15 to 102:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And again, that negative pressure test that was sent to the rig and performed by the rig was a negative pressure test that violated the MMS permit, which is

exemplified in Exhibit 570, correct?

Page 102:22 to 103:22

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) When you worked on the Macondo Well and performed your job duties with respect to same, you were aware of the contents of Subpart D of the MMS regulations pertaining to the drilling operations, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. You knew that the regulations prohibited drilling without a safe drilling margin, as identified in the approved APD for the Macondo Well, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. You also understood that, in the case of the Macondo Well, BP was required to maintain a safe margin between its mud weight and its fracture gradient, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. You knew that in connection with the Macondo Well, BP included plots in its drilling permit applications to MMS, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. You knew that when BP included dotted lines in these plots to the right of its pore pressure and to the left of its fracture gradient, that meant BP would not drill with the mud weight outside those dotted lines, correct?

Page 103:24 to 104:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that when BP submitted a worksheet in its permit applications listing mud weights and fracture gradients for intervals that had not yet been drilled, that meant that BP would not drill an interval with a drilling margin less than the difference between the mud weight for that interval and the fracture gradient at the previous shoe, correct?

Page 104:09 to 104:12

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You also knew that MMS relied upon BP to report accurate and reliable figures in its APDs, correct?

Page 104:14 to 104:22

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that when BP filed its October 29th, 2009, application for revised new well for the Macondo Well, it was responsible for disclosing to the permit regulators the actual LOT and pore pressure scores it recorded when it set the casing shoe at the depth of roughly 8,000 feet earlier in October of that year, correct?

Page 104:24 to 105:03

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that at that depth, the surface mud weight equivalent of the fracture gradient was no more than 10.3 pounds per gallon, correct?

Page 105:05 to 105:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You also knew that, in order to make the Macondo Well's drilling margin look as large as possible, BP filed an old plot that dated back to May 11th, 2009, correct?

Page 105:11 to 105:14

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) This plot recorded the fracture gradient at the 8,000 foot casing shoe as 11.1 pounds per gallon, correct?

Page 105:16 to 105:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that, when, in October 2009, BP drilled farther down the Macondo after it took a kick at 80 -- strike that -- at 8,970 feet, it did so without the

21 required kick margin, correct?

Page 105:23 to 106:03

23 A. Same answer.
24 Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that whenever
25 BP drills a casing interval, its kick margin is
1 required to be determined by comparing its current
2 mud weight with the formation integrity test score
3 at the previous casing shoe, correct?

Page 106:05 to 106:11

5 A. Same answer.
6 Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that when BP
7 drilled ahead at 8,970 feet after it took the
8 kick, it was drilling with a surface mud weight of
9 10.1 pounds per gallon and a surface fracture
10 gradient at the interval of less than 10.3 ppg,
11 correct?

Page 106:13 to 106:20

13 A. Same answer.
14 Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that when BP
15 set its 13 and five-eighths shoe casing -- casing
16 shoe in around March 22nd of 2010 at roughly
17 13,145 feet, its fracture gradient experts who
18 were working on the Macondo Well did not trust the
19 formation integrity test of 14.6 pounds per
20 gallon, correct?

Page 106:22 to 107:01

22 A. Same answer.
23 Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You also knew that
24 they -- that is, BP's internal experts -- thought
25 that result was excessive and not reliable as a
1 formation integrity tool, correct?

Page 107:03 to 107:08

3 A. Same answer.
4 Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You discussed doing an
5 open hole leak-off test to obtain an accurate
6 fracture gradient measurement, but decided against

it because you did not want to risk getting a lower fracture gradient value, correct?

Page 107:10 to 107:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that on April 2, 2010, BP set its 9 and seven-eighths shoe casing at the depth of roughly 17,168 feet, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that according to BP's Macondo team, the formation integrity test result recorded -- 16 pounds per gallon -- was, in fact, much higher than expected, correct?

Page 107:22 to 107:25

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that BP's Macondo team had no confidence in this result even on the date the test was taken, correct?

Page 108:02 to 108:06

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You also knew that one possible explanation that was discussed at the time was that BP had been testing casing or cement rather than the formation, correct?

Page 108:08 to 108:11

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You also knew that BP's purported 16-pound fracture gradient test result was not valid, correct?

Page 108:13 to 108:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that BP failed to conduct a formation integrity test for its 9 7/8 casing shoe or the subsequent casing interval in which it ever had confidence, correct?

Page 108:19 to 108:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You, nevertheless, reported the 16-pound fracture gradient result to MMS in your mid-April drilling permit application, correct?

Page 108:25 to 109:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that at 18,260 feet, the well suffered a total loss of returns, correct?
A. Same answer.

Page 109:06 to 109:09

Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You also knew that it again lost returns at that depth when the well was static and had a downhole mud weight of approximately 14.5 pounds per gallon, correct?

Page 109:11 to 109:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that from that point on, the Macondo engineers assumed that the most reliable estimate of the downhole fracture gradient at 18,260 feet was approximately 14.5 pounds per gallon, correct?

Page 109:18 to 109:22

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You also knew that at that point, the most reliable estimate of the downhole pore pressure was, in fact, 14.2 pounds per gallon, correct?

Page 109:24 to 110:08

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) During the cement job for the production casing, you were aware that

certain traditional, quote, "best and safest," close quote, cementing practices were not being used because BP was concerned that it could not increase the weight at the bottom of its hole on Macondo when it is circulating mud or cement to a normal amount above its static downhole mud weight, correct?

Page 110:11 to 110:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that BP's engineering team's concern about fracturing the Macondo Well's formation caused it to use a variety of techniques in an effort to minimize ECD during the cementing of the production casing, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. You knew that the engineering team used a pump rate of 4 barrels per minute for the cementing of the production casing on the Macondo Well in an effort to minimize ECD, correct?
A. Same answer.

Page 110:25 to 111:04

Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) And you were also aware that BP originally planned to circulate drilling fluid at a flow rate of at least 5 to 8 barrels per minute while attempting to convert the float collar on the Macondo Well, correct?

Page 111:06 to 111:13

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You were also aware that the BP engineering team eventually decided to use a flow rate of only 1 to 2 barrels per minute during the float collar conversion because of a concern that a greater flow rate would raise ECD to a level that might fracture the wellbore, correct?

Page 111:15 to 111:21

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You understood that the flow rate during float collar conversion did not reach the minimum flow rate to achieve float collar conversion, according to the manufacturer, Weatherford's, specification. Weatherford being the manufacturer of the float collar. Correct?

Page 111:23 to 112:03

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You were also aware that the BP engineering team reduced the volume of cement for the cementing to the production casing in the Macondo Well in an effort to lower ECD, correct?

Page 112:05 to 112:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that BP deviated from its original drilling program when it decided not to run a full bottoms-up circulation of drilling mud prior to cementing the production casing of the Macondo Well, correct?

Page 112:12 to 112:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You knew that BP decided not to run a full bottoms-up prior to cementing the production casing in the Macondo Well because of a concern that doing so could fracture the formation, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, you were aware that the formation was fractured, therefore allowing hydrocarbons to flow up into the casing, through and up the riser and onto the rig floor, causing the blowout, correct?

Page 112:25 to 113:05

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You also knew that the engineering team did not consider reducing the mud weight as a way to lower ECD during the cement job

because doing so would increase the likelihood of a kick, correct?

Page 113:07 to 113:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. UNDERHILL) You also knew that the BP engineering team decided to use a small base oil spacer in an effort to reduce ECD, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. You also knew that the BP engineering team decided to use foam cement on the production casing at the Macondo Well to minimize ECD, correct?

Page 113:17 to 113:17

A. Same answer.

Page 114:07 to 118:07

E X A M I N A T I O N
BY MR. HYMEL:
Q. Mr. Morel, as I introduced myself before the tape started, my name is Richard Hymel, and I represent TransOcean.
One of your responsibilities on the Macondo Well was to make sure the well was safe; isn't that correct?
A. Same answer.
BY MR. MORRISS: Form.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And part of your job was to assess the risks of the Macondo Well?
A. Same answer.
Q. You called John Guide numerous times during the drilling of the Macondo Well trying to make sense of the insanity; isn't that correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You called John Guide and asked his advice about exploring opportunities both inside and outside of BP, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) While you were designing and drilling the Macondo Well, you were looking

for other jobs outside of BP; isn't that correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) I want to turn to the Temporary Abandonment Procedure. Mr. Underhill asked you some questions about that, but I want to follow up on that.
The first Temporary Abandonment Procedure that you sent to the rig was on April 12th of 2010, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. You followed up that Temporary Abandonment Procedure with another aban -- Temporary Abandonment Procedure on April 14th of 2010; is that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Then on April 16th, the Temporary Abandonment Procedure that Mr. Underhill referred to as Exhibit 570 was sent to the rig, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And then on April 20th, the Temporary Abandonment Procedure was sent to the rig that Mr. Underhill referred to as Exhibit 97, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Now, you agree with me that each of those temporary abandonment procedures was different from the previous one? You agree?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Isn't it true that Mr. Kaluza called you to advise that the April 20th Temporary Abandonment Procedure deviated from the procedure approved by the MMS, and you replied that the team approved to deviate from the TA procedure approved by the MMS?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You did not notify the MMS that the Temporary Abandonment Procedure used on April 20th, 2010, deviated from the Temporary Abandonment Procedure approved by the MMS, didn't you?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You did not tell TransOcean that the Transo -- the Temporary

Abandonment Procedure used on April 20th, 2010, deviated from the Temporary Abandonment Procedure approved by the MMS, did you?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) One of the temporary abandonment procedures required that the mud in the -- in the well be displaced to 3300 feet below the mud line. Did you ever determine whether there was actually any need to displace the mud that far down?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Did you do any calculations to determine if there was any need to displace the mud in the well down to 3300 feet below the mud line?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did you ask any of the engineers on your team if there was any reason to displace the mud in the well to 3300 feet below the mud line?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did you ever calculate the amount of stress that would be put on the downhole cement job if you displaced the mud in the well down to 3300 feet below the mud line?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did BP perform any formal risk assessments on the changes in the different temporary abandonment procedures?

Page 118:09 to 118:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Did BP perform any Management of Change procedures on the different temporary abandonment procedures?

Page 118:14 to 118:18

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Mr. Underhill asked you some questions about the bottoms-up procedure; and you were concerned that doing a bottoms-up would have taken an additional 10 to 12 hours, correct?

Page 118:20 to 118:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You knew that reducing the volume and rate of mud circulation increased the risk of contamination of the cement; do you agree?

Page 118:25 to 119:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And you knew that increasing the risk of contamination increased the risk that the bottom hole cement job would fail, didn't you?

Page 119:06 to 119:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) BP did not perform any formal risk assessment on the decision to not perform a bottoms-up at a low rate, correct?

Page 119:11 to 120:11

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Did BP perform a Management of Change procedure on the decision to not perform a full bottoms-up at a low rate?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did TransOcean play any part in the decision not to run a bottoms-up?
A. Same answer.
Q. The cement job has been discussed previously, but I want to focus on landing the bottom plug. And you knew that the bottom plug landed nine barrels ahead of plan, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And when the bottom plug landed nine barrels ahead of plan, that meant that the bottom plug probably bypassed the mud on the way down and the mud contaminated the cement. Do you agree?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Did you do anything to

investigate why the bottom plug landed nine barrels ahead of plan?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.

Page 121:06 to 121:09

Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You never told anyone at TransOcean that the only stability test you ever got from Mr. Gagliano showed that the cement was unstable, did you?

Page 121:12 to 121:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You never told anyone at TransOcean that you never got a good stability test for the cement, did you?

Page 121:18 to 121:18

A. Same answer.

Page 121:25 to 122:04

Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You understood at that time, on April -- in April of 2010, that the only proven technique for deciding whether you had a good cement job was to run a cement bond log, correct?

Page 122:06 to 122:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And BP's ETP GP 1060 required you to run a bond log on the production casing, didn't it?

Page 122:11 to 122:19

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You understood that because you went with the long string, you needed to fix any problems with the cement before the temporary abandonment, correct?
A. Same answer.

Q. And the only proven method for detecting problems with the cement was to run a cement bond log, correct?

Page 122:21 to 123:02

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) BP decided not to run a cement bond log even though you knew that going with the long string made it particularly important to detect any problems with the cement job before displacing the well; isn't that correct?

Page 123:04 to 123:04

A. Same answer.

Page 123:09 to 123:11

Q. You agree that it was BP's responsibility to determine how the negative tests would be conducted?

Page 123:13 to 123:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And the onshore BP engineering team delegated that responsibility to you, didn't they?

Page 123:18 to 123:24

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Had you ever prepared a negative test procedure before?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you deny that you asked the well site leader and the mud engineer for advice on how to prepare the negative pressure test procedure?

Page 124:01 to 124:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You understood that this was BP's responsibility to decide whether the

negative pressure test was a success?

Page 124:06 to 124:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You understood that it was BP's responsibility to determine whether it was safe to move on after the test to the displacement of the riser; isn't that correct?

Page 124:12 to 125:11

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) But you left the rig before the negative pressure test even started, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you agree that the April 20th, 2010, Temporary Abandonment Procedure that you sent to the rig did not provide specifics on how to perform the negative pressure test?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you agree that the April 20th, 2010, Temporary Abandonment Procedure did not specify how the negative pressure test should be set up?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you agree that the April 20th, 2010, Temporary Abandonment Procedure did not specify calculated bleed back volumes?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you agree that the April 20th, 2010, Temporary Abandonment Procedure did not provide success or failure criteria?
A. Same answer.
Q. BP also chose to use an abnormally -- abnormally large volume of spacer during the negative pressure test, correct?

Page 125:14 to 125:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Typically, BP uses around 180 to 200 barrels of spacer during a negative pressure test, correct?

Page 125:20 to 125:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) In this instance, on April 20th, 2010, the plan that you sent to the rig called for 450 barrels of spacer, correct?

Page 126:01 to 126:08

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) By choosing the heavy spacer, BP increased the risk that the spacer would fall downward through the lighter seawater during displacement and potentially end up beneath the BOP when the lower annular was closed for the negative pressure test, correct?
A. Same answer.

Page 126:11 to 126:13

Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Do you agree that the spacer below the annular could cause problems with the negative pressure test?

Page 126:16 to 126:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Do you agree that BP was warned in advance that the spacer could cause some of -- some of the spacer to congeal in small restrictions and tools in the drill pipe?

Page 126:23 to 126:25

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) BP chose to use the spacer to save time and money, correct?

Page 127:02 to 127:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) The surface cement plug was set 3300 feet below the mud line so that weight could be hung below the lockdown sleeve to help set the lockdown sleeve; isn't that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Isn't it true that heavyweight drill pipe

could have been used so the surface cement plug did not have to be set so far below the mud line?

Page 127:12 to 127:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Isn't it true that weight could have also been placed above the lockdown sleeve so that the surface plug did not have to be set so far below the mud line?

Page 127:18 to 128:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Isn't it true that if you needed more time to figure out the temporary abandonment procedures or the cementing issues, that you could have taken that time?
A. Same answer.
Q. On April 13th, the onshore engineering team actually considered simply plugging the open hole and temporarily abandoning the well, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. The onshore engineering -- strike that.
The onshore engineering team decided against temporarily abandoning the well because it would have cost BP an additional 10- to $15 million to return to the well; do you agree?

Page 128:09 to 128:09

A. Same answer.

Page 129:10 to 129:13

Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And you would want the rig crew to have all the information related to safety concerns with displacing and the negative test. You agree?

Page 129:15 to 129:19

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You agree that BP should have told the TransOcean crew that Halliburton recommended 21 centralizers on the production

19 casing but BP decided to use only 6 centralizers?

Page 129:21 to 130:01

21 A. Same answer.
22 Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You agree that BP should
23 have told the TransOcean crew that the April 18th
24 OptiCem report prepared by Halliburton predicted a
25 severe gas flow problem if seven or fewer
1 centralizers were used on the production casing?

Page 130:03 to 130:08

3 A. Same answer.
4 Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You agree that BP should
5 have told the TransOcean crew that Weatherford
6 recommended circulating at 5 barrels per minute to
7 7 barrels per minute to convert the float collar,
8 but BP chose not to circulate at those rates.

Page 130:10 to 130:14

10 A. Same answer.
11 Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Do you agree that BP
12 should have told the TransOcean crew that
13 questions existed regarding whether the float
14 collar converted?

Page 130:16 to 130:19

16 A. Same answer.
17 Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Do you agree that BP
18 should have told the TransOcean crew that it did
19 not perform a full bottoms-up?

Page 130:21 to 130:25

21 A. Same answer.
22 Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Do you agree that BP
23 should have told the TransOcean crew that the
24 circulation pressure at the shearing out the float
25 collars was lower than modeled?

Page 131:02 to 131:06

2 A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Do you agree that BP should have told the TransOcean crew that BP performed the cement job on the production casing without getting complete lab tests on the cement?

Page 131:08 to 131:13

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Do you agree that BP should have told the TransOcean crew that the limited volume of cement used for the production casing and the low rate at which that cement was pumped increased the risk of cement failure?

Page 131:15 to 131:18

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Do you agree that BP should have told the TransOcean crew that it was using lost control material as a spacer?

Page 131:20 to 131:24

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Do you agree that there was worry on the rig about the next operation, which was the P&I at the Nile Well -- P&A at the Nile Well?

Page 132:01 to 134:19

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Do you deny that you sent an E-mail to Richard Miller on April 15 asking him to review the possibility of using a production liner on Macondo instead of the planned long string?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you deny that you apologized to Mr. Miller for asking him to consider design changes at the last minute?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you deny that you told Mr. Miller that Macondo was a nightmare well?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you deny that Mr. Miller told you that

he got nervous because BP had flipped the design parameters around so much?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Do you agree that BP was flipping the design parameters around?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) On April 14th, the onshore engineering team met to discuss whether to use a long string or a liner for the final production casing; isn't that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you were at that meeting?
A. Same answer.
Q. And at this meeting on April 14th, one week before the blowout, the onshore engineering team agreed to recommend a liner instead of a long string, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) The original plan for the well had called for a long string for the final production casing; isn't that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. You understood that changing to a liner would add another 7- to $10 million to the cost of the well; is that correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) But you thought that an extra 7- to $10 million was worth it because the liner was a safer option than the long string; isn't that correct?
A. Same answer.
MR. MORRISS: Form.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You thought that with the liner, BP was more likely to get a good cement job?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And you thought that BP was less likely to get a good cement job with the long string; isn't that correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) The BP Onshore Engineering Team subsequently decided to change the recommendation and go back to the long string, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. You understood, didn't you, that going with the long string increased the risk of cement failure?

Page 134:21 to 134:25

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Although you changed your recommendations, you made it clear to your supervisor, Mr. Sims, that there were risks in going with the liner, didn't you?

Page 135:02 to 135:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Strike that question.
Although you changed your recommendations, you made it clear to your supervisor, Mr. Sims, that there were risks in going with the long string, correct?

Page 135:09 to 135:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And, In fact, the team prepared another set of PowerPoint slides that went over the risks that were associated with the long string, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. You wanted to make sure that Mr. Sims understood that there were risks with going with the long string; do you agree?

Page 135:19 to 136:08

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And you told Mr. Sims that with the long string, BP was less likely to get a good cement job; isn't that correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You told Mr. Sims that the long string was still not as safe as the liner, didn't you?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And you understood that BP was prepared to accept the risks of going with the long string in order to save 7- to $10 million, correct?

Page 136:10 to 136:14

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You concluded that if BP went with the long string instead of the liner, it would be hard for BP to justify deferring fixing any problems with the cement, correct?

Page 136:16 to 136:22

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You believed at that time that if BP went with the long string, that BP would have to do a remediation on the cement job, if necessary, before the Temporary Abandonment Procedure, correct?
A. Same answer.

Page 138:24 to 139:05

Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) BP initially ordered six centralizer subs for use with the -- the production casing, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you're aware that Mr. Walz asked Mr. Cocales to get 15 more centralizers to be sent to the rig, correct?

Page 139:07 to 139:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And Mr. Guide decided that he did not want to use the additional centralizers, correct?

Page 139:12 to 139:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) If Mr. Guide didn't like the centralizers that were sent to the rig, you could have waited for more centralizers; isn't that correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And one of the options discussed at that point was simply to plug the open hole; isn't that correct?

Page 139:23 to 140:02

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Now, you were the person at BP who decided where the six centralizers would actually go on the drill -- on the production casing, correct?

Page 140:04 to 140:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You understood that it was important not only to get the right number of centralizers, but to put them in the right locations, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. In fact, you knew that poor casing centralization could result in an inadequate cement job; isn't that correct?

Page 140:14 to 141:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You knew that API Recommended Practice 65 states that computer simulations using accurate well and fluid data should be used to determine centralizer placement, didn't you?
A. Same answer.
Q. You're aware that BP's own policies recommended running multiple computer simulations to determine the sensitivity of the well design to hole size, excess cement volume and channelling, correct?

A. Same answer.
Q. But you didn't run any cement -- any computer simulations to determine the centralizer placement, correct?

Page 141:06 to 141:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You didn't comply with the API recommended practices to determine centralizer placement with computer simulations, correct?

Page 141:11 to 141:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You did not comply with BP's recommendation that you run multiple computer simulations to determine the centralizer placement, correct?

Page 141:17 to 141:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) You didn't follow the recommendations from the OptiCem modeling, correct?

Page 141:22 to 142:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) In fact, after your first placement, you decided that was not the best placement, so you did another placement, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And after the second placement, you again thought that wasn't the best placement, so you did a third placement, correct?

Page 142:06 to 142:11

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) When you finally decided where you wanted to run the centralizers, you didn't ask Mr. Gagliano to run an OptiCem model to see whether your placement was appropriate, did you?

Page 142:13 to 142:18

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Now, the reason you only had six centralizers -- six centralizer subs on the rig to work with is because you waited until the last minute to actually order the centralizers; isn't that correct?

Page 142:20 to 142:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And when you ordered the centralizers on March 31st, Weatherford only had six centralizer subs, correct?

Page 142:25 to 143:06

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And you took the six centralizer subs that Weatherford had on hand; isn't that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Now, you agree that you could have asked Weatherford to manufacture more centralizer subs?

Page 143:08 to 143:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Isn't it true that Weatherford offered to manufacture more centralizer subs within ten days, if you needed those?

Page 143:14 to 143:19

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) If you had asked Weatherford on March 31st to manufacture additional centralizer subs, those centralizer subs could have been manufactured before the production casing was run; isn't that correct?

Page 143:21 to 143:25

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Later, when BP decided to use 21 centralizers, BP asked Weatherford to send 15 centralizers that they had in stock, correct?
A. Same answer.

Page 144:02 to 144:04

Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) It was too late to order more centralizer subs unless you were willing to delay finishing the well; isn't that correct?

Page 144:06 to 144:08

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And you did not want to delay finishing the well, correct?

Page 144:10 to 144:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) That delay would cost BP money, correct?

Page 144:14 to 144:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Did you perform a -- any type of formal risk assessment on using 6 centralizers instead of 21 centralizers?

Page 144:19 to 144:22

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Did you perform any type of formal risk assessment on the placement of the centralizers?

Page 144:24 to 145:03

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Did you perform any MOC on using -- Management of Change on using centra -- centralizers versus 21 centralizers?
A. Same answer.

Page 145:18 to 148:16

Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Do you deny that BP made eight attempts to -- to convert the float collar?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you discussed with John Guide that you were having problems attempting to convert the float collar, and Mr. Guide said to increase -- increase the pressure, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you called Brian Clawson with Weatherford, and he told you that the ball in the autofill tube of the float collar would pass through the bottom of the auto tube without converting the floats at 1300 psi, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Did you tell anybody that Brian Clawson with Weatherford told you that the ball in the autofill tube of the float collar would pass through the bottom of the autofill tube without converting the floats at 1300 psi?
A. Same answer.
MR. MORRISS: Form.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Even though you had spoken to Mr. Clawson about the psi at which the ball would pass through the autofill tube of the float collar, Mr. Guide instructed you to increase the pressure up to 3,142 psi, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And when the pressure was increased up to 3,142 psi, circulation was established, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And at that point, you told Mr. Clawson, "Yeah, we blew it at 3,140. Still not sure what we blew yet."
Correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Even after the pressure was increased to 3,142 psi and circulation was established, questions still existed regarding whether the float collar converted; isn't that correct?

MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And one of those questions was that Halliburton -- strike that.
One of those questions was that Halliburton model, that the circulation pressure after converting the float collar should have been 570 psi and 4 barrels per minute, but you observed that the circulation pressure was 350 psi at 4 barrels per minute; is that correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) And even though the circulation pressure was lower than modeled, you did not stop the job, correct?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Do you agree that the risk the cement job would not set properly was increased if the float collar was not properly converted?
A. Same answer.
Q. Are you aware that BP takes the position that the oil and gas flowed up the shoe track and up the production casing?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you agree that the oil and gas could not have flowed up the shoe track and up the production casing if BP had properly converted the float collar?

Page 148:18 to 149:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Did BP perform any formal risk assessment on increasing the pressure to attempt to convert the float collar?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did BP perform any formal risk assessment on the low circulation pressures?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did BP perform any -- a Management of Change procedure on increasing the pressure to attempt to convert the float collar?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did BP perform a Management of Change on

the low circulation pressure?
A. Same answer.
Q. You had concerns about a breach in the casing, didn't you?
A. Same answer.

Page 149:12 to 149:15

Q. (BY MR. HYMEL) Even though you had concerns about a breach in the casing, you did nothing about that concern and decided to move forward with the TA procedure, correct?

Page 149:17 to 149:17

A. Same answer.

Page 149:25 to 150:11

E X A M I N A T I O N
BY MR. SCHWARTZ:
Q. Hi, Mr. Morel. My name is Jon-Bernard Schwartz, and I represent Halliburton. Do you understand who I am and who I represent?
A. Yes.
Q. I want to go back, if I could, to the design of the production casing that we've been discussing today.
You have agreed and you agree now that cementing a long string is more difficult than cementing a liner?

Page 150:13 to 150:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you also agree that it was substantially cheaper to cement the long string than the liner; isn't that correct?

Page 150:18 to 150:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And it would save -- doing so, it would have saved BP -- or did save BP 7- to $10 million, right?

Page 150:23 to 151:01

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Isn't it true that using a long string rather than a liner increases the risk of cement contamination?

Page 151:03 to 151:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And -- and this risk was further increased by using a tapered long string because the wiper plugs could not wipe it properly?

Page 151:09 to 151:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And using a long string did not permit moving or rotating the casing during the cement job; isn't that right?

Page 151:14 to 151:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you knew this, didn't you?

Page 151:18 to 151:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And rotating the casing would have improved the likelihood of a quality cement job, wouldn't it?

Page 151:23 to 152:02

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And cementing the long string required a higher cement pumping pressure and resulted in a higher ECD than cementing a liner?

Page 152:04 to 152:07

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Isn't it true that if you had choose -- chosen a liner, you could have obtained a lower ECD?

Page 152:09 to 152:14

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And isn't it true that with a liner, you could have ignored the ECD completely because you would have had the mechanical seal as another barrier to the hydrocarbon flow?

Page 152:16 to 152:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And isn't it true that if you had chosen a liner, you would have been more prone to remediate a cement job because remediation is easier with a liner than with a long string?

Page 152:23 to 153:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) During the week preceding the blowout when you were making changes to the Temporary Abandonment Procedure, you didn't consider how the risks associated with such changes would be mitigated in accordance with the risk register, did you?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) With regards to the risk register, when BP recommended the final long string design, you knew that possible hydrocarbon zones could be left exposed in the annulus with only the casing hanger seal as a single barrier for the temporary abandonment, right?

Page 153:14 to 153:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) But you did nothing to mitigate that risk?

Page 153:18 to 153:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) If you had chosen a liner over the long string, you wouldn't have had to have used a lower volume cement, correct?

Page 153:23 to 154:01

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) If you had chosen a liner over the long string, you wouldn't have had to use a slower pump rate; isn't that correct?

Page 154:03 to 154:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) If you had chosen the liner over the long string, you wouldn't have had to use nitrogen cement with reduced density; isn't that correct?

Page 154:09 to 154:13

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) In sum, BP's engineering team did not adequately consider the effect that the long string design would have on the cement job, did it?

Page 154:15 to 155:05

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you were part of this team, weren't you?
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) BP made -- you, on behalf of BP, made numerous cost-saving decisions that increased the chance of a blowout without running a formal risk assessment; isn't that right?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Isn't it true that in the days preceding the blowout, many of your decisions regarding the well were affected by the

fact that the well was over budget?
A. Same answer.

Page 155:07 to 155:11

Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Isn't it true that in the days preceding the blowout, many of your decisions regarding the well were affected by the fact that the -- the well was over its allocated time for its completion?

Page 155:13 to 155:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Because of that, in the days proceeding the blowout, didn't you, on behalf of BP, make many decisions that were cost-driven?

Page 155:18 to 155:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you did so without running any formal risk assessment; isn't that right?

Page 155:23 to 156:02

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you made changes in the days preceding the blowout just on an ad hoc basis?
A. Same answer.

Page 156:04 to 156:11

Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And we -- you were questioned previously about your deciding not to wait for more centralizers to be delivered to the rig, right?
A. Same answer.
Q. And that's -- not waiting for the centralizers to be delivered to the rig saved time, didn't it?

Page 156:13 to 156:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And time is money; isn't it?

Page 156:17 to 158:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) I'm going to hand you, Mr. Morel, what's been previously marked as Exhibit 2041. And it's Tab 5. So, if you would look at that document.
And this is an E-mail from you to Jesse Gagliano, Mark Hafle, Brett Cocales, and Greg Walz, subject: Regarding OptiCem report. And again, it's dated Thursday, April 15th. I'm going to read the text of the E-mail: "We have six centralizers. We can run them in a row, spread out, or any combinations of the two, but the vertical hole, so hopefully the pipe stays centralized due to gravity. As far as changes, it's too late to get any more product to the rig. Our only options is to rearrange placement of these centralizers. Please see attached diagram for my recommendation."
Did I read that right, Mr. Morel?
A. Same answer.
Q. And so, you said here: "It's too late to get any more product to the rig." Isn't that right?
A. Same answer.
Q. The truth is, it's never too late to get any more product to the rig; isn't that right?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) If you had wanted to, you could have stopped the rig completely to wait on this product getting to the rig, couldn't you?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anyone on the rig on BP's behalf could have done that; isn't that true?
A. Same answer.
Q. But the reason that you didn't wait for more product to arrive to the rig was -- was putting cost over safety; isn't that right?

Page 158:06 to 158:13

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And we talked about running the cement evaluation log, didn't we, today?
A. Same answer.
Q. And again, BP decided not to run a cement evaluation log; isn't that right?
A. Same answer.

Page 158:15 to 158:16

Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And that decision saved BP time?

Page 158:18 to 158:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And that decision saved BP money, didn't it?

Page 158:22 to 159:05

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) On or about April 15th, you recommended to the Macondo onshore engineers about setting a deep plug in the seawater; isn't that right?
A. Same answer.
Q. But you never conducted or saw to it that someone else conducted any formal risk analysis in this regard; isn't that right?

Page 159:07 to 159:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you did that because it saved you time, right?

Page 159:11 to 159:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And it saved you money?

Page 159:14 to 159:14

A. Same answer.

Page 159:18 to 159:20

BP decided not to perform additional tests regarding well integrity given the dubious negative test results; isn't that right?

Page 159:22 to 159:24

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you knew about these test results?

Page 160:01 to 160:03

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you did not make any recommendations to perform additional tests?

Page 160:05 to 160:08

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Is that because it saved you guys time?
A. Same answer.

Page 160:10 to 160:11

Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And it saved you money, right?

Page 160:13 to 160:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) During the displacement procedure, you did not emphasize the importance of monitoring for kicks during the displacement, did you?

Page 160:19 to 160:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) I'd like to talk about the volume of cement that was pumped. Isn't it true that it's better to pump more, rather than

less, cement into a well?

Page 160:25 to 161:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And isn't it true that in this case, with regards to the production casing, that it would have been better to pump more, rather than less, cement into the well?

Page 161:06 to 161:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Pumping more cement reduces the risk of contamination of cement by diluting the amount of contaminants, doesn't it?

Page 161:11 to 161:11

A. Same answer.

Page 161:15 to 161:20

Pumping more cement also reduces the impact of errors and cement placement; isn't that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. BP made a conscious decision to pump less cement, didn't it?

Page 161:22 to 161:25

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) You recognized that this small volume of cement provided little margin for error, didn't you?

Page 162:02 to 162:06

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Your decision and BP's decision to pump only 61 barrels of cement meant that there would be less cement above the hydrocarbon zone, right?

Page 162:08 to 162:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Displacement of the cement only 500 feet above the hydrocarbon zone violated BP's own engineering practice at BPT 1060; isn't that right?

Page 162:14 to 162:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And BP's decision to use less cement also increased the risk that placement errors would leave insufficient cement in the shoe track or in the annular space corresponding to the hydrocarbon zone; isn't that right?

Page 162:22 to 162:24

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you knew this at the time, didn't you?

Page 163:01 to 163:05

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And did -- and you knew at the time that BP's decision to use less cement also increased the chance of cement contamination; isn't that right?

Page 163:07 to 163:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And BP ignored these risks when it decided to use a low volume cement; isn't that true?

Page 163:12 to 163:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And didn't you know that BP ignored these risks when it decided to use a low volume cement?

Page 163:17 to 163:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) You would agree with me that BP's decision to use lower -- a lower pump rate affected the cement job?
A. Same answer.

Page 163:23 to 163:25

Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you knew this at the time that the cement job on the production casing was pumped; isn't that right?

Page 164:02 to 164:05

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And BP decided to pump the primary cement at a low rate; isn't that right?

Page 164:07 to 164:11

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And the low rate decreased the efficiency with which the cement displaced the mud from the annular space; isn't that right?

Page 164:13 to 164:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) This low rate also increased the risk of channeling; isn't that right?

Page 164:18 to 164:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you knew that it would also increase the risk of contamination?

Page 164:22 to 164:24

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you also knew that it would increase the risk of gas flow?

Page 165:01 to 165:03

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) You were aware of these risks; isn't that right?

Page 165:05 to 165:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) BP was aware of these risks; isn't that right?

Page 165:09 to 165:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Yet, BP ignored these risks when it decided to pump cement at a lower rate, didn't it?

Page 165:14 to 165:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you ignored these risks when you, on behalf of BP, decided to pump cement at a lower rate?

Page 165:19 to 166:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) We've discussed previously today running a cement bond log. I want to ask you some questions about that.
BP decided not to run a cement bond log after the cement job we're here for today; isn't that right?
A. Same answer.
Q. And a cement bond log would have determined if there was channeling in the cement; isn't that right?

Page 166:06 to 166:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) BP's decision not to run a cement bond log violated BP's own internal procedures, didn't it?

Page 166:11 to 166:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And without this cement bond log being run, BP had no way to verify whether there was any channeling in the cement; isn't that true?

Page 166:17 to 166:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) However, running a CBL would -- a cement bond log would require more time; isn't that right?

Page 166:22 to 166:24

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And running a CBL, or a cement bond log, would require money, correct?

Page 167:01 to 167:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) So BP saved time and money by not running the cement bond log; isn't that correct?

Page 167:06 to 167:11

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) On April 18th, 2010, you received an OptiCem report from Jesse Gagliano showing that using only seven centralizers would result in a severe gas flow potential; isn't that right?

Page 167:13 to 167:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) You did not contact Jesse Gagliano to discuss this information, did you?

Page 167:18 to 167:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) You did not seek advice from any of BP's internal experts regarding this information, did you?

Page 167:23 to 168:02

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) The only way to predict the effect of centralizer placement on mud displacement is through computer modeling; isn't that right?

Page 168:04 to 168:08

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And the April 18th, 2010, computer modeling using OptiCem software showed that using only seven centralizers would result in severe channeling; isn't that right?

Page 168:10 to 168:13

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Nevertheless, you, on behalf of BP, proceeded with using only six centralizers; isn't that right?

Page 168:15 to 168:18

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Nevertheless, BP proceeded with using only six centralizers; isn't that right?

Page 168:20 to 168:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) So, basically, you disregarded the April 18, 2010, model results; isn't that right?

Page 168:25 to 169:05

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you knew at the time of -- of the job that we're here for today that a previous OptiCem report from Jesse Gagliano showed that using 21 centralizers would result in only a minor gas flow potential; isn't that right?

Page 169:07 to 169:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) But you decided that it was not necessary to use as many centralizers; isn't that true?

Page 169:12 to 169:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) You -- and you went ahead and decided to design -- design centralizer placement yourself; isn't that correct?

Page 169:17 to 169:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you were planning on comparing the actual cementing data with the modeling after the cement job was done; were you not?

Page 169:23 to 170:02

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Instead of relying on Halliburton's model, you decided that you will probably be fine and we'll probably get a good cement job?

Page 170:04 to 170:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And your placement of the centralizers was different from the placement recommended by Jesse Gagliano; isn't that true?

Page 170:09 to 170:12

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) In fact, you didn't even tell him that you were going to use only six centralizers; isn't that right?

Page 170:14 to 170:22

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) You would agree with me that reduced pipe centralization increases the risk of poor mud displacement?
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Would you agree with me that reduced pipe centralization increases the risk that mud channels will compromise zonal isolation?

Page 170:24 to 171:03

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) You would agree with me that BP consciously assumed all the risks by choosing to use only six centralizers despite Halliburton's recommendation?

Page 171:05 to 171:11

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) I want to ask you some questions about the slurry design. Did you ever -- isn't it true that you told Jesse Gagliano that you wanted the cement slurry recipe to include more retarder to increase the thickening time?

Page 171:13 to 171:13

A. Same answer.

Page 171:21 to 172:17

Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Mr. Morel, I'm looking at Exhibit 987, which I just handed you. It's -- it's an E-mail between you and Mr. Gagliano dated April 17th, 2010; isn't that true?
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And your -- the subject

of the E-mail in Exhibit 987 is "Lab test."; isn't that right?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you write to Jesse Gagliano: "I would prefer the extra pump time with the added risk of having issues with the nitrogen. What are your thoughts? There isn't a compressive strength development yet, so it's hard to ensure we will get what we need until it's done. Brian."
Did I read that correctly, Mr. Morel?
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) So, isn't it true in this E-mail, you're telling Jesse Gagliano that you would prefer to alter the cement slurry recipe to include more retarder to increase the thickening time or pump time of the cement?

Page 172:19 to 172:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And isn't it true, then, in that E-mail, that you are recognizing that adding more retarder will potentially increase the risk of a nitrogen foam instability?

Page 172:25 to 173:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) You were aware of the difficulties with the float conversion; isn't that right?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you knew that it took nine attempts and 3,140 psi pressure to establish circulation?
A. Same answer.
Q. And even after circulation was established, you had doubts that the float collar had actually converted; isn't that true?

Page 173:12 to 173:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you weren't even sure when it was dislodged at 3140 psi when the circulation was established; isn't that right?

Page 173:17 to 173:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you were also concerned with low circulating pressure at that time; isn't that true?

Page 173:22 to 174:01

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Despite your doubts in this regard, isn't it true that you didn't try to verify in a meaningful way that the float collar had converted?

Page 174:03 to 174:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And these are unconverted float valves that could have compromised the bottom hole cement job; isn't that right?

Page 174:09 to 174:11

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Yet, you assumed that risk, didn't you?

Page 174:13 to 174:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) You were also concerned that there might have been a breach somewhere in the casing during this time; isn't that true?

Page 174:18 to 174:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) But you didn't do anything to verify that, did you?

Page 174:22 to 175:19

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Isn't it true,

Mr. Morel, that there's no such thing as the "bladder effect"?
A. Same answer.
Q. When you first drafted a Temporary Abandonment Procedure for the Macondo Well, you didn't even include a negative test procedure in that draft, did you?
A. Same answer.
Q. And then subsequently, when you did include it, you didn't describe the pass/fail criteria for the negative test; isn't that right?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you never explained in this procedure what pressures or flow volume increase you'd expect to see; isn't that right?
A. Same answer.
Q. On April 20, 2010, when you sent out operational notes describing the negative test, you once again ad -- omitted an explanation of what constitutes a successful negative test; isn't that true?

Page 175:21 to 175:25

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And neither -- and in this draft on April 20th, you didn't include any contingency procedures in the case -- in the case that the negative test failed; isn't that true?

Page 176:02 to 176:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) In fact, at the time, you believed that the negative test success has to be determined in terms of flow or no flow and monitoring of the pressure is not necessary; isn't that true?

Page 176:09 to 176:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you never took any steps to emphasize the importance of a negative test to the crew; isn't that correct?

Page 176:14 to 176:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you failed to do this even though you knew that the well was going to be severely underbalanced?

Page 176:19 to 176:24

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Isn't it true that during the drilling of this entire well, BP was drilling too fast to allow for full testing of pore pressure variations from predicted pore pressure?

Page 177:01 to 177:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Isn't it true that conducting a full bottoms-up prior to a cementing job is considered to be a best industry practice?

Page 177:06 to 177:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you'd agree with me that BP made the decision not to conduct a full bottoms-up prior to the final cement job?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you would agree with me that this resulted in cement contamination?

Page 177:14 to 177:18

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And you would agree with me that it was a contributing cause to the blowout?
A. Same answer.

Page 177:20 to 178:03

Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) With regards to the spacer that was used that we've discussed today, BP chose to use lost circulation materials as a

spacer; isn't that right?
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And when you did so, BP knew that there was a risk that this dense spacer could clog flow paths that could be critical to proper negative test procedure; isn't that right?

Page 178:06 to 178:09

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And, nonetheless, you used this spacer because it saved BP time and money; isn't that right?

Page 178:11 to 178:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Isn't it late that -- isn't it true that as late as April 12, 2010, you did not have a Temporary Abandonment Procedure in place?

Page 178:17 to 178:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Isn't it true that the rig crew and the well site leaders were still waiting on this procedure from you as late as April 12th, 2010?

Page 178:23 to 179:01

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And isn't it true that at that time, around April 12th of 2010, planning had been lagging behind operations for some time?

Page 179:03 to 179:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) During displacement, BP replaced 8,367 feet of drilling mud with seawater before setting any additional mechanical barriers; isn't that right?
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And BP conducted no

formal risk assessment of these changes to the TA procedure; isn't that true?
A. Same answer.

Page 179:14 to 179:18

Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And by "TA," I mean temporary abandonment.
You conducted no -- no such formal risk assessment yourself, did you?
A. Same answer.

Page 179:23 to 179:25

You did not consider the combined effect of these changes upon the Temporary Abandonment Procedure; isn't that true?

Page 180:02 to 180:25

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Mr. Morel, I'm going to hand you what's been previously marked as Exhibit 1517. Take a minute, if you would, to familiarize yourself with that document and if I -- if you would, please look at the second page of this document.
And this is the E-mail dated April 16th, 2010, between you and Mr. Cocales; and I'm going to read it to you. It says: "Even if the hole is perfectly straight, a straight piece of pipe even in tension will not seek the perfect center of the hole unless it has something to centralize it. But who cares? It's done. End of story. We'll probably be fine and we'll get a good cement job. I would rather have to squeeze than get stuck above the WH. So, Guide is right on the risk/reward equation. Best regards, Brett."
Did I read that correctly?
A. Same answer.
Q. And isn't it true that you never responded to Mr. Cocales, when he said "Who cares? It's done. End of story. We'll probably be fine"?

Page 181:02 to 181:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Isn't it true that you knew that the casing could have been damaged when you pressured the float collar, as we have discussed?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Isn't it true that Mr. Kaluza expressed his concern to you in this regard?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Isn't it true that, at the time of this cementing of the production casing, that you thought Halliburton performed a great job?

Page 181:19 to 181:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) And isn't it true that you sent E-mails to this effect to the team?

Page 181:23 to 182:14

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. SCHWARTZ) Isn't it true that, just before leaving the rig, you E-mailed the rest of the BP team, quote: "Just wanted to let everyone know the cement job went well. Pressure stayed low, but we had full returns the entire job, saw 80 psi lift pressure and landed out right on the circulated [sic] volume.... We should be coming out of the hole shortly"?
Didn't you write that?
A. Same answer.
Q. And isn't it true that later on you followed up with an E-mail saying, quote: "Halliburton's cement team" -- or saying, quote: "The Halliburton cement team did a great job"?
Isn't that true?
A. Same answer.

Page 182:22 to 183:09

E X A M I N A T I O N
BY MS. IIAMS:
Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Morel. My name is Sarah Iiams; and I, along with my colleague, Terrance Prout, represent Anadarko in this case.
First, I just want to ask you: BP was designated as the operator for the Macondo Well; is that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Will you agree that BP made the decisions with respect to the design, drilling, and operation of the Macondo Well?
A. Same answer.

Page 183:11 to 185:05

Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) You understand that Anadarko was a nonoperating party with respect to the Macondo Well, don't you?
A. Same answer.
Q. You're not aware of anyone from Anadarko having made any engineering decisions with respect to the design of the Macondo Well, are you?
A. Same answer.
Q. You're not aware of anyone from Anadarko having made any engineering decisions with respect to the drilling of the Macondo Well, are you?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko did not have engineering input into the well operations, did it?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko did not have any input regarding the cement job at Macondo, did it?
A. Same answer.
Q. You're not aware of anyone from Anadarko participating in developing or approving the cement design for the Macondo Well, are you?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko did not participate in the decision to use foam cement at Macondo, did it?
A. Same answer.
Q. You don't have any evidence that Anadarko had knowledge of the base cement slurry design, do you?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko did not participate in the

decision to use base oil as a spacer for this nitrified cement job, did it?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko did participate in the decision as to which test to run on the various components of the cement job, did it?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko did not receive the results of any of the tests on various components of the cement job, did it?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko had no role in the decision to start the cement job without BP having a successful foam stability test in its possession, did it?

Page 185:07 to 185:11

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Anadarko did not participate in the decision to use a small volume of cement for the 9 and seven-eighths production casing job, did it?

Page 185:13 to 186:05

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) You can't point to any evidence that Anadarko had any knowledge of the volume of cement that BP planned to use on the production casing job, can you?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko did not participate in the decision as to what pump rate to use for the Macondo cement job, did it?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko did not participate in the decision not to run a full bottoms-up; is that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko did not participate in the decision to ignore Halliburton's recommendation to use 21 centralizers and to use only six centralizers instead; is that correct?

Page 186:07 to 188:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Anadarko did not participate in the decision to call total depth where it was called, did it?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko did not participate in the decision to use LCM spacer consisting of Form-A-Set and Form-A-Squeeze, did it?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko did not participate in the determination as to whether the float collar had converted after nine attempts of conversion, did it?
A. Same answer.
Q. You have no information suggesting that Anadarko received notice that there had been difficulties in converting the float collar, do you?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko did not participate in conducting or interpreting the negative test; isn't that true?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko did not play any role in deciding when to install the lockdown sleeve, did it?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko was provided no details of the lockdown procedure; is that true?
A. Same answer.
Q. Anadarko did not participate in the decision not to run a cement bond log, did it?
A. Same answer.
Q. Mr. Morel, during the time period prior to April 20th, 2010, you're not aware of anyone from Anadarko visiting the DEEPWATER HORIZON rig, are you?
A. Same answer.
Q. And no Anadarko personnel were stationed on the DEEPWATER HORIZON like BP had its well site leaders on the rig; is that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Now, you were the drilling engineer at the time of the incident on April 20th, right?
A. Same answer.
Q. And there was a reorganization of job

accountability and reporting at BP in 2010; is that true?
A. Same answer.
Q. The reorganization created separate reporting structures for Engineering & Operations, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Prior to the reorganization, you and Mark Hafle reported to David Sims; but after the reorganization, you and Mr. Hafle and Mr. Cocales reported to Greg Walz; is that true?

Page 188:14 to 188:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) David Sims, who had been on the same level as John Guide before the reorganization, was promoted to become Mr. Guide's boss; is that right?
A. Same answer.
Q. Would you agree that the BP reorganization in 2010 resulted in confusion among the Macondo team as to who was responsible for what and to whom you ultimately reported?

Page 188:25 to 189:02

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) The reorganization led to questions of authority, didn't it?

Page 189:04 to 189:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Were you aware that, in an April, 2010, E-mail to David Sims, John Guide asked Mr. Sims what his authority was and expressed that, with the separation of Engineering & Operations, he didn't know what he could and could not do?

Page 189:12 to 189:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Is it fair to say that, shortly before the explosion, there were tensions

15 between the BP Engineering & Operation groups?

Page 189:17 to 189:21

17 A. Same answer.
18 Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Did Mr. Guide ever tell
19 you, as he did Mr. Sims, that the huge level of
20 paranoia from Engineering leadership was driving
21 chaos?

Page 189:23 to 190:05

23 A. Same answer.
24 Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Now, Greg Walz's new
25 position after the reorganization was Drilling
1 Engineering Team Leader; is that right?
2 A. Same answer.
3 Q. Is it fair to say that there were issues
4 with Mr. Walz's leadership and decision-making on
5 the cement job in April, 2010?

Page 190:07 to 190:11

7 A. Same answer.
8 Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) You received several
9 E-mails from Mr. Walz on April 16th and 17th where
10 he acknowledged that he did a flip-flop concerning
11 the use of space on the cement job, right?

Page 190:13 to 190:15

13 A. Same answer.
14 Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) He also indicated that he
15 had a misstep with the centralizer, didn't he?

Page 190:17 to 190:24

17 A. Same answer.
18 Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Okay. Mr. Walz also said
19 that he needed to do a better job at leadership,
20 didn't he?
21 A. Same answer.
22 Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Do you think that "a
23 misstep" is an accurate description of Mr. Walz's
24 handling of the centralizer issue?

Page 191:01 to 191:12

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Now, BP had a Gulf of Mexico Exploration and Appraisal Communication Plan that addressed, among other things, who to call on the onshore team and when, didn't it?
A. Same answer.
Q. The notes from an April 27th interview with you indicated -- after the incident indicated "Ops note direct results of positive test should be sent to Houston" but no similar requests for the negative test. Do you recall saying that in your interview?

Page 191:14 to 191:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Do you agree that the BP communication plan was not clear on who was to be contacted and when?

Page 191:19 to 191:22

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) The communication plan was unclear as to whether the rig was supposed to be called during a negative test, wasn't it?

Page 191:24 to 192:03

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Do you agree with the opinion expressed by Mark Hafle that the BP communication plan was not particularly well-written?

Page 192:05 to 192:11

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Are you familiar with the BP Investigative Report that indicates that "communication between BP and Halliburton personnel involved in this cement job was not effective in relation to the challenges and associated risk with the slurry design?

Page 192:13 to 192:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Now, you were directly involved in the cement job, right?
A. Same answer.

Page 192:18 to 192:20

Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Would you agree that there was ineffective communication about the cement job?

Page 192:22 to 194:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Mr. Morel, BP, as the operator, established written guidelines to be followed for cementing and design operations on its rigs; isn't that true?
A. Same answer.
Q. The BP Guidelines for Cement Design and Operations in Deepwater Gulf of Mexico previously has been marked in this case as Exhibit 791. I just have some questions about those.
Will you agree with the statement in BP's Guidelines for Cement Design that obtaining a competent cement job with proper tubular placement is the most important aspect of well design and construction?
A. Same answer.
Q. Now, BP's rig guidelines are supposed to be used by the drilling engineers in the detail planning and design of cement jobs from conception to execution; is that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you were the drilling engineer on the rig, right?
A. Same answer.
Q. Now, the purposes of the BP guidelines are to guide drilling personnel through the cement design process and to identify minimum requirements and standards of cement design and operations, right?
A. Same answer.
Q. And the BP guidelines state that it's

imperative that all requirements be met, doesn't it?

Page 194:06 to 194:19

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) And as the drilling engineer on the Macondo job, you will agree that it was imperative that you follow the requirements and BP's Guidelines for Cement Design and Operations, won't you?
A. Same answer.
Q. Now, the BP guidelines state that drilling engineers are responsible for reviewing the results of cement slurries and spacer tests as well as the details of cement operations including volumes to be pumped.
You agree with that statement, don't you?

Page 194:21 to 194:25

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) And it's important for the BP drilling engineer to be the responsible party for the cementing standards because BP is the operator, right?

Page 195:02 to 195:05

A. Same answer.
Q. And the operator should make sure that the requirements for a successful cement job are met, right?

Page 195:07 to 195:13

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) And you'll agree that achieving zonal isolation is a key requirement to a successful cement job, won't you?
A. Same answer.
Q. But will you agree that the BP cementing guidelines were not all followed at Macondo?

Page 195:15 to 196:01

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Now, BP Guidelines for Cement Design give the BP drilling engineers specific duties with respect to the job of design; isn't that right?
A. Same answer.
Q. You'll agree that the drilling engineer is responsible for providing the cement service provider with all of the necessary data and information to allow for the effective cement slurry, spacer design, and cement job plan, won't you?

Page 196:03 to 196:05

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) BP did not always provide Halliburton with the necessary data, did it?

Page 196:07 to 196:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) BP Guidelines for Cement Design also state that drilling engineers will provide the test matrix for BP Gulf of Mexico and any additional required test to be run on the cement slurries and spacers to the cement surface providers; is that true?
A. Same answer.
Q. You can't provide us with any documentation that you or any of the other engineers complied with that requirement, can you?

Page 196:19 to 196:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) You and Mark Hafle were the lead BP cement program engineers who were most involved in reviewing the cement design at Macondo, right?

Page 196:25 to 197:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) BP also had Erick

Cunningham as an adviser that you could consult with on issues relating to cement; is that true?
A. Same answer.
Q. And Mr. Cunningham actually approved the cement design, didn't he?
A. Same answer.
Q. And will you agree that Halliburton could not have poured the cement without the approval of BP as the operator?

Page 197:12 to 197:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Will you agree that, as the operator, BP had the ultimate decision as to what cement design would be put into the well?

Page 197:17 to 197:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) And BP made the ultimate decision to go with foam cement for the production casing job; is that true?

Page 197:22 to 197:24

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) You actually made the decision to use foam cement, didn't you?

Page 198:01 to 198:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Now, prior to Macondo, BP didn't have much experience with foam cement at this depth, did you?

Page 198:06 to 198:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Greg Walz was your boss, right?
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Are you aware that he said he only knew of about two jobs of a similar depth at Macondo -- as Macondo?

A. Same answer.
Q. Mr. Morel, you're aware that nitrogen foam cement, if it's unstable, can fail to provide zonal isolation, right?

Page 198:18 to 198:22

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) And you know that's what BP's investigative team concluded happened here at Macondo, right?
A. Same answer.

Page 198:25 to 199:04

Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Now, prior to the explosion, BP recognized that using foam cement could present risk due to stability issues; is that true?
A. Same answer.

Page 199:07 to 199:11

Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) You were present at an April 4th meeting with Erick Cunningham, Greg Walz, and others where the potential for contamination of cement with synthetic-based mud was discussed, weren't you?

Page 199:13 to 200:02

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) You and Mr. Hafle and Mr. Cocales also received an E-mail on April 16th from Jesse Gagliano stating that synthetic-based mud can destabilize the foam system which could cause nitrogen breakout; is that right?
A. Same answer.
Q. So, you and Mr. Hafle and Mr. Cocales were certainly aware of the potential for nitrogen breakout prior to the incident; is that true?
A. Same answer.
Q. You also received an E-mail from Greg Walz on April 16th about the fact that cement would not set if contaminated with synthetic-based mud, didn't you?

Page 200:04 to 200:14

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Now, you previously indicated to the BP investigators that nitrogen was the only option reviewed for this project, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. Given the complexities involved in the cement job and the knowledge of the risk associated with foam cement, will you agree that the team should have considered other options for this project?

Page 200:16 to 200:19

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) You-all didn't conduct any type of risk assessment about the use of foam cement for the job, did you?

Page 200:21 to 201:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Now, under BP Guidelines for Cement Design and Operations, drilling engineers are responsible for ensuring that adequate dry cement volumes be on the rig prior to all cement jobs, right?
A. Same answer.
Q. Will you agree that BP has ultimate approval over the dry blend to be used on the job?

Page 201:06 to 201:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Now, the technical advisor -- here, Mr. Gagliano -- would have to check with BP before ordering a dry blend of cement, right?

Page 201:12 to 201:16

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) For this job, the cement

dry blend was already on the rig and was not specifically designed for use on the Macondo Well; is that true?

Page 201:18 to 201:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) BP made the decision to use the existing base cement instead of purchasing a new blend, didn't it?

Page 201:23 to 202:02

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) And BP saved money by using a dry blend cement that was already on the rig, didn't it?
A. Same answer.

Page 202:04 to 202:11

Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Now, you're aware that after the incident, the BP Investigative Report expressed concern that the slurry contained a defoamer but no fluid loss additive, aren't you?
A. Same answer.
Q. You'll agree with me that you and others at BP were fully aware of what was and what wasn't in the slurry?

Page 202:13 to 202:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) BP Guidelines for Cement Design required the drilling engineers to review the results of the slurries, right?
A. Same answer.
Q. So, if you didn't review them, you would have been deviating from BP guidelines, wouldn't you?

Page 202:22 to 203:03

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Okay. Now, you were actually provided with the production casing

reports prior to the explosion that showed the constituents of the slurry that was going to be used on the well, right?
A. Same answer.

Page 203:05 to 203:09

Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) On April 16th, for example, you and Mr. Hafle and Mr. Cocales, Mr. Walz received the Production Casing Report, Version 6, that listed the slurry constituents, correct?

Page 203:11 to 203:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) On April 17th, you received another E-mail from Mr. Gagliano attaching the Production Casing Report, Version 5, that listed the slurry constituents, didn't you?

Page 203:17 to 203:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) On April 18th, you received another E-mail from Mr. Gagliano attaching Production Casing Report, Version 6, that also listed slurry constituents, didn't you?

Page 203:23 to 204:08

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Now, the production casing reports that you received showed the cement design and listed the additives, including D-AIR 3000 Defoamer, correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. So, you knew before the incident that the slurry contained a defoamer, right?
A. Same answer.
Q. There was no fluid-loss additive listed in any of the reports that you received, was there?

Page 204:10 to 204:13

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) So, you knew that the slurry contained no fluid-loss additive before, the cement was pumped, didn't you?

Page 204:15 to 204:19

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Mr. Morel, you can't point us to any instance prior to the explosion where you or anyone else at BP told Halliburton to use fluid-loss additives, can you?

Page 204:21 to 205:01

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) You can't point us to any occasion prior to the explosion where you or anyone else from BP expressed concern to Halliburton or anyone else about the use of a defoamer, can you?

Page 205:03 to 205:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Now, Mr. Morel, you provided written comments about other parts of the procedure to Mr. Gagliano -- for example, directing him to increase the amount of the tartar or to add base oil -- but you did not make any comment about the use of a defoamer or a fluid-loss additive, did you?

Page 205:12 to 205:18

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Now, base oil was used as a spacer on the cement job, was it not?
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) And Erick Cunningham of BP was the person who suggested adding base oil into the cement job, right?

Page 205:20 to 205:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Now, if base oil

commingles with cement, it can lead to destabilization and channeling, can't it?

Page 205:25 to 206:03

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Prior to the explosion, Mark Hafle had expressed concern about the use of base oil at Macondo, hadn't he?

Page 206:05 to 206:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) He actually said that he didn't like base oil for this job, didn't he?

Page 206:09 to 206:17

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Now, on April 16th, 2010, you sent the written direction to Halliburton to include the addition of base oil in the job procedure; is that true?
A. Same answer.
Q. You specifically instructed Mr. Gagliano to add a step to the procedure to pump 7 BBLs of base oil, didn't you?

Page 206:19 to 206:23

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) And Mr. Gagliano followed your direction because, as the operator, it was your ultimate decision as to what went in the well; isn't that true?

Page 206:25 to 207:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) So, BP was aware that base oil could commingle with foam and lead to destabilization prior to the job at Macondo, correct?

Page 207:06 to 207:08

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) And you-all had concerns about its use; isn't that true?

Page 207:10 to 207:13

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) But BP didn't conduct any formal risk assessment before using base oil on this job?

Page 207:15 to 208:01

Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Is that true?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you agree with the finding of the BP Investigative Report that important aspects of the foam cement design, such as foam stability, possible contamination effects, and fluid loss potential, did not appear to have been critically assessed in the prejob reviews?
A. Same answer.
Q. Will you agree that, as the drilling engineer, it was your responsibility to conduct these critical assessments in the prejob reviews?

Page 208:03 to 208:25

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) You'll agree that BP was supposed to engage in quality assurance and quality control of the cementing jobs at the well site, won't you?
A. Same answer.
Q. In fact, BP's written Guidelines for Cement Design and Operation provided a detailed checklist that was to be completed to ensure the performance of the cement job was as close as possible to the way the job is optimized; isn't that true?
MR. MORRISS: Form.
A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) Under the checklist, you were supposed to have a lab report showing cement slurry formulations and testing results, right?
MR. MORRISS: Form.

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) You never completed the checklist required by BP's Guidelines for Cement Design, did you?
A. Same answer.

Page 209:02 to 209:05

Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) You're not aware of anyone else completing the Checklist For Quality Assurance/Quality Control for this cementing job at the well site, are you?

Page 209:07 to 209:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) If the checklist was not completed, will you agree that was contrary to the BP Guidelines for Cement Design?

Page 209:12 to 209:22

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) You're aware that the BP Investigative Report stated that the BP Macondo Well Team did not provide effective quality assurance on Halliburton's technical services, aren't you?
A. Same answer.
Q. And it's a fair statement that you and the other members of the well -- Macondo Well Team did not provide effective quality assurance of the cement job, isn't it?

Page 209:25 to 210:15

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) You were asked some questions earlier about computer modeling and centralizers, and I just wanted to ask you: You'll agree that BP's written Guidelines for Cement Design and Operations in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico state that: "Computer modeling should be used to optimize the selection and placement of centralizers," don't you?
A. Same answer.

Q. And you had seen OptiCem simulator models before this job and on other wells, right?
A. Same answer.
Q. You never expressed concern that the reports were too long or that you were unable to read or understand them, did you?

Page 210:17 to 210:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) And BP's own guidelines required that you work with the cement company to run the centralizer placement models, right?

Page 210:22 to 211:01

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MS. IIAMS) So you'll agree with me that it was important for you, as the drilling engineer, to actually read the results of the centralizer placement simulations, won't you?

Page 211:03 to 211:03

A. Same answer.

Page 211:17 to 214:01

Mr. Morel, you're not familiar with the BOP equipment that was used on the DEEPWATER HORIZON in April of 2010, are you?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. You are not aware of any complaints or criticisms concerning the BOP that was in use on the DEEPWATER HORIZON in April of 2010, are you, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. You personally don't have any complaints or criticisms about the BOP in use on the DEEPWATER HORIZON in April of 2010?
A. Same answer.
Q. You don't have any personal knowledge regarding the design or manufacture of the blowout preventer on board the DEEPWATER HORIZON, do you, sir?
A. Same answer.

Q. Do you have any personal experience working with BOPs?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you have any knowledge regarding the maintenance of the blowout preventer on board the DEEPWATER HORIZON?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, in fact, you have no knowledge regarding the maintenance of the DEEPWATER HORIZON blowout preventer; do you, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. You have never designed, operated, or tested a blowout preventer, have you, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you're not here today in any sort of expert capacity on blowout preventers, are you, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you have no personal knowledge regarding the performance of the blowout preventer on the DEEPWATER HORIZON the night of April 20th; do you, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you have no personal knowledge as to what the crew did or did not do with respect to the operation of the blowout preventer on the night of April the 20th; do you, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. If I were to continue to ask you questions about well control activities on board the DEEPWATER HORIZON the night of April the 20th, would you continue to invoke your right not to answer those questions pursuant to the Fifth Amendment and refuse to answer the questions?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And if I were to continue to ask you questions about the blowout preventer on the DEEPWATER HORIZON, would you continue to invoke your right not to answer those questions pursuant to the Fifth Amendment and refuse to answer the questions?
A. Yes.

Page 214:10 to 218:18

BY MR. LEMOINE:

Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Morel. My name is Michael Lemoine. I represent Weatherford.

I'm going to ask you some questions that primarily involve issues that are related to my client, Weatherford.

You -- you were involved in the selection of the Weatherford M 45 AP autofill float collar that was used on the Macondo Well long string, were you not?

A. Same answer.

Q. You have a general understanding of what an M 45 AP Weatherford autofill float collar is designed for use in such a well?

A. Same answer.

Q. Would you agree with me, Mr. Morel, that the purposes of the M 45 AP float collar used in the long string of the Macondo Well -- and I will itemize them for you -- was for surge reduction. Do you agree with that?

A. Same answer.

Q. No. 2, providing a landing profile for the wiper plugs. Do you agree with that?

A. Same answer.

Q. And third, for preventing the back flow of cement after the cement pumping stops until the cement hardens? Do you agree with that?

A. Same answer.

Q. Did -- to your knowledge, did BP intend the Weatherford M 45 AP float collar used on the Macondo Well long string to serve any other purpose than those three purposes that I just itemized?

A. Same answer.

Q. Are you aware of any Weatherford product literature or product documents that represent that Weatherford's M 45 AP autofill float collar used by BP on the Macondo Well long string was designed or intended for any other purpose than the three purposes that I just itemized?

A. Same answer.

Q. Are you aware of any Weatherford information, written technical information, that states that Weatherford's M 45 AP autofill float collar is intended to be used as a mechanical barrier to hydrocarbon flow?

A. Same answer.

Q. Is it a fact that Weatherford never communicated to you verbally or represented to you in any way that the M 45 AP autofill float collar used on the Macondo Well long string was intended to be a mechanical barrier to hydrocarbon flow?
A. Same answer.
Q. Are you saying that Weatherford never represented to you that the float collar in question -- I'm not going to go through that long sentence again -- the float collar on the Macondo Well long string -- could be used as a mechanical barrier to hydrocarbon flow?
A. Same answer.
Q. Are you aware of any document from BP, either an ETP, DWOP, group practice or any guidance -- other guidance document, that states that a Weatherford autofill float collar such as the M 45 AP can be used on a well such as Macondo as a barrier to hydrocarbon flow?
A. Same answer.
Q. Are you aware of any BP document, whether an ETP, DWOP, group practice or any guidance document, that allows BP engineers to use oil field tools or products in deepwater wells such as the Macondo Well for purposes other than those for which the manufacturer of the tool has designed them?
A. Same answer.
Q. Are you aware of any industry standard, practice, or recommenta -- recommendation, including API, that states or implies that an autofill float collar such as the M 45 AP can be used as a barrier to hydrocarbon flow?
A. Same answer.
Q. I would like to ask you some questions about what you understand, as an engineer for BP, constitutes a "barrier to flow."
Would you agree that a barrier to flow -- a device used in a deepwater well for a barrier to flow should have the capacity and capability of withstanding the pore pressure -- the anticipated pore pressure of the reservoir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you agree with me that the -- the predicted pore pressure of the Macondo Well reservoir near total depth was somewhere between

12- and 14,000 psi?
A. Same answer.
MR. MORRISS: Form.
Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) Would you agree with me that you knew that the back pressure rating of the Weatherford float collar used on the Macondo Well long string was rated at only 5,000 psi?
A. Same answer.
Q. If -- if that information is correct, would you agree that, on that basis alone, the back pressure rating of a float collar at 5,000 psi placed in a long string with reservoir pressure between 12- and 14,000 psi would, in and of itself, render that float collar unable to serve the purpose of a barrier to hydrocarbon flow?

Page 218:20 to 218:24

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) And that it would be imprudent to place that device in the Macondo Well if the intent was that it was to serve as a barrier to hydrocarbon flow?

Page 219:01 to 219:06

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) Would you agree with me that, in describing generally the -- the characteristics of a barrier to flow, that one such as BP should consider whether that barrier provides a gas- or oil-tight seal?

Page 219:08 to 220:18

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) Would you agree with me that the reservoir of the Macondo Well near total depth was an oil and gas formation?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did Weatherford ever represent to you in any fashion, whether in writing or verbally, that the Weatherford M 45 AP autofill float collar provided a gas- or oil-tight seal upon conversion?
A. Same answer.

Q. Would you agree with me that what Weatherford did represent to you, including through its product literature, was that this float collar met the performance criteria of API RP 10F?
A. Same answer.
Q. Do you agree with me, Mr. Morel, that API RP 10F does not require a float collar to be a gas- or oil-tight seal?
A. Same answer.
Q. Are you familiar with BP Group Practice 10-60 pertaining to zone isolation requirements?
A. Same answer.
Q. Would you please flip to Tab 37 on the disk and in your binder, Tab 37.
Would you agree with me that what I have shown you is, in fact, BP Group Practice 10-60 pertaining to zone isolation requirements?
A. Same answer.
Q. Would you agree with me that this document, Tab 37, which I believe has already been identified as Exhibit 1802, that this particular document was the governing document for the Macondo Well long string with respect to the temporary abandonment procedures?
A. Same answer.

Page 220:20 to 220:25

Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) Would you agree with me that Tab 37, the BP Group Practice 10-60 was the applicable BP guidance document in effect on April 20, 2010, that set forth the requirements for the placement of hydrocarbon barriers during the temporary abandonment of the Macondo Well?

Page 221:02 to 222:02

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) Would you please turn to Section 6 -- no -- of -- of that 10-60 document.
Would you agree with me that it reads -- that it is entitled "Suspension and Temporary Abandonment" and reads that:
"Suspension and temporary abandonment shall be designed to ensure zonal isolation for the

duration of the suspension and permit safe reentry of the well."

Did I read that correctly?

A. Same answer.

Q. Would you please look at 6.1.1 regarding number of barriers. Would you agree that I'm reading this correctly: "Two temporary barriers shall be installed for isolation of movable hydrocarbon-bearing or overpressurized permeable sections from surface seabed."

Did I read that correct?

A. Same answer.

Q. Do you agree with me that the intention of BP with respect to the Macondo Well between April 15th and April 20th was to install two temporary barriers to be used with respect to the temporary abandonment operations?

A. Same answer.

Page 222:04 to 222:17

Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) Would you agree with me that nowhere in GP 10-60 does it provide that a float collar can be one of the barriers placed for temporary abandonment of a well?

A. Same answer.

Q. Would you please look at 6.2 -- Section 6.2, "Acceptable Barriers."

Would you agree with me, Mr. Morel, that this guidance document and particularly this section gives the information a BP engineer needs to know in selecting the type of barrier to comply with the guidance document requirement for the placement of barriers to hydrocarbon flow during temporary well abandonment?

Page 222:19 to 223:10

A. Same answer.

Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) Would you agree with me that, in part, 6.2 reads that, as an alternative to cement, mechanical barriers may be considered for suspension. "In this event, the impact or anticipated length of the suspension/subsurface environment and type or well on the durability of the selected" -- "selected barrier should be

made."
Did I read that correctly?
A. Same answer.
Q. Would you agree with me that this guidance document requires a BP engineer, in determining what mechanical barriers to place on a well for temporary well abandonment, should consider the anticipated length of the suspension?
A. Same answer.

Page 223:12 to 223:17

Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) And would you agree with me that, from your personal knowledge, the anticipated length of the suspension from the time that the Macondo Well would be temporarily abandoned until reentered was months?
A. Same answer.

Page 223:19 to 224:15

Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) Would you agree that one of the requirements under 6.2 is for the BP engineer to evaluate the subsurface environment in deciding which barrier would be acceptable to place in the well for temporary well abandonment?
A. Same answer.
Q. Would you agree with me that the subsurface environment of the Macondo Well on the long string, particularly in the area of the shoe track, would be such that it would be adjacent to a reservoir with pore pressure exceeding 12,000 psi?
A. Same answer.
Q. Would you agree with me that, given the Weatherford M 45 AP -- given that the Weatherford M 45 AP float collar was not designed to provide a gas- or oil-tight seal and was only rated for back pressure of 5,000 psi, that it would be imprudent for anyone to place that float collar in the Macondo Well long string if the intent was for it to serve as one of the hydrocarbon barriers discussed in that guidance document?

Page 224:17 to 225:07

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) Would you please look at Section 6.3, Veri -- ""Verification of Barriers." Would you agree that I'm reading this correctly? It states that: "The first barrier shall be pressure and/or inflow tested and tagged (if plug is set in open hole, tagging only required). The second barrier shall be tagged or pressure tested."
Did I read that correctly?
A. Same answer.
Q. Would you agree with me that Section 6.3 of this guidance document gives the information to a BP engineer on how to test the barriers to verify that they could serve that purpose in a temporary well abandonment procedure?

Page 225:09 to 225:19

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) Are you aware of the -- have you ever read the BP Bly report, investigative report?
A. Same answer.
Q. Are you aware that the BP investigative team determined that the differential pressure between the shoe track cement and the annulus cement was so little that the float test performed on the float collar on April 20th was unreliable?
A. Same answer.

Page 225:21 to 226:03

Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) If, in fact, the differential pressure was insufficient to provide a reliable float collar test to determine if it was holding, would you agree with me that, if someone made a mistake and used this -- intended for this float collar to be a mechanical barrier to flow, then under 6.3, it could not have been verified as to that function?

Page 226:05 to 226:05

A. Same answer.

Page 226:17 to 227:12

Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) Okay. Would you please look at Tab 23. Tab 23 was previously marked as Exhibit 1803.
Would you agree with me that this document -- you had personal involvement in the preparation of this document?
A. Same answer.
Q. Would you agree with me that this document, Tab 23, is the -- I'm sorry, contains the -- the procedures involved in preparing the Macondo Well for temporary abandonment?
A. Same answer.
Q. Would you please -- could you confirm for us, sir, that according to that document as well as your personal knowledge, having been involved in the BP well engineering team, that the two barriers intended for the Macondo Well in compliance with Guidance Document 10-60 were the cement in the annulus and shoe track; and No. 2, the cement plug?
A. Same answer.

Page 227:21 to 229:20

Would you agree that Section 9.2.3 provides the procedure for cementing the annulus and shoe track of the long string on the Macondo Well?
A. Same answer.
Q. Would you look at Section 9.2.4. Would you agree with me that that section provides the procedures for installing the cement plug at approximately 8,367 feet within the long string calculated from the mud line?
A. Same answer.
Q. And would you agree with me that this document supports the conclusion that the annulus and shoe track cement and the cement plug were intended to constitute the required barriers under Guidance Document 10-60 for the Macondo Well --
A. Same answer.
Q. -- and not the Weatherford float collar?
A. Same answer.
Q. Would you agree with me that there's

nothing in that document that we're looking at that states that the Weatherford float collar was intended to be placed on the long string of the Macondo Well to serve as a barrier to hydrocarbon flow?
A. Same answer.
Q. I want to turn -- I'm finished with the binders now, and this is going to be the last group of questions I have and it will go very fast. I want to ask you some brief questions about the events of April 19th.
It's a fact that you were on the rig during the cementing of the long string between the afternoon of April 19th and the early morning hours of April 20th; is that correct?
A. Same answer.
Q. And is it a fact, sir, that during -- that subsequent to the running of the long string to total depth, an attempt was made to establish circulation to the long string?
A. Same answer.
Q. And it's a fact, is it not, Mr. Morel, that when circulation was attempted through the long string after it was run to total depth, that circulation was unable to be established?
A. Same answer.
Q. And is it a fact that BP suspected that circulation could not be established because of blockage somewhere in the shoe track from debris during the autofill process?

Page 229:22 to 230:02

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) Would you agree that debris causing a blockage of the shoe track on pipe run in an autofill manner is something that was known and foreseeable by BP?
A. Same answer.

Page 230:04 to 230:15

Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) Would you agree that you have no information or evidence to indicate that the inability to establish circulation through the long string on the afternoon of April 19th was

not -- was in no way related to any malfunction of the Weatherford float collar installed on the long string?
A. Same answer.
Q. Is it a fact that what BP wanted to do that afternoon was to establish circulation by increasing pump pressure to blow whatever debris was causing the blockage out of the way?

Page 230:17 to 230:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) Would you agree that if BP was unable to clear the blockage by increasing pump pressure, that it would have resulted in the pulling of the long string?

Page 230:23 to 231:04

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) Is it a fact, Mr. Morel, that prior to increasing the pump pressure to clear the blockage, BP determined the burst pressure of the iron along the long string that would feel or that would be subject to these pressure increases?

Page 231:06 to 231:10

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) And that some of the equipment that BP was concerned about before authorizing the increase in pressure was the burst pressure of the cement head? Yes?

Page 231:12 to 231:14

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) The diverter -- diverter tool?

Page 231:16 to 231:18

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) The long string casing itself?

Page 231:20 to 231:21

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) And the float collar?

Page 231:23 to 233:20

A. Same answer.
Q. (BY MR. LEMOINE) And isn't it a fact that in determining the burst pressure of the float collar, you made a phone call to Brian Clawson in the afternoon of April 19th, 2010?
A. Same answer.
Q. And isn't it a fact that Brian Clawson told you that the burst pressure, the pressure above which the float collar would be severely damaged, was 6800 psi?
A. Same answer.
Q. And isn't it a fact that BP never exceeded 6800 psi?
A. Same answer.
Q. And never exceeded the burst pressure of any of the iron that I mentioned? I'll do it again: Cement head, diverter tool and the casing itself?
A. Same answer.
Q. And isn't it a fact that you have absolutely no information or evidence that the pressuring up in order to establish circulation through the float collar on the afternoon of April 19th caused any damage to the float collar?
A. Same answer.
Q. And you have no information or evidence to share with us that would indicate that the float collar did not convert?
A. Same answer.
Q. You have no evidence to indicate that the Weatherford float collar, the M 45 AP float collar, on the Macondo Well did not serve its intended function of providing a receptacle for the landing plugs, "yes" or "no"?
A. Same answer.
Q. Preventing the ingress of cement after the cement pumping was performed?
A. Same answer.

Q. And fulfilling its intended function of surge reduction when running the long string into the Macondo Well?
A. Same answer.
Q. You have no evidence or any -- any information or indication that the Weatherford float collar did not perform any of its intended functions that BP expected in the Macondo Well long string?
A. Same answer.

Page 234:03 to 234:05

BY MR. BICKFORD:
Q. Mr. Morel, Scott Bickford again. I just have a few follow-up questions.

Page 235:03 to 236:02

MR. BICKFORD: I'm going to mark what purports to be an E-mail from a Kate Paine to a John Brannen, B-R-A-N-N-E-N. "Subject: Lessons learned; plan forward Macondo." Date is March 19th, 2010.
(Marked Exhibit No. 4516.)
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Sir, do you know who Kate Paine is?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. Do you know who John Brannen is?
A. Same answer.
Q. Okay. Were you aware that Kate Paine had commented on -- to John Brannen regarding the lessons learned surrounding the events of early March at the Macondo Well?
A. Same answer.
Q. Were you aware that she stated: "I'm sorry to push back on lessons learned. I know you've got to get something out there to make it look like we won't do this again. But without obvious indicators and without a real push to make hole and skip the contingency liner, I don't see us really learning. The best bet is to hedge the 'most likely' and to have some centroid built into the plan initially. Kate."

Page 236:04 to 237:06

Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) Were you ever apprised of her opinion, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, I'd ask you to turn to Tab No. 74 -- no, sorry, it's not Tab 74. It's Tab -- it is Tab 64.
Sir, this -- I'm going to label this as Exhibit No. 4517.
(Marked Exhibit No. 4517.)
Q. (BY MR. BICKFORD) This purports to be an E-mail dated April 20th from you to John Guide, Mark Hafle, Brett Cocales, and Gregory Walz. Do you recognize the document, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Did you write the document, sir?
A. Same answer.
Q. Sir, the document states, quote: "Just wanted to let everyone know that the cement job went well. Pressure stayed low. We had full returns the entire job. Saw 80 psi lift pressure and landed outright on the calculated volume. Seal assembly is set and tested. We should be coming out of the hole shortly, Brian."
Did I read that correctly?
A. Same answer.
Q. And, sir, was that your opinion, having observed the cement job?
A. Same answer.