


Brian Morel: 1037 - 1230, 27 Apr 10, 25th Floor, Westlake One  
 Notes by Jim Weitherbee; Others present: Warren, Rex

We had issues with pressure pores (low) and frac (high)  
 We were taking losses, cut back mud wt from 14.5 to 14.3 to stop losses  
 Geolap measured 14.12 to 14.16  
 Emergency LCL pill to stop loss  
 Logging was smooth  
 7" casing was from Nexun  
 Crossover to 9 7/8" was from third party  
 Ran 7" casing to 5,800', followed by 9 7/8"; One bobble; went 10,000' down  
 Rig stand pipe P gage was not functioning; this is standard out there  
 Wanted P close to 14.5, but not to exceed that; and above 14.16  
 Sequence was: 7 bbl, 20 of 14.3 spacer, 5 cement, 39 foam, 7 shoe track vol, 20 bbl spacer  
 Dart for bottom; press higher than expected  
 Didn't see bottom release  
 Top went through DDT  
 After 150 bbl, switch to rig pump  
 7" bottom plug; went through p induction at pumps  
 Bottom plug landed 9 bbls of where it should have  
 Top plug OK  
 Set seal assembly, 6 turns to the right to release  
 4000 psi, then 10000 psi for 10 sec; bleed to 6700 psi (6500 psi was our intention)  
 Watched for 1 hr because rate was more than expected  
 Vadril procedure - sheared  
 Stabbed running tool into the well head  
 Press dropped initially 5 psi/min, then 4 psi/min for 10 min  
 Flow check  
 Went to bed at 3 am  
 Woke up an hour before flight (later said he left on the 11 am flight)  
 Wrote an ops note to bridge the gap between the procedure and current ops  
 X e-mail ops note from Brian was sent 20 Apr 10, at 10:43 am  
 Left (on the 11 am flight)  
 Looked at data retrospectively: u-tube effect; both lines had sea water, with a closed annular  
 Didn't have valve open at the cement unit (it was closed)  
 Crew was worried P & A on Nile (next job); working simo to ensure ready  
 Held conversations about how to be effective in the move



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Rig is performance-driven; always stay one step ahead
History of delivering great wells over 9 yrs
Touted as one of the best in TransOcean and BP
P&A ops on Nile will be different
Every meeting safety was talked about
TransOcean safety was on-board
Tape up for every p test, lifting ops always marked off properly
I always felt very safe when on board
Everyone placed safety first, production closely follows
Stop job numerous times, do another JSA
Stop after every new casing or after so many ft to ensure not complacent
Safety classes - Driller was involved, asked questions
John Guide was involved; asked questions
Foam cement reqd. had to stay between 14.6 and 14.2, so N2 can reduce 16.7 cement to 14.5
Needed MOC for cement job - Halburton predicted 15 equiv w/o N2, thought should not attempt
Job was designed improperly; 14.4 must have been wrong due to pressure effect (compressibility, since we added water)
14.19 from gages
14.0 to 14.2 to rid compressibility in model
Cement designed to not go into 9 7/8"
Plan 500' above known level (17800') so 17300' (MMS reqt.)
Leave 40' to 50' in case the count of joints was erroneous by one
Have done N2 production strings in deepwater
We're supposed to go to 19600', but frac reading lower so didn't get to it
We always foam 28" and 22", but not as deep as this
On Horizon we used a few hundred sacks vice thousands on other foam jobs
Rig puts info into cement jobs procedures since they have up-to-date info
Drilling program didn't include production string so MOC was written for production string and cement job
Three events: Casing, Packoff, Negative Press
DrilQuick has the program; hands are expected to run procedure
But recommended increase 3000 to 4000 lately, and then 10000
Operations prefers 6500 (BOPs were tested at 3500 annulars, 6500 with pipe)
Held 10000 for 10 sec
If press test not successful: Rig Operations Mgr (John) must decide
Regarding the neg test, if minor decisions, hand can decide; if bigger, John must decide
Negative test - each rig does it their way
We displace stinger to well head (to sea water)
Test those lines bu Open one line and drill pipe to cement unit; look for a flow

2350psi drop (sea water from rig to 8300') MMS approval obtained
Procedure is a bulletted ops note - doesn't tell you exactly how to do it
Two ways to conduct the neg test, A) both ends open or B) Open one end
Don't know if they tried to bleed pressure
They had a lack of understanding about how the U-tube works
Criteria for unsuccessful test: Flow (not press)
There was no flow in kill line
Not reported to town
If gas reaches kill line, it will freeze, expect hydrates
No protocol to witness neg test
If there are minor changes to the plan: Engin inform others, Call rig Mgr, Send note
If major changes to the plan: MOC, use Bizflow
Negative test - 30 minutes, use Drilling Procedure
Confusion over why engineer was told ther were 2 neg tests (they didn't complete 2 tests)
Mark is senior engineer, and was not aware of a pressure anomaly