


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## Interviewing Form

|   |                                       |
|---|---------------------------------------|
| Interviewee Name:   | Sean Bayer                            |
| Job Title:  | 3 <sup>rd</sup> Asst. Marine Engineer |
| Company:  | Transocean                            |
| Contact Details:  |                                       |
| Work Address:   | Park 10                               |
| Work Telephone:   |                                       |
| Work Cell:  |                                       |
| Home Address:   |                                       |
| Home Telephone:   |                                       |
| Home Cell:  |                                       |
| Interviewers Present:   | John MacDonald<br>Jana Judkins        |
| Date:   | June 15, 2010                         |
| Start Time:   | 2:30pm                                |
| Stop Time:  | 3:30pm                                |
| Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N                       | N                                     |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N | N                                     |
| Are documents attached to this form? Y/N                            | N                                     |
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs or other supporting      | N                                     |

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|  |   |
|--|---|
| materials taken to interview.  |   |
| <b>Interview Plan</b><br><br>Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc: | <b>Training and Competency Interview Questions</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. How long have you been with Transocean?</li> <li>2. Do you have any previous oilfield experience?</li> <li>3. What is your position?</li> <li>4. What are your job responsibilities? (Review Job Description before interview)</li> <li>5. What are the training requirements for this position?</li> <li>6. Can you explain the Worldwide Training matrix and its purpose?</li> <li>7. Have you completed all the training for your job? (check against compliance report).</li> <li>8. Does the training match the job requirements?</li> <li>9. Do you feel the training provided to you was sufficient? Why or Why not?</li> <li>10. When was your last training session, and what was it?</li> <li>11. How supportive of training and development was the rig management? What about shore-base managers?</li> <li>12. Where there any limitations on the training available?</li> <li>13. What was the quality of OJT on the DWH?</li> <li>14. What is your next position, and have you received any training for it?</li> <li>15. Do you know the progression of your career in Transocean?</li> <li>16. Have you received an appraisal in the last year? Can you explain the appraisal process?</li> <li>17. How many new crew members (or recently promoted) were on your crew?</li> <li>18. What is the quality of training provided to new employees?</li> <li>19. What training is provided onboard the rig for new arrivals, and what is the quality?</li> <li>20. What safety&amp; survival training did you receive and do you think it is adequate?</li> <li>21. What is your position on the Station Bill, and in an emergency? What is your lifeboat station? Life raft station?</li> <li>22. What are the first steps to take when shutting in a well, or upon detection of flow?</li> <li>23. Who is able to shear the pipe and disconnect?</li> </ol><br><b>Safety Culture Questions</b> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What are the Core Values of Transocean? Does the company live up to these Core Values?</li> <li>2. What are your Colors? What do they mean?</li> <li>3. What are the three most positive safety issues on the DWH?</li> <li>4. What are the three safety areas where improvement is needed?</li> <li>5. Do you complete a START card every day and why?</li> </ol> |

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|   | <p>6. Describe your participation in the THINK planning process?</p> <p>7. Would you describe the TOFS and last time you called a TOFS?</p> <p>8. Are you able to explain the Management of Change?</p> <p>A. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from Transocean, and can you describe the policy?</p> <p>B. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from BP and can you describe the policy?</p> <p>C. What effect did these bonuses have on your performance of the rig crews?</p> |
| <p style="text-align: center;">Sean Bayer – 3<sup>rd</sup> Asst. Marine Engineer</p> <p>Sean joined the DWH in September 2009. Sean said that he is compliant in the Worldwide Training Matrix. He is currently working on the mechanical OJT and feels that it is good training. Sean trained at the Massachusetts Maritime Academy where he received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Marine Engineering, water survival, and firefighting training. When Sean was asked if he was prepared to fight a fire in the engine room, he said that the room would just lock down with CO2. He was then corrected that this would not always be the best option to extinguish a fire in the engine room. Sean said that the 3<sup>rd</sup> Asst. is not on the fire team because there is only one on tour at a time.</p> <p>When asked his understanding of who is in charge, Sean said that the OIM was in charge of day to day operations and that the Captain is in charge in an emergency. He was not completely sure of himself when responding to this question. He said that he's never experienced a situation where the Management of Change was questioned.</p> <p>Sean was asked who could sound the general alarm or mayday and he said that anyone on the bridge; the 3<sup>rd</sup> Asst., or really anyone could that needed to. He said that some might feel intimidated and fear being reprimanded. At this point, Sean asked why the drills weren't conducted randomly. He said that the quality of the drills was good, but they were too consistent. He indicated that his primary muster is lifeboat 1 and secondary is lifeboat 3, and that he has no position on the Station Bill. Sean also mentioned there is an additional muster on the aft stairwells that's marked with paint on the deck. He has never been onboard for an H2S drill and is not familiar with ballasting drills. He feels like the 3<sup>rd</sup> party personnel show up to the drills and perform their duties as needed. Sean said that he'd rather be in a situation where he evacuated in a life raft instead of a lifeboat, but realizes that the lifeboat is ultimately safer. He was asked who gives the order to lower the lifeboat and Sean said that the Coxswain is responsible, but this is not mentioned in the drills. It was mentioned however, that the responsibilities of those involved in emergencies can be found on the vessel's station bill.</p> <p>Sean said that one of his responsibilities as 3<sup>rd</sup> Asst. Engineer is to work on the thrusters. He had only been on the rig floor one time. He indicated it was just he and the Motorman for the first half of his watch, then the 1<sup>st</sup> Engineer came on for the second half. He said that they were doing a pretty good job keeping up with the backlog PMs. Sean mentioned that he doesn't think the bridge should</p> |   |

ever have control of the engine room. If the bridge was in control, he felt like someone from the engine room needed to be there too and that it didn't make sense to be in control over the phone.

When asked if his training matched his job requirements, Sean said he felt 100% confident in his job. He said that his mentor took good care of him. Sean said that he shut down a job on his first hitch and it was kind of overwhelming for him. He then asked if the blackout recovery was supposed to be tested and John responded that in his opinion it should be done at least twice a year so that as many crew members as possible may participate, since it is such valuable learning experience.

Sean had requested additional training at Wartsila before the incident, but feels like his request has gotten "lost in the shuffle". He said that his next position will be the 2<sup>nd</sup> Asst. Engineer. Sean received an evaluation from the 1<sup>st</sup> Asst. and Mechanical Engineer on his 3<sup>rd</sup> hitch. He said he noticed some new crew on the rig, such as galley hands, and commented that he is still new too. He said that all new crew members are assigned a mentor and they are responsible for signing off of the new crew member's safety OJT. Sean said that the medic plays a video which discusses pertinent safety information, shows them the general areas of the vessel, then they are turned over to their respective supervisors and mentors.

Sean was not aware of procedures related to well control. Sean is aware of the Core Values, but hesitated in his response as to whether Transocean lived up to them, but did eventually say that he believed the Core Values were upheld. He was asked what to do if he was denied a part he needed to avoid compromising the safety of the vessel, and he said that he would go to his supervisor and that his supervisor may have to go to James Kent, the rig manager asset if he was denied. He indicated that there were lots of things put off for the 2011 shipyard. Sean is aware that he can anonymously contact the designated authority onshore if he felt it was necessary. Sean's colors are Green/Red.

Sean said that he brought down the engine room when Lloyd's was visiting the rig. He said that locking out/tagging out a water make should require a different procedure than locking out/tagging out a thruster. He explained his concern that an inactive valve should not require a permit, a PROMPT Card, then tag and shut it down, as it would require for a thruster. He did say that this procedure was needed for electrical isolation.

Sean said that the THINK Plan requirements changed with every hitch. He expressed his desire to see more consistencies. He said that he wrote out THINK Plans everyday and kept the bridge informed when working on the thrusters.

When asked about short changes, Sean said that engineers work a 4-6 month schedule and they stay with the same DPOs on 12 hour watches. He was asked who could initiate the emergency disconnect sequence and Sean said that the Driller in the Drill Shack would be responsible when the DPO goes to the red zone.


When asked to list three positive safety aspects onboard the DWH, Sean said that PROMPT cards are effective, pre-tour safety meetings to discuss procedures for handling yourself on the drill floor, and START Tours in areas you wouldn't normally be familiar with, i.e., the DPOs coming down to the engine room and vice versa. He said that the START Cards are often "pencil whipped", though they are definitely good tools to use at times. Sean said that TOFS can even be utilized to break for water

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when the crew becomes overheated. He says it can be intimidating, but knows it's got to be done.

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## Interviewing Form

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Interviewee Name:   | Jonathan Camacho  |
| Job Title:  | Dynamic POS I   |
| Company:  | Transocean  |
| Contact Details:  |   |
| Work Address:   | Park 10   |
| Work Telephone:   |   |
| Work Cell:  | 713-703-4273  |
| Home Address:   |  |
| Home Telephone:   |   |
| Home Cell:  |   |
| Interviewers Present:   | Steve Myers<br>John MacDonald<br>Jana Judkins                                     |
| Date:   | June 3, 2010  |
| Start Time:   | 9:55am  |
| Stop Time:  | 11:55 am  |
| Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N                       | N   |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N | N   |
| Are documents attached to this form? Y/N                            | Y   |
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs or other supporting      | Handwritten Notes, Drafts   |

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| materials taken to interview.                 |  |
| <b>Interview Plan</b>                         | <b>Training and Competency Interview Questions</b>   |
| Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc: | <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. How long have you been with Transocean?</li><li>2. Do you have any previous oilfield experience?</li><li>3. What is your position?</li><li>4. What are your job responsibilities? (Review Job Description before interview)</li><li>5. What are the training requirements for this position?</li><li>6. Can you explain the Worldwide Training matrix and its purpose?</li><li>7. Have you completed all the training for your job? (check against compliance report).</li><li>8. Does the training match the job requirements?</li><li>9. Do you feel the training provided to you was sufficient? Why or Why not?</li><li>10. When was your last training session, and what was it?</li><li>11. How supportive of training and development was the rig management? What about shore-base managers?</li><li>12. Were there any limitations on the training available?</li><li>13. What was the quality of OJT on the DWH?</li><li>14. What is your next position, and have you received any training for it?</li><li>15. Do you know the progression of your career in Transocean?</li><li>16. Have you received an appraisal in the last year? Can you explain the appraisal process?</li><li>17. How many new crew members (or recently promoted) were on your crew?</li><li>18. What is the quality of training provided to new employees?</li><li>19. What training is provided onboard the rig for new arrivals, and what</li></ol> |

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|   |  |
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|   | <p>is the quality?</p> <p>What are the Core Values of Transocean? Does the company live up to these Core Values?</p> <p>What are your Colors? What do they mean?</p> |
| <p>Jonathan Camacho – Dynamic POS Operator</p> <p>Jon has been on the DWH since 2007. Previously he was a Roustabout on the F100. He was in his second day at GMDSS class in Florida when he heard about the explosion. He had been off the rig for one week.</p> <p>Prior to his drilling experience, Jon was in the Navy as Radar Operator. After moving to Texas, he applied to work for several offshore companies, but was ultimately hired by Transocean. His first rig was the F100 where he was a Seaman for three hitches, then later a Roustabout. He learned about the DPO position on the F100 and began to inquire. He was learning quickly, so Tim Myers wrote a recommendation for a DPO trainee position on a DP vessel. He started as a Roustabout, but has been a DP for 2 ½ years now.</p> <p>The Crane Operator said it would be okay for him to try to get up to the bridge to train. He began learning more about the job description through mentoring, reading books, and continuing education courses. He was able to fill a DP spot for an injured crewman and started learning a lot about the rig on the main deck; learning pipes, systems, valves.</p> <p>Jon said the OJT requirements for a DPO, as it pertains to the WWTM, are DP certification and BCO license. These must be completed before the start of a DPO position. He believes that these requirements are sufficient and that it matches the training. He has an overall positive impression of the OJT Training Matrix because it's the training that he knows he needs. In addition, Jon said that the 11 days of TOPS training was definitely helpful.</p> <p>When asked if he thinks his career progression is normal, Jon replied that anyone can start from the bottom and advance the way he has. Some people have a hard time moving from their positions for one reason or another. He indicated that not necessarily everyone knows that they can be promoted. There is an ADP, but he wasn't sure if there was a certain requirement.</p> <p>Jon said that he feels the evaluation system has been beneficial to him. He feels like he's gotten a good sense of what it expected of him and how to improve some of his weaknesses, like his shyness and need to be more confident. He was given good reviews for his initiative to continue his training and education. When asked, he indicated that he has seen his DPO job description on his license,</p> |  |



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but had not seen his Roustabout job description.

Jon said that his supervisor gave hands on training and explanations to complete his DPO modules. His supervisor did not just sign off on his work, but he made sure he knew he was competent first. He said the Roustabout modules were not as hard as the DPO module completion, but it really depends upon the trainer.

Jon has not had any budgeting problems getting courses approved, although he has been warned that DPO advanced classes will create scheduling conflicts the more he advances.

Jon said that OIM is in charge when it's concerning a wellhead connection and drilling, but safety and stability is the Master's responsibility. He says that he knows this information because he's in the marine group and that others might not be aware of this. He believes the station bill states that the Master is in charge, but wasn't sure.

The fire/boat drills were conducted every Sunday at 10:30 am. He said that there had been talk amongst the crew that an impromptu drill could be more effective. Some days certain people would be excused from drills by the Captain, and some days they would not load the boat. They were always required to wear life preservers and safety pendants attached. When asked if he could lower and operate the lifeboat, Jon said that he could lower the lifeboat if needed, but that he had only operated a lifeboat in class on a lake. He can also operate a life raft if needed, but had only done it on a lake, as well.

Jon indicated that he did not participate in a pre-tour meeting because the watch team was on 6pm-6am, but the 12-12 DPO's would join the drill crew for the pre-tower meeting. He had heard complaints from other crew before, but he believed the meetings were helpful. He said it's good to know what everyone is doing, especially the DPO's needing to know what the drilling crew is doing. Jon feels like he has a good understanding of the verbal/written planning process. When asked about start cards and how they're perceived, Jon indicated that everyone does it because it's policy, but not everyone completes them properly.

Jon said that he spends about 3 hours on deck during his 12 hour shift. He helps the night AB since he's a DPO trainee. The last time he interrupted a job was one of his seniors on bridge. They had to ballast from taking on water from the Bankston and they were testing BOPs at the same time. There was a little bit of conflict between the drill floor and bridge, depending on who was in charge. Jon said that he was questioning the situation. He indicated that some people may be nervous to stop a job, especially Roustabout. When asked if he thought a supervisor would be nervous to stop a job, he replied that he believes all supervisors would stop a job.

Jon said that he did not believe third party personnel are as good about safety compliance as they should be. He said that he is aware the emergency drill improvements have been utilized and put into the GRS by the Senior DPO. The GMDSS says that a radio has to be in the lifeboat, but it does not have to be fixed. The radios were taken from the bridge.

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### Training/Licenses

Seaman ticket - not required on the F100

AB ticket

BCO license

TOPS

Lifeboat Certification

Safety Leadership Course

Rig Specific Training

Working on 3<sup>rd</sup> Mate

Needs to and turn in his Blue Book

Red/Blue Colors

Jon feels like he's been properly trained and he knows that he would have handled the situation to the best of his ability. His awareness is heightened and feels like he'll be prepared if something happens again. He wants to be completely competent in his role as DPO. He feels like he is always learning and doesn't want to limit himself. Jon was very complimentary about the mentoring and support system he has received from the beginning of his career and still presently with Transocean. He has always had a mentor assigned to him for each position he's held on each rig. Jon said Transocean is the best company he's worked for and that there are always things to improve upon, he had nothing to speak of. He said that he does occasionally think of improvements while he's on rig.

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## Interviewing Form

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Interviewee Name:   | Stanley Carden   |
| Job Title:  | Electrical/Electronic Supervisor                               |
| Company:  | Transocean   |
| Contact Details:  |  |
| Work Address:   | 1311 Broadfield Blvd. #44<br>Houston, Texas                    |
| Work Telephone:   | 713-232-8237   |
| Work Cell:  |  |
| Home Address:   |  |
| Home Telephone:   |  |
| Home Cell:  |  |
| Interviewers Present:   | John MacDonald<br>Stephanie Butefish                           |
| Date:   | 23 June 2010   |
| Start Time:   | 9:00 am  |
| Stop Time:  | 11:10 am   |
| Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N                       | Y  |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N | Y  |
| Are documents attached to this form? Y/N                            | N  |
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs                          | Drawing of Second Deck and Third Deck indicating escape route. |

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| or other supporting materials taken to interview.  |  |
| <b>Interview Plan</b><br><br>Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc:   |  |
| <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Interview with Stanley Carden</b></p> <p>Stanley Carden holds the position of Electrical/Electronic Supervisor. The interviewer, John MacDonald, explained the reason for the interview, namely, that we are trying to find out what happened, and to establish a time line for the day of the incident.</p> <p>Stanley was asked to describe his day on the day that the incident. It was Tuesday, and they had BP people coming out. It was a normal day.</p> <p>6 pm – Stanley went off duty and went to eat. Steve and Buddy wanted to have a meeting at 1900. This meeting lasted about two hours, ending at 9 pm. Afterwards, they went outside and talked and smoked. Then he went to his room, number 318 (shown on drawing), which is two decks down from the main deck. He sent a message on the computer to his girlfriend.</p> <p>9:40 pm – He heard a noise like ‘blowing down high pressure lines. He sent his girlfriend a message saying that ‘something is different; be right back.’ (This time stamped information was sent to the Investigation Team) (His girlfriend has some of these events down to the second.)</p> <p>9:41 pm – Stanley then goes out of his room and around the corner to the smoke deck. There was no smell, and he did not see anything unusual. He decided it was not high pressure air, as the sound was slightly different. He then turned back to go to the office to see what is wrong. He got to the door going back to the accommodations and heard the first explosion. At this point, he pointed to the drawing, indicating his room and the smoking area and the mud room. He could not detect where the sound of the explosion had come from. After the explosion, all the lights went out except the emergency lights. He opened the door to go back to the accommodations area, and the second explosion happened. It knocked him six feet back inside in the aft direction. He then dogged a watertight door. He saw ceiling panels on the floor. Then, he went up the center passageway but could not go up the stairs on the second deck because the stairs were full of debris at the top of the stairs. So, he then went to the starboard column circular stairs, and found he could not get out that door, either. So, he came back to his room to get his life jacket and headed to the stairwell to port column. There he met Chad, who said they could not go out through the pump room. They got out by way of the port column stairs. There was not much damage on the port side compared to the starboard side.</p> <p>They then went to midships into the mess decks; their goal was to go aft. The passage was blocked.</p> |  |

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They then went to the mess room and found Robert Hern, the night baker, in a daze, and sitting in the ceiling tiles. Stanley and Chad picked up Robert and walked with him to the mess deck to centreline passage toward the lifeboats. They went out a side door, and saw a medic; Stanley and Chad went back to the galley to see if they could find anyone. They saw no one. They pushed toward the transformer room and out the aft door. Then, they heard mumbling, and found Buddy Trahan, who was badly injured and sitting in debris, blocking the starboard column stairs. They got a stretcher and put Buddy on it and brought him to the lifeboat deck. Then, they went back in; they saw Randy, a Senior tool pusher, trying to help Wyman stand and walk. Wyman was located about five feet down the hall from Buddy.

They went out to get a second stretcher and put Wyman on it, and carried him out the door. They then saw that both lifeboats were gone, but at least they had taken Buddy on one of the boats. They then saw the marine crew and they carried Wyman into the liferaft. A guy in the liferaft told Chad to get in, and Stanley and Steve B. put the stretcher in the raft, and the noise doubled, so they threw the stretcher in. Andrea Fleytas jumped in and then Stanley jumped in next. At this point, Chad and Steve were already in. They felt hot air through the raft from between the columns as soon as they jumped in. Chad said he thought that was because more weight was on one side of the raft allowing the smoke and air to enter the raft. Then, the raft hit the water. David did not the brake to lower the raft; Stanley thinks Captain Curt may have released it from a davit. (After the stretcher was in, when people were trying to get into the liferaft, people were closer to the rig half of it, so the raft tilted towards the rig.) The painter was tied to the rig. When the liferaft went in to the water, people started to get out of the raft and swim towards the work boat (Bankston). Stanley saw the fast rescue craft picking people out of the water. Chad and Steve got out and tried to swim and grab lines to pull it away from the rig. Stanley and Randy and Wyman stayed in the liferaft. They discovered it wasn't moving, so Stanley saw a line still on the davit. He tried to untie the line and saw clevis, so he pulled a line at the bottom, and it released. They saw patches of fire near the lifeboat. They tied to the fast rescue boat, and current carried them away from the rig. When Stanley looked back, he saw the painter and then looked for a knife. They used a knife off of the fast rescue boat and cut the painter and got away from the fire.

NOTE: when pulling away on the liferaft, the riser could not be seen.

Further discussion about knives – Stanley got a knife and will not go out onto a rig again without a knife.

Note: Stanley was in the Navy for 23 years, and states that it did more to prepare him than the rest of his rig training.

### Training and Competency Interview Questions:

Stanley has been with Transocean for just over seven years. He has had no previous oilfield experience. His position is Electronic Supervisor. He has seen the job description for his job. He is familiar with the training requirements for his job, and is familiar with the Worldwide Training matrix. He has completed all the training requirements for this position. He has completed all the training for his job. He feels the training he received matches the job requirements. His last training was in water survival. He feels that rig management was supportive of training and development, as well as the shore-based managers. There were no limitations on the training available to him.

He thought the quality of the OJT on the DWH was good, but that a lot was not applicable to him.

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He has just finished mechanical OJT and got trained to be a motorman.

He received an appraisal in 2009. He filled in a development plan and the OIM looked at it and then approved it. When asked about the quality of the training provided to new employees, he said that they had a good mentorship program. He is familiar with the Station Bill, and in an emergency, he would go to ECR and stand by and assist as necessary.

When asked who is able to shear the pipe and disconnect, he said it would be the driller, then the bridge, and in an emergency, anyone could do it.

### Safety Culture Questions:

Stanley knows the company's core values, and believes that the company lives up to them. His colors are green/red. When asked what he thought are positive safety issues on the DWH, he said the Think Plan program, and the Start cards were valuable because it makes one 'look at it,' and reinforces something one needs to look out for. He participates each day in the Think Plan.

TOFS – (Time Out For Safety) – Stanley uses this every day to keep everyone focused.

Bonuses – Stanley thinks people will work safely anyway, regardless of bonuses. He enjoys getting a bonus, but that is not why he is there.

### Equipment Questions.

Regarding the BOP (blow out preventer), if there is an electrical issue with it, he gets involved with it. He also works on ventilation systems, panel purge, high gas.

When asked if he was aware of any system on the rig that was not operating correctly or that was out of service, said that he knew the purge panel was not working. It still purges though even though you get a loss of purge light.

When asked if he was involved in the BOP between well activity, he said that he does get involved to some extent. He is not involved with the engine safety system tests. He does not know how often the tests were performed.

When asked how the maintenance on the rig was approached, he said GMS was a dog, and that if you count the hours to do pms items, you would have to have twice the number of people you have. The majority of tasks time requirements account for more time than it actually takes to do the job.

When asked if he was aware of any safety systems on the rig that were not operating, he said there were one or two alarms waiting on parts to repair, but it was in good shape.

When asked how he would perceive the importance of safety on the rig with respect to completing maintenance, he said they were conscientious of getting it done safely.

When asked who is the person in charge of the rig, he said it was the OIM and the Captain. He believes the OIM handles well control, and the Captain handles the rig, and that usually the Captain is in charge. He did not see much of an issue with it.

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He believes that the order to abandon ship is given by the Captain. He did not know who gives the order to lower the lifeboats.

Of note: Stanley heard that people were panicking inside the lifeboats, and that some jumped out of the lifeboats after the lifeboats had been lowered into the water.


He believes that the driller would engage the EDS. He believes that anyone can send a mayday.

He does not know what happened to the BOP panel. Stanley recommends that Steve Bertoni be the one to consult with regarding engine questions, such as to determine if the dampers close on high gas.

Stanley thinks the second explosion may have been the fuel tanks, and that they possibly blew out the number 3 engine out back of the rig. He thinks the diesels would not speed up enough to fly apart.

Stanley thinks that perhaps if the watertight door near the sack room was shut the damage might be less, as the explosion came through that door.

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## Interviewing Form

|   |                                |
|---|--------------------------------|
| Interviewee Name:   | Nathan Carroll                 |
| Job Title:  | Able Bodied Seaman             |
| Company:  | Transocean                     |
| Contact Details:  |                                |
| Work Address:   | Park 10                        |
| Work Telephone:   |                                |
| Work Cell:  |                                |
| Home Address:   |                                |
| Home Telephone:   |                                |
| Home Cell:  |                                |
| Interviewers Present:   | John MacDonald<br>Jana Judkins |
| Date:   | June 15, 2010                  |
| Start Time:   | 11:10am                        |
| Stop Time:  | 12:15pm                        |
| Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N                       | N                              |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N | N                              |
| Are documents attached to this form? Y/N                            | N                              |
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs or other supporting      | N                              |

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| materials taken to interview.  |   |
| <b>Interview Plan</b><br><br>Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc: | <p>Training and Competency Interview Questions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. How long have you been with Transocean?</li> <li>2. Do you have any previous oilfield experience?</li> <li>3. What is your position?</li> <li>4. What are your job responsibilities? (Review Job Description before interview)</li> <li>5. What are the training requirements for this position?</li> <li>6. Can you explain the Worldwide Training matrix and its purpose?</li> <li>7. Have you completed all the training for your job? (check against compliance report).</li> <li>8. Does the training match the job requirements?</li> <li>9. Do you feel the training provided to you was sufficient? Why or Why not?</li> <li>10. When was your last training session, and what was it?</li> <li>11. How supportive of training and development was the rig management? What about shore-base managers?</li> <li>12. Were there any limitations on the training available?</li> <li>13. What was the quality of OJT on the DWH?</li> <li>14. What is your next position, and have you received any training for it?</li> <li>15. Do you know the progression of your career in Transocean?</li> <li>16. Have you received an appraisal in the last year? Can you explain the appraisal process?</li> <li>17. How many new crew members (or recently promoted) were on your crew?</li> <li>18. What is the quality of training provided to new employees?</li> <li>19. What training is provided onboard the rig for new arrivals, and what is the quality?</li> <li>20. What safety &amp; survival training did you receive and do you think it is adequate?</li> <li>21. What is your position on the Station Bill, and in an emergency? What is your lifeboat station? Life raft station?</li> <li>22. What are the first steps to take when shutting in a well, or upon detection of flow?</li> <li>23. Who is able to shear the pipe and disconnect?</li> </ol> <p>Safety Culture Questions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What are the Core Values of Transocean? Does the company live up to these Core Values?</li> <li>2. What are your Colors? What do they mean?</li> <li>3. What are the three most positive safety issues on the DWH?</li> <li>4. What are the three safety areas where improvement is needed?</li> <li>5. Do you complete a START card every day and why?</li> <li>6. Describe your participation in the THINK planning process?</li> </ol> |

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|  | <p>7. Would you describe the TOFS and last time you called a TOFS?</p> <p>8. Are you able to explain the Management of Change?</p> <p>A. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from Transocean, and can you describe the policy?</p> <p>B. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from BP and can you describe the policy?</p> <p>C. What effect did these bonuses have on your performance of the rig crews?</p> |
| <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Nathan Carroll – Able Bodied Seaman</b></p> <p>Nathan has been with Transocean since 2000 and on the DWH since 2001. Prior to joining Transocean, he had worked in the oilfield for 27 years. He was called in for relief the day before the incident, but was unable to respond in time to be of assistance.</p> <p>Nathan is of the understanding that the OIM is in charge during the day and that the Sr. DPO or Sr. Toolpusher might be in charge at night. More definitively, Nathan said that the Captain or Chief Mate is the person in charge. When asked about shutting down a job, Nathan said that anyone has the right to shut down a job and commented that poor communication was exercised during the crane fire and flooded pontoon incidents. Nathan was asked if there were increased ballasting drills after the flood and he said he had no knowledge of this fact. The fact though, was that the drills were being held every two weeks. He said that safety tours were conducted every hour on the hour to check the sea chest valves. He questioned Marcel's decision to chain lock one and open one valve. He thought there needed to be a tag on it. He said specifically that the management of change was not followed when Marcel was Chief Mate and that all departments need to have corresponding paperwork. Nathan was asked if it was a good idea for the Chief Mate and Captain to work the same tour, and he said that they worked opposite of one another after the flooding incident so that one of them would be on tour at all times, but that systems eventually returned to them working the same shift some time later.</p> <p>He also commented on the incident several years ago when Captain Young called to report his A/C was not working and was hung up on because attention needed to be directed toward a blown thruster. He specifically recalled Curt Kuchta, then the Chief Mate, telling the crew to "hang tight" during the brown out experienced in 2008.</p> <p>Nathan received well control training in 1999, but has transferred off of the drilling side. Nathan commented that the AD shouldn't have to be called to shut in a well in an emergency situation. He said that "once things start moving" anything can go wrong and that the functions of the BOP are essentially useless.</p> <p>Nathan does not have a short change schedule. He works from 6pm to 6am. Nathan said that he knows he needs his Marshal Islands Seaman's book and rating updated, but that his Coast Guard and AB unlimited are compliant. He has had some problems with Park 10 misplacing his Marshall Islands renewal paperwork. He is familiar with the Worldwide Training Matrix and aware that he needs to complete the Banksman OJT, which is a new training module. Nathan said that he's had some issues with rig management support in the past, but that they do their best to work with you. Nathan be-</p> |  |

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believes his training has been sufficient, but that he puts more emphasis on experience instead over paperwork. He commented that David Young knows the lines between paperwork and job training. It had been suggested to him that he put in for a Bosun position, but he is not interested.

When asked about new crew members, Nathan said there were a lot of inexperienced people, but he always took the time to mentor the crew when needed. He said the tally book was a good tool, but stressed the importance of watching and learning. Nathan was asked if the water survival and firefighting training were adequate and he agreed under normal conditions, but this incident was clearly not normal. He said that he had a bad feeling on his last two hitches. He felt like the water tight doors needed to be inspected thoroughly and that only half of the hydraulic doors were working properly on his last hitch. In his opinion, there was no consistency in maintaining the doors.

He was asked if he had seen his job description and that said, "no, not really." He said that Captain Young requested some ABs to be sent to Korea, but that he did not see the job description prior to his arrival. Nathan said that he has had an appraisal in the last year and that his strengths and areas that needed developing were discussed with him.


Nathan's primary muster is forward lifeboats 1 and 2 and secondary muster is lifeboats 3 and 4. He indicated that the gas drill muster is the cinema or galley. He said that the Sunday drills are taken seriously and that everyone participated. He has advanced firefighting training, but said that the crane and deck crews are the designated fire team crew. His position on the Station Bill was to assist as needed.

When Nathan was asked to explain the first steps to shutting in a well, or upon detection of flow, he said to monitor the returns, or in a bigger flood or gas leak, cut the mud, call the drill shack and cut the pressure, pick up and shut down the pumps. He said that whoever was in the drill shack could shear the pipe and disconnect. He said that no one should be scared to shut down and see what they're working with.

Nathan said that overall the company lives up to its Core Values and that the crew went above and beyond taking care of the vessel. Nathan's colors are Red/Yellow and he knows what they mean. Nathan said the importance of communication was extremely important. He mentioned that paperwork isn't going to save your life at the end of the day, but it does give you time to stop and think. In the past, he said that Randy Ezell asked everyone to complete paperwork while there was drill pipe in the hole and the well was kicking. He thought it was a little late for paperwork at that point. Nathan was asked if well control issues were common knowledge and he said that everyone should have known it was a dangerous well from the start. He would get base oil readings for the mud engineers at night and became concerned that the drilling was under balanced. He said that safety is compromised when mud pressure is shut down and the mud is undercut.

Nathan actively participated in verbal and written THINK planning and commented on the flexibility to change the planning as the job changed. He said that he would take the time to explain TOFS when he needed to use it. Nathan was interviewed by the Lloyd's Representatives when they were onboard and he stressed the importance of communication to them, as well. He mentioned that if an incident occurred, not all 4 crews would be properly informed. Nathan appears to be very knowledgeable and takes his job responsibility and safety very seriously.

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## Interviewing Form

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Interviewee Name:   | Michael Cutrer                          |
| Job Title:  | Able Bodied Seaman                      |
| Company:  | Transocean                              |
| Contact Details:  |   |
| Work Address:   | 1311 Broadfield # 400<br>Houston, Texas |
| Work Telephone:   | 832-587-8500                            |
| Work Cell:  |   |
| Home Address:   |   |
| Home Telephone:   |   |
| Home Cell:  |   |
| Interviewers Present:   | John MacDonald<br>Stephanie Butefish    |
| Date:   | June 17, 2010                           |
| Start Time:   | 9:40 am                                 |
| Stop Time:  | 10:30 am                                |
| Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N                       | N                                       |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N | N                                       |
| Are documents attached to this form? Y/N                            | N                                       |
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs                          |   |

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| or other supporting materials taken to interview.                          |  |
| <b>Interview Plan</b><br><br>Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc: | <b>Training and Competency Interview Questions</b><br><br><ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. How long have you been with Transocean?</li><li>2. Do you have any previous oilfield experience?</li><li>3. What is your position?</li><li>4. What are your job responsibilities? (Review Job Description before interview)</li><li>5. What are the training requirements for this position?</li><li>6. Can you explain the Worldwide Training matrix and its purpose?</li><li>7. Have you completed all the training for your job? (check against compliance report).</li><li>8. Does the training match the job requirements?</li><li>9. Do you feel the training provided to you was sufficient? Why or Why not?</li><li>10. When was your last training session, and what was it?</li><li>11. How supportive of training and development was the rig management? What about shore-base managers?</li><li>12. Were there any limitations on the training available?</li><li>13. What was the quality of OJT on the DWH?</li><li>14. What is your next position, and have you received any training for it?</li><li>15. Do you know the progression of your career in Transocean?</li><li>16. Have you received an appraisal in the last year? Can you explain the appraisal process?</li><li>17. How many new crew members (or recently promoted) were on your</li></ol> |

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|  | <p>crew?</p> <p>18. What is the quality of training provided to new employees?</p> <p>19. What training is provided onboard the rig for new arrivals, and what is the quality?</p> <p>20. What safety&amp; survival training did you receive and do you think it is adequate?</p> <p>21. What is your position on the Station Bill, and in an emergency? What is your lifeboat station? Life raft station?</p> <p>22. What are the first steps to take when shutting in a well, or upon detection of flow?</p> <p>23. Who is able to shear the pipe and disconnect?</p> <p>Safety Culture Questions</p> <p>1. What are the Core Values of Transocean? Does the company live up to these Core Values?</p> <p>2. What are your Colors? What do they mean?</p> <p>3. What are the three most positive safety issues on the DWH?</p> <p>4. What are the three safety areas where improvement is needed?</p> <p>5. Do you complete a START card every day and why?</p> <p>6. Describe your participation in the THINK planning process?</p> <p>7. Would you describe the TOFS and last time you called a TOFS?</p> <p>8. Are you able to explain the Management of Change?</p> <p>A. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from Transocean, and can you describe the policy?</p> <p>B. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from BP and can you describe the policy?</p> <p>C. What effect did these bonuses have on your performance of the rig</p> |
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|   | crews? |
| <p style="text-align: center;">Interview with Michael L. Cutrer<br/>June 17, 2010</p> <p>Michael L. Cutrer is an Able Bodied Seaman. He was not on board the Horizon at the time of the incident.</p> <p>He will have been with Transocean five years in September. He had no previous oilfield experience. Prior to working for Transocean, he was a vet tech at a research center. He is getting ready to get his unlimited, then will go on to Bosun, then work towards the position of Chief Mate.</p> <p>His current job responsibilities include working on valves and firedampers. He is not sure if he has seen the job description for his job. He has seen a training matrix. He does believe that the training he has received does match the job requirements, and that the training he received was sufficient. His last training course was navigation watch. He believes rig management and shore-base managers were all behind him and supportive. Michael says there were no limitations on the training available to him. His opinion of the quality of OJT on the DWH is that it is good.</p> <p>His next position is to be unlimited AB. He has three more months to go. Next, he needs sea time and letter. He does know the progression of his career in Transocean. He knows the progression of his career in Transocean.</p> <p>He believes that his appraisal for this year has been written up, and now needs to have the in person discussion. He knows that in the evaluation process, if he needs improvement in an area, it will make him a better employee. He knows that Kennedy Cola has recently been promoted. He believes that the quality of training for new employees is good. On board the rig, there is a mentor program for new people. Bosuns would put new people with Michael and he would show them around.</p> <p>Michael has had lifeboatman training, STCW 95, HUET training, and water survival. He feels it is adequate training. His position on the station bill in an emergency is that AB's go to hooks. The directions are on the room doors. AB's are on standby and assist as necessary.</p> <p>When asked who is able to shear the pipe and disconnect, Michael replied that it is the driller.</p> <p>Safety Culture:</p> <p>Michael knew the core values of Transocean: Financial Integrity Respect Safety and Technical Leadership. His colors are yellow over red.</p> <p>Start cards – they had to write one per day. He believes they are good to help limit accidents, and that they provoke thought and safety. He does one each day; it's mandatory and he found it helpful on the rig.</p> |        |

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TOFS – He has no problem calling a time out for safety. The last time he called one was when a battery switch was left on in a lifeboat.

Areas that need improvement: Michael did not readily have any responses for this. He does agree that the coveralls were warm at first, but he did get used to them. Over all, though, they have what they need.

Think Plan – He said that they have talks every morning. It is also helpful to minimize hazards. They bring the plan to the job and follow the plan.

Bonuses – He recalls receiving a bonus on wells they drilled if there were no first aids, and for performance. He does not recall if they were from BP or from Transocean. He does not believe that the bonus affects performance on the rig crew.

Quality of drills (Fire and Abandon Ship) – He feels the quality of those drills is good.

Person in charge – He believes the person in charge is the Captain or the OIM, but is not positive.


Mayday distress signal – He believes the Mayday distress signal should be sent by the Captain or the DPO.

He believes that in an emergency, the Captain is the one who gives the order to abandon ship and to lower the lifeboats. If the Captain is incapacitated, then it would be the Chief mate, or follow the chain of command.

Michael will next be going to the Spirit and then to the Petrobras.

Interview concluded.

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## Interviewing Form

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Interviewee Name:   | Michael Dicello                                |
| Job Title:  | Chief Engineer                                 |
| Company:  | Transocean                                     |
| Contact Details:  |  |
| Work Address:   | Park 10  |
| Work Telephone:   |  |
| Work Cell:  |  |
| Home Address:   |  |
| Home Telephone:   |  |
| Home Cell:  |  |
| Interviewers Present:   | Simon Watson<br>John MacDonald<br>Jana Judkins |
| Date:   | June 9, 2010                                   |
| Start Time:   | 2:30pm   |
| Stop Time:  | 3:15pm   |
| Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N                       | N  |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N | N  |
| Are documents attached to this form? Y/N                            | N  |
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs                          | N  |

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| or other supporting materials taken to interview.                          |  |
| <b>Interview Plan</b><br><br>Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc: | <b>Training and Competency Interview Questions</b><br><br>1. How long have you been with Transocean?<br>2. Do you have any previous oilfield experience?<br>3. What is your position?<br>4. What are your job responsibilities? (Review Job Description before interview)<br>5. What are the training requirements for this position?<br>6. Can you explain the Worldwide Training matrix and its purpose?<br>7. Have you completed all the training for your job? (check against compliance report).<br>8. Does the training match the job requirements?<br>9. Do you feel the training provided to you was sufficient? Why or Why not?<br>10. When was your last training session, and what was it?<br>11. How supportive of training and development was the rig management? What about shore-base managers?<br>12. Where there any limitations on the training available?<br>13. What was the quality of OJT on the DWH?<br>14. What is your next position, and have you received any training for it?<br>15. Do you know the progression of your career in Transocean?<br>16. Have you received an appraisal in the last year? Can you explain the appraisal process?<br>17. How many new crew members (or recently promoted) were on your crew?<br>18. What is the quality of training provided to new employees?<br>19. What training is provided onboard the rig for new arrivals, and what is the quality?<br>20. What safety& survival training did you receive and do you think it is adequate?<br>21. What is your position on the Station Bill, and in an emergency? What is your lifeboat station? Life raft station?<br>22. What are the first steps to take when shutting in a well, or upon detection of flow?<br>23. Who is able to shear the pipe and disconnect?<br><br><b>Safety Culture Questions</b><br>1. What are the Core Values of Transocean? Does the company live up to these Core Values?<br>2. What are your Colors? What do they mean?<br>3. What are the three most positive safety issues on the DWH? |

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|   | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>4. What are the three safety areas where improvement is needed?</li> <li>5. Do you complete a START card every day and why?</li> <li>6. Describe your participation in the THINK planning process?</li> <li>7. Would you describe the TOFS and last time you called a TOFS?</li> <li>8. Are you able to explain the Management of Change?</li> </ol><br><ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from Transocean, and can you describe the policy?</li> <li>B. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from BP and can you describe the policy?</li> <li>C. What effect did these bonuses have on your performance of the rig crews?</li> </ol><br><p>Equipment Questions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Did you work with any of the well control or safety systems on the rig, if so which ones</li> <li>2. Are you aware of any system on the rig that was not operating correctly or that was out of service. Especially related to the BOP and alarm systems.</li> <li>3. Were you involved in the BOP between well activity, if so how</li> <li>4. Were you involved in the Engine safety system tests, specifically the over speeds.</li> <li>5. Do you know how often the tests were performed.</li> <li>6. How was the Maintenance on the rig approached, was there a concern over the manning levels or amount of maintenance</li> <li>7. Were you aware of any safety systems on the rig that were not operating</li> <li>8. How would you perceive the importance of safety on the rig with respect to completing maintenance</li> </ol> |
| <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Michael Dicello – Chief Engineer</b></p> <p>Prior to joining Transocean in 2001, Michael worked for Global. He was sent to Australia for 3 years on the Millennium, where he was promoted to Maintenance Supervisor. He had just finished his first full tour days before the incident.</p> <p>Qualifications Mentioned:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unlimited Chiefs – Diesel, 3<sup>rd</sup> Steam Qualifications</li> <li>• Motormen</li> <li>• Mechanical</li> <li>• Electrical</li> <li>• Electronics</li> <li>• CPR</li> </ul> |   |

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- First Aid
- Medical Care Provider
- HUET
- Advanced Firefighting (Canada and Australia)
- Electrical Hazardous Area (on list for training)

Michael has moved up progressively and is familiar with the Chief Engineers position. He said that Transocean has an overall positive approach to training, but has sometimes "penny pinched" when classes that been denied that weren't necessary for their job description, leaving some feeling slighted. He is not entirely familiar with the Worldwide Training Matrix, but has seen it. The last training he received was the HUET course, which he has completed at least six times.

When asked his opinion of the OJT modules, Michael said he understands the concept, but does not believe it's necessary for his position. Because he oversees electricians and ETs, he acknowledges the benefits that the OJT modules provide. Michael said that his next position could possibly be OIM or Asset Manager and does not require additional training. He is familiar with the appraisal process and his last evaluation went very well. He has not had any issues with appraisals, but is aware that shortcomings are sometimes overlooked. He said that the process is roughly 50% biased, so he believes in giving honest evaluations. Michael said that some people had difficulty separating friendships from professional expectations of their subordinates. Michael is eligible for a yearly performance bonus, but does not rely on it as a motivational tool.

Michael's general opinion regarding the competency of maintenance crews is that the younger crew members are acceptable. When asked his opinion regarding the cut back of crews, Michael said that he had experienced some difficulties on the Millennium (1993-1994) with a crew cutting back from eight to two. He said that the changes from Impact to RMS would have benefitted with more electricians. With regard to the Impact conversion delays and backlog, Michael said he working with Robert (Tiano?) on this.

Michael was asked about training for crew members and said that it was adequate, but might be light for someone new to offshore. He said that the TOPS training definitely helps prepare them for working offshore. As far as he knows, the mentoring system is effective.

Michael is on the damage control team, so according to the station bill he reports to the back console of the bridge during emergency procedures. He indicated that permission to disconnect and activate the EDS was not necessary in an emergency. He was not aware of any documentation that supports this. Michael said that the Captain is in charge of safety and the OIM is in charge during well control. If the welfare of the vessel comes into play, the Captain is in charge. With respect to the DP circles, he was unaware of procedures for closing the vessel but when asked who could do so in an emergency, Michael said that absolutely anyone could if the vessel was "in the red". If the vessel was "in the yellow", the proper chain of command would be consulted.

When asked about fire and boat drills at night or in foul weather, Michael said that there were no drills performed at night and that foul weather drills could be dangerous switching from auto to manual mode of DP. He had experienced an incident where the vessel could not get back on track due

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to high winds. He said that DP and man overboard drills were conducted, but not routinely on Sundays. Michael said that if given the option he would rather use an FRC over a lifeboat because it's faster and lower to the water. Michael was asked if he saw the value in having a dehumidifier and fixed radios in the lifeboats and he agreed that these were essential.

When lowering the lifeboat, Michael said the crew waits for a radio or horn signal from the bridge. Ultimately, the lifeboat captain would make the call to evacuate. Anyone can sound the general alarm, but mayday should be sent from a controlled situation on the bridge. Other crew members might not be aware of the situation. He believes the same rule should apply for the EDS.

When asked about the pre-run telephone call with the OIM, Subsea Supervisor, Chief Engineer, Electrical and Mechanical Supervisors and Toolpusher, as a process to control the BOP, Michael said that he had never participated in a pre-run call and that it seemed like "one more step" to ensure everyone was on the same page. When discussing the engines failure to trip in over-speed, Michael said that he didn't understand what happened. He said the engines worked properly for the Coast Guard and ABS. Minor adjustments were needed, but they were ultimately fine.

Michael said that the auto-valve on the ventilation system would close during a gas and fire alarm. It had to be maintained by Motormen and Engineers, but it did work properly. He said that he was not aware of the safety systems, including the gas detections, alarms, etc., functioning improperly. He said that variably some sensors are always going to be in the process of failing. The panels for these safety systems are on the bridge and in the ECR. The SIMRAD system alarm on the bridge monitored gas on the drill floor and could easily be missed if the page was not being monitored. Michael said that the gas alarm could always be heard, but not always the page. He was not aware if alarm volume could be tampered with, but said that some disregard nuisance alarms.


Michael was asked about the purge switch on the BOP panel. He did not have an opinion on whether the loss of BOP function could have caused the pod to go to vent allowing the annular to reopen. He was not familiar with the ETs working with the purge switch.

Michael is aware of Transocean's Core Values and his colors. With regard to positive safety procedures, Michael said that the process is there to help and it works if it's used. He said that stop procedures are also a positive safety tool. The message conveyed in the weekly meetings is safety first, no matter how long it takes. When asked if he was aware of pressure to complete jobs, Michael said it depends on the personalities. There are always people that are hardnosed and act like bullies. He said that a BP Company Man was not received well and was referred to as "Darth Vader".

Michael said that scheduled maintenance on the drill floor is an area that could be improved. He suggested a minimum of six hours of daily and preventative maintenance each week. Michael is familiar with the THINK process and Prompt cards. He said that everyone is aware of the Time Out for Safety procedure and knew to use it when necessary. Michael is competent in the roles of his crew and expects everyone to fulfill their job responsibilities. He felt like safety was never compromised due to budget and that the cost/benefit analysis was justifiable in most cases.



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## Interviewing Form

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Interviewee Name:   | Mike Dow                                       |
| Job Title:  | Chief Mate                                     |
| Company:  | Transocean                                     |
| Contact Details:  |  |
| Work Address:   | Park 10  |
| Work Telephone:   |  |
| Work Cell:  |  |
| Home Address:   |  |
| Home Telephone:   |  |
| Home Cell:  |  |
| Interviewers Present:   | John MacDonald<br>Roger Sawyer<br>Jana Judkins |
| Date:   | June 17, 2010                                  |
| Start Time:   | 4:30pm   |
| Stop Time:  | 5:20pm   |
| Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N                       | N  |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N | Y  |
| Are documents attached to this form? Y/N                            | Y  |
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs                          | N  |

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| or other supporting materials taken to interview.  |   |
| <b>Interview Plan</b><br><br>Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc:   | <b>Safety Culture Questions</b><br>1. What are the Core Values of Transocean? Does the company live up to these Core Values?<br>2. What are your Colors? What do they mean?<br>3. What are the three most positive safety issues on the DWH?<br>4. What are the three safety areas where improvement is needed?<br>5. Do you complete a START card every day and why?<br>6. Describe your participation in the THINK planning process?<br>7. Would you describe the TOFS and last time you called a TOFS?<br>8. Are you able to explain the Management of Change?<br><br>A. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from Transocean, and can you describe the policy?<br>B. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from BP and can you describe the policy?<br>C. What effect did these bonuses have on your performance of the rig crews? |
| <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Mike Dow – Chief Mate</b></p> <p>1. How long have you been with Transocean?<br/>I have been working for Transocean since November 2001.</p> <p>2. Do you have any previous oilfield experience?<br/>Before coming to work at Transocean I worked for Seacor Marine primarily as a Mate on the OSV <i>Seacor Conquest</i>. I also served some time on anchor handling vessels.</p> <p>3. What is your position?<br/>I was the Chief Mate on the <i>Deepwater Horizon</i>. I have been serving in that position since January 2009.</p> <p>4. What are your job responsibilities? (Review Job Description before interview)<br/>My duties included the oversight of the marine department on the vessel. This involved supervising the Bosn, ABs, and DP Operators. In addition to my supervisory duties, I was responsible for the maintenance of fire equipment, lifesaving equipment, the ballast system,</p> |   |

the bulk system and systems associated with watertight integrity (watertight dampers). I was responsible for ensuring that the stability of the vessel was completed and also tracked changes to the vessel's deadweight.

5. What are the training requirements for this position?

I was required to have an unlimited Chief Mate license and because I was working on a semi-submersible a Ballast Control Operator endorsement. In order to gain my license and endorsements I was required to complete the classes required by the US Coast Guard for STCW (Standards of Training and Certification of Watchstanders).

In addition to the professional requirements of my license, I was required to complete classes for Transocean including Safety Leadership Foundations, Comprehensive Stability, and DP classes. There are also OJT requirements for this position.

6. Can you explain the Worldwide Training matrix and its purpose?

The purpose of the training matrix is to ensure that all personnel working in a position have met a minimum standard of training for a given position.

7. Have you completed all the training for your job? (check against compliance report).

As of 17 June 2010, I am deficient in the requirement to have attended MEM (Major Emergency Management) Person in Charge (PIC). I have completed all professional training required for a Chief Mate. This is a new requirement of personnel in the Chief Mate position.

8. Does the training match the job requirements?

Yes.

9. Do you feel the training provided to you was sufficient? Why or Why not?

The training that I received was sufficient to carry out the job of Chief Mate. The professional training that is required for licensing has a minimum sea service requirement ensuring a minimum level of experience prior to receiving the license.

10. When was your last training session, and what was it?

In June 2010 I have completed Major Emergency Management (MEM) and Supervisory Well Control.

11. How supportive of training and development was the rig management? What about shore-base managers?

Rig management has always been supportive of ensuring that personnel received the training that is required. I have never had a problem with classes being denied by rig-based, or shore-based management.

12. Were there any limitations on the training available?

Scheduling of classes is always difficult. With certain classes, there are problems with the

scheduling and the number of spaces available.

13. What was the quality of OJT on the DWH?

For positions within the marine department on the *Deepwater Horizon*, OJT was effective. We ensured that DP Operators were completing their OJT within a timely manner. The meant that personnel had demonstrated their competence before being allowed to perform their duties. This OJT was accomplished by both the Chief Mates and Sr. DP Operators for junior personnel.

For the ABs, we were fortunate in being able to get some training time with our personnel before they were given permanent positions. The usual path was to have a roustabout working with the Bosn and ABs while they were gaining their sea time and completing their STCW requirements. This allowed them to be trained in the job prior to their gaining a position.

14. What is your next position, and have you received any training for it?

My next position is Captain and I have been receiving training for that position through my duties as Chief Mate. I have completed all of the professional training for STCW for my Masters and OIM license.

15. Do you know the progression of your career in Transocean?

Answered in previous question.

16. Have you received an appraisal in the last year? Can you explain the appraisal process?

My last appraisal was completed in December 2009. The appraisal process involves the Captain (immediate supervisor) talking with the members of my crew, assembling the appraisal and then reviewing his findings with me. The appraisal was then forwarded to the OIM for his review and comments. It then became part of my personnel record.

17. How many new crew members (or recently promoted) were on your crew?

The Bosn and ABs had no short service employees (<6 months) experience. As far as I can remember, there were no DP Operators with less than 6 months experience in their position.

18. What is the quality of training provided to new employees?

I feel that we did a good job of training new employees of the company.

19. What training is provided onboard the rig for new arrivals, and what is the quality?

Training for new individuals included training as a part of their orientation on arrival, OJT and formal training.

When personnel arrived on the rig for the first time, they were taken through an orientation

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that provided information on their emergency duties (station bill), location of lifesaving equipment, rig familiarization and emergency signals. This initial training was supplemented by training conducted during weekly drills and safety meetings.

In addition the training that was given to all personnel, there was department specific training that occurred. For members of the marine department, this included more in depth training on the operation and use of emergency and lifesaving equipment.

20. What safety & survival training did you receive and do you think it is adequate? I received training on water survival and fire fighting as a part of my professional licensing requirements (STCW). This was supplemented on the water survival and HUET training that I received. Rig specific training was received during drills and safety meetings.

21. What is your position on the Station Bill, and in an emergency? What is your lifeboat station? Life raft station?

When the Fire & Emergency signal sounded I was the On Scene commander. When the Abandonment alarm sounded I was the PIC of Lifeboat #2, which was my assigned lifeboat.

22. What are the first steps to take when shutting in a well, or upon detection of flow?  
The driller should pick up off bottom (if possible), stop rotation, stop the pumps and close the annulars.

23. Who is able to shear the pipe and disconnect?  
Primary responsibility for activating EDS rests with the Driller or Toolpusher on the Rig Floor. The Sr. DP Operator has the responsibility for activating the red alert for a DP emergency. The EDS would still be activated by personnel on the Rig Floor. In the event of an emergency where the normal procedures do not apply (no functionality on the Rig Floor, etc), the bridge team had training as to the procedure for initiating an EDS from the BOP Control Panel on the bridge.

Mike is familiar with Transocean's Core Values and commitment to safe operations. He said that the company has progressively gotten better about living up to these values over the last 10 years. Mike's colors are Red/Green and he knows what the colors mean.

When asked about the rig's positive safety tools, Mike said that THINK planning is very useful in the Marine department. It provokes the crew to stop and think. Mike said that TOFS is also a great tool because it's important to know that stopping a job is an okay thing to do. And lastly, Mike said that mentorship has been very positive and believes it has generally led to a slower turnover ratio. He said that overall safety observations could use some improvements. No one likes to confront someone to correct them, but it's something that has to be done. When asked about the Management of Change, Mike said that managing quick change was slow and not captured as well as it could have been.

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Mike said that routine written handovers indicated if certain equipment was not available or if jobs were not completed. He said the crew was very good at passing information on between crews, especially after the flood. Mike said if something wasn't available, the TSTP was documented.

Mike said the last time he called a TOFS was on his last hitch because someone had improper hand placement while changing a valve. Mike completed a START Card everyday because it was company policy. He said START Tours are out of peoples comfort zones, so as a supervisor, he said he needed to set an example. When preparing THINK Plans, Mike said you have to think of the "what ifs". He was complimentary of his ABs and said they did most of the THINK Plan writing. He said THINK drills were treated like an OJT.

Mike received a performance and safety bonus from BP and 30 safety points from Transocean. Mike said that bonuses did not affect this most recent well, but they generally affected the loyalty of the rig. He thinks it made it a better rig.

Mike indicated that the OIM is in charge on location during normal operations and the Captain is in charge during a marine emergency. He said that ideally the Captain is responsible for the mayday, but whoever is on watch needs to be responsible in an emergency. When ordering an abandon ship, Mike said that the Captain would first be responsible, then the Chief Mate. He also said the Captain would make the call to lower the lifeboats. Mike was not entirely sure what the documentation read with regard to activating the EDS. He said the primary authority should be the drill floor. When safety is an issue, it should be activated by the bridge. He said the DPO might be "hard pressed" and not feel like they had the authority to activate the EDS.

Mike said that the Station Bill indicates he is the fire emergency on team commander. In the event of an abandon ship, he is in charge of lifeboat 2. In a hypothetical situation, Mike said he'd like to wait before evacuating even with a full muster, but in this incident there was a 250 ft. fire, which he said he would make the call to evacuate. Mike said the life-saving inspections were just completed the week before the incident, with the exception of the fixed CO2. He said the documentation was with Schuber Hughkins at Total Safety.

Mike said the over-speed testing was conducted by the engineers with ABS and the Coast Guard. He commented on the need to implement stretcher drills. He said that the week before the incident, they were trying to get the crew down to 144 for the additional bed space. When commenting on the lifeboat braking mechanism, Mike said that once the brake was released, it couldn't be stopped remotely. However, it could be stopped manually from the deck.

When discussing the standby generator, Mike said it took 600 seconds to initiate from a dead start. Engines 3 and 4 would be the engines to get up and running during a blackout. These two engines would normally start automatically. He said it took 48 seconds to sync to

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the bus after a blackout. The 1<sup>st</sup> thruster would take 2 minutes. The UPS designated 1-8 for the thrusters. (I missed something here.) He said there were 5 separate UPSs for the DP system.



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## Interviewing Form

|   |                     |
|---|---------------------|
| Interviewee Name:   | David Hackney       |
| Job Title:  | Master              |
| Company:  | Transocean          |
| Contact Details:  |                     |
| Work Address:   |                     |
| Work Telephone:   |                     |
| Work Cell:  |                     |
| Home Address:   |                     |
| Home Telephone:   |                     |
| Home Cell:  |                     |
| Interviewers Present:   | John MacDonald      |
| Date:   | July 22, 2010       |
| Start Time:   | 9:25 a.m.           |
| Stop Time:  | 10:15 a.m.          |
| Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N                       | Yes                 |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N | No                  |
| Are documents attached to this form? Y/N                            | Yes                 |
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs or other supporting      | Interview questions |

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|---|--|
| materials taken to interview.                 |  |
| <b>Interview Plan</b>                         | <b><u>Training and Competency Interview Questions</u></b>  |
| Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc: | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. How long have you been with Transocean?</li> <li>2. Do you have any previous oilfield experience?</li> <li>3. What is your position?</li> <li>4. What are your job responsibilities? (review job description before interview)</li> <li>5. What are the training requirements for this position?</li> <li>6. Can you explain the Worldwide Training Matrix and its purpose?</li> <li>7. Have you completed all the training for your job? (check against compliance report)</li> <li>8. Does the training match the job requirements?</li> <li>9. Do you feel the training provided to you was sufficient? Why or why not?</li> <li>10. When was your last training session and what was it?</li> <li>11. How supportive of training and development was the rig management? What about shore-based managers?</li> <li>12. Were there any limitations on the training available?</li> <li>13. What was the quality of OJT on the DWH?</li> <li>14. What is your next position, and have you received any training for it?</li> <li>15. Do you know the progression of your career in Transocean?</li> <li>16. Have you received an appraisal in the last year? Can you explain the appraisal process?</li> <li>17. How many new crew members (or recently promoted) were on your crew?</li> <li>18. What is the quality of training provided to new employees?</li> <li>19. What training is provided onboard the rig for new arrivals, and what is the quality?</li> <li>20. What safety &amp; survival training did you receive and do you think it is adequate?</li> <li>21. What is your position on the Station Bill and in an emergency? What is your life boat station? Life raft station?</li> <li>22. What are the first steps to take when shutting in a well or upon detection of flow?</li> <li>23. Who is able to shear the pipe and disconnect?</li> </ol> <p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Safety Culture Questions</u></b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What are the Core Values of Transocean? Does the company live up to these Core Values?</li> <li>2. What are your colors? What do they mean?</li> <li>3. What are the three most positive safety issues on the DWH?</li> <li>4. What are the three safety areas where improvement is needed?</li> <li>5. Do you complete a START card every day? Why?</li> </ol> |

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|---|---|
|   | <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>6. Describe your participation in the THINK planning process.</li><li>7. Please describe the TOFS and the last time you called a TOFS.</li><li>8. Are you able to explain the Management of Change?</li><li>9. Bonus<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>A. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from Transocean, and can you describe the policy?</li><li>B. Did you get a Performance or Safety bonus from BP and can you describe the policy?</li><li>C. What effect did these bonuses have on the performance of the rig crews?</li></ol></li></ol> |
| <p style="text-align: center;">Interview of David Hackney – Master<br/>Transocean Office<br/>July 22, 2010</p> <p>Interviewer: John MacDonald</p> <p>Note taker: Diane Willey</p> <p>Start time: 9:30 a.m.</p> <p>Stop time: 10:15 a.m.</p> <p>David was not on the rig during the incident; he left 11 hours prior. David has been employed by Transocean for one year. He has worked three 21-day hitches. He finished a hitch as Captain on the Pathfinder this morning. He had a "brief stint" on the Seven Seas. Prior to working with Transocean, from 1989/1990 he worked on SONAT's 534 in addition to a couple of supply boats (Sunchase and Tidewater). David has been a Captain since 1991.</p> <p>David was asked if he has seen his job description; he said yes. He was asked if he thought the job description matched what his actual work load entailed; he said yes, he though the description was well thought out.</p> <p>He was asked if he was familiar with the training requirements for his position. He said yes, the RSTC is good about keeping the crew up-to-date with what training they needed. He said he is aware that there is training that he needs to complete and he had classes scheduled through December 2010. Since the incident occurred, he is unsure what his training options are.</p> <p>David was asked if he was familiar with the training matrix. He said he yes; additionally he can look online as well as speak to the RSTC.</p> <p>He was asked if the training matched his job requirements; he said yes. He was asked if he thought that the training provided was sufficient; he said yes. He was asked what the most recent training he attended; he said the second DP class in March 2010. David was asked if rig management was</p> |   |

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supportive of training and development; he said yes. He was asked if there was a limitation on training; he said no.

David was asked for his opinion of the overall quality of the OJT on the Deepwater Horizon; he said it was good.

He was asked if he knew what his next position would be; he said "OIM." He was asked if he has the desire to become an OIM; he said yes. He also said that he would be interested in looking at a shore-based position.

David was asked if he received an appraisal last year and if so, could he explain the appraisal process. He said yes, he did receive an appraisal. He said appraisals are given each year. He appraises others in addition to being appraised.

David was asked what training is provided for new arrivals on the rig and the quality of such training. He said what the Horizon provides is "the best he has ever encountered." He said the new crew members go through an in-depth orientation (lasting one to two hours), are introduced to the Captain and OIM; tour the rig, and are assigned a mentor. They are also provided orange hard hats, so the rig knows they are new and will look out for them.

He was asked what safety and survival techniques they are taught as new crew members. David said they attend TOPS, HUITT, fire fighting and life saving procedures. He said the TOPS instructors are very good; they keep the attendees' attention.

David was asked what his position on the Station Bill is. He said he is in charge in emergency situations. His lifeboat station is #1 and #3; life raft is #1 and #3.

He was asked what the steps were when shutting in a well or upon detection of flow. He said he relies on Jimmy Harrell, OIM, to handle well control issues. When asked who has authority to shear the pipe and disconnect, he said the OIM, Senior Toolpusher and Company Man. If those people are not available, David said it is his decision who to give authority to. He said he would also provide notification by phone.

David was asked if he knew the core values of Transocean. He said "FIRST" (Financial discipline, Integrity and honesty Respect, Safety and Technical Support). He said he has randomly asked crew members this question and he was a bit surprised that everyone knows the meaning. When asked if he thinks that Transocean lives up to their core values, he said yes.

His colors are red/green.

He was asked to name three of the most positive safety areas on the DWH. He said permitting requirements, and the preparation and completion of THINK Plans, Prompt Cards and START Cards.

When asked to name three areas where improvement is needed, he was unable to think of anything. He said the DWH was extremely safe. He said he has worked on the Americas, DD3 as a Chief Mate and Horizon and the safety cultures on all of Transocean's rigs are the same...very safe.

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David was asked if he completed a START Card every day; he said yes. When asked why, he said because it is required, but also because it promotes safety and it is a vehicle to provide constructive criticism. He said that he tells the crew to not always write about something positive. He said that he goes over the cards with the supervisors and acts on them if attention is required immediately. He occasionally does START tours.

When asked about his participation in the THINK Planning process, he said it depends on whether or not a permit is required. He said he audits the THINK Plans every morning.

David was asked when the last time he called a TOFS was. He said when they recently shifted out of the dry dock he called numerous TOFS. He said the new guys had line holding issues and he would stop and show them correctly.

He was asked if he thought any of the crew members was fearful of reporting incidents; he said no.

When asked if he ever received a bonus from Transocean or BP, David said he is eligible for a bonus at the end of the year based on safety and performance. He said he received a well works bonus while on the Horizon in the amount of \$500. He was asked if he thought the potential of a bonus affected the crew's performance; he said it is an incentive for them.

David was asked if he thought everyone knew who was in charge of the rig; he said "most do especially senior management, supervisors and marine crew." He was asked how he thought this information could be reinforced to the crew; he said to reiterate it in the pre-tours. He was asked if the command structure was clear on the Horizon Station Bill; he said yes. He said in fact, he and Jimmy Harrell talked about this issue during his last hitch.

David was asked if he felt that the life boat was an acceptable FRC on the Horizon; he said yes, he was comfortable with it.

He was asked who has ultimate authority when lowering the life boats. He said the Master is in charge in all emergencies.

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## Interviewing Form

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Interviewee Name:   | William Jernigan  |
| Job Title:  | Chief Mechanic  |
| Company:  | Transocean  |
| Contact Details:  |   |
| Work Address:   |   |
| Work Telephone:   |   |
| Work Cell:  |   |
| Home Address:   |   |
| Home Telephone:   |   |
| Home Cell:  |   |
| Interviewers Present:   | John MacDonald<br>Stephanie Butefish                    |
| Date:   | June 22, 2010   |
| Start Time:   | 9:45 am   |
| Stop Time:  | 11:45 am  |
| Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N                                     | Y   |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N               | Y   |
| Are documents attached to this form? Y/N  | N   |
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs or other supporting materials taken to | Drawing of Drill Floor Plan, Main Deck, and Second Deck |

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|  |  |
|--|--|
| interview.   |  |
| <b>Interview Plan</b><br><br>Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc: |  |

Interview with William Jernigan, Chief Mechanic  
June 22, 2010

The interviewer, John MacDonald, explained the reason for the interview—that we are constructing a timeline of events on the night of the incident in order to reconstruct what happened and to have something better going forward.

William Jernigan has been with Transocean three years this April. He has no previous oilfield experience. His position is Chief Mechanic. He started as a Roustabout and worked his way up to his current position. He has not seen his job description; he was shown what to do. He is supposed to take water survival before going back to work. Looking at his personnel file, John MacDonald went over some of the items in which William is currently non-compliant. When asked if William believes the training matches the job description, he said yes, and he does believe it is sufficient to do the job. His last training session was SLT at Park 10. He was on the rig at the time of the incident.

He believes his rig management and shore-based managers were supportive of training. There were no limitations on the training available to him. He thinks the quality of OJT training on the DWH was good. He thinks his next position may be mechanical supervisor.

William had an appraisal in 2009, and believes it was based on workmanship, leadership, and initiative.

William did not notice that there were many new crew members on the rig. He believes that the quality of training for new crew members is good. He did have a mentor when he first arrived on the rig. William has completed HUET and BOSIET training. He completed firefighting training as a Roustabout. He did water survival and rigging training also. He did go to TOPS. He is somewhat familiar with the station bill, and he knows what it says for chief mechanic. He was supposed to go to the ECR in back, but it blew up and he could not go there. He knows where the lifeboat and liferaft stations are. His job does not require him to know what steps to take when shutting in a well or upon detection of flow.

When asked who is able to shear the pipe and disconnect, he responded that it would be the bridge personnel and the drill floor.

Safety Culture Questions:

William knew the core values of the company, and also believes that the company lives up to them.

His colors are red over blue. He thinks it means that when he has a job to do, he wants to do it, but

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he checks everything.

When asked to describe the three most positive things that help with safety, he said that the drills on Sunday were helpful; that the Think Plan was a good way to check oneself and others, and TSTP (Task Specific Think Plans) were also helpful.

He does complete a start card every day. They make a person take time out to see if there are any hazards involved in doing a task safely. William's participation in the Think planning process involves doing it every day. He writes a think plan and a TSTP and prompt cards. The prompt cards help him to think, and they do them for each job.

TOFS – He is comfortable calling a time out for safety. He recalls that on his last hitch, he did call a time out for safety while working on mud pumps.

Management of change – William discussed how this process works, and said that it is used in several areas. He said it is used if you have to change how a job is done and the need to make other people aware of it.

Bonuses – William did not receive a bonus from Transocean. He did get a well bonus from BP. While it was nice to get a bonus, he did not believe it made people rush to do a job, nor did it affect the way they did their job.

William was asked to recount the events of the night of the incident:

William's shift is noon till midnight – actually 11:30 am till 11:30 pm.

8:00 pm – he did routine pm's that day, then had supper. He then went to his office and closed pm's on the computer. He went upstairs with the ET (Mike Williams) to help at the starboard crane; they set boom limits, cable and drums with Dale (the crane operator). Dale set the crane in the cradle at about 8:40 – 8:45 pm. Dale stayed with the crane. (Note: during the explosion, William heard Joe (from Haliburton) say that he saw Dale coming down some stairs and the stairs collapsed, and Dale was blown off the crane stairs.)

Discussion of Mike Williams' appearance on 60 Minutes. William said that Mike was possibly hit on his head and may have some of the facts inaccurately. He did see that Mike was pulled up onto the Bankston, and that Mike had a bandage on his head.

9-9:15 pm – William came down stairs on top of the Schlumberger deck. He had come down from starboard crane and he could see inside a retractable door; he said 'hi' to Adam and one other roughneck on the rig floor; he went downstairs near the Haliburton mud unit/log shacks, then downstairs to the drill floor level, then downstairs to the main deck, turned right and went down a walkway to his office. It was breacktime. He began to sweep and mop his floor, which took about 30 minutes.

9:30 – 9:35 pm - He then sat down at his desk. About one to two minutes later, the first explosion happened. He heard a boom, followed by multiple booms. It sounded as though a crane boom had fallen. Next, the lights went out. He was alone in a chair at this point. He then got his flashlight, hat, and gloves, and exited the mechanic shop door, which is an inboard door to the hall. Then, he started to go up the stairs leading to the main deck, but stopped halfway and decided instead to go



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back down, and then opened the door to the living quarters near the break room. He opened the door, and another explosion came and it blew him aft back nearly to the office door near the stairs. He saw 2-3 other people (thinks these two might have been tank cleaners) who were also blown back with him; they were blown back about 12 feet toward the rails. They got up, and saw what appeared to be smoke and dust. It left a taste in his mouth; he thought it might be insulation dust; it was not hot. At this point, William said to go to the lifeboats. The walls were blown and pushed in towards the center of the hall and the ceiling tiles were down. They went straight up the hall and to the right, grabbed life jackets under the stairs, and went straight across the deck to lifeboat #2. William met the off tour AD there, and together they tried to get a muster. The emergency lights worked, but not enough to see to get muster, so they used William's small flashlight. They walked through a door between the cinema room and the galley on the boat deck. William does not recall hearing the general alarm bells, but they could hear an announcement to muster at the galley and at the cinema, but William told people to come out to the deck. He did see people getting into boats instead of going to muster. He also saw Matt Hughes, a Roughneck, climb over the handrail located near the forward lifeboat, but he does not know if Matt jumped.

When asked how long people waited in the boat until it was lowered, he did not know. Some of the people in the boat said they could not see well to fasten their seatbelts, so they tied themselves in some way. William was the last person in the boat. He saw flames go up the starboard side of the derrick, and flames coming out of the diverter line on the starboard side. He saw the top drive and blocks fall, and he could see lines flying.

Next, Steve, the Bosun, got into the boat; William got in behind the driver; Mike Mayfield got in, and William was behind them. Then, the boats were lowered. Note: William believes that if some people knew how to let that lifeboat down, they would have left a lot of people on the deck. When they got into the boat, Steve pulled the handle and they had a smooth ride down. He cranked the engine before it was lowered. Then William opened the back door and grabbed the D-ring off and threw it off the boat. They took off. William left the back door open. He saw the number 1 lifeboat take off behind them. William's lifeboat drove away and then stopped to let the number 1 catch up with them, and they both headed back to the Bankston. William looked for anyone who may be in the water, but saw no one. Meanwhile, the number 1 lifeboat arrived at the Bankston, and then William's number 2 lifeboat arrived at the Bankston. The number 1 boat began to unload, and then the number 2 began to unload. Note: while alongside the Bankston, a line was either tossed from the Bankston to the lifeboat number 2 or from lifeboat number 2 to the Bankston (William does not recall which boat tossed the initial line). They offloaded out of the side door through a rope ladder up to the Bankston. William was one of the last to get off his lifeboat; behind him were Mike Mayfield and Steve. While they were getting off the boat, they saw mud on both the Bankston and the lifeboat. At that point, William had not spoken to the crew of the Bankston.

After about 12-14 hours, they left and went to a platform where the Coast Guard boarded the Bankston there. The crew of the DWH were given supplies, pajamas and coveralls. They sat 'awhile' at this location, then left and arrived at Fouchon around 4-4:30 am. Some of the people asked why they were not leaving sooner, and were told that the Coast Guard said to wait, and that the Bankston was to be the command ship. Daun Winslow talked to the people of the DWH and gave them the news and information as he learned it.

Further note from William – after they looked around, they saw an inflatable liferaft stuck under the rig starboard forward under the galley (he was not sure how well he could see the actual location of

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the raft relative to the rig). The rescue boat went to them and pulled them out and brought the raft toward William's boat, and tied on. William saw Steve Bertone get out and also David Young and Wyman, who was on a stretcher.

When asked who is the person in charge of the rig, William said that under normal circumstances, and when on a well, it is the OIM. When it is underway, it is the Captain. In an emergency, it is the Captain who is in charge, and next in charge would be the Chief Mate, etc., down the chain.

When asked who should give the order to abandon ship, he said it should come from the bridge.

Shortchange – William said they do it in his area. When he gets to the rig, he puts his gear in his room, and relieves the mechanic at 9 am. The other chief mechanic then goes off duty for 6 hours, and comes back to relieve William; William comes back at 11:30.

Further items:

When asked about the quality of the muster, he replied that he and the AD tried their best to get a muster; they tried again on the boat.

He said the coxswain for the lifeboats are: the AB (the Coxswains on the Station Bill are the DPO's), who handles the upkeep; and the DPO, who does the lifeboat instruction drills.

William does not recall if there was anyone on a stretcher on his lifeboat. There was sufficient room in the lifeboat.

All doors were closed on the lifeboat. The sprinklers were not on for lifeboat #2.

When they landed, William left the back door open while it was floating. He saw sprinklers on lifeboat #1 while looking out the back door.

He knew that lifeboat 2 was the fast rescue craft because he had heard Steve say that, so they looked for people in the water while lifeboat 1 was headed toward the Bankston.

When asked if he thought there was enough time that night to take a muster, William said 'no.'

When they lowered the boat, the fire got really big; waiting for 5-10 more minutes would mean they might have been burned.

He heard that Andrea sent the mayday.

He does not know the amount of time that passed from the time of the first explosion till the first boat was lowered.

William does not work on any well control systems.

When asked if he was aware of any system on the rig that was not operating correctly, William mentioned that mud pump #1 was messed up; it would get back pressure and would not build up pressure in the pump. It was a problem they never figured out.

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
William does not know of any BOP problems. He worked with the crane and rig floor systems only.

William does not have any concerns about maintenance on the rig. He is not aware of any safety systems not operating. He feels that safety on the rig with respect to complete maintenance was very important.

When asked if he has an understanding of the ventilation systems, William said 'no.'

They did a muster on the Bankston. Carl, the radio operator, and 2 others and Allan (AD) worked on getting the muster.

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### Interviewing Form

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Interviewee Name:   | Yancy J. Keplinger                       |
| Job Title:  | Sr. Dynamic POS Operator                 |
| Company:  | Transocean                               |
| Contact Details:  |  |
| Work Address:   |  |
| Work Telephone:   | 713 232-8262                             |
| Work Cell:  |  |
| Home Address:   |  |
| Home Telephone:   |  |
| Home Cell:  |  |
| Interviewers Present:   | Perrin R. Roller, P.E.<br>John MacDonald |
| Date:   | 2 June 2010                              |
| Start Time:   | 9:10 am                                  |
| Stop Time:  | 11:00 am                                 |
| Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N                                     |  |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N               |  |
| Are documents attached to this form? Y/N  |  |
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs or other supporting materials taken to |  |

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|  |  |
|--|--|
| interview.   |  |
| <b>Interview Plan</b><br><br>Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc: |  |

Interview with Mr. Yancy J. Keplinger

Tuesday, June 2, 2010

Date: Tuesday, June 2, 2010

Interviewers: Mr. Perrin Roller  
Mr. John MacDonald

Mr. Yancy Keplinger came to Houston from New Orleans. He lives in Houma. He is in town for today only. His flight home leaves at 3:25 pm today.

The interviewer, Mr. Perrin Roller, asked Mr. Keplinger to recall in a narrative from pertinent point to details. Also attending this interview was Mr. John B. MacDonald.

Yancy's prior experience: He was a lead AB on the Enterprise for 4 years. Before that, he was a welder at Weatherford. The Enterprise was his first offshore job. He started as a seaman, then became an AB. He heard of an opening for bosun—Captain Joe put Yancy's name in the hat for it. Yancy was a bosun for 11 months. He then started as a DPO Trainee and was promoted directly to Senior DPO.

Yancy has taken basic and advance firefighting training classes on his time off.

Sequence of Events -

Yancy described the night before as being calm, with minimal seas and minimal winds. He was on tour with Andrea (Andrea Fleytas – DPO). The Chief was up; had just finished a cement job. There were visitors from BP – Pat O'Brien and Bill Davis. The Captain was showing them around. The time was between 8 and 9 (PM).

The cement job was to be the last job to be done. Chief had not been to bed. The person who finished the cement job (John XXX) stayed up. The captain brought the VIPs to the bridge. The 2 VPs were practicing on the simulator and on the joystick. Andrea was at the desk while Yancy was with

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the VPs on the simulator. Then the chief mate left to get the time for when the next cement job was to be. They heard noise. Camera 21 indicated mud spewing out. Yancy adjusted the camera and saw an explosion on the starboard side, midship.

Saw nothing on the port side; there is no camera there. PSV Damon Bankston was still on the port side hooked up to the mud hose. At that time, they had stopped for one hour backloading mud. He received a call from the drill floor. Gas detectors went off on the drilling floor, sack room, main deck, mud room.

Saw shale shaker. Called shale shaker at X-2144, which usually answers on 4<sup>th</sup> ring. There was no answer on 7<sup>th</sup> ring. This took place prior to the main explosion.

M/V Bankston stern became covered with mud. When Yancy noticed the starboard side damage, he saw mud flowing first with massive force, then went from mud to gas. When the gas detectors went off, he started called spaces.

Regarding command and control of the bridge – the general alarm went on and stayed on. Other alarms triggered the general alarm automatically. Yancy commented that with respect to the alarms, he did not notice any specific sequence in which they were triggered. It appeared they all went off pretty much about the same time. Yancy called the Bankston to get off the port side. It was still hooked up with the mud hose. Someone said 3-4 people were in the water off the starboard side. He called the Bankston for help. Asked to launch rescue boat (FRC) to get the men.

Didn't hear engines / generators speed up, but did hear (first) explosion. The emergency lights were working in the Control Room. Believes that gas got into the intake, and it ran up the turbo. It is believed that mud, then gas going up into the turbo caused the engines to overspeed. Then the second explosion occurred. Also said gas could have come from anywhere; it settled and flowed; it got sucked up in generator #3 on starboard side, sped up the engine, blew up, and then there was a black out. Yancy said next that Willy or someone said that the ECR (engine control room) was gone. Was told that when the generator blew, it blew the ECR (Engine Control Room). ECR is between 2 engine rooms. The second explosion blew out the bulk heads. Noticed that the aft lifeboats were gone. Had one person in ECR, Brent Mansfield (2<sup>nd</sup> Engineer), make it to the bridge. Had the back of his head split open.

Yancy made an announcement to all to get to the life boat—mess hall. He made note that at that time he did not know "the riser (drill pipe) skate was in the mess hall". The 2<sup>nd</sup> muster point is near the cinema room. It was determined to be safer to muster inside at first. Later, it was decided to get outside. The PA system was working at this time.

Andrea Fleytas, DPO, sent GMDSS (Global Maritime Distress Safety System) Mayday while Yancy was making announcements. She asked the captain if she should get on GMDSS to make calls. Yancy believes the general alarms and the Mayday calls could be sounded by anyone; they need to know GMDSS—there is only one on the bridge.

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Yancy's VHF radio was working, so he could make contact with the bosun. He believes that anyone can bypass the captain in an emergency of that magnitude. Andrea was reprimanded for it; however, she was calm and professional. Both Yancy and Andrea were later complimented for doing their jobs well under stress.

At some point, several people came to the bridge. Steve Bertone, maintenance supervisor came to bridge and asked the captain if he could start the emergency generator, and the captain said yes. If it happened again, they would probably not do it again because there was lots of gas in the area; could use this info for future.

Yancy has been with the company for 12 years. When Yancy left the rig, he did not go into a life raft or life boat. When the captain gave the word to abandon, Yancy made calls on the VHF radio, channel 16. Andrea threw him a life jacket. By the time they made their way to a lifeboat (Yancy was assigned to boat #2), the boats were gone. Yancy jumped into the water.

The station bill is that the off tour DPO and DPO are the coxswains. The on tour persons are directed as needed by the captain. Yancy was doing what he had to do, and was not listening to what was going on. He made calls, and contacted a boat on VHF channel 16. When he and Andrea arrived to the lifeboat deck, mud was everywhere. Also with them was Wyman Wheller, tool pusher (in stretcher). Yancy helped chief mate (David Young) get a liferaft ready. Helped Dave hook a liferaft. While he went to get the 2<sup>nd</sup> liferaft ready, Stan Carden (electrical supervisor), Randy Ezell (toolpusher), and David Young got in the first liferafts. Wyman was put in the liferaft. The liferaft was lower, and still had a big opening.

The other guys disappeared –apparently they jumped. Dave got Andrea's jacket, and Andrea was pushed into a liferaft. The liferaft went down. Dave said the liferaft pitched up to about a 45 degree angle. There are two ways to lower a liferaft. It can be lowered from a davit, or by grabbing a handle to lower it. Yancy had not seen the angle of the liferaft as it went down.

Yancy and the captain were the last off the rig. The captain decided to jump; then Yancy jumped. He could feel the smoke and heat on the back of his neck. Before jumping, he looked at the cables below, and waited for the liferaft to move before jumping. He was wearing a life jacket. He crossed his arms before jumping. When he hit the water, his jacket came up and popped him in his jaw. The liferaft was now about 10-15 feet away, so he swam to get to it. They saw a rescue boat and yelled to it. Near him was the captain, Steve Ralins ?? (sp), Chad (chief electrician) and Brad (who?). Several people stayed on outside of the liferaft. The Sea Painter was still hooked up. Couldn't see inside. Randy was at the door. The driver had a pocket knife. Randy cut the rope, and drug off to the Bankston. When they got to the Bankston, 2 lifeboats were on starboard side. They saw the Jacobs ladders.

At the time Yancy jumped, he was on an embarkation deck. It is a 75-foot jump to the water. It did hurt, and he did have time to think on the way down. Dave and Mike grabbed GMDSS radios. A lifeboat was designated as FRC. At the time he left the bridge, the emergency lights were still functioning. UPS #9 was functioning. In the blackout, they had no thrusters. Regarding SBC's – the



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computers went out, then on, but they couldn't do anything with them. PLC's are (on UPS) 9, 10, 11, 12, 13. UPS is 14, 15 are for acoustics.

Yancy helped get Wyman into the liferaft. Did not hear the captain say anything. Main concern was to get people out of there. He did what he had to do to get home to his family.

Someone grabbed a bullhorn and it came in handy. In the past, it was used for weekly drill. Did lectures from bullhorn. He doesn't know if a muster was taken; he was on the bridge.

When he got to the boat, they put 3<sup>rd</sup> Jacobs ladder down. He held rescue boat and lifeboats together so people could get to the boat on which they needed to be. The 2 boats were eventually tied together. They got the first aid kit. At some point, Yancy saw Carl taking muster. Carl is the radio operator. The AD's take muster, and pass to bridge. While still on the bridge, Carl said he needed the muster list, and took it to the boat.

Yancy's understanding is that in emergency situations, the captain is in charge, even though the rig is hooked up to the sea floor. Others can make suggestions; however, the captain makes the final decisions. The OIM takes the well control situations. He believed that the drilling people, etc. knew that the captain was in charge.

Yancy is not on the firefighting team. The firefighting team is the crane crew.

Off tower, the DPO (lifeboat #1) and Sr. DPO (lifeboat #2) are in contact with the bridge via radio. The AD takes muster.

Yancy believes the weekly drills were fine; some people did not fully cooperate, however. When it is Yancy's turn to be in charge at drill, he is in charge of lifeboat #2, he lets it down and gets the new people to go inside of the boat and shows them where the batteries are, etc. and how to operate and start the boat. There are different lectures each week. People usually have on hardhats, etc., but do not connect the chin straps.

When they arrived at the Bankston, they were given clothes, food, etc. Yancy knew the Bankston was the first responder, and so would be the central command for the operation, and knew they would be there till the Coast Guard released them.

Things Yancy believes should be considered to make rigs safer:

There is a need for another escape route to sea, such as shoots.

Other points of note:

Andrea was burned on her leg while getting into liferaft – it was hot.

Buddy was burned on his leg also. Yancy spoke to Buddy at the memorial. Buddy was on the bridge when things began. When Yancy turned around, Buddy was gone. Yancy did not know

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Buddy had been hurt till they got on to the Bankston. Buddy had gone to look for Randy.

There were 3 people in stretchers. All lifeboats have a rear door.

Yancy believes that the emergency lights still working at lifeboat #1 and #2 at the time of the explosion. There was plenty of other light to see with.

Regarding future classes:

Yancy is thinking of going to emergency management classes, and believes that these classes should be not just for supervisors.

Regarding the status of the watertight doors: Hydraulic doors in columns and pontoons – cannot recall if any were open. These are often left open for air circulation. If a person wants to go to a pontoon, they must come to the bridge and sign in and sign out. There is also a checklist for doors. Computer monitor screens can show what doors are opened. The doors can be shut down from SBC. Couplings are not in the way of the doors.

Yancy did notice Chris Pleasant (subsea engineer) came onto the bridge and asked the captain if he hit EDS button after the blackout. He asked 3 times, waiting a few seconds in between each inquiry. Said he (who is he/ Chris?) hit the button, but doesn't know if the panel lit. It was 10:42 am when he hit the button. The captain had told Andrea to write 10:42 as the time when the button was pushed. Yancy was making radio calls at this time. When asked, he said that a DPO or a driller can call for EDS. Andrea grabbed the log book, etc., and went to the lifeboat deck. The log book was not brought onto the lifeboat; it was left behind.

The Bankston brought them in. It made one stop at a nearby rig a few miles away, and Mark, Chris, and two subsea guys and Daun Winslow got off. They waited for lawyers at that rig, and Coast Guard, too.

At the beach, two BP people came on board with shoes for them. They were directing people and giving supplies, such as clothes and food, and getting people to the medical van. It was described as a process rather than a meet and greet. There were counselors available, and Yancy has seen one; he will go back to see the counselor in a couple of weeks. He did not see any of the counselors that were available in New Orleans.

Yancy was asked if he saw smoke hoods in the rooms or if people took flashlights. He responded that he did not see anyone use the smoke hoods in the rooms or whether people took flashlights. Yancy has a mini flashlight in his pocket usually, but not that night. Lights were still on in the bridge. He acted on instinct and training.

While at the beach, they lined up for urinalysis. Afterwards, there was a question session. Then Larry gave him a hug. Yancy was taken to the medical van. Dr. John Steen from New Orleans checked Yancy, and Glen Shropshire took him to meet his wife, who was waiting for him. She also works for Trans Ocean. Yancy went to the bridge and asked if he had to go to New Orleans. He told

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the captain that he would be going home instead.

On the way home, he was in pain, stiff and sore from holding the 2 boats together.

His shift on the tour is from 12 noon till 12 midnight. From 10:30 am till time he arrived home, he had no sleep. (about 2 days).

After seeing Dr. Steen, he went to Pelican State in Harahan to get checked out further. He was given x-rays (hairline fracture on jaw), tear on shoulder muscle. MRI showed no fracture. He now goes 3 times a week for therapy on his shoulder. Yancy takes Lexapro, prescribed by his therapist. He and his wife now see his doctor for post traumatic stress syndrome. His wife found out about the accident at work. She received a call from HR from Dan ???, who told her the news. Yancy and his wife have 3 sons, ages 17, 15, and 13. His youngest son got through on the hot line.

The critical were placed on a helicopter and a couple of people who could walk were taken away with them. Yancy and 2 others stayed on the stern till the wounded were transferred.

Other items discussed:

Coast Guard handed out papers for personal info and sequence of events. Yancy could not figure out why lawyers were onboard so fast. Yancy spoke only to the Coast Guard. He further commented that the Bankston crew did a great job, giving food, tobacco, cigarettes, etc. Another boat came alongside to deliver groceries and supplies for these extra people. The captain left the bridge twice, but mainly stayed there.


Yancy's recommendations for improvement:

Employ another egress to water without having to jump from that high.

Need to block heat.

Interview concluded approximately 11:00 am.

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## Interviewing Form

|   |                                      |
|---|--------------------------------------|
| Interviewee Name:   | Mike Mayfield                        |
| Job Title:  | Sr. Dynamic POS Operator             |
| Company:  | Transocean                           |
| Contact Details:  |                                      |
| Work Address:   |                                      |
| Work Telephone:   |                                      |
| Work Cell:  |                                      |
| Home Address:   |                                      |
| Home Telephone:   |                                      |
| Home Cell:  |                                      |
| Interviewers Present:   | John MacDonald<br>Stephanie Butefish |
| Date:   | 3 June 2010                          |
| Start Time:   | 1:25 pm                              |
| Stop Time:  | 5:00 pm                              |
| Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N                                     |                                      |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N               | Yes – a GA drawing                   |
| Are documents attached to this form? Y/N  | Y                                    |
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs or other supporting materials taken to | N/A                                  |

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|  |  |
|--|--|
| interview.   |  |
| <b>Interview Plan</b><br><br>Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc: | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What formal emergency response training have you received</li> <li>2. Who was your Supervisor</li> <li>3. Did you receive an Induction/Orientation when you joined the rig</li> <li>4. What was your primary muster point, was it available, how did you reach it</li> <li>5. What was your secondary muster point</li> <li>6. If you were a senior member of crew did you use the rigs ER Manual, if yes were the procedures useful</li> <li>7. When you went to muster could you see you reach your muster point i.e. was the emergency lighting working</li> <li>8. Was the rig on main or emergency power when you went to muster</li> <li>9. Have you participated in drills/exercises on the rig, if yes describe your impression their quality</li> <li>10. How well could you hear the               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Alarms</li> <li>• PA's if yes what were the quality of the instructions</li> </ul> </li> <li>11. Did you use any of the personnel escape equipment provided (Smoke Hood, Gloves, Torch/Flashlight and Lifejacket), if yes:-               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were they readily available</li> <li>• Did they work as you expected, and</li> <li>• Were they effective</li> </ul> </li> <li>12. If you jumped into the sea describe why, what happened and how you were rescued and by who and what treatment did you receive</li> <li>13. What was the quality of the muster</li> <li>14. What were the quality of the instruction you received like at your muster point and how controlled was the muster process</li> <li>15. Describe the quality of the loading of the lifeboat</li> <li>16. Was there a stretcher in your Lifeboat, if yes how was that managed</li> <li>17. Was there sufficient room in the Lifeboat for you/others</li> <li>18. Describe the quality of the instructions from the Coxswain</li> <li>19. Describe what happened once the lifeboat was clear of the rig, including how long you were in the lifeboat</li> <li>20. If you were in the water how were you rescued &amp; by who</li> <li>21. How did you reached the shore, if via a vessel how did you</li> </ol> |

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|   |  |
|---|--|
|   | <p>get from the Lifeboat to the vessel</p> <p>22. Who meet you when you reached the shore</p> <p>23. How were you treated when you reached the shore</p> <p>24. Were you "debriefed" when you reached the shore and did you give a statement to anyone from Transocean/BP, if yes can you remember who</p> <p>25. What were the "reception" facilities for you when you reached the shore</p> <p>26. How did you get home</p> <p>27. What follow up have you received since you got home</p> <p>28. What things do you think went well during the evacuation/escape and rescue</p> <p>29. What do you think could be improved</p> <p>30. Anything else you would like to add</p> <p>31. What was your location on the rig?</p> <p>32. What damage did you see?</p> |
| <p>Interview with Mike Mayfield</p> <p>Mike Mayfield arrived from Alabama today for the interview, and will return home this evening. Mr. MacDonald explained to Mike what the main focus will be of this interview, and that it is an effort to get the whole picture. He asked Mike to walk through the events.</p> <p>Mike has been working in the oil field for about 35-36 years. He started on jackups, then went to deepwater 11-12 years. His first rig in deepwater was the Enterprise, on which he was a materials man. There, he took notes and organized. Stayed there 56 days. Then, went on The Spirit as a materials man. Was a materials man on The Spirit till asked to go to the bridge. He moved rigs. He was tested and sent to school. Said that training on The Spirit was good. Glen Moreland trained people.</p> <p>He currently gets about 3-4 hours of sleep per night. Is currently taking muscle relaxers. At first, after the incident, he was ok, but after that, it was tough.</p> <p>Mr. MacDonald briefly mentioned some of the names of others who have been interviewed so far—Buddy Trahan, Yancy, Curt, and David.</p> <p>Mike and his wife have been going to counselling. Just after the incident, his family and neighbors gathered on his lawn and thought that he was not coming back. They were talking as if he was gone. His wife is going to counselling on Tuesday.</p> <p>Discussion of muster training: They had muster training, but did not have time the night of the explosion. Prior training helped a lot.</p> <p>Then, at some point, there was an opening on the Deepwater Horizon, and he was asked if he wanted to transfer there. It was a big change. His duties involved sitting at a desk for one hour</p> |  |

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monitoring DP and the VMS (vessel management system), and then he was off the desk for one hour performing other tasks. On the Horizon, one could not go out and look over the area; had to stay on the bridge. He had heard of well control problems, and throughout his hitch, there were well control situations, such as high gas at shale shakers. Drill floor would call and he would make announcements to stop smoking, etc., until further notice.

When asked if permits were pulled, Mike replied that yes, usually a pusher or a senior tool pusher would post administrative items. His opinion on the pros and cons of permit to work being on the bridge: he was against it at first; now he is glad it's there. He said it allowed him and others to have a good overall picture of what types of operations were ongoing and would allow them to better respond to emergency situations.

### Events that night:

Mike's shift was to work from midnight till noon. He usually sets his clock 2 hours early. He turned on the television to watch a boxing match and turned the alarm off. Around just after 9:30, one of the boxers on tv was knocked out early. Mike then got up and began to get ready. Said prayers, then goes to his door to get his clothes ready, per habit. Next, he hanged his bag on a wall, and started for the bathroom. He then heard a sound, which he described as sounding like an air line burst. He walked to the bathroom. Heard a sound like an engine running away. The explosion happened about 9:50.

Mike told Dave and Darin what he heard, and their take was similar to Mike's—it sounded like a runaway engine. Next, Mike heard what sounded like a generator explosion. On the public address system, he heard Yancy saying this was not a drill. Mike grabbed his clothes and dressed, tried to leave his room and find his bag. Lights came on, and Yancy was still announcing this is not a drill, and to go to 2<sup>nd</sup> muster station. (Lifeboat #1 personnel (Darin's) goes to Mess Hall. Lifeboat #2 personnel goes to Cinema).

Mike started for the bridge. He did not grab a flashlight, nor did he see anyone with a flashlight. In his room, he normally has a flashlight on his desk and one in his locker, and he did not have one on him at the time. He needed a knife on the lifeboat. Mike was on 3<sup>rd</sup> deck (2 below). He looked out the door, and headed to the cinema. His hallway was decimated. Walls caved in and the ceiling was down. Mike's room is 308 port forward, near the electrical room. Ceiling and tile was down about 2 doors away from his room. The farther toward starboard he went, the worse it was. He saw a stairway covered with debris and blocked. He could see its handrail, leading to the 2<sup>nd</sup> deck. Mike turned around to reach inside muster. He ran to another watertight door to go upstairs, went to port side and up the spiral stairs, from 3<sup>rd</sup> deck (with at least 3 other people) to 2<sup>nd</sup> deck, went through the briefing room, and up the stairs that lead to the bridge.

The bridge was busy at this time. Mike arrived there at the same time as Brent Mansfield. They saw people running around. Andrea Fleytas (Dynamic POS Oper II) was on GMDSS radio. Mike was on the bridge when Andrea hit the distress button. There was a discussion between Andrea and the Captain about hitting this button. Yancy Keplinger was making announcements. Mike looked at the panel and noticed 'no engines', and told Yancy that. They brought Wyman or someone to the bridge on a stretcher. Dave came in to ask for help. James Brent Mansfield, 1<sup>st</sup> Engineer, came through the door, holding his head, which was bleeding from a head injury. Brent said he had been blown



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from one side of the ECR room to the other side. Next, Wiley Stoner, (motorman) who also had injuries, came to the bridge. The emergency generator did not start. At this time, another engineer came in, also injured. He saw Chris Pleasant (Subsea Engineer) at the EDS panel pushing buttons. Mike asked if it was working, and said that it did not look like it was working. Chris said to wait 17 seconds. Mike said that doesn't look like it's working, so Mike left the bridge and headed for lifeboat #2.

They looked for firesuits. The radio got lost. Dave started pulling on his boots, then came an explosion and fire, and then Mike covered Dave. Then Mike pushed Dave to safety. They saw fire coming out of the cement room on the main starboard side deck. The cement room is on the main deck, near the crane. After Mike pushed Dave around a corner, during which there were many explosions, they saw fire coming around the corner. They decided to continue on through the bridge to reach the lifeboats. Earlier, the Captain told Mike and Dave to get firehoses and go through the back. Mike said there were no engines to run pumps, so they could not fight the fire, and that they needed to go. The fire was bright. Mike told Chris Pleasant 'we have no engines and we need to let the rig float away from the well.' The Captain said 'we do not have authority to do that.' Jimmy came in and said that 'yes we do have authority.' Mike cannot recall when the button was punched. The Captain then said 'yes we do have the authority'. Chris had pushed the button before Jimmy came in.

Next, drawings were used to point locations of EDS and BOP panels.

Lifeboats: Mike and Darin Rupinski, DPO, got people into the boats. Mike was in boat #2, which was located port forward. Darin went to lifeboat #1. Lifeboat #2 is also the rescue boat. One of the aft boats got blown off, but Mike did not see it happen. Crane operator Micah Sandell, saw it blow off. Mike said the lifeboats do not have a fixed radio.

When mud and water blew out, it covered the lifeboats. Mike opened a hatch on the lifeboat to see better. Steven Richards, Bosun, pulled the brake to release them. Steve was saying 'we need to go' and 'we can't wait too long.' Mike and Daun Winslow, (Division Manager Performance) talked, and they went back and forth between boats. Then, they got word to go.

When they got the ok to leave, they closed the doors. Steve (Richards, Bosun) was already in the boat at the helm with several other people. Then Steve kept telling Mike to get into the boat. Mike put a foot into the boat and kept a lookout for others. He saw two people jump over handrails and also saw Daun Winslow. They discussed whether it was time to go now. At that point, the fire slowed down. The well was calming down. Then 'it' came next time, and blew flames up into the derrick. Mike saw fire coming out of the derrick. Fire was burning to starboard forward side of the derrick. Mike was concerned that the derrick would fall, and it did fall forward starboard.

Mike saw Troy Hadaway (Rig Safety & Training Coordinator III). They then opened the doors and Troy got into the boat, and they closed doors again.

Mike told Steve to hold the wire rope brake release cable till they hit the water. Mike started the switches for the batteries to the engine and when the boat hit the water, Mike pulled the pin to release the hooks. Mike believes the lifeboat had no search light on it. This boat was operated by Steve Richards, Bosun. When they had travelled about 300 – 400 meters from the rig, Mike Mayfield took over the helm at Steve's request. They headed for the Bankston. They arrived at the Bankston, and it took awhile for the boat to empty. He does not know if people wore seatbelts.

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There was a 3<sup>rd</sup> party tank cleaner who wanted to get off the boat, and maybe would jump. A discussion took place, in which Mike told him to count to 100 in order to calm him down and then left.

Mike described the events as dreamlike. They were in the Bankston for several (8-10) hours. They were not told why they could not leave for so long. He watched the rig burn, and saw boats arrive to spray water to cool the rig.

A phone was made available, and some people got to use it but not others. He did not see the Captain 'forever'. He did not know that the Captain was on the bridge helping to conduct emergency response with the Bankston crew and other boats. Some were angry about that; when the Captain did come down, it was to get food and go back.

When he arrived in New Orleans, Mike had a debriefing and then a shower.

Later, at home, Mike received calls from Captain Curt Kuchta asking how Mike is doing. Mike watched CSPAN daily.

While on the Bankston, He told Daun Winslow that the derrick would give. The block hit the floor. The leg can't hold the heat, and the forward starboard leg might move forward. Mike started having pains in his chest. He and David went to a medic to be checked out. Mike received an EKG; his blood pressure was high. His heart was ok, and it appears that he had an anxiety attack.

The people were given water to drink, in preparation for a drug test.

Discussion of formal emergency training.

Mike has had firefighting training. He thinks it is valuable. Mike did receive orientation on the rig. He did participate in drills, and found the quality of the drills to be pretty good. Some people would do as they were told during the drills, and if some people gave trouble, they would be turned in. He believes that his supervisor on board is the Chief Mate.

Muster point – the primary muster point for Mike was lifeboat #2. The AD's do muster.

Mike's title is Sr. DPO (Sr. Dynamics POS Operator).

Mike believes the secondary muster points are on the newest station bill.

Mike believes that the Captain and the OIM have overall charge of rig. Mike saw them both handling decisions together.

When asked if he could hear alarms on the main deck, he said yes, heard them. Does not recall if he saw emergency lights.

That night, there was no time to muster. Steve told Mike they would try to get a muster, but things moved too fast. Quality of loading onto the lifeboat was good after people got into the boat. Mike told people to spread out and split the weight around. There was no stretcher in the lifeboat. Buddy (Trahan) was in lifeboat #1. There was sufficient room in the lifeboat. Regarding the quality of the coxswain was that he tried to do the right thing.

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Mike has worked on the Horizon for 5-6 years. They were in the lifeboat for approximately 10-15 minutes until they reached the Bankston. Their treatment on the Bankston was good. Treatment on the shore was good. When asked if he gave a statement, he said yes, he gave one on the Bankston.

A Schuman company man named Jim Dennis went to Mike's home. Mr. Dennis said Mike could receive a check in the amount of \$5,000 for loss of his personal belongings. Mike asked Mr. Dennis to leave the paperwork with Mike, and said he would talk it over with his wife.

Mike drove home to his family.

Regarding what went right during the evacuation, Mike said they got out as many people as they could.

They were offered counselling at shore, but Mike waited till he got home to get it.

There were no night time boat drills. Mike thinks that would be confusing at night, and thinks it's better to have drills at the same time each time.

Discussion of events earlier in the evening—

As to how the word got around about where to muster, Mike may have told Yancy to make the announcement about where to muster.

Jim Harrell (OIM Offshore Inst Mgr) said part of forward conveyor was down in the galley.

When asked if at the time they went down in the lifeboats were the doors closed, Mike answered 'yes.' The emergency lighting did not help, as they could see clearly. Mike saw 2 people jump while at the lifeboat and another person jump while he was driving away in the lifeboat.

As to the best tool to keep people calm, Mike doesn't know.

Discussion about escaping through the column legs. Mike said it would be too difficult.

The mayday was sent by Andrea Fleytas (DPO).

The whole forward passageway on 3<sup>rd</sup> deck had ceiling tiles and walls/bulkheads down.

Mike believes that anyone can sound general alarm bells.

Discussion of how handover to relief is handled. Mike said they talk about it, and it is written every night. Mike does his handover notes every other day and then a final handover paper for his relief before he leaves the rig.

Estimated time passage from the first explosion till the boat was lowered was about 30-40 minutes.

At this point, Mike is not ready to do anything right now; it's too early. He has become closer to his family as a result of the event.

Mr. MacDonald asked who woke everybody up, as it was normally a task for the catering crew. Mike said it was not necessary, as they felt such a violent shock. They thought a boat had hit the rig, or

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perhaps it was terrorist activity.

While on board, Mike noticed a window missing on the Bankston. He spoke to the crew about it, and they told him that they noticed the rig was covered in fog from the waterline upwards, which turned out to be gas; then, when the explosion happened, the fog went away and appeared that the explosion lifted the rig somewhat. Then they saw fire. The explosion blew out a Bankston window. The window is in the door (2 ½ - 3') and looks at the stern.

While still on the Bankston, Mike talked to Randy Ezell (Sr. Toolpusher) who said to Mike that Randy was talking to Jason Anderson (Sr. Toolpusher), who had called Randy to describe a problem. Randy said he would be right there. At the next moment, the explosion happened. Randy said things disintegrated around him. Micah (Sandell), the gantry crane operator, saw a fireball coming to him.

The main deck plates (located on main deck in the pump room area) were on end. Mike ran up to starboard side.

Interview concluded at 5:00 pm.

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## Interviewing Form

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Interviewee Name:   | Paul Meinhart                               |
| Job Title:  | Motor Operator                              |
| Company:  | Transocean                                  |
| Contact Details:  |   |
| Work Address:   | 1311 Broadfield Suite 400<br>Houston, Texas |
| Work Telephone:   | 713-232-7500                                |
| Work Cell:  |   |
| Home Address:   |   |
| Home Telephone:   |   |
| Home Cell:  |   |
| Interviewers Present:   | John MacDonald<br>Stephanie Butefish        |
| Date:   | 21 June 2010                                |
| Start Time:   | 8:40 am                                     |
| Stop Time:  | 11:00 am                                    |
| Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N                       | Y – personnel file                          |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N | Y – GA Drawings                             |
| Are documents attached to this form? Y/N                            |   |
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs                          |   |

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|  |  |
|--|--|
| or other supporting materials taken to interview.  |  |
| <b>Interview Plan</b><br><br>Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc:   |  |
| <p style="text-align: center;">Interview with Paul Meinhart<br/>June 21, 2010</p> <p>Paul Meinhart drove to the interview from his home in Cypress, Texas. The interviewer, John MacDonald, explained the reason for this interview, which is to see what worked and what did not work, and to find out what happened. Basically to paint a picture of what happened.</p> <p>Paul has been with Transocean for almost one year. He has had no previous oil field experience. In the past, he was a diesel mechanic for two years. He was on the rig when the incident happened.</p> <p>He did attend the memorial. In his opinion, the real truth about what happened will not be released on the news.</p> <p>When asked for his opinion of the safety protocols on the rig, he said that some were good, and that some were just overkill. He stated that 'you can only do so much, and that the last man who was crushed (not during this tragedy) was sitting next to a bumpstop for a crane. All the start cards didn't help him.'</p> <p>He has seen his job description 'probably one or two times.' In his opinion, he does not work for Transocean—he works for whatever rig he is on (he has only worked on two Transocean rigs), and that not one rig is similar to the other as far as how things are done. For example, he stated that the Captain or OIM has an HSE book and says 'we will use it word by word. One of his supervisors says 'no problem.' The book says permit is good for 24 hours; however, the OIM says it will be good for only 12 hours.' He does not know if there is anything in the HSE manual that says you can exceed standards.</p> <p>When asked if he knows what the training requirements are for his position, he responded that yes, he is familiar with the world wide matrix. He was working on getting his motor man operator OJT filled out.</p> <p>He had filled in for a mechanic on the DD1 for four hitches. The first half of his career (outside of Transocean) was as a mechanic. He is comfortable doing the work, but had to work under someone.</p> <p>When asked if he thought that training matches his job requirements, he said it was 'hard to tell; it comes down to who you are working for.'</p> |  |

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When asked if he was getting support from shorebased managers, he said 'some yes, some no.'

When asked if there were any limitations on the training available to him, he said that he was not there long enough. He was going to go to engine classes, but that probably will not happen now.

When asked if he knows where he will be going next, he said that they don't send people like him overseas. He meant people at his position or level. There are about 6 operators from that rig and that others will be placed before him. (He and one other operator were hurt in the explosion).

He was asked what he thought of the quality of the OJT on the DWH. Paul said that it could use some improvement. The quiz in the back of the book showed some wrong answers. He also said that not much of the actual information in the book pertains to a motor operator on a rig. He does not know if his supervisor has reported this up the chain. He has done a test and an online 'thing' and the operator 'thing'.

His next position could be mechanic or he could go up to the engineering side. He does not know what he will be doing now. Does not know if a motor operator will be sent overseas. He is in a wait and see mode.

When asked if he has had an appraisal in the last year, he said 'no,' that he has not been there long enough, and was not working in a position matching his job title.

When asked if he noticed a lot of new people in his department, he said no, there were not.

When asked about the quality of the training of new employees on the DD1, he mentioned that he had a mentor who was very knowledgeable and safety conscious. He further stated that if he ever goes offshore again, he wants more training on the safety systems, like using the manual davit to deploy the life raft. He believes that some people were given more training than others. When he was working nights, he was woken for training drills with the general alarm, and shown what to do while sleepy. Next time, he wants to be trained specifically. At this point, he stated that he was one of the last 10 people off the rig, and that he had jumped. He was with the Captain Curt, Yancy (SDPO), Andrea (DPO), the mechanical supervisor, Chad, and an electrician. He tried to help operate the davit but was told to get out of the way so that the marine personnel could prepare the davit, which they did after he moved. His training was with about 100 other people, and he is the type who needs to see it, do it, and then memorize it.

Safety & Survival Training - He has taken BST and Huet.

When asked if it was adequate for what he had to go through, he said that the main thing he used was the jump off the rig—in training, they were told not to look down, but overall, yes, his training was helpful.

When asked if he knew his position on the station bill, he said it is to assist as directed. He goes to the lifeboat in an emergency.

When asked who is able to shear the pipe and disconnect, he said that it would be anyone at the equipment.

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Safety Culture – When asked if he believes the company lives up to its core values, he said that he doesn't know enough about the company, but from what he does know, 'yes.'

He does not know his colors, because they had stopped using that system just before he came on, and later it was reinstated, so he is in that 'gap' of personnel who did not take the assessment.

When asked to name three positive safety issues on the DWH, he said that he likes the Think Plan process, because it gets people together to discuss what is to be done.

TOFS – If you have enough understanding of what is going on, and you see someone doing something unsafe, you should stop them.

Regarding whether mentorship was positive for safety, he said it was ok, and it did give feedback to questions.

Negatives – Start Cards – He said that no matter what, a routine is a routine, and people will get complacent on a routine; for specific incidents, it is fine. He did the one start card per day because it was required. The last time he did a start card was some time ago. They (people in his position) do not get around the rig much, as they work in a secure area. The people he worked with were safe and high quality.

Management of Change – he said that if there is a set process and if you have a better way of doing something, that would be an example of management of change.

Bonuses – he received a bonus from Transocean once. When asked if a BP bonus would affect safety or how something would be done, or cause people to rush, he said 'no.'

Regarding formal emergency response training, he has had basic firefighting training through TOPS.

His supervisor was Brent Mansfield or Sean McGowan. When asked if he could reach a muster point, he said yes. He does not recall if the lights were working. He does recall that the consoles were lit.

Paul does not know what happened with the engines. After the explosion, there was no power. He does not know what exploded. He believes that the first explosion came from number 3 engine. He thinks an air vent system may have brought gas into the engine room and caused the engine to overspeed. The second explosion may have come from gas in the mud pump room. He did hear both explosions and was in the engine control room at the time. He was injured.

The first explosion blew off a door and hurt Brent; it cut Paul's elbow. (At this point, Paul pointed to a drawing). Paul had been standing where it is noted on the drawing, and it moved him to the left. Brent was at a desk which was L-shaped and in the center of the room. In the first explosion, Paul was pushed left between a wall and console. At the second explosion, he was hit by a door that opens out (points to drawing, and says drawing is wrong about which way this door opens). The door was blown off its hinges. Paul suffered bruising and two broken ribs, all on his left side. It is a computer room, really the ECR (Engine Control Room). The floor tiles were blown out. A desk, cabinet and water cooler were gone. Paul thinks the bulkheads were still intact at that point. Most



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of the explosions came through the doors. In the second explosion, the ceiling tiles blew out, and Paul believes that this second explosion may have come from an area on the rig where the air ducts were, so that may be when the ceiling then blew out.

The sack room is above the mud pump room, so Paul thinks the second explosion came from this area. The mud pumps were on the same deck with the engines. The mud pumps were all on the same deck; two were set to fit with a lower roof line. One particular area was open to two floors.

Back to second explosion – According to Paul the second explosion came from the sack room or mud pump room, down the hallway, through the HVAC room between the ECR and the mud pump room. After the second blast, he recalls Chad Murray came through with bleeding from his head. Paul was sitting, and was hurt. Paul heard Brent in a starboard aft corner of the room; he was moaning and was covered in debris. Paul pulled debris off Brent. Willie Stoner came in and helped Brent up to walk. In this ECR (Engine Control Room), the floor was built up; after the explosion, tiles were missing, and Willie and Brent fell into where the tile had been previously. They went out on the back deck, saw a phone and a sink near a door. Willie tried to call the bridge while Paul tried to wash off blood from Brent at the sink. Willie said they cannot get anyone on the phone—the line was silent and phone was no longer functional. Paul does not recall whether lifeboats were there or not. There was so much damage and fire on the back of the rig, they knew they could not muster at the aft lifeboat station.

At this point, Paul was asked to recount his day. His day had started with installing a pipe on a thruster. Around 10 pm, he sat down in the control room to discuss who would do the next tasks, and then they heard an alarm at approximately 10 pm. The bridge came on the radio and called the Bankston. He heard someone on the radio say that we are in a well control situation, and to move 500 meters away. Less than a minute later, they started getting more alarms. These were gas alarms.

Doug Brown went to the console. (Doug is in the position of 3<sup>rd</sup> Engineer; his title is Chief Mechanic.) Paul put his hard hat on. Brent said 'don't leave'. About 10 seconds later, they heard the engine speed up. About 15 seconds later, the lights went out. Normally, if the main power is lost, all other standby engines come on. From the time they lost main power to the time of the first explosion was about 10-15 seconds; then 10-15 seconds between the first and second explosion.

Recap by Paul: they were in the dark before the first explosion. After the explosion, Paul tried to help Brent; Chad Murray and Doug B. Were already gone. The time it takes to walk from aft lifeboats to go forward is normally two minutes. They walked port then forward. They could not get anyone on the phone; Brent was incoherent. They tried to get to the bridge, with Willie Stoner, (motor man) took Brent. On the back deck, they wanted to go down stairs (see map) but those stairs were completely destroyed. Lots of debris was on this deck. A piece of steel (he thinks it was a muffler/exhaust from an engine) was laying on the deck, and Paul moved it. They went up another set of stairs to the main deck. Then they walked port then to forward. The whole rig was covered in drill mud about 2 inches deep. Mud was thick along the walkway from the forward side of the riser storage area to the bridge. They went in to the bridge, taking Brent with them. The Captain started looking for a medic; however, medic was taking care others. They looked for life jackets, and put one on Brent. The ET was hit in the forehead. Captain, Steve Bertone, Doug B, and Chad Murray and Brent were there.

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Paul recalls the Captain saying they need a medic. He looked at Chris and asked if we were loose from the well. Paul did not know the time. Chris said 'I pushed the button and the equipment showed we are disconnected.' The Captain said 'we need power.' Paul, Chad and Doug said there is no power. The Captain asked for emergency power. Paul, Chad and Doug went to the generator room, located on the port side midship. According to Paul the standby generator can run one seawater pump and fire pump and heating system to get a main engine started. Paul and Steve B were trying to get the standby generator started. They did not think about gas possibly being in the area because this is a naturally ventilated area. Gas would have had to be on deck for awhile to get in. They did see fire in the moon pool area and the BOP house, which was about 20 feet away. At no time did he believe that attempting to start the generator was unsafe. They tried to start the generator; nothing happened. They read through the procedures step by step in the book. Still no start, and the room they were in was black. Paul had the door open; Steve said to close it. Paul and Chad had flashlights. Paul noticed that they were close to the fire and that there was only one way out, and this could be bad.

Then, five minutes later, they went back to the bridge. No one was there except for Dave Young, Andrea, and the Captain. The Captain then gave the order to abandon rig. They all then went to the lifeboats, but they had been launched and were gone. Paul looked at the deck hatch and ladder to get closer to the water. He saw an injured man on a stretcher and two people were carrying him to the lifeboat deck. They tried to get a liferaft deployed. Eventually, they did get it to deploy. They placed the man in the stretcher into the liferaft. At this point, he could feel heat and smoke coming up from below. Paul tried to cover his face near a wall. Then Andrea was pushed into the liferaft. It had two or three people in it, and was lowered into the water. At this point, there are 5-6 people still on the deck of the rig—Paul, Yancy, the Captain, and 2-3 others.

Paul said that one guy jumped and the Captain jumped from his right. Yancy jumped in front of him. Paul then jumped after Yancy. They were now in the water. The Captain started telling people to get into the raft. They saw the fast rescue craft go over and pick up Andrea from the water.

Paul said that the Captain did an excellent job, and Paul would have no hesitation to work with him again. The Captain seemed to do his part to take in the damage to the vessel, and did a good job. The Captain yelled for the fast rescue boat to pull up; they threw a rope to the raft. They tied up and the Bankston pulled in reverse. They were there about 5-10 minutes. They then began getting people out of the liferafts. At this point, Paul could feel back pain. A crew member from the Bankston had pulled Paul up onto the boat. The Bankston put down a Jacobs ladder and Paul went on deck. A crane was used to lift the injured man on the stretcher and bring him to the deck.

When asked to describe the quality of the drills, such as abandon ship, etc., Paul said they did them each weekend; he has no opinion as to the quality. An example of such a drill would be: an alarm would go off, they would have to stand in hot sun for 15 minutes while someone read how to put on a life jacket. On the DD1, the Captain let the night shift have a note on their doors for the daytime drills. The night shift would then drill at night.

On shore – he was flown to Alabama with Doug Brown, Buddy Trahan, two catering hands and one more person. He was asked to sign some papers for collateral reimbursement. He went to New Orleans, and there he did a Coast Guard interview.

When asked who is the person in charge of the rig, Paul said that when the rig is underway, the

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Captain is in charge. When the rig is drilling, the person in charge is the BP company man for drilling decisions. For Transocean employees, the OIM is in charge, then the Sr. Tool Pusher, then Tool Pusher, and so on down the chain. In an emergency situation, the Captain is in charge, Chief Mate and bridge personnel.

When asked if he felt that if BP told anyone to do something with the well, are they required to do it, Paul responded 'yes', unless the OIM or someone feels that it is dangerous. Paul says he would have no problem stopping someone if he thought they were doing something dangerous.

Shortchange – Paul says it does happen, but they do not do it in his group, however, one time he was shortchanged in his favor to 18 hours instead of 6.

He did not know if the lifeboats had fixed radios in them.

When asked who can issue an order to do an emergency disconnect, he said it is up to whoever is in the area to hit the button. Paul would not have a problem pushing it if he thought it necessary.

When asked who can send a mayday, he replied that he does not know, but thinks it would come from bridge personnel, and they would not have to have the Captain's permission to do it. Paul would do it if he thought it would save a life.


When asked who gives the order to abandon, he said that in general, it is the Captain.

When asked if he had anything to add, Paul stated that the only way aft lifeboats could have been burned and broken is if they got damaged in the explosion. The fire was in the center of the rig. He says there is not anything that he could see that would have damaged the lifeboats after they got into them.

Paul says that he has not been contacted lately by HR. He did receive a call from Ron with Schumann.

Interview concluded.

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


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**Interviewing Form**

**Page 1 of**

|   |   |
|---|---|
| Interviewee Name:   | James Musgrove  |
| Job Title:  | Able Bodied Seaman  |
| Company:  | Transocean  |
| Contact Details:  | Park 10   |
| Work Address:   |   |
| Work Telephone:   |   |
| Work Cell:  |   |
| Home Address:   |  |
| Home Telephone:   |  |
| Home Cell:  |  |
| Interviewers Present:   | John MacDonald  |
| Note Taker:   | Keith Lamb  |
| Date:   | June 16 <sup>th</sup> , 2010  |
| Start Time:   | 10:00 a.m.  |
| Stop Time:  | 11:15 a.m.  |
| Was documentation taken to the interview?<br>Y/N                    | Yes. Training and Competency Interview Questions.                                 |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N | No.   |
| Are documents attached to this form?<br>Y/N                         | Yes.  |

|  |   |
|--|---|
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs or other supporting materials taken to interview. | No.   |
|  | <p>Training and Competency Interview Questions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. How long have you been with Transocean?</li> <li>2. Do you have any previous oilfield experience?</li> <li>3. What is your position?</li> <li>4. What are your job responsibilities? (Review Job Description before interview)</li> <li>5. What are the training requirements for this position?</li> <li>6. Can you explain the Worldwide Training matrix and its purpose?</li> <li>7. Have you completed all the training for your job? (check against compliance report).</li> <li>8. Does the training match the job requirements?</li> <li>9. Do you feel the training provided to you was sufficient? Why or Why not?</li> <li>10. When was your last training session, and what was it?</li> <li>11. How supportive of training and development was the rig management? What about shore-base managers?</li> <li>12. Where there any limitations on the training available?</li> <li>13. What was the quality of OJT on the DWH?</li> <li>14. What is your next position, and have you received any training for it?</li> <li>15. Do you know the progression of your career in Transocean?</li> <li>16. Have you received an appraisal in the last year? Can you explain the appraisal process?</li> </ol> |

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|  | <p>17. How many new crew members (or recently promoted) were on your crew?</p> <p>18. What is the quality of training provided to new employees?</p> <p>19. What training is provided onboard the rig for new arrivals, and what is the quality?</p> <p>20. What safety&amp; survival training did you receive and do you think it is adequate?</p> <p>21. What is your position on the Station Bill, and in an emergency? What is your lifeboat station? Life raft station?</p> <p>22. What are the first steps to take when shutting in a well, or upon detection of flow?</p> <p>23. Who is able to shear the pipe and disconnect?</p> <p>Safety Culture Questions</p> <p>1. What are the Core Values of Transocean? Does the company live up to these Core Values?</p> <p>2. What are your Colors? What do they mean?</p> <p>3. What are the three most positive safety issues on the DWH?</p> <p>4. What are the three safety areas where improvement is needed?</p> <p>5. Do you complete a START card every day and why?</p> <p>6. Describe your participation in the THINK planning process?</p> <p>7. Would you describe the TOFS and last time you called a TOFS?</p> <p>8. Are you able to explain the Management of Change?</p> <p>A. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from Transocean, and can you describe the policy?</p> <p>B. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from BP and can you describe the policy?</p> <p>C. What effect did these bonuses have on your performance of the rig</p> |
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|  | crews? |
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Interview of James Musgrove

Transocean office

June 16, 2010

Interviewer: John MacDonald

Note Taker: Keith Lamb

Start Time: 10:00 a.m.

Stop Time: 11:15 a.m.

We are here today to paint a picture of what happen. James was not on the rig during the time of the incident. He began working with Transocean in the year 2000. James worked on the Horizon for nearly 6 years. He worked on land rigs as a fitter or welder in his younger days. He also was a contractor for Bethlehem Steel. James's job position today is an Able bodied Seaman. According to James his responsibilities and ratings have been updated accordingly. His training requirement was the Life Boat.

James said he has completed all his training for his job. He was offshore most of his life and says that his training compliance report is up to date. His training does match his job requirements. He acknowledged the training provided was sufficient. His last training session was H.U.E.T. (Helicopter Underwater Escape Training) and H.L.O. (Helicopter Landing Officer) Training and development from rig managers and shore-base managers were great. He was unaware of limitations on training.

James said the OJT quality on the DWH was fine. His next position he could work up to is a Bosun. The training to become a Bosun is more experience and understanding. James is aware



of his progression at Transocean, and would like to know more about the marine dept at Transocean. He does not think that Americans like him will fill AB/Bosun positions in places Angola or Singapore.

James had received a good appraisal in the last year. His explanation regarding the appraisal process was that he understood that people should be cognisant of their strengths, their development areas, and that development plans should be used to ensure personnel's growth. It was unknown to James and he was unable to state whether many crew members were promoted. Training was acceptable to him regarding new employees. The training matrix includes OJT and new employees receive an indoctrination. They learned escape routes, safety equipment, and how the alarm systems worked. He thought this was adequate. He thought it was required for all employees to receive safety and survival training. HUET and water safety training was received and he thought it was adequate.

According to James his position when off tour during an emergency was to assist as required. His position on tour was to assist as required. James' position during fire, emergencies, and abandonment was to assist and have knowledge of the weather conditions. He said that Chad Murray, Wyman Wheeler, and Buddy Trahan were all very lucky to get off the rig. James admits he is not a driller and that he has no expertise in shutting in a well, or being able to shear the pipe and disconnect. He explained supervisors call the shots and that's all he said about that subject.

James explains that Transocean lives up to its core values. His colors are blue over green which to him means he is detailed oriented. He would be more satisfied to know the whole plan and heard Transocean might stop using colors. James explains positive safety issues on the DWH are if you see wrong you can stop the job if necessary. The three safety areas that are important to James are: 1.) Drills each week - he feels they are very important and that new employees coming into new fields could be taught more. 2.) Maintenance programs (inspecting SBCA's), Life Saving Equipment, and check all safety issues are important and 3.) Replacing all equipment that's not usable. James did not comment on improvement opportunities.

James completed a start card everyday. He said they are useful and a commitment to safety. He said his participation in the THINK planning process is used everyday on all tasks whether major or minor. It's always on his mind and it's a very good tool. James describes TOFS as when we stop the job to remove doubt and get everyone on the same page. His last time to call a TOFS was prior to going home. He said "it was on my last two or three days before going home. L.A. maritime came out to recertify the life boats, check latch releases, and to work hand to hand on various things". James acknowledges he is able to manage change when needed.

James describes the policy for performances or safety bonus from Transocean as a well bonus. They are given for "well in time" on performance bonuses and they get a safety bonus every month. BP also gave well bonuses. James answered only for himself regarding performances of rig crews. He said, "don't bank on them"

James participated in quality drills. Abandon drills were every week which is a good drill. Water cannon drills are always good. He was asked how short changes on board work. Regarding "Roustabouts" - everyone short changes. He said, "when you are on a split crew some have to fly to air port and then work, and others drive and wait from boat docks. Young guys can stay up all night and work, while old guys plan for work duties and rest. Fatigue can set in if you don't

rest. Roustabout hours worked is 12 noon to 12 midnight. Short change crews work 12 noon to 6pm and then 12 midnight to 6:00 am.

James thinks he was clear with who's in ultimately in charge on board the rig. If the ship was not attached the captain is control (PIC) of vessel. If vessel is attached, the IOM was the PIC. OIM oversees the well control but reports to the captain. James also had the understanding that marine personnel has more engineering experience. He knew the captain was still in charge.

He said that anyone on vessel can sound general alarm bells if faulty. James explained that Mayday is sent when in distress. Mayday is sent depending on the sequence of events and magnitude of the fire or blowout. Such events according to James may include: 1) all shafts leaking water and call for help; 2) Fire on board – may possibly have to abandon ship.

James knowledge for lowering life boats are by chain of command. Instructions are available for lowering life boats. Most trained on board to get all available on board and then the Coxswain on board can lower boats.

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## Interviewing Form

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| Interviewee Name:   | Nathaniel "Nate" Roche         |
| Job Title:  | Sr. Dynamic POS Operator I     |
| Company:  | Transocean                     |
| Contact Details:  |                                |
| Work Address:   | Park 10                        |
| Work Telephone:   |                                |
| Work Cell:  |                                |
| Home Address:   |                                |
| Home Telephone:   |                                |
| Home Cell:  |                                |
| Interviewers Present:   | John MacDonald<br>Jana Judkins |
| Date:   | June 4, 2010                   |
| Start Time:   | 9:30am                         |
| Stop Time:  | 11:00am                        |
| Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N                                     | N                              |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N               | N                              |
| Are documents attached to this form? Y/N  | N                              |
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs or other supporting materials taken to | N                              |

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| interview.   |  |
| <b>Interview Plan</b><br><br>Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc: | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What formal emergency response training have you received</li> <li>2. Who was your Supervisor</li> <li>3. Did you receive an Induction/Orientation when you joined the rig</li> <li>4. What was your primary muster point, was it available, how did you reach it</li> <li>5. What was your secondary muster point</li> <li>6. If you were a senior member of crew did you use the rigs ER Manual, if yes were the procedures useful</li> <li>7. When you went to muster could you see you reach your muster point i.e. was the emergency lighting working</li> <li>8. Was the rig on main or emergency power when you went to muster</li> <li>9. Have you participated in drills/exercises on the rig, if yes describe your impression their quality</li> <li>10. How well could you hear the               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Alarms</li> <li>• PA's if yes what were the quality of the instructions</li> </ul> </li> <li>11. Did you use any of the personnel escape equipment provided (Smoke Hood, Gloves, Torch/Flashlight and Lifejacket), if yes:-               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Were they readily available</li> <li>• Did they work as you expected, and</li> <li>• Were they effective</li> </ul> </li> <li>12. If you jumped into the sea describe why, what happened and how you were rescued and by who and what treatment did you receive</li> <li>13. What was the quality of the muster</li> <li>14. What were the quality of the instruction you received like at your muster point and how controlled was the muster process</li> <li>15. Describe the quality of the loading of the lifeboat</li> <li>16. Was there a stretcher in your Lifeboat, if yes how was that managed</li> <li>17. Was there sufficient room in the Lifeboat for you/others</li> <li>18. Describe the quality of the instructions from the Coxswain</li> <li>19. Describe what happened once the lifeboat was clear of the rig, including how long you were in the lifeboat</li> <li>20. If you were in the water how were you rescued &amp; by who</li> <li>21. How did you reached the shore, if via a vessel how did you</li> </ol> |

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|  | <p>get from the Lifeboat to the vessel</p> <p>22. Who meet you when you reached the shore</p> <p>23. How were you treated when you reached the shore</p> <p>24. Were you "debriefed" when you reached the shore and did you give a statement to anyone from Transocean/BP, if yes can you remember who</p> <p>25. What were the "reception" facilities for you when you reached the shore</p> <p>26. How did you get home</p> <p>27. What follow up have you received since you got home</p> <p>28. What things do you think went well during the evacuation/escape and rescue</p> <p>29. What do you think could be improved</p> <p>30. Anything else you would like to add</p> <p>31. What was your location on the rig?</p> <p>32. What damage did you see?</p> <p>1. Did you work with any of the well control or safety systems on the rig, if so which ones</p> <p>2. Are you aware of any system on the rig that was not operating correctly or that was out of service. Especially related to the BOP and alarm systems.</p> <p>3. Were you involved in the BOP between well activity, if so how</p> |
| <p>Nathaniel "Nate" Roche – Sr. Dynamic POS Operator I.</p> <p>Nate has been on the DWH for 2 ½ years, of which 1 ½ as a Sr. DPO. He was off of the rig 4 days prior to the incident.</p> <p>When asked his opinion of the fire and boat safety drills, Nate said that conducting the drills at night would be beneficial, but that he was unsure of having unplanned drills for safety reasons. A variable time to conduct the drills rather than a set time would be more beneficial. He stated that 3<sup>rd</sup> party crews/service hands were as earnest as the rest of the crew, but maybe not the catering crew. He said that they didn't generally load the boat during drills, but the boat was lowered to where the hull was blocked. They checked to see if the engines were running. Nate offered additional touring for new people including demonstrating to them the necessary actions to take while inside of the lifeboats and telling them about the various safety gear inside of the lifeboat.</p> <p>Nate said that other than a total catastrophe, you would wait for the Master by horn or radio to give the orders to leave by lifeboat. He wasn't aware of how much contact was made to the bridge in</p> |  |

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this situation. He said that the good of many was put in the best interest for all. Nate said that typically the Chief Mate, Captain, OIM, or DPO would sound the alarm, but anyone could do it in a bad enough situation. The designated GMDSS, DPOs, and other marine personnel could send the mayday when needed. You would consult the Captain beforehand if you could, but not in an emergency situation.

Nate does not recall well control problems being out of the ordinary when he left. He said that they were losing back and forth formation throughout the well. He recalls a few gas alarms going off. They were set at 5 and 10 ppms and LEL gas was high at 25% and high-high at 50%. When the alarms sounded, Sperry Sun said to shut down hot work and outside smoking. Sperry Sun sets the alarms at returns. The drilling info screen read the gas unit alarm.

Nate said that the aft lifeboats could be seen from camera 23, but it wasn't a useful camera because it couldn't zoom. He said the cameras in the pump room were fixed, as well. He thought that a pan and tilt feature to the cameras would be useful.

Nate's job responsibilities while on tour were maintain the vessel's position and assist as directed. He was the lifeboat commander while off duty.

Nate believes that there is a good orientation and mentoring program for new personnel and also for people changing positions on the vessel. His primary muster points were the 1 and 2 forward boats; foul weather points were the cinema or galley; the aft lifeboats would be utilized if the forward lifeboats were unavailable for any reason. Nate said that the drills would switch between the forward and aft lifeboats. He said that the noise on the stern was not terribly loud, but a loud voice or bull horn was needed.

When asked if he had a clear understanding of who was in charge in a particular situation, Nate said the verbage in the station bill was clear, but not clear in the manual. He said that if the general alarm is sounded, the Captain is in charge. The OIM was in charge when the vessel was not underway. He believes that the 3<sup>rd</sup> party crews and maintenance are generally aware of this, but maybe not aware of who's in charge in every scenario.

When Nate was asked about the need for scramble nets or Jacob's ladders, he said that the stairs lacked structural integrity. He didn't think that Jacob's ladders would be useful on a semi, but possibly on a ship. He also said that the generator was set up as a stand by and not necessarily an emergency generator. It was primarily used for lighting or as a cold start for the auxiliaries. He said that they didn't automatically kick in when needed.

Basic training mentioned: (He would have much more training than this)

Firefighting Advanced

STCW

Water Survival

Nate believes that the training is pretty good and that you get what you put into it. He said that the OJT training for DPO's is kind of general, but rig specific OJT covers the necessary subject matter

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better. He said that he was tough on signing off on modules. He was mentoring Jonathan Camacho. A book was kept to easily review everyone's proficiencies. Everyone cross-check's each other for general consensus. He said that while on tour, handovers were done 20 minutes earlier while the Jr. DPO takes his break to eat. They would go over the written notes in the book, which was on a formatted page. They would discuss things to be watching for, plans, weather checks, and then have lunch. When leaving the vessel, he and his counterpart would discuss 3-4 pages of updates and RMS jobs. He recorded his notes from the entire hitch by making lists, and then would expand from the list in detail upon completion.

When asked about anything we might need to be aware of, Nate mentioned that some crewmen were told to muster inside in the galley/cinema area, but they weren't aware that the inside had collapsed. He expressed that no amount of training can really prepare you for a catastrophe like this. He said that he has been flooded with calls from lawyers, but has dismissed them all. When asked about how he felt about the 60 minutes interview by Mike Williams or anything else he might want to tell us, Nate said that he feels Williams created a sob story to file a lawsuit. Nate also said that he would like to know why the over speed didn't trip the engines.

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## Interviewing Form

|   |                |
|---|----------------|
| Interviewee Name:   | David Young    |
| Job Title:  | Chief Mate     |
| Company:  | Transocean     |
| Contact Details:  |                |
| Work Address:   | Park 10        |
| Work Telephone:   |                |
| Work Cell:  |                |
| Home Address:   |                |
| Home Telephone:   |                |
| Home Cell:  |                |
| Interviewers Present:   | John MacDonald |
| Date:   | June 1, 2010   |
| Start Time:   | 1:30 p.m.      |
| Stop Time:  | 5:15 p.m.      |
| Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N                                     |                |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N               |                |
| Are documents attached to this form? Y/N  |                |
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs or other supporting materials taken to |                |



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| interview. |  |
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| <b>Interview Plan</b><br><br>Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc: | <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Interview with David Young, Chief Mate<br/>Transocean Office<br/>Tuesday, June 1, 2010</b></p> <p>Interviewer: John MacDonald<br/>Note taker: Diane Willey</p> <p>Start time: 1:30 p.m.<br/>Stop time: 5:15 p.m.</p> <p>David arrived on the rig floor at approximately 9:30 p.m. He was talking with to Caleb Holloway (floorhand), Jason Anderson (roustabout), and Dewey Revette (driller) about differential pressure issues. Vince Tabler, a cementer with Halliburton, walked in but there was no conversation in front of or with him. They asked Caleb to bleed the stand pipe and shut it in. David then left that area. Jason walked out the rig floor door toward the rig floor. He went to the starboard side of the bridge. He told Curt Kuchta, the rig's captain, that it would be a while before the cementing job would be started because there was "an issue on the floor." He noticed that BP guys were on the bridge at that time. David went downstairs into the subsea office with Chris Pleasant (subsea engineer) and Allen Seraile, AD. Chris and Allen flipped through the channels on the CCTV.</p> <p>Allen saw water coming through the rotary, but David did not notice it. Approximately one minute later he heard gas emitting and he went back to the bridge via the door which was on starboard side of the bridge was was on the port side of the vessel. There was an explosion and he heard the engines over speed. He was not sure if that is what he heard but after speaking with others, it is what he thought he heard. Initially there was gas and gray mud ("the color of cement"). David could smell gas and the rig was getting covered in mud which was coming through the crown. All of the decks were being covered too. He saw an explosion and then fire on the starboard side forward of the rig (a large area on fire). All power to the rig went out. After the explosion it was just the derrick that was burning. David said he called the bridge many times and tried to keep his radio with him all the time.</p> <p>After the explosion David was in and out of the bridge many times. He said that the radio was working, but the bridge was very hectic (he changed his term) because lots of people were taking actions. Since he had just arrived on the bridge he did not know who was doing what so it seemed confusing until he was brought up to speed. People were yelling and it was very loud, however, Yancy Kepplinger and Andrea Fleytas were remaining calm. At some point he does remember hearing a general alarm going off while he was on the bridge and he was able to hear the PA system.</p> <p>David came out of the bridge and went to his muster point, which was fire locker #1 (the emergency gear locker). There should have been eight people at the locker, but only Chris Choy, roustabout, showed up. Chris' second muster point was fire locker #2, but he couldn't get there. There was a</p> |
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camera at the muster station, but no one could see the CCTV. He said that there was no time to refer to the emergency manual. (It is the AD's responsibility to muster the boats but there was no time to muster while on the rig and there is no "t-card system." They finally did muster once they arrived on the Bankston.) He also said that Patrick Morgan, the AD, did write down people's names though.

The life boat that David was assigned to had already loaded. David had a chance to board it but decided to stay and help those going to the liferaft.

Someone told David that Dale Kepplinger was down. David made it over to Dale, where he was face down against the crane pedestal. David put his hand on Dale's shoulder. The back of Dale's coveralls was not burned at all. David is almost positive that Dale was already dead by the time he got to him because there was a very large amount of blood coming from his head. He noticed that the crane was not into the rack all the way. David later heard from others that Dale got blown out on his way down from the crane, but he does not know if this is correct or not. He speculated that Dale could have fallen or climbed out and then fallen to the main deck. David said that the decks were extremely slippery and Dale weighed at least 300 pounds, so one man alone would not have been able to carry him.

David returned back to Chris Choy and Chris Pleasant. He thinks Chris Pleasant did have on a life jacket at that time. He told Chris Pleasant to go get help for Dale immediately after the explosion, but Chris got consumed by the bridge and was unable to return. He did not see Chris Pleasant again. He speculated that he possibly went to the boats.

David spoke to Jimmy Harrell (OIM) who said he could see straight through four entire rooms in the living quarters because the ceiling and bulkheads were knocked down. He said that later when he saw Jimmy he was hurt, could not hear, and was very disoriented.

David noticed diverter gas coming out of the diverter. There was a fire over the cement room, which was over the rig floor, and the flames were blazing over David's head.

David got Mike Mayfield (SDPO) to go to boat #2 and wait. He was supposed to stay at the boats while David went to the gear locker to get more people. David heard more explosions at that time.

David noticed the gas in the transit room. He went to the bridge (he thinks). He told everyone that "it's time to go." Captain Curt said to go to the AFT boats, but they were already gone at that time. He could not get to the back deck or port side because it was extremely dangerous.

He saw people carrying Buddy Trahan (operations manager asset) and Wyman Wheeler (toolpusher) out on stretchers. Steve Bertoni (maintenance supervisor) and Stan Carden (electrical supervisor) were at the other end of the stokes litter. Per David, Chad Murray (chief electrician), Randy Ezell (toolpusher) and possibly Steve Bertoni were the ones who saved Buddy and Wyman. Wyman was brought from the tool pusher room area. Chad handed Buddy to David. Buddy and Wyman were put on the boat deck. He then told people to put Buddy's stretcher in the back of the life boat.

David used a life jacket and did have fire gear on. He was unable to notice, however, if any other people had the smoke hoods on or not. He said it was very difficult to convince people not to jump overboard. There was extreme panic with lots of yelling and other loud noises, especially from the

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guys who were unable to get themselves off the rig.

David is pretty sure that Andrea used her best judgment and was the one who sent the mayday to the Coast Guard and other vessels, because of the severe situation.

David advised Curt that "it was time to go" based on what he had seen on the bridge and his travels throughout the rig. Andrea got David a life jacket. Everyone followed.

He said the people who did jump overboard were Yancy Kepplinger, senior DPO, Curt Kutchta, captain Matt Hughes, floorhand, and maybe Mike Williams, chief electronic technician but he was not positive.

David was the first one to get to a raft. He thinks that Randy Ezell was next in the boat behind him. While it was inflating, he was preparing it to load it with people then deploy. He expressed that the raft was very hard to get because it had to swing over the davit then pull it over the rail. He also said that the chains were in a bad location. (David recommended improving the lift raft deployment design.)

He did not see Buddy being loaded into the raft. He did say that the captain, Curt Kuchta, was flustered at the rafts.

When David initially got into the raft there was no smoke. At that time he looked for the brake handle and initially grabbed it. The raft then got extremely smoky. He and others pulled Wyman into the raft, but he was unable to find the brake handle again. The knife was where it was supposed to be but it was very hard to find at the time. It was hard to keep the raft straight while getting people in. He pulled Andrea into the raft by her life jacket and she landed on top of Wyman. He thinks that Yancy Kepplinger, Senior DPO, or Curt might have raised counterweight or pulled the brake to let the raft go down. While the raft was being lowered down to the water, it was at a 90 degree angle (toward the outboard side). It went right side up into the water, however.

After the raft was deployed he could hear the crown hit the deck and saw the draw work's wires break. He was told that some people jumped from the helicopter deck, but he isn't sure who. He encouraged people not to jump overboard because they might be hard to locate afterward. He said that the fact that since the boats were located on the deck, it did prevent people from jumping overboard.

He is not sure who gave the order to lower the life boats...maybe boat someone on #1, Don Winslow (operations manager performance) or Darren Lipenski (the Coxsen). He said that Darren helped people get into the boat and might have driven the boat away, but he was not sure. He said that Don and Darren were the ones to close the doors to the boat.

Personnel on David's raft included Randy Ezell, Chad Murray, Stan Cardin, Steve Bertoni, Andrea Floetis, DPO and Wyman Wheeler.

Once people got out of the raft, David, Randy and Stan stayed on the raft with Wyman so they could get him staged in order for get onto the Bankston. They cut the support straps of the raft to get Wyman out. They then pulled Wyman's stretcher from the raft into the boat.

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Initially David rolled out of the raft (with his life jacket on) and swam away from the raft. The vessel order for how the vessels were lined up during the offloading of personnel was raft, life boat, rescue boat, then the Bankston. He said that there were Coast Guard personnel already on the Bankston when he got on board.

They had a full muster before midnight. They did not leave for town until after sunrise. David said that they had to make several stops, one to pick up BP personnel and also to drop off Don Winslow (operations manager), Chris Pleasant and Mark Hay (subsea engineer).

Once they arrived on shore, David said that BP people were waiting at the dock and police and additional Coast Guard personnel escorted them to the Crown Plaza. There were given telephones to make phone calls right away then everyone had to take a urine test. They were provided clothing, but all of it was sized XXXL, so he was unable to fit into anything. Transocean personnel greeted them and had medical assistance available (including counselors), food, a hotel room, travel arrangements to get home, and cash to travel with. David even said that somehow they got by the TSA with no problems at all.

Paul Johnson (rig manager) told everyone to go home.

They then loaded into busses and taken to the airport. He then flew home.

Since David has been back home he has gone to his own doctors. He was unable to hear for about a week. He will continue to follow up with his doctors. He said that Shuman called and asked if they could set up psychiatrist appointments for him. (He did not mention if he scheduled any or not.) He also said that Shuman mailed him a waiver to sign, which he did not do. He did, however, sign a witness statement for the Coast Guard.

### Other information

David cannot recall hearing an EDS order. He said to ask Mike Mayfield about it. He said that "anyone who is near the button" can sound the general alarm bell.

David got burned on the arm and forehead. Andrea Fleytas got burned on her leg.

David attended a maritime academy and also took an advance firefighting class. He said that he has participated in Transocean's drills/exercises on the rig and thinks the quality of the drills is good. He has never conducted drills at night or during bad weather because he did not want to take such a risk. He said that the only person allowed to excuse personnel from participating in the drills is the captain. Personnel are required to attend water survival and basic fire training.

He said that between shift changes, the on-duty personnel would call the off-duty personnel or leave handwritten notes to inform them of important information they needed to know. David said he kept notes in his tally book, but he does see the value of keeping daily notes in the RMS. (are you sure he said that?)

David stated that Carl Taylor (radio operator) did a great job mustering.

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### Final thoughts/recommendations

David was upset that he did not have a knife in his pocket because he could have used it to cut the stretcher for Buddy, used it in the life raft to expedite things, getting the stretcher out of the case, etc. He said there were many uses for the knife, but he did not have one.

David said the main recommendation of improvement would be the life raft deployment as well as maneuverability. David said the quality of the way he loaded and got people loaded into the life boat was "decent" but one person had to stand inside the raft and one person halfway in the raft and halfway on the rig. David also recommends putting individual hand cranks for each function in each life raft davit. Also install the cradles at the proper height they need to be deployed at so boarding the raft is easier.

David also recommends installation of Jacobs ladders on board. He did say that the Horizon did not have scramble nets, but they could have used them if they had them. He said the crew has had desktop training on how to escape using sea ladders, however.

He also said that it is very important for trained personnel to hold the boats and rafts. Some people had to be physically restrained in these vessels and it is important for someone to evacuate properly as well as promptly. He also said that there was neither dehumidifier nor any fixed radios on the life boats.

He said that it was clear who was in charge, but it changes between the captain and the offshore installation manager. The captain did know he was in charge of the emergency situation.

He subsequently heard that the life boat deployment went smoothly. He said the sprinkler system did come on in one boat but he was not sure about the other boat.

When speaking about the 60 Minutes interview with Mike Williams, David wanted to correct some things that Mike said on the show. First of all, Andrea did not jump overboard. She left the rig in a life raft. David also said that he was the last one into the boat and that Mike was already in there when he arrived. David stated that Mike said that he had to report to the bridge "for duties" but actually he did not help or lead any part of the evacuation.