

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA**

**In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig  
“Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf  
Of Mexico, on April 20, 2010**

**Applies to: *All Cases.***

\*     **MDL No. 2179**  
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\*     **SECTION: J**  
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\*     **JUDGE BARBIER**  
\*     **MAGISTRATE SHUSHAN**

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**ALL PARTIES OBJECTIONS TO DEPOSITION DESIGNATIONS OF  
ROBERT KALUZA**

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<u>From</u>		<u>To</u>		<u>Objecting</u> <u>Party</u>	<u>Objection</u>	<u>Ruling</u>
<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>			
13	19	13	21	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
15	16	18	7	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
18	17	18	20	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
21	13	23	3	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
22	9	23	14	Transocean	Lacks foundation (Fed. R. Evid. 602). No adverse inference against Transocean should be drawn.	
23	7	26	10	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
26	15	29	4	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
29	13	36	11	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	

31	8	31	19	HESI	Assumes facts not in evidence, misstates the evidence, lack of foundation: The witness was asked whether he knew that the rig had achieved an annular cement column of 500 feet above the uppermost hydrocarbon zone. There is no evidence in the record to support the proposition that the cement column was 500 feet above the uppermost hydrocarbon zone; in fact, the evidence shows that the cement column was less than 500 feet above the uppermost hydrocarbon zone. See Deposition of Frank Patton, 442:12-446:17; 447:19-448:7; Exhibit 3512; Exhibit 7279.	
36	15	42	10	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
42	14	43	8	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
43	9	43	18	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment, Compound	
43	19	46	17	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	

44	11	45	4	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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45	6	45	9	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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45	11	45	16	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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45	18	45	23	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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45	25	45	25	M-I		
46	21	49	1	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
49	5	52	20	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
53	24	56	5	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
56	15	60	7	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
60	10	60	17	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
61	5	66	10	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
65	11	65	25	Transocean	Lacks foundation (Fed. R. Evid. 602); hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 802). No adverse inference against Transocean should be drawn.	

65	18	65	25	Cameron	Lack of Foundation (FRE 602); Assumes Facts Not in Evidence; Speculation	
66	22	74	10	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
74	15	75	25	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
76	3	77	19	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
78	12	83	18	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
84	1	88	4	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
88	8	89	7	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
89	13	95	17	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
89	13	90	11	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.</p>	



					See Fed. R. Evid. 403.	
90	13	91	6	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
95	19	101	5	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
101	13	111	25	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
120	12	121	14	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
121	15	121	21	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
122	5	149	23	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	

129	14	129	19	HESI	Lack of foundation, speculation, vague and ambiguous: The witness was asked whether unstable foam can lead to "nitrogen breakout failure" and failure to achieve zonal isolation. This question lacks foundation and necessarily calls for speculation; there is no evidence in the record, including the exhibits, showing that the witness is qualified to answer this question. Further, "nitrogen breakout failure" is vague and ambiguous.	
138	16	138	19	HESI	Lack of foundation, speculation: The witness was asked whether the cement used around the production casing was unstable. This question lacks foundation and necessarily calls for speculation; there is no evidence in the record, including the exhibits, showing that the witness is qualified to answer this question.	
138	20	138	24	HESI	Lack of foundation, speculation: The witness was asked whether the flow of hydrocarbons into the wellbore and out of the well was caused by cement failure. This question lacks foundation and necessarily calls for speculation; there is no information in the record, including the exhibits, showing that the witness is qualified to answer this question.	

144	10	144	12	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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144	15	144	18	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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144	22	144	22	M-I		
150	9	167	9	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
154	6	155	19	Transocean	Lacks foundation (Fed. R. Evid. 602); hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 802). No adverse inference against Transocean should be drawn.	
156	4	156	8	Transocean	Calls for speculation; lacks foundation (Fed. R. Evid. 602). No adverse inference against Transocean should be drawn.	

157	7	157	10	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
157	7	157	10	Transocean	<p>acks foundation (Fed. R. Evid. 602). No adverse inference against Transocean should be drawn.</p>	

157	12	157	17	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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157	19	157	19	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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161	10	161	13	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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161	16	161	20	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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161	24	161	24	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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165	1	165	4	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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165	6	165	6	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
165	7	165	15	HESI	<p>Lack of foundation, speculation, assumes facts not in evidence: The witness was asked whether he considered the use of nitrogen cement and its "increased risk of instability" in evaluating the negative test results. The assumption of increased risk of instability of nitrogen cement is not in evidence; nor is there any evidence in the record to suggest that this witness would have the requisite knowledge to answer such a question, which necessarily would require the him to speculate.</p>	

167	22	176	2	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
176	10	178	4	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
178	7	185	17	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
187	6	187	21	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
189	22	191	22	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
191	12	191	17	Transocean	Calls for speculation; lacks foundation (Fed. R. Evid. 602). No adverse inference against Transocean should be drawn.	
192	8	199	24	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
196	2	196	8	HESI	Lack of foundation, misstates the evidence: The witness was asked if it was true that he had no slurry tests from Halliburton before pumping the final cement job on April 20, 2010; the evidence shows that BP did, in fact, receive slurry test results from Halliburton prior to that time.	
196	9	196	14	HESI	Lack of foundation: The witness was asked if he had any familiarity with "problems BP had with Jesse Gagliano of Halliburton." As the questioning attorney never demonstrated--either through questioning or by introducing any exhibits--what these problems may have been or whether they even existed, there is no foundation to ask this witness this question.	

197	21	197	23	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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198	1	198	4	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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					<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
198	7	198	7	M-I		
200	9	201	25	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
202	11	208	23	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
213	22	220	6	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
221	17	226	18	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
225	9	225	15	HESI	<p>Assumes facts not in evidence: The witness was asked whether BP told the Transocean crew that BP performed the cement job on the production casing without getting complete lab tests on the cement. The assumption of incomplete lab tests on the</p>	

					cement is not in evidence.	
226	6	226	9	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	

226	12	226	15	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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					This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i> , 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i> , 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i> , 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.	
226	18	226	18	M-I		
227	17	230	3	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
230	10	230	10	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
230	15	251	6	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
241	1	241	5	Transocean	Hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 802). No adverse inference against Transocean should be drawn.	
241	11	241	13	Transocean	Hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 802). No adverse inference against Transocean should be drawn.	
241	19	241	23	Transocean	Hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 802). No adverse inference against Transocean should be drawn.	

242	14	241	21	Transocean	<p>Calls for speculation; lacks foundation (Fed. R. Evid. 602); Hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 802). No adverse inference against Transocean should be drawn.</p>	
242	22	242	25	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	

243	3	243	11	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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243	13	243	18	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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243	20	243	24	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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244	2	244	5	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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244	8	244	11	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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244	14	244	17	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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244	20	244	25	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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245	3	245	9	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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245	12	245	15	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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245	17	245	24	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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246	2	246	5	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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246	7	246	11	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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246	13	246	17	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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246	20	246	25	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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247	2	247	7	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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247	9	247	12	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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247	14	247	14	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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247	18	247	20	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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247	22	248	1	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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248	4	248	8	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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248	11	248	15	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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248	18	249	9	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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249	11	249	15	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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249	17	249	21	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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249	23	250	4	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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250	6	250	10	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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250	13	250	20	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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250	23	251	4	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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					<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
251	6	251	6	M-I		
251	25	258	22	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
259	4	267	14	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	

265	12	265	16	M-I	<p>This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i>, 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i>, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i>, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.</p>	
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					This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See FDIC v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also LiBuitti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.	
265	19	265	19	M-I		
267	20	268	1	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
268	5	270	18	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
271	3	272	20	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
273	17	274	1	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
273	17	274	1	Transocean	Hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 802). No adverse inference against Transocean should be drawn.	
274	7	276	18	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	

276	10	276	18	Transocean	Vague; lacks foundation (Fed. R. Evid. 602); hearsay (Fed. R. Evid. 802). No adverse inference against Transocean should be drawn.	
276	22	278	8	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
278	16	281	9	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
281	22	282	6	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
282	11	283	9	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
283	15	284	25	BP		
285	12	289	13	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
288	17	288	20	M-I	This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See <i>FDIC v. Fid. &amp; Deposit Co. of Md.</i> , 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also <i>LiBuitti v. United States</i> , 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See <i>State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman</i> , 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.	

					This testimony should be stricken as not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Additionally, no adverse inference should be imputed against M-I for this witness' invocation of the Fifth Amendment because this witness (1) is not a current or former employee of M-I, (2) was not under M-I's control, and (3) does not have compatible interests with M-I in this litigation. See FDIC v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 45 F.3d 969, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1995); see also LiBuitti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 123 (2nd Cir. 1997). Furthermore, there is no independent evidence to corroborate this adverse inference against M-I. See State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (5th Cir. 1990). Finally, imputing an adverse inference from this unaffiliated, third-party witness to M-I would be significantly more prejudicial than probative under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.	
288	22	288	22	M-I		
290	10	292	19	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
292	25	295	24	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
296	6	296	16	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
297	13	297	18	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
298	9	298	24	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
299	7	299	19	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
301	7	301	13	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	
302	10	307	10	BP	Relevance, Prejudice, 5th Amendment	

304	18	304	24	HESI	Speculation: The witness was asked to agree that all persons on the rig that evening believed that the auto-fill float collar was preventing the ingress of cement through the shoe track. This question calls for speculation by the witness about what all persons on the rig believed.	
305	3	305	9	HESI	Vague and ambiguous, lack of foundation, misstates the evidence: The witness was asked to agree that the "Halliburton Report" indicates that subsequent to the test, after the cement job, the Weatherford float collar was holding. The question is vague and ambiguous because it does not identify any specific Halliburton Report, neither in this question nor in any of the questions by this counsel. Further, it misstates the evidence to say that any Halliburton Report indicated that the float collar was holding.	