


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Interviewing Form

Interviewee Name:	Chad Murray
Job Title:	Chief Electrician
Company:	Transocean
Contact Details:	
Work Address:	
Work Telephone:	
Work Cell:	
Home Address:	
Home Telephone:	
Home Cell:	
Interviewers Present:	Derek Hart; Ewen Florence Diane Willey, note taker
Date:	June 30, 2010
Start Time:	9:50 a.m.
Stop Time:	12:00 p.m.
Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N	Yes
Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N	Yes
Are documents attached to this form? Y/N	Yes
Details of documents, drawing, photographs or other supporting	Rig drawings; interview questions



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materials taken to interview.	
Interview Plan Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc:	<u>EMERGENCY RESPONSE QUESTIONS</u> 1. What formal emergency response training have you received? 2. Who was your supervisor? 3. Did you receive an induction/orientation when you joined the rig? 4. What was your primary muster point? Was it available? How did you reach it? 5. What was your secondary muster point? 6. If you were a senior member of crew did you use the rigs ER Manual? If yes, were the procedures useful? 7. When you went to muster could you see your muster point (i.e. was the emergency lighting working)? 8. Was the rig on main or emergency power when you went to muster? 9. Have you participated in drills/exercises on the rig? If yes, describe your impression of their quality. 10. How well could you hear the: <input type="checkbox"/> Alarms? <input type="checkbox"/> PA's? If yes, what was the quality of the instructions? 11. Did you use any of the personal escape equipment provided (smoke hood, gloves, torch/flashlight and lifejacket)? If yes: <input type="checkbox"/> Were they readily available? <input type="checkbox"/> Did they work as you expected? <input type="checkbox"/> Were they effective? 12. If you jumped into the sea describe why, what happened, and how you were rescued and by who and what treatment did you receive. 13. What was the quality of the muster? 14. What was the quality of the instruction you received (i.e. at your muster point) and how controlled was the muster process? 15. Describe the quality of the loading of the lifeboat. 16. Was there a stretcher in your lifeboat? If yes, how was that managed? 17. Was there sufficient room in the lifeboat for you? Others? 18. Describe the quality of the instructions from the Coxswain. 19. Describe what happened once the lifeboat was clear of the rig, including how long you were in the lifeboat. 20. If you were in the water, how were you rescued & by who?

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	<ol style="list-style-type: none">21. How did you reach the shore? If via a vessel, how did you get from the lifeboat to the vessel?22. Who met you when you reached the shore?23. How were you treated once you reached the shore?24. Were you "debriefed" when you reached the shore? Did you give a statement to anyone from Transocean/BP? If yes, can you remember who?25. What were the "reception" facilities for you when you reached the shore?26. How did you get home?27. What follow-up have you received since you got home?28. What things do you think went well during the evacuation/escape and rescue?29. What do you think could be improved?30. Anything else you would like to add?31. What was your location on the rig?32. What damage did you see? <p style="text-align: center;"><u>Equipment Questions</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Did you work with any of the well control or safety systems on the rig, if so which ones?2. Are you aware of any system on the rig that was not operating correctly or that was out of service (especially related to the BOP and alarm systems)?3. Were you involved in the BOP between well activities? If so, how?4. Were you involved in the engine safety system tests, specifically the over speeds?5. Do you know how often the tests were performed?6. How was the maintenance on the rig approached? Was there a concern over the manning levels or amount of maintenance?7. Were you aware of any safety systems on the rig that were not operating?8. How would you perceive the importance of safety on the
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	<p>rig with respect to completing maintenance?</p> <p><u>Training and Competency Interview Questions</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. How long have you been with Transocean?2. Do you have any previous oilfield experience?3. What is your position?4. What are your job responsibilities? (review job description before interview)5. What are the training requirements for this position?6. Can you explain the Worldwide Training Matrix and its purpose?7. Have you completed all the training for your job? (check against compliance report)8. Does the training match the job requirements?9. Do you feel the training provided to you was sufficient? Why or why not?10. When was your last training session, and what was it?11. How supportive of training and development was the rig management? What about shore-based managers?12. Were there any limitations on the training available?13. What was the quality of OJT on the DWH?14. What is your next position, and have you received any training for it?15. Do you know the progression of your career in Transocean?16. Have you received an appraisal in the last year? Can you explain the appraisal process?17. How many new crew members (or recently promoted) were on your crew?18. What is the quality of training provided to new employees?19. What training is provided onboard the rig for new arrivals, and what is the quality?20. What safety & survival training did you receive and do you think it is adequate?21. What is your position on the Station Bill and in an emergency? What is your life boat station? Life raft station?22. What are the first steps to take when shutting in a well or upon detection of flow?23. Who is able to shear the pipe and disconnect? <p><u>Safety Culture Questions</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. What are the Core Values of Transocean? Does the company live up to these Core Values?2. What are your colors? What do they mean?3. What are the three most positive safety issues on the DWH?4. What are the three safety areas where improvement is needed?5. Do you complete a START card every day? Why?6. Describe your participation in the THINK planning process.
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	<ol style="list-style-type: none">7. Please describe the TOFS and the last time you called a TOFS.8. Are you able to explain the Management of Change?9. Bonus<ol style="list-style-type: none">A. Did you get a Performance or Safety Bonus from Transocean, and can you describe the policy?B. Did you get a Performance or Safety bonus from BP and can you describe the policy?C. What effect did these bonuses have on the performance of the rig crews?
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Interview of Chad Murray – Chief Electrician
Transocean Office
June 30, 2010

Interviewers: Derek Hart
Ewen Florence

Note taker: Diane Willey

Start time: 9:50 a.m.

Stop time: 12:00 p.m.

Chad was on the rig during the incident. He has been with Transocean for almost 6 years. Prior to Transocean, he worked for Pride in Mexico where he worked 28/28. Prior to that, he was a farmer. Chad began his Transocean career as a roustabout and moved his way up to Chief Electrician. He worked on the Marianas for 4 or 5 months and also the Deepwater Millennium. He had worked as Chief Electrician on the Horizon for approximately two years at the time of the incident.

Chad had been on his hitch for 8 days before the incident occurred. His tour began at 12:00 p.m. (midday) on April 20, 2010.

He went to the pre-tour meeting at 11:30 a.m. Chad recalled that BP Company Man and the Transocean OIM could not come together about the job to be done. BP did not know what to do and the OIM was telling them what they needed to do regarding the well.

Chad was asked if he was aware of any problems with the well prior to April 20. He said it had been kicking and had been shut in a few times because it filled up with up to 3,000 parts of gas. When asked how long this had been going on, he said "probably since they started on it."

Chad said prior to the incident he performed some preventive maintenance duties, including working on the air conditioning for the living quarters accommodation. He said he usually would eat around 6:30 p.m. (after most of the crowd left and before closing time at 7:00 p.m.) but he did not eat supper that day. He said many times he would just get a styrofoam plate and eat in his shop. This day, however, he remembered getting a drink of water and taking a little break.

Chad said he was first aware of a problem at approximately 9:15 p.m. or 9:20 p.m. He heard the driller paging everyone. He recalled that the #2 pump blew a pop off valve.

Chad received a call to go to the pump room and was asked to isolate #2 Mud Pump so the drill crew could change the pop off valve. They did the paperwork and got the signatures. He electrically isolated (locked off) the pump and the drill crew would post the isolation certificate on the Bridge. Chad said the time between locking and unlocking the pump usually took about 10 minutes. This time they were in a big hurry, however. Shane Roshto was the person who took the isolation certificate to the Bridge. He went to the drive room and locked the pump out, then came back to

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the pump room.

Once the pop off valve was changed Roy Kemp, the Derrickhand, said there were problems and they needed to unlock the pump. He seemed to be in a rush to get this done. Chad said he would help them move the old pop off valve to a position where it could be mechanically lifted out of the room. So once he had de-isolated the pump he returned to his shop and hung the locks in the shop. At that time he heard pressure building in the pump room then the lights went out. The lights went out, he grabbed his flashlight. He then heard an explosion. At this time he was between the "alleyway" (hallway) and the pump room, next to the water-tight door leading into the pump room (see drawings for detail). He was blown/thrown down the alleyway away from the closed, hinged water-tight door (which opened into the pump room).

Chad said the rig shook so bad that he was not sure if he was thrown or shaken down the hall. He said it felt like an earthquake. He said he was thrown from the door to the pump room all the way to the change room door, which he said was approximately 50 feet.

Minutes before the explosion, Shane Roshto, Adam Weise, Don Clark and Roy Kemp were in the pump room and seemed to be in a hurry to replace the pop off valve. Chad told them he would help them. They had the new pop off valve installed and were tightening it up. Chad said he would put the locks up and be right back (to the guys). Chad left to go put the locks in his shop, turned around to go back to the pump room where the guys were, and this was when the explosion happened. Chad had just left them approximately 30 seconds prior to the explosion.

Chad said he did not lose consciousness after he was thrown down the hallway, but he was dazed. Chad still had his flashlight lanyard around his wrist, so he could see. He said he got back up and went down the hall and opened the door to the pump room and looked in. Pump #1 was completely gone. The distance from the door to the pump (which opened to the inside of the room) was only 3 to 4 feet away from the pump, but the pump was not there whatsoever. By this time it was dark and very smoky. He was unable to get to the ECR. **Note:** he did not try to get to the ECR based on the damage in the pump room his assessment was that he could/should not try and reach it via the pump room. He also said that he could not see #1 Mud Pump, so he was not 100% sure it was missing.

He said he does not remember being hurt when he got up. The explosion knocked him off balance. When asked if he smelled gas, he said yes, when he opened the pump room he smelled both gas and smoke. He did not smell it in the hallway, however. The smoke was very thick though. He was asked if he saw any fire; Chad said "no." He said he thinks he could see clear to the back of the rig from the pump room door.

The hallway was not touched, per Chad. He said there was no ceiling tiles installed above until you reach the change room. The hallway was in good condition.

Chad turned and went up the hallway through the change room to the living quarters. He went to go to the stairs and then to the galley. There was debris everywhere, Chad said. He met up with his supervisor, Stan Carden. They went part-way up the staircase and another explosion occurred.

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He headed back up the hallway on the port side. He said there was no debris by the change room. He heard his supervisor, Stan Carden, down the hall. He (Stan) tried to muster but could not get there (ECR). They then went up to the port forward spiral staircase and got to the mess room door. Robert (last name unknown) from the catering company was down in the mess room on his hands and knees. Chad and Stan took him to the medic, who happened to be by the door. Chad and Stan went back into the mess room though to the galley and then into the dry storage and saw dry storage items everywhere. In the mess room and galley he said that items that were "fixed" were still in place. They then went through the transformer room into the hallway. There was lots of debris in the hallway by this time. They heard the fire roaring and knew they had to get off the rig.

They saw Randy Ezell and Wyman Wheeler in the starboard forward hallway. They initially did not see Buddy Trahan, as he was laying with his arms legs underneath him under debris in the doorway. When Chad and Stan saw him, Buddy said "help." Chad said they threw the debris covering Buddy into the hallway and through the door to the transformer room. He heard someone yell "2 men down." Some of the guys went and got stretchers and pulled them through to the door. Chad and Stan got Buddy out and put him on a stretcher. Between the door and stairway, someone picked up Chad's end of the stretcher and took Buddy away through the door to the life boats. They told people at the boats that they needed another stretcher and someone threw a stretcher to them through the transformer room door; he and Stan took that and put Wyman on it. At that time it was very hot and he could smell gas.

Randy was dazed and confused, but could walk and was helping as much as he could. They were on the second deck. Ceiling tiles and wall panels were everywhere.

Chad said if there had of been water-tight doors at the bulkhead going into the sack room from the accommodation, people would not have been injured. He said the Nautilus is set up just like this, too.

Per Chad, there was not anything in the mess room that should not have been there. He said there were ceiling tiles, wires hanging down and insulation scattered throughout it (items that were welded down like the salad bar was still in place), however. Chad heard from someone that the pipe conveyor fell through into the mess room, but he did not personally see this.

Chad said his muster station was the ECR when he was on tour. When he was off tour he was to report to the life boats. He had no official duties when he is off tour.

When they got back to the lifeboat deck with Wyman both life boats had already deployed. David Young the Chief Mate was preparing the life raft and they assisted. Dave Young got in the life raft first. Chad stepped in to help transfer Wyman in. The rest of the crew members then boarded the life raft. Those on board were: Chad Murray, Stan Carden, Wyman Wheeler (on stretcher), Dave Young, Steve Bertone, Randy Ezell, and Andrea Fleytas.

The raft was approximately 2 feet lower than the rig, so the heat and smoke were extremely hot. The raft was lowered. He thinks that Dave Young pulled the handle, but he was not positive about this; possibly by the Captain from the deck. Chad was a bit nervous to see if it would shift or not. Chad's face was blistered due to the extreme heat. The raft jerked up and the crew members tumbled on top of each other it righted then jerked the other way. Chad had then blacked out.

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Curt Kuchta, Yancy Keplinger, Mike Williams and Paul Meinhart jumped into the water after the life raft had been launched.

The raft was lowered and they hit the water (Chad was conscious again by this time). The water contained layers of oil and gas. While in the raft on the sea, they were approximately 50 feet away from the fire under the rig. Once they hit the water, Steve, Dave and Chad got out of the life raft to pull it away from the fire. Chad's boot got hung on the rope outside the raft, so he hung upside down in the water for what seemed to be about 30 seconds while he was trying to get his foot clear. He started unlacing the boot and his foot became loose. He was then able to continue to pull the raft. Chad later realized that the painter line never parted and it was still attached to the rig.

Paul was able to swim to the Damon Bankston's Fast Rescue Craft (FRC) and he got in. The FRC then motored over and picked up Mike Williams. The FRC arrived at the life raft. One of the crew members on the FRC had a knife and was able to pass it to someone (he did not know who) and they cut the painter line connected to the rig. The FRC then towed the life raft to the Bankston.

Once they arrived at the Bankston, they saw the life boats already tied up and life boat #1 was unloading people on to the Bankston. They transferred Wyman from the raft to the FRC (so the Bankston could use its RFC crane to lift him up) and then onto the Bankston. Chad went and checked on Brent Mansfield, Jimmy Harrell, Buddy, and a few others. He helped as needed. They mustered outside and realized there were still 11 crew members missing. Chad could account for the 4 guys who were in the pump room and he knew the guys from the drill floor and mud pits did not make it.

Chad mostly helped Wyman. The back of his head was bleeding and they cleaned the insulation from his eyes. The Coast Guard then arrived and began airlifting the seriously injured. Buddy was taken first; then Brent Mansfield, and Wyman was third.

Once the injured people were evacuated, the DWH crew watched the rig burn all night because the Bankston did not move from their location. He said it was the absolute worst thing to watch at that time. He compared it to watching your home burn down, knowing that you have 11 brothers in there.

When asked if anyone made a medical assessment of him, Chad said there were people hurt much worse than he was and he did not request medical attention that night. He was not checked out until the next day by the medics.

Chad was asked if they were kept informed of what was happening while they were on the Bankston. He said no, that they did not know why they were sitting there...not moving. They had no clue when they would be leaving. They were told they had to wait because the Coast Guard's search and rescue team would not release them. They needed to be available in case any survivors were located. Chad said his personal opinion is they stalled until they could get "their people" on the Bankston.

The Bankston finally left and went to a platform in to pick people up. After a lengthy wait, they picked up the Coast Guard, MMS and BP lawyers, and they were informed they would be heading to Port Fourchon.

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They were given cigarettes, which were unnecessary. They left that rig and headed for another rig. Chad said he thinks this is when the medics came on board.

When asked if they were able to use a phone from the Bankston, Chad said about 2 hours after they had been on the Bankston, one guy said he had a cell phone that was working and Chad called and spoke to his dad at approximately 11:00 p.m. Chad was upset because he said their families were probably worried to death and there was no way to get hold of each other. When asked if Transocean notified his family, Chad said he recently divorced and did not change his contact information with Transocean, so they would not have been able to reach his family.

The Bankston did not have enough facilities to cope with so many people, but they did the best they could.

Chad said he had no doubt they could have been unloaded off the Bankston before daylight because there were approximately 35 boats in the area. They finally arrived in Port Fourchon at approximately 3:30 a.m. Thursday morning. Once they arrived, they were told they could not get off for another 45 minutes. They were told they were "not ready for us." They were lined up ready to get off the boat but they were told to stay on board. Chad said "people don't understand how you feel until you have been there."

They had to take their drug test and had not even been able to change clothes, see or talk to their family, etc. This made Chad extremely upset. He said they could have at least waited to do the drug test until they got clothes and saw their families.

After the drug test was administered, they were provided food and clothes. Chad picked up coveralls, socks, underwear and a drink. The crew was then taken by busses to the Crown Plaza in New Orleans, where many of their families were waiting for them.

They arrived at the Crown Plaza at approximately 6:30 a.m. or 7:00 a.m. Paul Johnson, rig manager, met with everyone. Chad then checked into his room and showered. He went down and had the medic check him out. He subsequently arranged with the Chevrolet dealership to have keys made for his vehicle. At approximately 10:30 a.m. he rode a shuttle to Houma. Chad then went to the Chevrolet dealership for his key. Afterward he went and saw Wyman Wheeler in the hospital and then went home.

When asked, Chad said there were not any other Transocean people in the hotel.

Chad was asked who has called him since he has been home. He said he has not received any calls since the memorial, but earlier he received several calls from Andy Williams. Paul Johnson also called him, as did Daun Winslow. A Shuman representative has called him and he told her he is going to therapy. Chad said he received his "personal effects" compensation approximately 1 ½ to 2 weeks after he got home.

Two days after the memorial, he had to testify in New Orleans in front of the Coast Guard and MMS.

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Chad was asked if he had ever been in a life boat on the Horizon. He said yes, a couple of times during drills. He has never been lowered into the water, however.

Training/Safety Issues

Chad was asked if he was compliant with his OJT; he said he yes. He has taken water survival but fire fighting is not required, per the training matrix. He has taken the EX maintenance class, too.

Chad said the preventive maintenance ("PM") schedule need to be changed. He said he normally has approximately 120 overdue PM's in his box. He said there is no way one can keep up with all of the equipment as the current schedule says. He said there are way too many PM's per piece of equipment. Chad said he liked EMPAC. When they initiated RMS, they did not go rig-by-rig to determine what rig had what equipment, so it took more time to keep up with the system since much of the equipment was not on board. Chad said it took too much time to get approval to perform PM's on the rig. He said EX was good, but RMS and EMPAC did not match up.

He said that if the equipment was explosion proof and torn up, they would normally put it back together as it was.

Questions/thoughts

When asked what involvement he had with maintenance of the engines, such as emergency shut downs, Chad said mainly the engineers and ET's worked on them, so he did not have much involvement. He said when ABS would arrive to perform the testing, he would not work on it. Chad said the control system work is done by the ET's and the engineers work on the mechanical parts.

When asked further about ABS testing, Chad said he had been on board when ABS was doing the testing, but he was not sure what testing was done. He said the ESDs were tested, but he was not exactly sure when. He said it is the same with maintenance (preventive and corrective) and gas detection. The ET's and engineers take care of them.

When asked if he worked with the ET's on the BOP, he said no.

Chad was asked if he had any involvement with the standby generator. He said yes. He said it had electric and hydraulic starts. They tied in with the drills and ran it Sunday for 2 hours. He said the standby generator was started by the engine room engineers.

When asked if the batteries, generator and switch boards were self-contained within the room, Chad said yes, they were.

Chad was asked if the standby generator could be started remotely from the room. He said yes, you could start it from the panel within the room. He said that after power is lost, the generator should come online automatically; if it does not start within 5 minutes, you can manually start it. He said the generator has a delay. If it senses a loss of power, it is supposed to start automatically. You can also start it from the control room (Bridge) and ECR. He said the maintenance supervisor tried to start it manually during the incident, but with all the wires etc. hanging down and gas on the rig it's probably a good thing it did not start. He said it is set up for "remote" so it should be able to start

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from the ECR and Bridge.

In Chad's opinion, there does not need to be a "standby" generator. There needs to be an "emergency" generator. He said there were already 6 engines on the DWH; there did not need to be a standby engine.

When asked about any safety systems not working correctly Chad said the drill floor purge system was running on bypass. He said when the BOP panel is purged and the drill floor door opens, you lose the purge in the driller's shack. They were running it on bypass even before Chad joined the rig. He said they ordered the parts and with help of the subsea engineer put it back like it was supposed to be, but within a day the Toolpusher left the door open while talking to the Driller and the system shut down as it was supposed to do. He said the whole panel was shut down and he was told to put it back on bypass. The panel did not function when it lost power. He was not sure what happened when you lost purge. He said it is shut down to keep from sparking. The ET's fixed the purge approximately 3 to 4 months ago.

Chad also said the seal door was not working but they fixed it. The ET's ordered a new seal and repaired it. He said it was working and "doing what it should do." They put it back on bypass a few days after it was repaired.

If any 2 fire alarms in the same zone go off, they can acknowledge them and then call someone to check them out. If two alarms go off in the same zone, it will set off the general alarm. Chad said it was standard practice on the Bridge to call someone to look at the equipment when an alarm sounded. The alarms are kept on silent all the time so they will not wake up sleeping crew members.

He said that the ESD trips up the rig saver flaps. The ESD can be activated from the rig floor, Bridge or ECR.

Chad said the engines went out the back of the rig and took the switch boards with them. Everything was shoved out of the way and the switch gear was behind and above them. The #3 and #6 engines were online at the time of the incident.

He said "when you feed methane gas to a diesel engine, the engines will run away."

Chad said the fresh air supply leading to the engine rooms from the deck upstairs (i.e. fans) feed the space, not directly to the engines.

Chad said the Coast Guard never formally interviewed him.

He was unaware of any safety systems that were not working properly apart from the above with purge system.

When asked if there were any problems with the BOP, he said the yellow pod was down. He was unsure why there was only one pod working. He said if both pods are not working the stack shouldn't be down. If so, the good side would fail.

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Chad said engines #3 and #6 caused the explosion. He said you could hear them revving up and knew the sound because he'd been on another rig where the engines had oversped. He did not hear the engines rev down. He said it has a sound of its own. He said #6 blew up and the explosion ran from the sack storage through the living quarters.

Chad believes the explosion blew into the pump room. He said there was no door to the area where mud pump #1 was separated from any other pumps (see drawing). He said there definitely should be doors to separate them.

He said he thinks gas came into the pumps and caused the pop off valve to blow, because seawater with gas, not mud, was pumping. He said you could not see mud or seawater anywhere. He said "the pop off valves blew without anything running."

Chad was asked if the #1 Mud Pump was running when he was isolating #2. He said he did not think any were pumps were running at the time.

Chad was asked when he would keep a copy of the isolation certificate. He said the gold copy was kept at the isolation point, the pink copy went to the Bridge and yellow was at the work site. He said that Shane Roshto had just received the paperwork for the isolation and he had just taken a copy to the Bridge.

Chad was asked if TOFS was well accepted. He said yes, "if I can keep you from getting hurt, that is what it is for." He said in general, the crew could call a TOFS on anyone. He added that any time humans are involved, there will be human error.

When asked if they ever did "hazard hunts," Chad said yes, they had certain days they would do them and different departments would also do them. The feedback was generally positive.

Chad said the main drawback to all the written safety procedures is the paperwork that has to be done. He said it takes quite a while to get it completed. He said you have to track people down, which is also aggravating. He thinks it would be better to use discretion when using the THINK Plan or Prompt Card.

Chad was asked if he ever received a well bonus. He said yes, a few from BP. When asked if he or the crew ever cut corners, including under reporting to get the bonus, he said no.

When asked about the hitch change from 14/14 to 21/21, Chad said he liked 14/14 better. He said normally when it gets to about day 12 or 13; people are getting tired and worn out. They get complacent and the morale weakens. We used to only have a couple of days until we went home, but now we have at least another week to work like this.

Recommendations:

When you go into any well control situation the areas around the pump, pit or shakers; no one should be in those areas.

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Install water-tight doors separating the pumps so they are isolated from the other areas.

When the rig accommodation is connected to the work areas, make sure there are water-tight doors, not just fire doors.