


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### Interviewing Form

Interviewee Name:	Amy Annand
Job Title:	Consultant
Company:	Lloyds Register
Contact Details:	
Work Address:	
Work Telephone:	
Work Cell:	
Home Address:	c/o Lloyds Register EMEA, Union Terrace, Aberdeen, Scotland, UK
Home Telephone:	
Home Cell:	
Interviewers Present:	Derek Hart
Date:	June 15, 2010
Start Time:	3:00 p.m.
Stop Time:	4:30p.m.
Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N	Yes - Lloyds Report, see below
Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N	No
Are documents attached to this form? Y/N	No
Details of documents, drawing, photographs or	Lloyds Register EMEA Report issued 11 <sup>th</sup> May 2010 "Transocean Safety Management and safety Culture/Climate Review – Deepwater Horizon. Undertaken 12 <sup>th</sup> to 16 <sup>th</sup> March

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TRN-INV-00000084

TDR037-000084

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other supporting materials taken to interview.	2010 by Garry Moon & Amy Annand
<b>Interview Plan</b>  Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Discuss the key issues raised in the Lloyds Report</li><li>2. Discuss and clarify a number of the finds; these are set out below as questions</li><li>3. Obtain an overall impression from the two Lloyds personnel of the safety culture on the Deepwater Horizon</li></ol>

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### Interview of Amy Annand

#### Lloyds Register

Aberdeen 15<sup>th</sup> June 2010

Q. *Orientation – What was the quality and did you enter a Life Boat?*

It was conducted by the Medic who showed a rig specific video, she was then shown to her room, round the accommodation and where to muster. Was at no time during stay on board was shown into her life boat.

Q. *Smoke Hoods – What specific instruction were you given about these?*

Not sure what was in the emergency pack in her cabin but was aware that it was in the cabin.

Q. *Mentor - Who was assigned as your mentor and were you accompanied at all times?*

No specific mentor was assigned. Never went outside the accommodation unaccompanied various people accompanied her round the rig; mainly it was the RSTC.

Q. *Culture – “The strong team culture onboard Deepwater Horizon and the levels of mutual trust evident between crews’ means that the rig safety culture was deemed to be robust”*

This was seen at all levels across the rig within the Transocean group, very much a sense of “team spirit”

Q. *Leadership – “Rig leadership was identified as one of the strongest areas in this review”*

The offshore leadership was referred to as “The Fantastic 4”; this was the OIM + Capt + Snr TP + Chief Eng, but it was not just the four that were on the rig at the time, but was consistent across the two teams. These four persons (seen during the visit) understood the company processes. These four leaders also thought they had good support from the RMP Paul Johnson who stuck to his word and had since his time as the RMP lead a “back to basics” approach to the management system which had helped to clear away a lot of the confusion that had been in place previously.

Q. *Report & Influence – “In short, individuals reported that they could confidently approach rig management with any safety concerns they may have, knowing that, if their concern is justified, they will receive full backing. It must be stated at this point, however, that the workforce felt that this level of influence was restricted to issues that could be*

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*resolved directly on the rig, and that they had little influence at Divisional or Corporate levels"*

This was very much that the rig team felt they could have some level of control over that was within their sphere of influence, but once things needed addressing off the rig, and, certainly further than the RMP then there was frustration over lack of direct influence to make things happen in timely manner.

*Q. BP Participation – "It is noted that the client (BP) supported the LR EMEA review by allowing third party contractors to participate, but took no part themselves in the interview process" Why?*

There was no reason given why and Lloyds did not push the issue. BP seemed happy enough for the process to go ahead. This was the first rig she had been on that the Client had not participated in the process so found it slightly odd.

*Q. Equipment reliability vs. drilling priorities – "Some crew members expressed a concern over issues relating to equipment reliability, which they believed was as a result of drilling priorities taking precedence over planned maintenance" Expand on this*

Think this predominately came from the Maintenance group, but the Medic also made similar comments. This was particularly around between well maintenance. There was a concern about the unreliability of both drill floor and some other equipment (not specified) and they was a push to keep things running and that if the rig was on down time then people would be held accountable as to why.

*Q. SLF & SLT Training (key company training modules) – "There were some criticisms relating to SLF and SLT courses being delivered by onshore people who were perceived to have insufficient operational rig knowledge" Expand on this*

Those delivering the training were seen to out of touch with rig activities. These courses were not pushing/challenging guys understanding, it was more about the process than how conduct the process. These courses were also seen as too high a level for some of the lower level crews.

*Q. Training – "The focus appears to be on 'ticking the box' to complete the matrix, rather than an emphasis on learning"*

There was too much focus on the % compliance rather than the quality and what training is being undertaken. Commented that training was much better received in non western countries where the local crews see a much greater benefit of training to themselves

*Q. TOPS and New Hires – expand on comments in the report*

Supervisors felt people coming through the TOPS system were not properly prepared for offshore. There was too much focus on the theory and not enough "hands on" practical training. The new hires interviewed did find this training beneficial. Also a concern that that new hires were being taught that working safely meant working slowly, rather than

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efficiently

*Q. THINK – “Although the perception survey indicated that people would not be confident in taking shortcuts, the survey also clearly indicated that a quarter (24.4%) of the participants had observed THINK Plans which were not carried out properly by others on the rig. This may relate to people’s observations that the THINK planning process is not strictly adhered to (e.g. creating plans during or even after the task) as potential downtime approaches, or during downtime. Although there was a general willingness and ability to call TOFS, feedback suggested that, at times of operational pressure and downtime, some crew members would be less willing to stop the job for fear of slowing things down”*

THINK plans for bigger jobs were well thought through and of a good quality, but the same could not be said for more routine operations. There was a confidence amongst the Transocean crews to call TOFS amongst themselves, but less so with such as 3<sup>rd</sup> parties where the understanding of the task from the Transocean crew was less.

*Q. Work Rota – “Recently, 21 days on, 21 days off hitch has been introduced for Transocean personnel. LR EMEA recognizes that this change is still in the transition phase. However, many crew members reported that this change was affecting the workforce’s motivation, attention, and attitude, especially during the final week of the hitch” What effect (if any) do you think this was having on safety on the rig?*

There was a feeling of lack of involvement in the decision making process, it was forced on them and the crews resented this fact. It was meant people had to adjust their life styles, not only themselves but also their families, and this was the feeling across the whole rig. The last week of a hitch supervisors felt they had to monitor and support the crews more and this was leading to an increase in risk

*Q – “The reviewers felt that planning and risk management performance levels onboard the Deepwater Horizon were stronger than the perception survey results indicated” Expand on this*

From all other surveys Lloyds had found that rig crews thought they were managing risk better than they were; in the case of the DWH it was the opposite

*Q. Merger influence on safety – “The perception survey indicated that one third of the workforce felt that the merger (Transocean/GSF) had negatively impacted on safety” Expand on this*

The feeling was the company was now “too big” and was not the Transocean they were used too. The rig was a positive on the level of marine manning.

*Q. MOC – “This feedback supports a consistent view that organisational change is not managed and/or communicated well in Transocean company-wide” Expand on this*

The crews don’t understand why we need to change and it was not being explained to them “it comes out of no where with no consultation.”

*Q. Safety – “Nearly all participants believed that Transocean genuinely felt that their safety was important to them. This included Corporate and Divisional leaders (to a lesser*

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*extent)”; expand on the latter comments*

DWH felt that safety was important to their team which included the RMP Paul Johnson, but they felt that the further up the management tree the was not necessarily the case especially with some of the dic tats that came down from above e.g. long sleeve coveralls

*Q. General Safety Meeting – “The general safety meeting was seen to be less effective as a communication mechanism, as it was perceived to focus more on statistics than safety. Although some of the rig management did participate in these meetings, crew members felt they got little value from it” Expand on this & why some senior members did not participate*

This was seen as a key disappointment where much of the meeting was centered around a discussion about statistics, some of which turned out to be wrong + there was a disbelief in them anyway. It then degenerated into a discussion about RSTC booking training. Such as the OIM did not attend and there were no BP representatives. The departmental Safety meetings were much better with genuine issues being discussed

*Q. TOFS – “Worryingly, 46.3% of the people surveyed felt that some of the workforce were uncomfortable calling a TOFS when unsafe situations occurred” Expand on why*

There is seen by Lloyds a genuine issue, but it is unlikely to be anywhere near as quoted. 43% reported an issue, but they all could have been taking about the same person. Note: I told Lloyds this was a best misleading and at worst a gross misrepresentation; they had a very long and complicated reason why they recorded the data this way

*Q. Incident Reporting – “There was less agreement (73.2%) with the idea that all incidents were reported, investigated and followed up” Expand on why*

This is linked to dropped object reporting issue, see below

*Q. Incident Investigation/Blame – “However, 24.4% of those interviewed felt that the purpose of incident investigations was to determine who is to blame and should be disciplined” Expand on this*

This is linked to dropped object reporting issue, see below

*Q. Dropped Object reporting/Blame – “People felt that dropped objects investigations were conducted to attribute blame. They equated any dropped objects event with a ‘trip to Houston’ and a discipline case”. Expand on this*

A common comment from the crews (not senior supervisors), especially the younger members of the crew in particular that reporting a dropped object will lead to disciplinary action, a trip to Houston and that they will loose their job. Paul Johnson had been to the rig and explained the management’s position on this issue; this had been accepted at supervisory level, but not amongst the lower levels of the crew.

*Q. Drill - There were four BP third party contractors that did not participate in the drill*

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*(and it was unclear why they were excused). The excused third parties included ROV operators and a well control specialist. Why?*

This did not detract from the overall quality of the drill, but was another example of BP not actively participate in the whole Lloyds exercise

*Q. Drill – Compared to others rigs how was the quality of the drill and your particular muster? Note: Garry observed the fire teams, Amy observed the Command Team*

There was a good muster in good time (10 minutes); there were some small issues with the muster. Everyone was calm and well organized, she was not aware of any debrief held after the drill.

*Q. Closing meeting with offshore management team – feedback received to your report/findings?*

Pretty good, a lot of heading nodding on the issues that Lloyds raised i.e. no real surprises. The main issue were 21/21, MOC + that the rig was not listened too. Although invited there was no BP rep at the close out.

*Q. Closing meeting with onshore management team - feedback received to your report/findings*

She described this as OK. Paul Johnson, Keelan Adamson, Chris Knight, Gerry Canducci and Bill Sannan were present and they seemed to take onboard everything that was mentioned. **Note:** the onshore close out covered all the rigs visited in NAM i.e. common issues + rig specific ones. A separate one to one was also held with Bill Sannan to discuss some of the issues raised about the NAM Division in more detail

*Q. Anything else you would like to add?*

The quotes in the report represent the feedback from a number of people; the "one offs" did not make it into the report. What stood out from the Horizon was the Leadership, and the crews belief in that leadership together with a belief and awareness of Transocean from the senior staff processes.

