

# CONFIDENTIAL

## Interviewing Form

|   |  |
|---|--|
| Interviewee Name:   | Gary Moon  |
| Job Title:  | Consultant   |
| Company:  | Lloyds Register  |
| Contact Details:  |  |
| Work Address:   |  |
| Work Telephone:   |  |
| Work Cell:  |  |
| Home Address:   | c/o Lloyds Register EMEA, Union Terrace, Aberdeen, Scotland, UK  |
| Home Telephone:   |  |
| Home Cell:  |  |
| Interviewers Present:   | Derek Hart   |
| Date:   | June 15, 2010  |
| Start Time:   | 1:00 p.m.  |
| Stop Time:  | 2:45p.m.   |
| Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N                       | Yes - Lloyds Report, see below   |
| Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N | No   |
| Are documents attached to this form? Y/N                            | No   |
| Details of documents, drawing, photographs or                       | Lloyds Register EMEA Report issued 11 <sup>th</sup> May 2010<br>"Transocean Safety Management and safety Culture/Climate Review – Deepwater Horizon. Undertaken 12 <sup>th</sup> to 16 <sup>th</sup> March |

CONFIDENTIAL



TRN-INV-00003406

TDR037-003406

## CONFIDENTIAL

|  |   |
|--|---|
| other supporting materials taken to interview.                             | 2010 by Garry Moon & Amy Annand   |
| <b>Interview Plan</b><br><br>Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc: | <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Discuss the key issues raised in the Lloyds Report</li><li>2. Discuss and clarify a number of the finds; these are set out below as questions</li><li>3. Obtain an overall impression from the two Lloyds personnel of the safety culture on the Deepwater Horizon</li></ol> |

## CONFIDENTIAL

### Interview of Garry Moon

Lloyds Register

Consultant

June 15, 2010

Q. *Orientation – What was the quality and did you enter a Life Boat?*

Very strong, took about one hour and lead by the rig Medic. It was very clear; there was an emphasis on the fact the rig was having well control issues. Also came across strong the Transocean requirement for "Red Zones" as part of Dropped Object management. The only rig visited that had a dedicated rig specific video. He was not shown into a Life Boat on this rig, but was on another rig visited in FEA.

**Note:** the content and quality of orientations he attended was not consistent across the Transocean rigs he visited

Q. *Smoke Hoods – What specific instruction were you given about these?*

Not sure/can't remember

Q. *Mentor - Who was assigned as your mentor and were you accompanied at all times?*

No specific mentor was assigned, but was given a point of contact (RSTC). Never went outside the accommodation un-accompanied

Q. *Culture – "The strong team culture onboard Deepwater Horizon and the levels of mutual trust evident between crews' means that the rig safety culture was deemed to be robust"*

This was seen at all levels across the rig within the Transocean group, the Client did not actively appear to contribute to this, was not obstructive but lacked active engagement

Q. *Leadership – "Rig leadership was identified as one of the strongest areas in this review"*

Unity between the onshore and offshore management

Q. *Report & Influence – "In short, individuals reported that they could confidently approach rig management with any safety concerns they may have, knowing that, if their concern is justified, they will receive full backing. It must be stated at this point, however, that the workforce felt that this level of influence was restricted to issues that could be resolved directly on the rig, and that they had little influence at Divisional or Corporate levels"*

## CONFIDENTIAL

The rig team was very much "involved" in resolving issues that were within their sphere of influence; there was frustration with being unable to have influence over/move issues forward that lie outwith their sphere of influence

*Q. BP Participation – "It is noted that the client (BP) supported the LR EMEA review by allowing third party contractors to participate, but took no part themselves in the interview process" Why?*

The BP reps were OK with allowing their sub contractors to participate and one "focus" session was run with a BP sub contracting group. However although invited they did not participate even to the extent of declining to attend the opening and closing meetings

*Q. Equipment reliability vs. drilling priorities – "Some crew members expressed a concern over issues relating to equipment reliability, which they believed was as a result of drilling priorities taking precedence over planned maintenance" Expand on this*

Think this predominately came from the Maintenance group. "They (Drilling) break it and we fix it"; feeling the rig was being "pushed" hard and the equipment was suffering

*Q. SLF & SLT Training (key company training modules) – "There were some criticisms relating to SLF and SLT courses being delivered by onshore people who were perceived to have insufficient operational rig knowledge" Expand on this*

This was not unique to the DWH; views being that these courses are strong on content/process and weak on implementation + those delivering them are too remote from the field.

*Q. Training – "The focus appears to be on 'ticking the box' to complete the matrix, rather than an emphasis on learning"*

Setting a target of 85% compliance is not having the desired result in that people are completing training to meet a target which is leaving holes in their knowledge + concentrating on the quick fixes to keep up the compliance levels

*Q. TOPS and New Hires – expand on comments in the report*

This came from Supervisors; that new hires out of the TOPS system are not ready to work offshore, they come to the rig with a lot of theoretical knowledge, but very little practical "hands on". In some cases supervisors were "damming" about what they saw as a poor system; however almost exclusively none had attended the TOPS school/given proper feedback on their concerns to management. Those junior crews who had been through TOPS thought it was a very helpful course.

## CONFIDENTIAL

*Q. THINK – “Although the perception survey indicated that people would not be confident in taking shortcuts, the survey also clearly indicated that a quarter (24.4%) of the participants had observed THINK Plans which were not carried out properly by others on the rig. This may relate to people’s observations that the THINK planning process is not strictly adhered to (e.g. creating plans during or even after the task) as potential downtime approaches, or during downtime. Although there was a general willingness and ability to call TOFS, feedback suggested that, at times of operational pressure and downtime, some crew members would be less willing to stop the job for fear of slowing things down”*

The feedback was that “downtime is looming” and the crews would put pressure on themselves to avoid/minimize this as they wanted to do a good job and be seen as the “best”. There was no evidence that BP was applying any direct pressure to work faster etc.

*Q. Work Rota – “Recently, 21 days on, 21 days off hitch has been introduced for Transocean personnel. LR EMEA recognizes that this change is still in the transition phase. However, many crew members reported that this change was affecting the workforce’s motivation, attention, and attitude, especially during the final week of the hitch” What effect (if any) do you think this was having on safety on the rig?*

This is a sub set of the overall MOC process. The 21/21 had been introduced without any consultation with the rig and this was having an effect on the crews + their families. Whilst it was recognized that the rig was in transition with this process particularly the drill crew supervisors were reporting that in the final week they were having to monitor their crews much more closely and fatigue was seen as a genuine issue. It should be noted that such as Marine crew who live on the North East seaboard were quite happy with this change. Response from onshore management to this was that’s the way it is.

*Q – “The reviewers felt that planning and risk management performance levels onboard the Deepwater Horizon were stronger than the perception survey results indicated” Expand on this*

From all other surveys Lloyds had found that a rig crews thought they were managing risk better than they were; in the case of the DWH it was the opposite

*Q. Merger influence on safety – “The perception survey indicated that one third of the workforce felt that the merger (Transocean/GSF) had negatively impacted on safety” Expand on this*

There was a perception that issues post merger were having an adverse effect on safety, but in reality most issues seen by the rig as merger related such as changes to long sleeve coveralls, EMPAC to RMS would have happened anyway; not as a result of the merger

*Q. MOC – “This feedback supports a consistent view that organisational change is not managed and/or communicated well in Transocean company-wide” Expand on this*

Overall the weakest area across Transocean. Crux seems to be that reason for change is very poorly/not communicated/explained by management to rig level personnel; example being the implementation of long sleeve coveralls where it was “this is what the company requires” end of story

## CONFIDENTIAL

*Q. Safety – “Nearly all participants believed that Transocean genuinely felt that their safety was important to them. This included Corporate and Divisional leaders (to a lesser extent)”; expand on the latter comments*

DWH felt that safety was important to their team which included the RMP Paul Johnson, but they felt that the further up the management tree the was not necessarily the case especially with some of the dic tats that came down from above e.g. long sleeve coveralls

*Q. General Safety Meeting – “The general safety meeting was seen to be less effective as a communication mechanism, as it was perceived to focus more on statistics than safety. Although some of the rig management did participate in these meetings, crew members felt they got little value from it” Expand on this & why some senior members did not participate*

This was seen as a key disappointment where much of the meeting was a discussion around statistics, some of which turned out to be wrong + there was a disbelief in them anyway. The one attended degenerated into a discussion about RSTC booking training. Such as the OIM did not attend and there were no BP representatives. The departmental Safety meetings were much better with genuine issues being discussed

*Q. TOFS – “Worryingly, 46.3% of the people surveyed felt that some of the workforce were uncomfortable calling a TOFS when unsafe situations occurred” Expand on why*

There is a genuine issue, but it is unlikely to be anywhere near as quoted. 43% reported an issue, but they all could have been taking about the same person. **Note:** I told Lloyds this was a best misleading and at worst a gross misrepresentation; they had a very long and complicated reason why they recorded the data this way

*Q. Incident Reporting – “There was less agreement (73.2%) with the idea that all incidents were reported, investigated and followed up” Expand on why*

This is linked to dropped object reporting issue, see below

*Q. Incident Investigation/Blame – “However, 24.4% of those interviewed felt that the purpose of incident investigations was to determine who is to blame and should be disciplined” Expand on this*

This is linked to dropped object reporting issue, see below

*Q. Dropped Object reporting/Blame – “People felt that dropped objects investigations were conducted to attribute blame. They equated any dropped objects event with a ‘trip to Houston’ and a discipline case”. Expand on this*

Crews (not senior supervisors) have developed a perception that management has a view that all dropped objects are preventable and as such reporting a dropped object will lead to disciplinary action, a trip to Houston and a fear of loosing their job. The

## CONFIDENTIAL

requirement to write to Steve Newman (now Arnaud Bobillier) about a dropped objects has further reinforced this perception. This is leading to under reporting of dropped objects e.g. if something is dropped "did anyone see that? No that's good we'll not report it".

Q. *Drill - There were four BP third party contractors that did not participate in the drill (and it was unclear why they were excused). The excused third parties included ROV operators and a well control specialist. Why?*

They were involved in critical well operations

Q. *Drill - Compared to others rigs how was the quality of the drill and your particular muster? Note: Garry observed the fire teams, Amy observed the Command Team*

The Chief Mate did a good job, but not sure about the "others" level of understanding; there was a lack of explanation about why things were being done in a certain way

Q. *Closing meeting with offshore management team - feedback received to your report/findings?*

Can't remember

Q. *Closing meeting with onshore management team - feedback received to your report/findings*

Very positive, nothing came up that was particularly unknown to the team. Feedback was well received, wanted to get after the issues raised

Q. *Anything else you would like to add?*

In light of what happened on the Horizon have re read the report a number of times and stand by what is written 100%. What was impressive was the RMP and his alignment with his offshore management team. The rig crews were very helpful, accommodating and very honest with their responses.

