

From: Robinson, Steve W (Alaska)  
Sent: Fri May 07 21:07:28 2010  
To: MC252\_Email\_Retention  
Subject: FW: Offer: Interview notes D Simms #2  
Importance: Normal  
Attachments: Gill Cowlam Interview Notes.xls

-----Original Message-----

From: Cowlam, Gillian S  
Sent: Friday, May 07, 2010 12:48 PM  
To: Robinson, Steve W (Alaska)  
Cc: Teweleit, Kimberly A; Thorn, Barbara K; Wall, Dave; Brock, Tony; Pagram, Bronwyn F; Defranco, Samuel J; Corser, Kent  
Subject: Offer: Interview notes D Simms #2

Please find attached notes from the telephone interview with Dave Simms

Regards

Gill Cowlam  
Acting North Sea SPU Engineering Authority HSSE & Engineering

Location: 1A36 North Sea HQ  
Tel: 01224 834102 (direct)  
Mobile: 07795 127934  
Email: gillian.cowlam@uk.bp.com

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
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-----Original Message-----

From: Wall, Dave  
Sent: 06 May 2010 22:06  
To: Wall, Dave; Corser, Kent; Robinson, Steve W (Alaska); Brock, Tony; Pagram, Bronwyn F; Cowlam, Gillian S; Defranco, Samuel J  
Cc: Teweleit, Kimberly A; Thorn, Barbara K  
Subject: RE: Emailing: Dave W Interviews.xls

Interview notes from second Halliburton Cementer and Mud Logger interview. Christopher Ryan Haire and Cathleen Willis.

Dave



CONFIDENTIAL

BP-HZN-BLY00165710

**David Simms 5/5 Phone interview**  
Gill Cowlam & Steve Robinson

Q: Are we using the float collar model on the relief wells /other wells

Possible

Request to ask Weatherford for data on the reliability in the face of high shear

Also any reliability statistics on the flapper?

Ok

Talk through events from shaking to explosion:

Initial shaking and noise felt like it was under the bridge - may be the cantilever effect

Short lived and followed by sound of gas escape from the direction of the rig floor - in total 10-15sec from start of shaking

Scurrying around on the bridge - looking at screens

Looked out of the bridge port door - can see 15-20' edge of rig and all covered in mud including boat

Could not see rig floor from that location

Bankston moving away at that point - thought that was quite quick as event only just happened

No mud apparently flowing at that time

No unusual smell

Closed door - collective "don't go out there"

Don't recall anything else until major explosion occurred - direction was from the middle of the rig. Would characterise this as down in the rig (deep boom) rather than high in the rig.

David Sims

arr 230

Bob day wellsite leader brief conv in office - negative test, something not right, trying to sort out

8 people, night on tour

On rig floor, too many people in diller shed (about 9), stayed less than one minute

"Supper, Don relieved Bob

Don asked about attending 7pm mtg, David said no need to attend

700-900 meeting - most Sr leadership in attendance, Don arr late, left early

900 to bridge

Everyone felt high freq vibration and humming for a few seconds - sounded like high flow through pipe

described as sounding like prop boat pushing against rig

Heard gas/water sound escaping for a few seconds

Checked screens

Port side, went out

Damon Banks taking on liquid oil base mud

Damon moving away

Captain came in, said 'don't go out'

Big explosion, lights out

Only lights on were BOP panel

Open port door, saw someone swimming, had life vest on

Everyone in bridge donned life vests

Injured arriving to bridge - one with head wound

David to BOP panel, couldn't read (dark), got captain

OKM arrived, had stuff in eyes

David asked if we should disconnect

prior to hitting ESD, one red light lit up

2199 disconnect (quote from captain) - EDS 2166

Starboard, flames, DP operator given mayday, coordinates given - Andrea

more injured through bridge

Mustering at life boats

Flames near catwalk which was path to boats

casualty was full with pat dave and don

lowered, covered in mud

1 hr to damon bankston, offloaded

boats and helos all over,

was told DB launched fast rescue equipment right after explosion

Another ROV in field

4 critical and 12 wounded entitled

Don and Pat went up to bridge of damon banks to communicate

Flames got worse over time

Next day David Don and 2 subsea engineers got on ROV - max closest ROV (9-10am)

Rig being sprayed from water cannons

Survey of rig, 700 feet east of wellhead

David Sims 5/5 Phone Interview  
Gill Cowlem & Steve Robinson

MOC was conducted by David  
Sims on 7"x9 7/8" production  
casing

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Scramming around on the bridge - looking at screens  
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BP-H2N-  
BLY00061743

Riser bullseye pegged out, indication rising greater than 5 degrees (on bullseye) several times with ROV, problems pressuring up pump

trouble with failsafe valves

Tried to work around system logic by disarming failsafes

Failsafe pin cutoff to trigger, no response

Salvage company on location to manage water use

Rigs used to idleship in visits, comfortable, no issues subsea side, david had no issues

Casing job

cement job finished early am of event

did not know steps or procedure of neg test - typically procedure that stays on rig - no set proc, unique to well

Bob - got unusual results, not acting right, David did not drill down (ask more questions) Double checking to line up right, pressure volume, Bob not concerned thought drill pipe around 8K ft.

Cementing - nitrogen

Halliburton simulation - showed couldn't circulate at TD

MOC signed by ma, jon and others

Eric cunningham, BP cement expert, involved in review along with john sprague

First time for nitrogen job on production casing string for their group

did MOC, approved

well plan usually have clear approval plan, ad-hoc changed do not, unless major

BOP

did not know if FEMA or shear out qualifications had been done

had BOP problems in past, but none lately

ESD

space out procedure and policy - didn't know, wasn't sure, but thought there should be

David Simon

Noise:

From sound of escaping gas... little no. through  
- direction of blast

Telephone call 3/18/80

11:55

Steve Robinson / Port Customs

David Simon

First call: at 10:50 AM during that period in which I should have  
possibly

Recall hearing gas - what would during the incident? Reliability, in  
4 recall to David & offer him to investigate

very seriously, or evidence on the paper? (Reliability of info)

Initial reaction & noise felt like small bridge (concrete effect?)

blast wave followed by the sound of gas escape direction of gas flow } 10:50 - 5:00

Strong wind blowing - looking at sensors

Worked out Port Based bridge - normal wind coming everything on port side / after

boat couldn't see gas flow from location - can see ship at 15-20' wide back

couldn't move up along at that point - quite quiet? as no gas just happened

No apparent wind flow up at that time

No unusual smell

closed door - collective "don't go out there"

Don't recall anything until major explosion occurred.

Direction in front the middle of the ship (gas flow) - character and sound in the gas  
- deep boom

Couldn't see anything - no windows

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\*Struggled to get out of capsules



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## Event

On board to run lockdown sleeve  
Shane was in the company mans office (on the same level as the Galley) on Tuesday evening making a personal phone call  
Power went out and several seconds later heard a sound like something falling and impacting the deck (assumed to be first explosion)  
Alarm sounding and walking towards galley to muster when explosion (stated as second) occurred.  
Estimated that it was 7 beeps of the alarm maybe ten seconds between first blast and second blast  
Pressure wave was travelling from Galley towards company man office and it was strong enough to push them backwards several feet  
The second explosion caused ceilings and walls to collapse, lots of dust and smoke?  
Couldn't muster in galley because of the damage and a fire in the kitchen area.

Exited the accommodation via the door near the galley.

About 5 minutes after the second explosion was outside and looked back at the rig. View was obscured by the accommodation but could see the rig floor engulfed in flames and a vertical flame halfway up the derrick. Looked like it was coming out of the drill pipe.  
Very Intense bright flames that were difficult to look at  
22:25 hrs lifeboat was in the water.