

Interview Summary Form**Interview Details**

Interviewee Names: Dwight Bradshaw Date: 10/5/10 Time: 4:00pm
 Interviewee Title: LA DEQ Interviewee Job Location: LA
Barbara Parker
Greg Pollock Interview Location: Conference Call
 Interviewer Name(s): Larry Dietrick

Interview Questions

	Initial Question 1:	Describe your regular, pre-incident job duties and also your specific role during the DWH incident, including when you were brought in, what skill sets you were brought in to support?
Focus Area: ACP/Area Com	Question 2:	What is your understanding of, and the familiarity with, all the response plans at the State and Local levels within LA? Were ACPs and the One Gulf Plan used and integrated during the response? Have you participated in Area Committee meetings? Can you tell us who has participated in those meetings and with what regularity?
Focus Area: NRF	Question 3:	Were all LA State and Local personnel familiar with NIMS/ICS? Were they easily integrated into the overall ICS response organization? With the State of LA responding as if this were a Stafford Act and the ICP working under the NCP and OPA 90, describe the effects on the ICP and its participants. Any suggestions for how this would work better?
Focus Area: ICP/UAC	Question 4:	Did LA have an equal voice in the Houma ICP and from the UAC? Can you describe the states involvement, including when you were not able to sign-off on the IAP and what effect that had on the response.
Focus Area: Political Demands	Question 5:	Please describe the effects Political pressure (Federal, state and local) had on the overall response? Were there operational decisions made strictly for political purposes, can you describe the effect this had on the response?
Focus Area: ID Qual./Sustainability	Question 6:	Please describe whether or not the right people and assets were called upon to respond to this spill. Did you think that the people working on the spill were properly trained for this job?
Focus Area: ID Qual/Sustainability	Question 7:	Can you speak to the long term sustainability of the personnel on this response? We have heard about a variety of working rotations for USCG/State/BP employees, can you speak to what worked well and what did not. Any suggestions for how this long term response could have worked better? Can you say what some of the effects of long term stress were on the personnel involved in the response?
Focus Area: Information Flow/COP	Question 8:	Talk a bit about information flow, both within the Command Posts/UAC/Field How was it managed? If there was misinformation, how was it tracked, validated and corrected? What was successful and what failed (both from an IT/Platform perspective and info content perspective.)
Focus Area: PP/ESA	Question 9:	Can you describe the process used to identify priority protection areas? Did you feel that the right areas were identified for protection? Can you tell us about the protection strategies used and whether or not they were effective?
Focus Area: Lessons Learned	Question 10:	At any time to you recall discussion of lessons learned from previous spills or large exercises?
	Final Question 1:	What was the top "best practice" during this incident, from your perspective?
Final Question 1:		What do you assess to be the top "area needing improvement" (or downright "failures") from your perspective, and do you have any related recommendations regarding these area(s)?
Final Question 2:		Is there anything else you would like to tell us about?
Final Question 3:		Who else should we interview?
		THANK-YOU!!

Describe your regular, pre-incident job duties and also your specific role during the DWH incident, including when you were brought in, what skill sets you were brought in to support?

- I have worked for LA DEQ for 19 years. I started initially specializing in regulations pertaining to oil & gas production facilities and drilling rigs. I also responded to oil spills.
- Fortunately, LA is the epicenter of oil spills in the country, for a variety of reasons, so I have lots of experience with oil spills.
- LOSCO coordinates all spill response activities in the State. DEQ is the lead technical agency in the State of LA. We serve a function similar to NOAA for the USCG.
- When LOSCO cannot be there, and DEQ is there, we fill LOSCO's role. Typically if LOSCO cannot be SOSC for the duration, they would designate DEQ as the SOSC.
- I have served as a SOSC. I was the technical lead or SOSC for all spills following Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Ike. I was the SOSC for the Murphy Oil Spill (from Katrina in Chalmette).
- Since Katrina, I have not had many normal duties as we have been in response mode ever since.
- When DWH happened, called to Baton Rouge and initially put in charge of it for DEQ.

What was your role in Robert?

- At Robert, I was serving as the SOSC for the UAC. At that time, Roland was the SOSC in Houma. Later Roland was replaced by someone else.

Did your role change throughout the duration of the spill?

- I was the SOSC at the UAC for about 100 days, although I did have someone that would backfill me so I could take an occasional break.
- DEQ still has many people involved, mostly from the oil cleanup portion, along with monitoring of debris disposal, staging areas, and overall response activities.
- I am not longer actively involved in the response effort since it has transitioned to recovery.

Did you spend any time in Houma?

- I tried to get down to Houma 1 day a week, but sometimes it was 2 weeks between visits. Most of the DEQ staff was working out of Houma. I would keep in touch with them and get down there whenever I could.

What is your understanding of, and the familiarity with, all the response plans at the State and Local levels within LA? Were ACPs and the One Gulf Plan used and integrated during the response? Have you participated in Area Committee meetings? Can you tell us who has participated in those meetings and with what regularity? How can the plans be improved?

- I don't know if you could have a plan adequate for an event this size. People always plan for the last biggest thing to occur.
- Now we have hindsight to see how it could have been better, if we had a process to facilitate moving of resources to the area where needed.
- One issue that took a long time to get figured out was to get a skimmer's capability to match what was coming at us. Went to a great deal of effort trying to do that. Maybe having some provisions in place to facilitate that process would have helped.
- My perspective is from years of dealing with oil spill response in LA. I really did not have much problem with the plan's accuracy, but it is a matter of responding to the incident within the framework of the plan. Plans can be too specific where it can hurt you instead of helping you because coastal environments are a dynamic situation. There is a danger in getting too locked into specifics within the plan that will limit you from acting appropriately depending on the specific circumstances (e.g., tides, weather, wind direction, etc.) associated with a spill.

- In this situation, given the overall magnitude of the spill, and the media/public scrutiny, I don't know if anyone could have foreseen that and been prepared for it.
- I regularly attended the Area Committee meetings.
- Area Committee meetings were not generally attended by parishes. They were primarily attended by USCG, OSROs, LOSCO, DEQ and industry reps from the area. Generally the local/parish governments did not attend.

What were you trying to get vs. what you did get?

- We tried to get every skimmer we could lay our hands on. They were actually manufacturing skimmers for us. They did allow some skimmers from other countries to come in, some worked and others failed miserably.
- Basically, we had 3 tools to deal with the spill – skimming, burning and dispersants. During the spill there were several times when the weather conditions prevented us from using any of the available tools. All 3 tools worked well, when the conditions were right.

What process was being used to get the skimmers?

- BP (as the RP) did everything they could to get skimmers. I wasn't involved, but tracked their process, i.e., when they arrived and how they deployed.
- About the time we got all of the skimmers we wanted, the oil stopped flowing into the Gulf.
- It was a risky proposition pulling all of these big offshore response vessels into the Gulf to deal with this spill because these vessels play a big part of other parts of the country's contingency plans. Had something happened elsewhere, it would have taken a long time to get them back to their normal AOR.

Were all LA State and Local personnel familiar with NIMS/ICS? Were they easily integrated into the overall ICS response organization? With the State of LA responding as if this were a Stafford Act and the ICP working under the NCP and OPA 90, describe the effects on the ICP and its participants. Any suggestions for how this would work better?

- There was some familiarity because of what happened to us with the hurricanes. However, those responses are different than a USCG-led NCP/OPA90 response.
- Many local governments didn't understand that it is a different law governing this response, and that it was not a Stafford Act response. Local governments were treating it like it was a Stafford Act, and they didn't understand that everything had to go through the Unified Command. They did their own thing and expected to be reimbursed.

What about at higher levels of state government?

- Yes, but not so much from a NIMS perspective, but there was an understanding that it is a different law than Stafford Act, and it is run differently. If it is not approved by the Command, then it is not approved for reimbursement.
- LA has been through 4 big hurricanes in 5 years. So state officials are programmed to respond in that mode. The problem is how to reel that in once you have started it?

How did this play out in terms of impacting the response itself? Was there a disconnect?

- It had a lot of implications on the response, some of which played out in the media.
- The first potential hurricane in the Gulf, the Command said we have move all stuff that is potentially in harm's way and get it out of there. A lot of resources were all at risk and needed to be put in safe harbor.
- Parish governments pushed back. They didn't want the resources to leave, even though they were only being moved to higher ground to protect them from potential damage. The PPs did not allow them to move out to get them out of harms way. It's an example taken to the extreme.

Do you have any suggestions for improving the understanding at the local level of the system we have in place?

- We have had Stafford Act responses in rapid succession. Stafford Act responses are almost automatic here. Somehow need to go out and train them on the NCP and appropriate response under that regulation. The NCP was kind of alien to them. In addition, none really had any oil spill response experience. But they did have lots of disaster response experiences under the Stafford Act and as a result, they went with what they were familiar with.
- I am not sure how you fix that. Unless you have some sort of personnel that are accredited or trained in NCP and OPA90, and if they aren't, then they cannot participate in the response organization. That might be a way to address this problem, but that probably won't fly.
- LA Parish Presidents are independent and do their own thing. How do you convince them that it is in their best interest to follow the process and work within Unified Command? It is tough to get them to follow the NCP and work within the command.

Did LA have an equal voice in the Houma ICP and at the UAC? Can you describe the states' involvement, including when you were not able to sign-off on the IAP and what effect that had on the response?

- At the UAC, we had a voice, but there you are talking about multiple states, multiple federal agencies, at a high level. We definitely had a voice and were active in the decisions and big over riding issues with the other states, particularly on the dispersant issue.
- Some states decided not to be represented for the entire time at the UAC, such as TX didn't get impacted until later in the event.
- LA had a strong voice in the Houma ICP. There were things that came up in that Unified Command that the state would veto. This related to response activities that we thought weren't appropriate for our marshes or beaches. Or if there was something that we would like to see brought up related to a particular booming strategy, etc.

LA was instructed at some level not to sign the IAP. What impact did that have on the response? Was there a rationale that came with the instruction not to sign the IAP?

- Yes, we were instructed to not sign the IAP. To me, that could cause serious legal issues on the response effort. I am not sure how you can call it a Unified Command document if one of the Unified Commanders wasn't signing the document.
- This was not my decision; came from as high up as you can go.
- It was not just LA; saw this with other states (MS, AL, and FL) at the UAC. Those states had little experience overall with oil spills and current administrations had none. Same with LA – current Governor and Cabinet had no experience with oil spills and no knowledge of what is the appropriate response, how does this operate, who is in charge, etc. This caused a lot of problems. When you factor in the overarching political aspects, and it really didn't help.

When you heard the state was not signing the IAP, were you able to argue or explain why it was a bad idea?

- No, was not allowed to. Lots of people were aware of how things got to be counterproductive. There were so many drivers to response activities other than stopping the source and cleaning the oil up. At all the levels, people got lost in the weeds.

Please describe the effects political pressure (including federal, state and local levels) had on the overall response. Were there operational decisions made strictly for political purposes, can you describe the effect this had on the response?

- At the federal level, EPA was the chief culprit. EPA early on tried to instill that they were in charge and would control what happened, particularly in certain areas such as dispersant use, waste container classification, etc. It didn't matter what the NCP said.
- They wanted every container to be classified as hazardous waste. In fact, we only had 1 container of all that were tested to be marginally above the limit to be RCRA waste. The interesting thing is, it was so close that when we retested it, the results were reversed. That mired handling the waste from the event; it became a bureaucratic morass.
- Regarding dispersants, they tried to limit what dispersants could be used, then the quantities that could be used and how they could be used. They probably caused more shoreline impacts than what we should have had.
- EPA was responding strictly to political pressure from environmentalists being opposed to any dispersant use.
- EPA also made us switch dispersants to a less toxic dispersant. As things played out, we realized the one we were using at the beginning was the only one that was effective on this type of oil.
- EPA mandated that we had to ask them each day to use dispersants. The Incident Commanders have to be in control of those decisions, but in this case EPA was overriding them on that. It ultimately caused more damage to shorelines than if they were allowed to use dispersants when they wanted to use them and did not have to apply/request to use them each day.
- There were times when we didn't need dispersants as we could burn 2 times as much oil as was coming from the source. But when the weather was bad, the only option was dispersants and we had to fight to get permission to use them each day. The battles weren't pretty. The use of dispersants was getting overridden at the highest levels. It was detrimental to the response effort and caused more harm than good.

The conditions for burning are almost the same for mechanical recovery, what is your thought for those situations in the Gulf? Any insight on that?

- Skimmers under ideal conditions cannot deal with the quantity of oil that you can burn through ISB. When you have optimal conditions, ISB would remove more oil in terms of barrels per hour.
- We were in the situation with an ongoing discharge, so each day was a fight to make headway against the total volume of oil in the Gulf. ISB allowed us to deal with more oil and we wanted to take advantage of every way to gain on the oil and reduce its total volume.
- Unfortunately, as sea conditions got rougher, you could not burn, but could possibly still skim. Eventually though, things were so rough that the only option you had was dispersants.

Did you ever hear any documentation that would compare those rates (in terms of barrels per hour removed)?

- There is, but it is hard to evaluate. It was rare that you had static conditions out there for very long so that you compare.
- Every tool in the tool box was being used whenever it could be used. Dispersant use was always a last resort.
- It was pretty obvious to us that ISB was much more effective for removing oil than skimming when weather conditions were ideal.

Can you talk to the Political Pressure the response organization had to deal with?

- For example, the Natural Resource Conservation Service (under USDA) bypassed the normal chain of command and went straight to USCG to ask for the application of bagasse (a byproduct of sugar production) along the entire LA coastline.
- We have used this agricultural byproduct on previous spill responses, but it was inappropriate in this situation because you cannot recover it in a marsh environment. As a result, you are just adding more stuff to the environment that has oil in it. In addition, bagasse also absorbs water and sinks once it is saturated. We have used it as wildlife protectant in specific circumstances, but they wanted to put down a 3 inches thick, 10 foot wide coating along the entire shoreline of LA.
- We had to battle to prevent this from happening because we thought it would have been more detrimental to the marsh to do this and had a negative impact on wildlife too.
- We later found out that the driver behind this was that there was 1M tons of this stuff in a warehouse in LA. It was strange that a federal agency was acting like a vendor in this situation.

Can you give examples of pressures exerted from the state and local governments?

- Most obvious one was the state was trying to run everything through the Governor's Cabinet instead of delegating that authority to the SOS.
- Locals wouldn't let trucks leave with resources even with a hurricane bearing down. They were doing their own thing in 3 of the Parishes.
- Operational decisions were made for political reasons. The pressure came from all sides, from Washington on down.
- It helped to drive the public perception of things. The media treated the event poorly. For months after the oil was out of the water, they would show the same images even when the oil was not really in the Gulf or the marshes. They were not showing the true picture and it fueled a lot of the misconceptions.
- Another hurdle was that in oil spill response we have put tremendous efforts into prevention. There are still little spills but most of the public does not know that they occur. For example, in Katrina and Rita, had 10.5M barrels spilled, but generally the public doesn't know it occurred, because of the widespread destruction from the storms themselves. The public as a whole is very unaware of the basics of how oil acts in the water, how to clean it up, the difficulty involved, particularly when floating in open water. In open water, can never get it all cleaned up. Physics defies that.

Please describe whether or not the right people and assets were called upon to respond to this spill. Did you think that the people working on the spill were properly trained for this job?

- There were problems because of the magnitude of the event and when we had to triple what was already there. We don't have that many trained people in the country, even USCG. They had to put people through training before they could be put in the field.
- When the command was still in Robert, a person representing the EPA asked me what SCAT means. This was someone who was an emergency responder, but had never been involved in an oil spill on open water or shoreline cleanup. This was similar across all levels of government – had people with no experience in oil spills working this event.
- People were getting minimal training before they were sent out. You can have really good training, but until you experience it, you cannot really appreciate it or have an understanding on how to respond to it. Experience is critical when dealing with issues related to oil in the coastal zone. Experience allows you to have an appreciation and understanding on how to respond. Classroom training does not replace experience.

Did you ever feel hesitancy in asking to get people from other states to come and help?

- At one time there was consideration for LA to ask TX for help, but then LA decided not to pursue it.

- We took everyone available from within the State, and we did a lot of training, SCAT training, for everyone. We tried to get minimal training for everyone going on, including HAZWOPER, etc. With the magnitude, we tapped out the normal resources.
- The question is, how to train and maintain that many people for a response that might not happen again for 15 or 20 years? What effort to you prepare for a rare event? That will take a lot of thought.

Can you speak to the long term sustainability of the personnel on this response? We have heard about a variety of working rotations for USCG/State/BP employees, can you speak to what worked well and what did not. Any suggestions for how this long term response could have worked better? Can you say what some of the effects of long term stress were on the personnel involved in the response?

- There was the whole gambit from 1-2 week rotations to people who where there pretty much full time the whole time of the response. For example, there were some SCAT rotations that lasted for 1 week when it was so hot. In the Command Posts, it varied from people rotating every few weeks, to getting a day off a week, if you were lucky.
- There was evidence of burnout, but mostly viewed that from the contractors, not government personnel. Contractors wanted to keep people working as they are making money that way. Oil spill response is a feast or famine business. When you have a spill, they want to work, 16 hr days, 7 days a week. They were having a tough time, but they would at least have some rotation on a monthly basis.

Did any agency have a system to replace – observe if people were showing signs of stress? Effects of burnout? Any suggestions or ideas on how to make it work better?

- It was determined by the individual agencies on their own. There was no command input into that, though they did try to encourage people to go home and get some sleep when some were burning the candle at both ends. Early on, this happened a lot.
- Until the source was controlled, there was tremendous pressure.
- Compared to other influences (i.e., political), it was not significant. Not even measureable, thanks to the other external influences.
- I don't know how to make it work better. Might take promulgating regulations for relief for all involved in the response effort. We went through it with Katrina, and managed it well. We were just one piece of the response in that one. Didn't have the political pressure for that one either.
- In the most part, I thought agencies handled it pretty well.
- The toughest position was the FOSC. That individual had a lot of pressure and responsibilities that couldn't be delegated. It would have been tough to send them away more often. You would have lost continuity in the response effort.

Talk a bit about information flow, both within the Command Posts/UAC/Field. How was it managed? If there was misinformation, how was it tracked, validated and corrected? What was successful and what failed (both from an IT/Platform perspective and info content perspective.) Can you put an estimate on how long it took to get control of it?

- There were parts that were really good. Source control and offshore efforts, they were really good. The information would flow really well to and from the field.
- When you have an "on the ground effort" in LA, there are some really remote coastline, and that always causes problems in information flow. Information generally is lagging 24hrs or more. Over flights were key in directing folks to the oil, but in bad weather, you can't keep the eyes in the sky. Even with the spotter planes, it is really difficult when the work crews were going out to do the work and it takes them 2 hours to get to the area they are supposed to be working.

- The size of the event made it difficult to maintain communication flow both ways. The first thing to suffer is the flow from the Incident Commanders to the responders in the field. The scale means it outgrows the structure really quick and it takes a while to get it back.

Related to the use of VOOs, there was a pressure to employ them, but how do you communicate with them?

- Some them had VHF radios (which are line of sight). Some had cell phones. But how do you connect the VOOs to spotter aircraft? It took several weeks to get the communications flow figured out. It was accomplished, just took a while. Not something that you normally do.

What was your opinion of the VOO program – was it a success?

- It kept the fishermen employed. But now we have shortages in seafood because they haven't gone back to work. They aren't used to having to go out and earn a paycheck (rather than getting the steady paycheck from BP.)
- The fishermen do know their waters and they know where the oil will be. The issue is, how do you leverage that knowledge into oil recovery operations?
- They were also restricted on what they could do once they found the oil due to a lack of training. There was a huge range in what they did vs. their value in response efforts.
- There was no real VOO program in place prior to this incident. We did have a plan to use volunteers – but not in direct response operations, like the VOOs were used. Our plan was to use volunteers at aid stations, help in feeding the troops, etc. overseen by the Red Cross. VOOs were not in any of the plans.

Regarding pre-positioned equipment, do any plans demand pre-positioned equipment be stationed to protect certain areas?

- Originally, the big mantra was boom. Calls went up along all of the Gulf states for boom. Everyone wanted more boom.
- In reality, a lot of that was unnecessary and did more harm than good to the marshes.
- In Bay Jimmy area, there has been a lot of local coverage about this. In Plaquemines Parish, there is probably more damage from the boom than from the oil. The boom washed up in to areas where there was no oil and damaged the marshes.
- Do have lots of resources pre-staged in LA, because we have a lot of spills. But because of the political demands, there wasn't enough boom on this planet. In truth, the boom wasn't needed. It was political boom. It probably became the metric because you could see it, TV cameras could capture it. It is effective in certain circumstances, but not with certain waves or other conditions. In reality, it is of limited utility and more of a liability than an asset in a lot of cases.
- Also, we needed to track what other ACPs require other states to have on hand – what they have to keep vs. what they can provide to assist.

What was available based on the plan vs. needed to be acquired during the response?

- In the plan, we have placement of boom to protect areas that will actually be beneficial when boomed (e.g., rookeries, water intakes, etc.).
- For this event, they wanted to boom every shoreline in SE LA.

Can you describe the process used to identify priority protection areas? Did you feel that the right areas were identified for protection? Can you tell us about the protection strategies used and whether or not they were effective?

- There is gear behind the plan, but it was never foreseen that we would see something of this size/magnitude.

- Did not anticipate the hundreds of miles of shoreline that were at risk from this event. Plans have always adequately addressed that – the deployment of effective measures within 24 hrs (except for a few remote areas).
- There are resources staged all over the state, much is owned by the OSROs, but when not tied up with a specific contract is it available.
- Only time we had problems was during Katrina and Rita and it was because the infrastructure was gone and we could not get the equipment to where we needed to be.
- There were enough resources for the coastal response, but it was not enough to cover the political demands.
- We used the One Gulf Plan and the USCG ACPs for each MSU (New Orleans, Mobile, etc.).
- There were not enough offshore response vessels in the Gulf to do this response. We also did not have the capability to met the effort for in-situ burning, likely because this is something that is not done that frequently for oil spills. When you don't have to worry about the impact of the smoke, as in this case because it was so far off shore, it is a great option.
- If you move OSRO resources to help, there is the possibility that something could happen where they are normally stockpiled. You have to balance the risk of what might happen in those places with your area's needs.

Do you have site-specific planning?

- We did have some site-specific strategies in the plan and we did boom them according to the plan. It did happen. For example, we had boom out around Breton Island (a national refuge area).
- There were conflicts with what the Command wanted to protect vs. what the Parish wanted protected.

Do you drill or physically test the booming strategies (and make adjustments, retrain, etc.) for priority protection areas?

- In LA, we do it all the time. We don't need to do it in a drill. We do it for real spills all the time. The resources and plans are in place to protect the critical areas. We know what to do.
- You cannot accomplish anything by trying to boom the outer coastal areas. We can, however, protect the interior coastal areas. We can get it done in 12 hrs or less. It is designated and utilizes the expertise of the wildlife agents in those refuges to set up the boom and figure out what they want boomed. We have real practice in actually doing it, both in exercises and real world incidents. We know what will happen when wind or tide changes, river rises or falls, etc. We have had a lot of real-life experience in this.
- There are lots of examples of "political boom." For example, Mobile Bay, Mississippi Sound, etc. They surrounded every marsh island in Barataria Bay – it didn't work. Boom was pushed up onto the shoreline.

At any time to you recall discussion of lessons learned from previous spills or large exercises?

- We always do that. We always talk about what to expect.
- Important thing to remember is that there were USCG people there who have worked with us on oil spill responses extensively in the past. They have a lot of experience. There were others USCG officers that didn't have the experience. But there was continuity provided by the SOS, NOAA, etc. to assist these individuals.

Any contact with collection or rehabilitation of wildlife? Any problems or difficulties in collection or rehabilitation?

- There was an enormous effort put out, across the whole Gulf (and in LA). Public was turning in ever dead thing they saw, even if it was not close to the spill.

- Unfortunately, this event just coincided with the time that you have the larger population of dead animals (birds, turtles, marine mammals, etc.), because of nesting season, etc.
- They tried to use a wildlife rehab facility for photo ops. To be able to catch an oiled bird, you need to get it into a facility and nurture it back to health. The intrusion of the cameras was actually harmful to the animals, but the politicians didn't care.
- LA Department of Wildlife and Fisheries was in charge of trying to recover oiled and dead animals. They tracked the numbers.

Best Practice?

- Use of subsurface dispersants ultimately saved an enormous amount of damage to the environment. It worked and the science will help prove that.

Area for Improvement?

- Political aspects – local, state, national.

Anything that we have not touched on?

- The overall picture of things – have never been so disappointed on a spill because of the outside influence on what you were trying to accomplish.
- National political figures vs. State political figures. State was looking at it as a source of revenue. Maybe even the national government.
- RP putting out so much money - \$20B in claims – it was incredible.
- We were impeded from all sides in trying to get our job completed.

What would you do to stop the boom wars?

- It was a bogus issue, not real.
- Much of the country did not know what it takes to respond to an oil spill response.
- Crude oil is a lot less harmful to the environment than other types of oil. LA Crude is light, very easy to clean up, and the toxicity quickly dissipates.
- Leak occurred a mile deep, but by the time that the oil reached the surface, much of the damaging properties you worry about were already a non-issue.
- They were burning off about 35 mil cu ft of gas each day. The gas was dissolving in the water column and not reaching the surface. Never saw bubbles.

Anyone else we should speak to?

- Let me talk to them and see if they will. Personally to get to the boots on the ground issues – Jeff Dozak – DEQ person who was my counterpart at Houma. Served as Deputy to me on this response. He did a lot of work out of the forward operating bases. Dwight's Desk Number: 504-736-7714