

DEEPWATER HORIZON (DH) Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) Interview Question Compilation

Focus Area: Long-Term Sustainability (Personnel, Equipment and Resources)

Question 1:	How was the USCG reserve recall handled?
Question 2:	Did the RP, FOSC, State have the resources (both people and equipment) available to sustain a long-term response operations?
Question 3:	Was the availability of qualified personnel, equipment and/or resources an issue at any point?
Question 4:	What plans were in place to ensure a long-term sustainable response effort and who created and monitored that plan?
Question 5:	In your opinion, how is the state managing expectations for long-term sustainability?
Question 6:	When did the UAC begin to contemplate long-term sustainability?
Question 7:	Was the USCG Preparedness Program adequately resourced and ready for this spill?
Question 8:	What does the transition plan include? Please describe the top issues you are dealing with in the transition plan, such as demobilizing, ESAs, Parishes, and NRDA.

Focus Area: Area Committee Representation/Involvement

Question 1:	How active or vigorous is the Area Committee for this Captain of the Port Zone? (Pollock)
Question 2:	How frequently does the Committee meet and what is the attendance level for the members? (Pollock)
Question 3:	Do local or state representatives hold any Area Committee sub-committee chairmanships or other leadership assignments? (Pollock)
Question 4:	In your opinion, were local and state elected officials/stakeholders familiar with the Area Committee and its purpose and membership? (Pollock)
Question 5:	In your opinion, has the quality of the Area Contingency Plan suffered because of a lack of interest in the Plan by the Area Committee? (Pollock)
Question 6:	Are you aware of other local or state planning committees that might compete with the Area Committee or confuse response coordination? (Pollock)
Question 7:	What steps can be taken to stimulate interest and involvement in the Area Committee process? (Pollock)
Question 8:	Please tell us what the nature of your participation on your local Area Committee. And how long have you been a part of it? (Parker) (This question is for anyone in the local region, USCG, state or local representative. It will give us a sense of who is on that particular Area Committee.)
Question 9:	Is there an executive steering committee for your Area Committee, if so please tell us who is a part of that steering committee. (Some of the plans in the region call for an executive steering committee. This will let us know if they have one and follow-up questions will tell us who is on it and what their role has been.)
Question 10:	Have the members of the Area Committee participated in developing the Area Plan or worked on revising it? If so, please tell us who has participated in that and what are their tasks. (Parker)
Question 11:	Have you had an opportunity to add topics to the Area Committee and make presentations during meetings? If so, what topics have you been interested in and what types of presentations have you done? (Parker)
Question 12:	Can you tell us if Area Committee meeting minutes are sent out on a regular basis? Do you know who is responsible for taking these minutes? (Parker)

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Question 13:	Did you incorporate off-shore WCD scenarios in your area exercises? What was the involvement of the area Committee or your staff in reviewing the BP Geographic Response Plan? (Holt)
Question 14:	How well did the area committee planning process equate into the earlier response process? If it didn't, why not? How would you do it differently?
Question 15:	What plans did you use in the response process other than the ACP?
Question 16:	How does the state participate in the Area Planning process?
Question 17:	How do parishes participate in ACs and spill responses? Do they have their own plans? Did the parishes participate differently in this incident?
Question 18:	Do you rely on the State to take care of the locals and their concerns?
Question 19:	Did you sign off on the ACP on behalf of the state when it was written? Are you still confident in the ACP?
Question 21:	How did the State participate in the review of industry and regional contingency plans for off-shore operations?
Question 22:	How did the State participate in the development, review or approval of the Worst Case Discharge portions of the industry plans or area plans?

Focus Area: Use of Dispersants

Question 1:	Did the dispersant approval guidelines work adequately to accommodate timely dispersant decisions for the offshore area?
Question 2:	Were dispersants used in nearshore areas i.e., inside three miles and what was the outcome?
Question 3:	Are the dispersant approval guidelines adequate to accommodate timely dispersant decision making for nearshore areas?
Question 4:	Were protocols for monitoring the fate and effects of dispersants included in the contingency plans, dispersant plans or otherwise available prior to the spill occurring?
Question 5:	Should product testing for dispersants be required for specific oils in specific water bodies, using indigenous species and chronic as well as acute toxicity testing?
Question 6:	Were there sufficient quantities of dispersants to match the requirements for a Worst Case Discharge?
Question 7:	What did you do in anticipation of the decision to use dispersants?
Question 8:	Can you please tell us who made the decision that using subsurface dispersants was an appropriate method? Had you ever heard of using them in this manner before? (Parker)
Question 9:	Were SMART protocols employed to make a determination as to whether or not the dispersants were effective? Can you tell us who briefed you on the results of the SMART protocols if they were used? Did you think that the information you were given was adequate for making decisions? What changes are needed in the SMART protocols for monitoring the efficacy of dispersant applications? (Parker)
Question 10:	Had you ever participated in an oil spill response where dispersants had been used? If so, how effective had they been then?
Question 11:	Was the dispersant pre-planning and approval process appropriate for this size and scale of incident? How well did it prepare you for this type of event? What lessons learned did you take away from this process that you would like to use for improvements for the next event?
Question 12:	Was the dispersant approval process adequate and timely for this event?
Question 13:	At that time, was there any, or did the plan identify, an upper limit on the amount of dispersants to apply?
Question 11:	What about monitoring of the fate and effects of dispersants long-term? Was there any conversation related to the long-term impacts of where the dispersants were going?

Question 12:	What was your role in deciding on the use of Dispersants? Did you follow protocols from the plans and procedures or did you have to deviate to address real-world issues?
Question 13:	Was there any discussion on your watch about 24 hour application of dispersants?
Question 14:	Describe the State's response interaction with the RRT with respect to Dispersants.
Question 15:	Describe your interaction with the RRT and the UAC's interaction with the NRT with respect to Dispersants.
Question 16:	Was there a target missed because an opportunity passed because no decision made by senior officials to allow the use of dispersants?
Question 17:	What happened in the UAC when EPA sent a letter indicating there should be use of a different amount of dispersant and type of dispersant?
Subsea Dispersant Use	
Question 1:	Did you feel pressured by any particular group or individual to use dispersants in the sub-surface? (Parker)
Question 2:	How much, if any, was pre-approved for subsea dispersants?
Question 3:	When/how was the decision made to deploy dispersants undersea? Discuss the use of subsurface dispersants.
Question 4:	How did the decisions regarding subsea dispersant application come about? What was the approval process and how were the decisions vetted?
Question 5:	What was the process for the request of subsea dispersants? Did you coordinate closely with the RRT and NRT as the FOSC?
Question 6:	What changes are needed in the dispersant approval guidelines to accommodate subsea injection?
Question 7:	What protocols are needed to monitor the efficacy of subsurface injection?

Focus Area: Political Demands	
Question 1:	The National Incident Management System (NIMS)/Incident Command System has a mechanism for the incorporation of local and state level stakeholder concerns into the Unified Command decision making process. In your opinion, were local/state issues addressed primarily through the established NIMS/ICS mechanism or were local/state issues dealt with in some other fashion? (Pollock)
Question 2:	In your opinion, was there enough emphasis placed on liaison activities with local and state elected officials? Were they adequately informed of the progress of the response? (Pollock)
Question 3:	There have been reports that elected officials were making operational equipment deployment decisions outside of the Unified Command, some of which were counter to sound and proven response management practices. Are you aware of any elected officials making these decisions? If so, what series of events transpired that would prompt them to make operational decisions? (Pollock)
Question 4:	Did the Area Unified Command effectively broker competing demands by elected officials for response resources? (Pollock)
Question 5:	Did the demands of local and state elected officials ever impede the response? If so, how? (Pollock)
Question 6:	There were news reports that weeks into the event, some local elected officials claimed they, "still don't know who is in charge." In your opinion were elected officials familiar with the response structure for an event like the Deepwater Horizon i.e., NIMS/ICS and the National Contingency Plan? (Pollock)
Question 7:	Is the parish liaison program a program that should be a standard practice during a SONS or major oil spill?

Question 8:	Were local political concerns part of your planning for incidents?
Question 9:	Was the organizational structure sufficient to handle political demands?
Question 10:	Did political demands delay decision making and operational progress?
Question 11:	Please tell us if there was a VIP plan in place in your region that gave you a methodology for dealing with political figures of all levels that were interested in coming to the command posts to see what was happening. If not, are you aware of whether or not one was written? (Parker)
Question 12:	Was your work hindered in any way due to political figures wanting to get tours of the effected area? Please describe to us what efforts you had to make to communicate or deal with political individuals. Do you have any suggestions for how better to deal with this type of situation?(Parker)
Question 13:	Can you tell us if you would have done anything differently in the response if you did not have to be concerned with local, state or federal politicians? (Parker)
Question 14:	To what degree were your decisions affected because you needed to consider political ramifications?
Question 15:	How would you say the response was affected by the President of the United State's involvement?
Question 16:	Can you say if ranking of sensitive areas was determined solely due to environmental concerns or were there other factors that played into how highly sensitive an area was ranked? How did this message get to the Planning section where these decisions should be made?
Question 17:	Were the planners able to rank sensitive areas based on habitat and species along or were political factors part of that ranking? (Parker)
Question 18:	Were the State and parishes adequately included and involved in the command structure? Please describe.
Question 19:	Who was responsible for reporting information to the Governor?
Question 20:	What plan was the State and Parish's operating under? How do the Parishes fit into State government?
Question 21:	It appears that the SOSOC is not making decisions within the State, how are those decisions being made? Is there a de-facto SOSOC?
Question 22:	Were you influenced by politics in the execution of the response? Did it have a positive or negative impact on the response operations? What were those impacts?
Question 23:	Do you believe pressure from senior officials, elected officials or BP impeded the decision making process? If so, could you give us an example?
Question 24:	Were you influenced by politics in the execution of the response? Did it have a positive or negative impact on the response operations? What were those impacts?
Question 25:	Did things get better after Parish Liaisons were established?
Question 26:	The SOSOC was at the UAC and then pulled and moved to the ICP; do you think that move hurt things in any way?
Question 27:	Please describe the working relationship with the parishes and the Parish Liaison Officer Program. How can that be improved? Please tell us more about the Parish Liaison Officer Program.
Question 28:	How did you work with BP on addressing parish needs? When did you first find out about BP giving money directly to the parishes? Were you a part of that decision?

Focus Area: External Communications

Question 1:	Did the Unified Area Command and Regional ICPs (Houma, Mobile & St. Pete) adequately communicate information about the response structure, operations, process etc., to elected stakeholders (Governors, Parish Presidents, Members of Congress) in order to "bring them inside the tent?" (Pollock)
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Question 2:	What is your assessment of the JIC's performance during this event, given the challenges they faced with respect to ever changing discharge amounts, companies blaming each other on Capitol Hill, concerns about dispersant usage, among other issues? (Pollock)
Question 3:	Several state governors were seen on television on a regular basis criticizing the response effort and effectively short-circuiting the JIC-model of unified messaging. Were attempts made to try and get them to respect the importance of unity and what was the result? (Pollock)
Question 4:	Do you think the JIC model worked in this event? What improvements were made to the JIC during the incident? (Pollock)
Question 5:	Were there enough qualified public affairs officers to function effectively during this SONS?
Question 6:	How was the public affairs organization (e.g., JIC) set up?
Question 7:	Was interoperability an issue during the initial stages of the response?
Question 8:	Was there a sufficient number of interoperable communications equipment?
Question 9:	In your opinion, based on what you have seen at all operational levels, is there open communication flow?
Question 10:	Did the JIC ever get caught up? When the JIC shifted to the UAC, did it complicate trying to get the message out as one message?
Question 11:	You identified that one of the focus areas that you could talk about was external communications. Given your role at Situation Unit and the Planning Section, could you discuss your role related to external communications?
Question 12:	What was your thought process in terms of removing some of the public affairs responsibilities from the Houma ICP?

Focus Area: Priority Protection/Environmentally Sensitive Areas

Question 1:	Was surveillance of oil movements adequate for supporting protection of ESAs?
Question 2:	Should contingency planning and preparedness include site specific strategies, tactics, equipment and personnel for pre-identified shoreline segments, critical passages, inlets, harbors and other ESAs?
Question 3:	
Question 4:	Do ACPs adequately establish priorities for application of countermeasures and removal actions for ESAs?
Question 5:	Do ACPs have adequate monitoring plans to evaluate effectiveness of countermeasures or removal plans including set asides and control areas?
Question 6:	Do ACPs have adequate site specific planning for ESAs with pre-identified booming strategies, tactics, anchor points, access, removal techniques, storage and monitoring?
Question 7:	What was the awareness among Area Committee members of the priority protection sites and ESAs?
Question 8:	Were all ESAs and Culturally Significant Areas pre-identified in your ACP?
Question 9:	Were booming strategies previously identified and implemented in your ACP?
Question 10:	Are Sensitive Area Maps user-friendly? Are they full implemented?
Question 11:	Were alternative response strategies pre-identified for oiled marshes?
Question 12:	What is the process for identifying ESAs location and protection strategies?

Question 13:	Please describe if any Vessels of Opportunity programs, comprised of contracts for trained crews and equipment, were in place prior to the spill to protect ESAs? Were VOO deployed to do near shore protection? Do you have MOUs in place to engage the shrimp boats as VOO?
Question 14:	Permitting process for ESAs? What is missing regarding ESAs? How to incorporate into plans?
Question 15:	Was berm development needed to protect ESAs?
Question 16:	Please describe the decision-making process regarding environmental compliance requirements for the spill response regarding National Historic Preservation Act, Endangered Species Act, Native Graves Protection, Repatriation Act, etc. How and when were these delegated to BP and its contractors?
Question 17:	Were there any concerns with decanting and discharging into federal water?
Question 18:	Has the UAC had any involvement with the prioritization or protection of ESAs? What is that level of involvement? Boom removal?
Question 19:	Should contingency planning and preparedness include site-specific strategies, tactics, equipment and personnel for pre-identified shoreline segments, critical passages, inlets, harbors and other ESAs? How would you approach this?

Focus Area: Use of In-Situ Burning

Question 1:	Did the In-Situ Burn plans and guidelines work adequately to accommodate timely ISB decision making?
Question 2:	Was any ISB conducted in nearshore areas, was it successful and were there any circumstances that complicated the decision making?
Question 3:	How was the volume of oil consumed by ISB measured and was it accurate?
Question 4:	Was the extensive use of offshore ISB conducted due to a lack of containment, recovery and/or storage equipment for mechanical recovery?
Question 5:	Were any uncontrolled ISBs conducted, were they successful and are adequate guidelines included in contingency plans to make uncontrolled ISB decisions?
Question 6:	What standards were used to protect public health or the environment from the effects of black smoke from ISB?
Question 7:	Were the resources in the industry and government contingency plans adequate to support the scale of ISB that was conducted or was there a shortage that had to be fulfilled after the spill occurred?
Question 8:	Did the contingency plans identify sufficient fireproof boom, vessels, trained crew, igniters and other necessary equipment for a spill of the size that occurred?
Question 9:	Were any burning agents used?
Question 10:	What air monitoring programs were put in place to monitor the air downwind from the burn: pre-burn, during burn and post burn?
Question 11:	What would you recommend to change in plans and preparedness (equipment) to prepare for large scale in-situ burning of oil spills?
Question 12:	What would you do differently on the in-situ burn process if you had a chance to do it over again?
Question 13:	What limitations did you encounter that limited the use of in-situ burning as a response tool?
Question 14:	Discuss the in-situ burning protocols. How did they work? Any way to make them work better? Was the In Situ Burn protocol appropriate? How well did it prepare you for this event? Any lessons learned you would take away?
Question 15:	Describe the State's response interaction with the RRT with respect to In situ burning.

Question 16:	Describe your interaction with the RRT and the UAC's interaction with the NRT with respect to In situ burning.
Question 17:	What was your role in deciding on the use of In-Situ Burning?

Focus Area: Worst Case Discharge (Standard)

Question 1:	What accounts for the glaring discrepancy in resources and equipment used in responding to the incident versus what is required in the government and industry contingency plans for a worst case scenario?
Question 2:	Is the planning for the worst case discharge in the ACP and industry plans sufficient and does it result in adequate resources for implementing and sustaining the response?
Question 3:	Does the worst case discharge in the approved plans ensure sufficient equipment for containment, control and removal of a real worst case spill?
Question 4:	Was implementation of the ACP adequate to remove a worst case discharge?
Question 5:	Is government required under the NCP/ACP required to purchase, possess and have ready at all times sufficient equipment resources and personnel necessary to immediately contain, control and remove a worst case discharge before a spill occurs?
Question 6:	Is industry required under their mandated contingency plans to purchase, possess and have ready at all times sufficient equipment resources and personnel necessary to immediately contain, control and remove a worst case discharge before a spill occurs?
Question 7:	Is there confusion about who, industry or government, is required to have in place and ready sufficient equipment resources and personnel necessary to immediately contain, control and remove a worst case discharge before a spill occurs?
Question 8:	Does the ACP have an adequate description and accounting of how industry facility response plans are integrated into ACPs?
Question 9:	Do you agree that the NCP does not require government to acquire and have ready the resources for source control or a worst case discharge before a spill occurs?
Question 10:	Are there Response Equipment CAPS in the MMS response plan requirements or in their NTL like those for EPA facilities and USCG vessels/facilities?
Question 11:	What effects if any on the response occurred due to a different Federal agency leading the response than the agency that regulated and reviewed/approved industries' plans?
Question 12:	What in your opinion is reasonable percentage of the WCD planning volume should be planned for in terms of response equipment and personnel?
Question 13:	Who was responsible for calculating the WCD volume for the Macondo well? Provide names, titles, and functions. (Moore)
Question 14:	Please list all of the variables used in WCD determination for the well and identify which variables were estimated. Please produce the method by which the number was modeled/calculated. (Moore)
Question 15:	What was the review and approval process for the volume included in the BP OSRP? Who specifically signed off on the volume? Provide names, titles, and functions. (Moore)
Question 16:	Is there an economic incentive for an operator to increase the WCD volume in an OSRP? Is there an economic impact to an operator when the volume of a WCD increases? (Moore)
Question 17:	Discuss how source control decision-making integrated in to the UAC. Who was a part of the decision-making process? Which states were involved, if any? What was the approval process?
Question 18:	If the USCG was preparing for a worst-case discharge, why was that information not shared with the public?

Focus Area: Unified Area Command, Incident Command Posts

Question 1:	Describe how the initial response organization was set up? What plan(s) did it follow? What influenced this decision?
Question 2:	When was it determined that a UAC was needed? What was the reasoning behind this decision?
Question 3:	What influenced the early organizations in the UIC's and UAC? The IMH? The ACP's? The RP Response Plan? The NCP?
Question 4:	List some of the external forces that caused changes to the organizations during the first month of response? How were these decisions made and implemented?
Question 5:	What effects did the inclusion of non-ICS trained personnel have on the response?
Question 6:	In pure ICS and the IMH only the IC position is Unified, all other sections of the Organization are integration into one team. How did this concept work in the first 30 days of response? What could have been done different?
Question 7:	Describe the division of roles and responsibilities between the UAC and the UIC's. How was this split arrived upon? Was it effective? Did it ever change or did one overstep there AoR?
Question 8:	What effects on the response organization did the Media/Public have during the response?
Question 9:	What effects on the response organization did Political pressure have during the response? Include Federal, state and local in your answers please!
Question 10:	Looking back at the response organization, what would you do differently if you could have?
Question 11:	Talk a bit about information flow, both within the Command Posts and between UAC and UIC. How was it managed? How was mis-information tracked, validated and corrected? What was successful and what failed miserably (both from an IT/Platform perspective and info content perspective)?
Question 12:	What seemed to be the priority in the UIC Posts? Develop safe operational strategies and tactics for the responders in the field or feed the information requiring best?
Question 13:	At one point the UIC's had over 1000 people in them and the UAC had 300+. In your opinion was this too many? Was there confusion / redundancy because of the numbers?
Question 14:	Describe the process of developing the IAP's for the next operational period. Include how the objective setting by UC was influenced by the UAC, political, media and public pressures.
Question 15:	Describe the process for transmitting the IAP to the field personnel for implementation of the developed IAP. Was it effective? Did the people in the field truly know what was expected of them? How was feedback from the field handled and implemented? Was it timely?
Question 16:	Did states (SOSC) have a legitimate role and voice in the Unified Command?
Question 17:	Did the Unified Area Command function as envisioned and was it effective?
Question 18:	Did tactical direction come from higher authority than the UAC (e.g., NIC, DHS, WH)? Can you provide some examples?
Question 19:	Were decisions driven by elected officials, appointed officials, etc. not normally involved in those decisions?
Question 20:	Was Minerals Management Service ever a part of the Unified Command? If so, were they located in Houma or somewhere else? If somewhere else, how did you communicate with them? If not, how did you receive input to source control decisions?
Question 21:	Who initiated the SIMOPS plan and what effect did it have on the response effort?

Question 22:	<p>This incident started out as an explosion and fire, then a SAR, then an oil spill. As these parameters changed, describe how you ramped up during that time, to where you ended up in a Unified Area Command/ICP:</p> <p>a. When did you go to 24-hour operations and how did you handle it?</p> <p>b. How did all the stakeholders embrace this organization build-up?</p>
Question 23:	Discuss how source control decision-making integrated in to the UAC. Who was a part of the decision-making process? Which states were involved, if any? What was the approval process?
Question 24:	How did the UAC get involved in making tactical decisions?
Question 25:	In the early stages where you can't use the IAP without going to the UAC, can you think of a tactical decision that was delayed but you went out and did anyway?
Question 26:	In terms of media relations nearly on, had own section? That was elevated and UAC took over JIC operations from ICP? Did the ICP not talk to media anymore?
Question 27:	One thing that was unique in this event was the Unified Area Command vs. a Command Post. Did you have training with that?
Question 28:	Was there an operations section at the Unified Area Command? Should there have been?
Question 29:	What was the coordination between the UAC and the Houma ICP?
Question 30:	What was the relationship and coordination between the UAC and the NIC?
Question 31:	How did the roles and responsibilities of the UAC evolve once the NIC was established?
Question 32:	What would you recommend to improve either the UAC or NIC?
Question 33:	Could you discuss your official role this incident? What was the process of growing the organization to a UAC? Based on your professional experience, were there any recommendations you made to enhance the response operation?
Question 34:	The SOSOC was at the UAC and then pulled and moved to the ICP; do you think that move hurt things in any way?
Question 35:	In the CB incident the media got out of control and the JIC never caught up – did that happen here? When JIC shifted to the UAC, did it complicate trying to get the message out as one message?
Question 36:	Describe the level of activity at the UAC.
Question 37:	So the UAC's main role was to be both a resource provider and a resource broker?
Question 38:	Who was in charge, and what was your interaction with the local ICPs?
Question 39:	What was the level of training of those in the UAC? (UAC vs. ICS training)
Question 40:	What was considered in the decision to make an operational group at the UAC?
Question 41:	How were you appointed as the FOSC?
Question 42:	When you arrived as the FOSC did you discover things were different from what you had been told?
Question 43:	Given that at the UAC level there isn't an operations section, how did the planning process work?
Question 44:	How did you integrate information from all of the ICPs?
Question 45:	What were the elements included in the Area Command Operating Guide? What is its relationship to each ICP's IAP?
Question 46:	Describe your relationship with the BP representative in the UAC? How frequent were your communications with BP outside of the formal meeting schedule? In your opinion was the UAC truly unified?

Question 47:	What went into the decision to move the JIC responsibility to the UAC?
Question 48:	Prior to the time that UAC was stood up, how would ICs been able to get resources?
Question 49:	Long-term strategies, by day 40, what was the UAC thinking in terms of long-term sustainability?

Focus Area: Spill Quantification	
Question 1:	What process was used initially to determine that “there was no leak” from the Macondo wellhead following the explosion/fire and sinking of DH MODU?
Question 2:	What was the reasoning to announce to the media that only 1000 bbls were being discharged when BP announced that the well was not secure?
Question 3:	What processes were used to arrive at an oil discharge from 12,500 bbls/day to 25,000 bbls/day?
Question 4:	Throughout the spill response, several outside sources questioned the daily discharge numbers as being too low. How did the UAC/NIC deal with these concerns?
Question 5:	Is the latest figure (52,000 bbls/day) a firm figure?
Question 6:	The first couple of Incident Action Plans (IAPs) refer to a max. production rate from the well of 162,000 bbls/day. It appears in several IAPs that trajectory analysis was conducted using a flow rate of 162,000 bbls/day and a “Worst Case Discharge” was predicted using that figure with a 2 day flow. However, the initial 4 SITREPS cited an estimated discharge rate of 1,000 bbls/day until SITREP 10 at which time the estimated flow rate was put at 5,500 bbls/day. How do you reconcile the 2 significantly different numbers? Who provided the 162,000 bbl/day figure and who provided the 1,000 and 5,500 bbls/day figures? Who conducted the trajectory analysis for 162,000 bbl/day for 2 days? What was the source of the 1,000 bbl/day and 5,500 bbl/day flow rates?
Question 7:	There has been a lot of discussion about quantification of the spill rate and its impact on the response. From your standpoint, do you think uncertainty had an impact on the actual response? Do you think the accuracy had an impact in terms of public perception?
Question 8:	How did you derive the quantification numbers-where did the flow rates come from? Were they provided by BP?
Question 9:	What was your thinking in relation to releasing the quantification value to the public? If the USCG was preparing for a worst-case discharge, why was that information not shared with the public?
Question 10:	This being a spill where resources were pulled in domestic and internationally – did the unknown flow rate change the ramp up?

Focus Area: Application of Lessons Learned from Prior Spill Responses and Exercise Programs (e.g., NPREP and SONS)	
Question 1:	SONS response has been exercised several times in the past. What, if any, lessons learned were repeated during the DH response?
Question 2:	Several large spill events have resulted in AA reports, starting with the Exxon Valdez spill. Have these reports been shared institutionally w/in the Coast Guard community of spill responders?
Question 3:	What institutional changes have been made as a result of prior spill event reviews that were not followed during the DH response (e.g. providing quantity released to media)?
Question 4:	What institutional processes are in place or should be in place to ensure that CG response community reads and complies with findings and recommendations from AA reports from previous spill events?
Question 5:	Do you have any recommendations on how you better implement lessons learned?

Question 6:	Are your exercise lessons learned shared with your AC? Do AC's follow-up on lessons learned/improvement actions?
Question 7:	At any time during this response did anyone ever brief you about any mistakes that had been made during other oil spills in this region or anywhere in world? (Parker) <u>Note</u> : If this person didn't have the knowledge of lessons learned during other exercises or events was there anyone else that recognized that and informed them, a backup system if you will.
Question 8:	Have you ever been involved in a large oil spill exercise? If so, what has been your role in that or those exercises? Do you recall if there was a debrief where you discussed what could be done better next time? (Parker) <u>Note</u> : Asking about the experience of the individual and if they recognize the lessons learned portion of an exercise.
Question 9:	Have you ever been involved in a large oil spill before? If so, once the response was completed was there any kind of formal or informal discussion about what could have been done differently for a better outcome? (Parker) <u>Note</u> : Again, asking about their real experience. What knowledge did they have to call upon?
Question 10:	Describe how the SONS 2002 lessons learned and other exercises were integrated into the area planning process?
Question 11:	How did lessons learned from earlier exercises influence response?

Focus Area: Cascading of Response Resources

Question 1:	Were there adequate resources, both equipment and personnel, available in the initial phases of the response? Where did these resources come from?
Question 2:	Early in the response how were resource needs identified?
Question 3:	Once identified as a need, describe the process by which these resources were approved, sourced, requisitioned, acquired, received and assigned to duty?
Question 4:	What problems did you encounter early in the response with resource identification and acquisition?
Question 5:	As resources were requisitioned to the GoM, was any consideration given to the issue of leaving other operational areas short of needed response equipment?
Question 6:	From first identification of need to actual deployment, in general how long did it take to have the needed resources on scene? Could this process have been improved and lag time reduced?
Question 7:	Describe the resource need identification for the command posts (both facilities and personnel). Did the process adequately address the immediate and long term need? Were there adequate pools of trained personnel to fill the ICS roles at UAC and UIC?
Question 8:	Describe the training procedures and safety briefings for incoming responders? Were they adequate?
Question 9:	Describe the transition process used as people rotated off and new arrived on scene. Was it effective? How can it be improved?
Question 10:	What barriers were encountered that hindered the quick cascading of personnel and equipment resources? How were they overcome?
Question 11:	Did the ACP adequately address the need to cascade resources from other areas? If so, how far was it anticipated that cascaded resources would have to come from?
Question 12:	How did you determine the effectiveness of response equipment to optimize its use? (Moore)
Question 13:	How much and what types of boom were used near the Macondo well to contain oil? (Moore)
Question 14:	When were contracted OSROs notified of the Deepwater Horizon spill? When did the first oil spill response vessel arrive at the Deepwater Horizon site? (Moore)
Question 15:	What was the EDRC of all vessels at the Deepwater Horizon site one day after the rig went down? One week after the rig went down? One month after the rig went down? (Moore)

Question 16:	What measures did you take throughout the response to increase surface capture of oil at the spill site? (Moore)
Question 17:	Were state laws or other factors an impediment to receiving resources? If they were, could you explain what those impediments were? What needs to be changed to remove those obstacles? (Moore)
Question 18:	Discuss cascading of resources

Focus Area: Common Operating Picture

Question 1:	How did communication flow during the incident?
Question 2:	What technology, if any, did you use to maintain and distribute a Common Operating Picture for all participants?
Question 3:	Did information requests drive response priorities and overburden the incident organization?
Question 4:	How long did it take for information? Accurate information?
Question 5:	How do you create a user-defined operating picture that can be used by the agency?
Question 6:	Prior to ERMA, what was being used for the Common Operating Picture?
Question 7:	What organization produced the COP used by you and most responders? How effective was it?
Question 8:	When the UAC was established, did you have the same COP?
Question 9:	Discuss the evolution of developing your COP and coordinating it with other COPs? Was universally shared/used among responders? How effective was the COP you used, and how is it today?
Question 10:	What organization produced the COP used by you and most responders? How effective was it?
Question 11:	How well did the electronic planning process work for you and integrate in with Environmental Resource Management Application (ERMA) and the COP?
Question 12:	How often was the COP changing? When did it become the UAC COP?
Question 13:	Where was COP emanating from?
Question 14:	How long did it take for you to get the same COP?

Focus Area: Integration of Regional and Area Contingency Plans for a Regional Oil Spill Response

Question 1:	What purpose does a Regional Contingency Plan serve that an Area Contingency Plan does not?
Question 2:	Did you use the One Gulf Plan for any aspect of this response?
Question 3:	With an understanding that there is a One Gulf Plan, BP Regional Plan, parish emergency plans, separate Area Plans – how were they used and integrated for use and response?

Focus Area: Influence of Senior Agency Leadership

Question 1:	Did Senior Leadership help or hinder the initial stages of the response?
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Question 2:	Do you believe pressure from senior officials impeded the decision making process? If so, could you give us an example?
Question 3:	Please describe the Parish Liaison Officer Program and the role of DHS in that program.

Focus Area: Role of the Secretary of DHS under HSPD-5

Question 1:	Did HSPD-5 intersect with the NCP during this response?
Question 2:	Should HSPD-5 supersede NCP during a SONS?
Question 3:	What is the role of the PFO during a SONS?
Question 4:	What was the involvement of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of DHS in your response organization?

Focus Area: Role of the National Incident Commander (NIC)

Question 1:	Was the NIC an effective organization during this incident? Why or why not?
Question 2:	Did you find the NIC organization helpful to the UAC?
Question 3:	Discuss the process of how the SONS Declaration and appointment of a NIC came about, and its impact on the UAC. How did that impact the battle rhythm established at that time?

Focus Area: Integration of the National Response Framework (NRF) Organizational Structure

Question 1:	Should there have been an ICP in each state? Did not establishing ICP in state of Mississippi hinder the spill response or heighten political demands in the state of Mississippi?
Question 2:	Was state/local EM structure in anyway integrated into the organizational structure?
Question 3:	At the onset of the discharge, how did you look to set up the Response? What type of response structure did you think was appropriate? (Note: What type of organization structure was in this person's mind?) (Parker)
Question 4:	Had you been a part of a large oil spill in the past? If so, how was that response structure organized? Did you have that in mind when you were thinking about how best to organize this response? (Parker)
Question 5:	Do you think the structures that were used during this response were appropriate? If you could make something more effective, what would you do? (Parker)
Question 6:	How can the NCP be rationalized with the NRF to incorporate state to state resource assistance such as through EMAC.
Question 7:	We heard how the states feel more comfortable working in the Stafford Act system. Have you thought how this response would have gone if they had used the NRF?

Focus Area: Role of the National Response Team (NRT) and Regional Response Teams (RRTs)

Question 1:	How involved were the regular NRT members involved in the response?
Question 2:	What should the role of the NRT be during the preparedness phase (before incident) and during response phase (during incident) be? Should the NRT's role during a response parallel with its role during the preparedness phase?

Question 3:	Did the NRT support the NIC?
Question 4:	Did the UAC have any direct interaction with the NRT?
Question 5:	What was the intention behind the establishing of the IASG?
Question 6:	What was the level of participation on the IASG?
Question 7:	Should there have been an "Incident specific NRT"? Or did the IASG play that role?
Question 8:	Was the IASG and effective body during the incident? Why or why not?
Question 9:	Did you interact with the RRT during the initial stages of this response?
Question 10:	What were your expectations regarding the RRT during the initial stages of the response?
Question 11:	Describe the interaction with the RRT and UAC's interaction with the NRT with respect to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Dispersants b. In situ burning c. Permitting d. Alternative technologies

Focus Area: Use of the Vessel of Opportunity (VOO) Program

Question 1:	Was there a pre-established VOO program in place? Are the procedures for the VOO Program listed in the Area Contingency Plan or BP OSRP? (Moore)
Question 2:	When was the VOO Program activated? (Moore)
Question 3:	How were local vessel operators notified of the VOO Program? What was the plan/process in place to hire VOOs? (Moore)
Question 4:	What types of training was provided to vessel operators, who conducted it, and how was completion tracked? (Moore)
Question 5:	Did you monitor the effectiveness of vessels to optimize their use? (Moore)
Question 6:	What was the plan/process in place to hire VOOs? (Moore)
Question 7:	What incentives were there to join the program?
Question 8:	Were there criteria for individuals to join the program? Did you find that that criteria was appropriate? How was the criteria developed?
Question 9:	Were there enough VOO available or were there too many?
Question 10:	Please describe if any Vessels of Opportunity programs, comprised of contracts for trained crews and equipment, were in place prior to the spill to protect ESAs? Were VOO deployed to do near shore protection? Do you have MOUs in place to engage the shrimp boats as VOO?

Focus Area: Identification, Tracking and Deployment of Qualified Personnel and Equipment

Question 1:	What process did you use for identifying qualified personnel and equipment prior to the response? Also, Please explain the process through which response equipment was initially ordered. (Moore)
Question 2:	Please explain the process through which response equipment was deployed to specific sites. (Moore)

Question 3:	Please explain how response equipment was tracked on a daily basis. (Moore)
Question 4:	What were the training requirements for personnel working on response vessels? (Moore)
Question 5:	Was the RII Useful?
Question 6:	How were international resources identified, ordered and tracked during the incident?
Question 7:	Were there problems moving those international resources to the desired locations?
Question 8:	How were qualified USCG personnel identified, ordered and tracked during DWH?
Question 9:	What types of equipment were in most limited supply and what in the way of trained personnel were scarcest?
Question 10:	Please describe to us what systems were in place to get the equipment and trained personnel to the scene/Forward Operating Bases that you needed. (Parker)
Question 11:	Over time did your thinking change about what equipment and resources were needed? When did that happen? What did you do to make any changes? (Parker)
Question 12:	Were you ever satisfied with the amount of equipment and response personnel that you had in place? If yes, can you describe why you thought you had enough resources or too many resource? If no, please tell us what additional steps you took to address this. (Parker)
Question 13:	How would you improve your ability to incorporate resources from state agencies and industry (i.e., Maine), such as people or equipment, if they have specialized knowledge and can support the USCG or other Federal agency in a response?