

Hanzalik BP Played on 1-28-2015

Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014

BP Designations 00:09:34

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9:10 - 9:12	Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:03) 9:10 Q. How long did you work for the 9:11 U.S. Coast Guard? 9:12 A. 25 years.	V127A.1
10:4 - 10:6	Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:05) 10:4 Q. Can you briefly summarize the 10:5 positions you've held over your 25 years with 10:6 the Coast Guard?	V127A.2
10:10 - 10:14	Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:19) 10:10 I was in marine safety from 1990, 10:11 roughly, until -- until I retired, and that 10:12 included pollution response, regulatory 10:13 enforcement, search and rescue, water waste 10:14 management, among others.	V127A.3
12:19 - 13:3	Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:18) 12:19 Q. So, all total, throughout your 12:20 career, about how many years of experience do 12:21 you have in emergency response in incident 12:22 management? 12:23 A. I would say 20 -- 24. 12:24 Q. Over that 24-year time period -- 12:25 A. Uh-huh. 13:1 Q. -- about how many oil spills 13:2 have you responded to? 13:3 A. I would say over a thousand.	V127A.4
14:19 - 14:21	Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:04) 14:19 Q. Approximately about 14:20 April 22nd you were up at Robert working for 14:21 the area command?	V127A.5
14:23 - 14:24	Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:03) 14:23 A. Right, working for -- working 14:24 for Admiral Landry.	V127A.6
15:19 - 15:24	Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:11) 15:19 Q. In your position as deputy for 15:20 pollution response and assisting 15:21 Admiral Landry, did you help oversee the 15:22 setup of the overall Unified Command 15:23 organization? 15:24 A. Yes.	V127A.10
29:6 - 29:9	Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:10)	V127A.7

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29:11 - 29:12	<p>29:6 Q. While you served at the Unified 29:7 Area Command at -- at the Incident Command 29:8 Post in Houma and as FOSC, did you regularly 29:9 interact with BP representatives? Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:03)</p>	V127A.8
29:1 - 29:5	<p>29:11 A. I -- I worked with BP 29:12 representatives every day. Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:07) 29:1 Q. Was it your experience that the 29:2 Coast Guard and BP worked with a unity of 29:3 effort in responding to the Deepwater Horizon 29:4 spill? 29:5 A. Yes.</p>	V127A.9
53:25 - 54:8	<p>Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:25) 53:25 Q. What are some of the activities 54:1 during the response that you think BP did 54:2 well? 54:3 A. I believe the mechanical 54:4 recovery went really well, I believe 54:5 shoreline cleanup went really well, 54:6 dispersant operations went well, and in situ 54:7 burning went well and command in general of 54:8 the situation went really well.</p>	V127A.11
42:17 - 43:5	<p>Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:38) 42:17 Q. Do you think that in situ 42:18 burning was a huge success during the 42:19 response? 42:20 A. Yes. 42:21 Q. Why do you think so? 42:22 A. Well, before Deepwater Horizon, 42:23 there had only been really one in situ burn 42:24 offshore and that was during Exxon Valdez. I 42:25 think we did 311 burns or 411 burns. Some of 43:1 them lasted a couple of days offshore. It 43:2 just never happened before. There hasn't 43:3 been an in situ burn operation as large as 43:4 that ever anywhere in the world. Pretty much 43:5 speaks for itself.</p>	V127A.12
43:20 - 44:9	<p>Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:48) 43:20 Q. What was BP's contribution to</p>	V127A.13

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43:21 the in situ burning operations?
 43:22 A. They pretty much procured all
 43:23 the equipment, all the personnel, all the
 43:24 boats to go offshore and burn. Experts,
 43:25 whatever they needed to oversee the
 44:1 operation. Coordinated with the Coast Guard
 44:2 to make sure that they had wildlife people on
 44:3 board to -- to monitor and make sure there
 44:4 was no wildlife that may have been affected.
 44:5 They had strike team -- Coast Guard strike
 44:6 team people out there to do air monitoring.
 44:7 EPA did air monitoring for it, also. So it
 44:8 was a huge operation. Operation within an
 44:9 operation, I guess you could say.

46:23 - 47:6

Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:14)

V127A.14

46:23 Q. Was the use of dispersants, in
 46:24 your view, effective in preventing a
 46:25 substantial amount of oil from reaching the
 47:1 shoreline?

47:2 A. Yes.

47:3 Q. Did BP contribute to the Unified
 47:4 Command's efforts to use dispersants to
 47:5 respond to the spill?

47:6 A. Yes.

47:7 - 47:19

Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:38)

V127A.15

47:7 Q. How did BP assist the Unified
 47:8 Command in its efforts to use dispersants
 47:9 during the response?

47:10 A. Again, they procured all the
 47:11 people, all the planes that actually sprayed
 47:12 dispersants, all the experts that monitored
 47:13 the dispersant operations. That's just for
 47:14 the aerial part of it.

47:15 And then for subsea, which was
 47:16 unprecedented operation, they procured all
 47:17 the dispersant, the boats, the monitoring,
 47:18 the equipment to actually inject the
 47:19 dispersants, they did all of that.

47:20 - 47:24

Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:08)

V127A.16

47:20 Q. All the personnel and other

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41:22 - 41:25	<p>47:21 resources that you've mentioned were critical 47:22 to the success of the dispersant operations 47:23 during the response, right? 47:24 A. Yes.</p> <p>Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:14)</p> <p>41:22 Q. Was there any type of resource 41:23 that you felt was needed for the response 41:24 that BP refused to provide? 41:25 A. I can't think of any.</p>	V127A.17
242:8 - 242:21	<p>Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:40)</p> <p>242:8 Q. Did you also discuss needing to 242:9 get BP to pay for these resources and people? 242:10 A. I didn't really have to discuss 242:11 that with them. They did it. I didn't 242:12 have -- I didn't even talk money with them. 242:13 There was a -- there was a instance where the 242:14 last Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund was going 242:15 to run out of money and the Coast Guard 242:16 couldn't meet its obligations under that and 242:17 BP was willing to actually pony up money to 242:18 cover Coast Guard costs. 242:19 Q. Money was never an issue for BP 242:20 when it came to the response? 242:21 A. In my opinion, no, it wasn't.</p>	V127A.18
197:6 - 197:8	<p>Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:05)</p> <p>197:6 Q. (BY MS. JAKOLA) In 2010, the 197:7 State of Louisiana ordered diversions of the 197:8 Mississippi River, correct?</p>	V127A.24
197:10 - 197:10	<p>Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:02)</p> <p>197:10 A. My understanding, yes.</p>	V127A.25
197:17 - 197:19	<p>Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:05)</p> <p>197:17 Q. The FOSC did not approve the 197:18 Mississippi River diversions, true? 197:19 A. That is correct.</p>	V127A.26
200:9 - 201:4	<p>Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:47)</p> <p>200:9 the 200:10 governor of the State of Louisiana requested 200:11 that the diversions that had taken place be 200:12 considered an official response activity, 200:13 correct?</p>	V127A.27

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	200:14 A. That's correct.	
	200:15 Q. Do you have an understanding as	
	200:16 to why the Louisiana governor made that	
	200:17 request?	
	200:18 A. Yes, because there was going to	
	200:19 be environmental damage to oyster beds	
	200:20 because of the freshwater infusion into	
	200:21 Barataria Bay, a couple of bays, I don't	
	200:22 remember exactly, a couple of bays that that	
	200:23 water was flowing into, but we knew that that	
	200:24 was going to be a problem. I talked to	
	200:25 Dwight Bradshaw about it. He's another	
	201:1 person that knew about this, too.	
	201:2 And he goes, it's not going to	
	201:3 do any good. I don't know why he's doing it	
	201:4 and why he didn't ask us. So...	
201:5 - 201:21	Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:38)	V127A.28
	201:5 Q. Can you tell me a bit more about	
	201:6 your conversation with Mr. Bradshaw?	
	201:7 A. Well, he came to me and said	
	201:8 that the State is going to be diverting water	
	201:9 from the Mississippi River to these --	
	201:10 through these diversions to increase the flow	
	201:11 of water into these areas to keep oil from	
	201:12 coming into these bay areas.	
	201:13 And I just shook my head and	
	201:14 said, what the hell is that going to do?	
	201:15 And he said, it's not going to	
	201:16 do anything; probably kill some oysters.	
	201:17 That's pretty much it.	
	201:18 Q. Mr. Brad- -- Mr. Bradshaw is	
	201:19 with the Louisiana Department of	
	201:20 Environmental Quality?	
	201:21 A. Yes.	
201:22 - 201:24	Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:09)	V127A.29
	201:22 Q. Mr. Bradshaw acknowledged to you	
	201:23 that the diversions of the Mississippi River	
	201:24 were not an effective response tool, correct?	
202:1 - 202:4	Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:08)	V127A.30
	202:1 A. Correct.	

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202:6 - 202:8	<p>202:2 Q. (BY MS. JAKOLA) He acknowledged 202:3 that the Mississippi River diversions would 202:4 kill oysters?</p> <p>Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:07)</p>	V127A.31
202:25 - 203:4	<p>202:6 A. My -- yeah, it's my 202:7 understanding that -- if freshwater got into 202:8 those areas, that it would damage oysters.</p> <p>Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:08)</p>	V127A.32
262:16 - 263:18	<p>202:25 Q. And, again, the Mississippi 203:1 River diversions were never approved by the 203:2 Unified Command, correct?</p> <p>203:3 A. My -- that is my understanding, 203:4 yes.</p> <p>Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:01:17)</p> <p>262:16 Q. (BY MS. JAKOLA) Can you 262:17 describe some of those new technologies that 262:18 BP helped initiate for the response? 262:19 A. Well, I mean, just the capping 262:20 stack technology that -- that happened during 262:21 the response, that was something that I don't 262:22 believe has ever been done before. The use 262:23 of Dutch skimmers in the U.S., those were 262:24 brought over. Claims, just the number of 262:25 claims that BP re- -- they didn't really have 263:1 to do that. I mean, they -- they could have 263:2 responded to it. They could have just said 263:3 no. But the government handled the claims 263:4 and paid all those claims out to all these 263:5 people, whether they had documentation or 263:6 not. They didn't really have to do that. 263:7 So -- and that -- we didn't require them to 263:8 do that. 263:9 There is just -- I don't know. 263:10 There were just so many things that if you 263:11 would have had a small company, you would 263:12 have never seen anything like it. I mean, it 263:13 would have been -- they would have dried up 263:14 and left, so... 263:15 Q. In addition to the examples 263:16 you've mentioned, BP also developed new</p>	V127A.19

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263:20 - 264:7	<p>263:17 techniques for cleaning up the shoreline, 263:18 correct?</p> <p>Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:33)</p> <p>263:20 A. Yes, that's correct.</p> <p>263:21 Beach-cleaning machines and other things, 263:22 they did that. And then they also set up a 263:23 program with the Coast Guard and NOAA to look 263:24 at different technologies that were out there 263:25 and test those during the spill to see if 264:1 they would actually work. And then over -- I 264:2 think there was 120 suggestions that came 264:3 in -- 120,000 suggestions that came in and 264:4 culled through all of those and basically 264:5 whittled them down to a certain number to -- 264:6 to be used, and they didn't have to do any of 264:7 that.</p>	V127A.20
264:13 - 264:15	<p>Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:07)</p> <p>264:13 Q. Had anything of that sort ever 264:14 been undertaken before, in your experience, 264:15 in responding to spills?</p>	V127A.21
264:17 - 264:18	<p>Hanzalik, James 06-17-2014 (00:00:07)</p> <p>264:17 A. In my experience, no. Ever, 264:18 never, and then in history that I'd seen.</p>	V127A.22

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