

Interview Summary Form			
Interview Details			
Interviewee Name:	RADM Zukunft	Date:	8/26/10
Interviewee Title:	FOSC	Time:	9:00am
Interviewer Name(s):	Team	Job Location:	Robert, LA
		Location:	New Orleans, LA

Initial Question: What was your job role and how did it evolve (if at all) during the DEEPWATER HORIZON incident?

Question 1: Who was the FOSC at each stage of the response?

Question 2: Information was requested on the FOSC's

Question 3: Interviewee Name: RADM Zukunft Date: 8/26/10 Time: 9:00am

Question 4: Interviewee Title: FOSC Interviewee Job Location: Robert, LA

Question 5: Has the UAC had any involvement with the prioritization or protection of ESA's? What is that level of involvement? Boom removal?

Question 6: Role of the National Incident Commander (NIC) (Jim)

Question 7: Please describe the Political Demands (John C.) How can that be im

Question 8: Long Term Sustainability (John T.) 1. Was the 2. In your op

Question 9: Long Term Sustainability (David) a. What does this plan include? b. Please describe the top issues you are dealing with in the transition plan, such as demobilizing ESA's, Parishes, and NSDA.

Final Question 1: What were the top 2 "best practices" during the incident from your perspective?

Final Question 2: What do you assess to be the top 2 "areas needing improvement" or "downright failures" from your perspective, and do you have any related recommendations regarding these areas?

Per the pie chart, skimming shows 3%, but in some days we were skimming in excess of 60%, but the numbers in the chart default to the national average. We can prove that we made effective decisions else we would have had more oil onshore. Big challenge is that much of the response to a spill and what you can do to respond to it is weather and sea dependant. We had 16 days where burning and skimming couldn't be done because of weather, but subsurface dispersants could have been used (see other issues re: dispersant approval).

Given the fact that State will not sign anything, and Parishes are doing their own thing, what do you anticipate in relation to demob for the State of Louisiana?

- We do have a designated SOSC, Garrett Graves, he resides in Baton Rouge not the UAC.
- RADM Z will meet with him this week to try to determine an approach to move forward.
- We had to put a 7 day moratorium on moving any equipment out of a parish, this ended on 20 Aug., and so we can now start to move equipment out of the parishes.
- We need to reach agreement with each of the 11 parishes on the transition plan. We cannot work through state to get parish agreement - as it should have been set up.

To what extent, if any, did the unknown flow rate impact the scale of the response? If CG was operating under a worst case scenario discharge, why was that info not made public? Is there something that could have been done earlier in the process to consider so you had some specificity of wells or something that can be done so you have the info earlier on about the wells that exist?

- Despite what the flow rate was, we went to MMS (now BOEM) to see what their flow rate was: it was 166,000 barrels a day for complete well failures. What that showed us was that in the NCP process, and the fact that it was sitting over

We established the flow rate technology group early on, and tried to make an educated estimate. We did not want to be cavalier about releasing a number, because it impacts the RFP. (Response approach was always for a worst case discharge. RADM Z saw his job in that he had to prepare for the worst, but provide info on what was known at the time.

Was CG involved in permitting of this activity? Would it help?

- It would have helped to be involved in the permitting of the rig, at least to see the contingency plans of the vessel, if not the platform. Then we would know more about worst case discharge.