

Interview Summary Form

Interview Details

Interviewee Name: **RADM Zukunif** Date: **8/26/10** Time: **9:00am**
 Interviewee Title: **FOSC** Interviewee Job Location: **Robert, LA**
 Interviewer Name(s): **Team** Location: **New Orleans, LA**

Interview Questions

Initial Question: What was your job role and how did it evolve (if at all) during the DEEPWATER HORIZON incident?

Question 1: Who was the FOSC at each stage of the response?
 1. How were you appointed as the FOSC?
 2. When you arrived as the FOSC did you discover things were different from what you had been told?

Question 2: How was your in-briefing handled?
 3. How was your in-briefing handled?
 4. What did you find that was different or needed to be changed?

Question 3: What were the top 2 "best practice(s)" during this incident, from your perspective?

Question 4: What do you assess to be the top 2 "areas needing improvement" or "downright failures" from your perspective, and do you have any related recommendations regarding these areas?

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What were the top 2 "best practice(s)" during this incident, from your perspective?

- RP was committed (currently have spent \$6.7B) and is living up to its responsibility.
- Recognized as FOSC that he signs off on plans and was able to make informed decisions leveraging the expertise they had.

In relation to the SONS exercise and involvement of some senior USCG officials – would more involvement have added more value to the response from the onset? Do you have any LL from the first use of HSPD-5?

- Experience from SONS helped them to step up. We had some representatives from the SONS exercise that have been immersed in this response within the NID staff.
- That is where the CG has really inserted itself and is providing a conduit to other senior leadership.
- SONS 2010 did have an international component, and having gone through that exercise and knowing the SONS protocols, the department came up to speed very quickly.
- We Co-Chair NRT with EPA, even though SONS not declared or HSPD-5 overlay, through the SONS exercise, we were familiar with the NRT process and their representation of the whole of government.

Qualified personnel: did you get the people you identified and needed?

- The UAC was good, we never had to argue the "who is in charge" issue.
- USCG has an internal database – MRTT (mission readiness training tool). It is not an integrated database to find qualified individuals and experts. We were impressed with the talent that did get here and develop a network of quality personnel.
- State and RRT processes allowed for those agencies that had worked a spill to get engaged and empowered in the decision making process.

Jones Act – there was some misperception on how it applied. Were any resources turned away because of the Jones Act?

...because of the Jones Act. ...and was able to engage those ... There is a provision to be able to bring ... flags.

...from your perspective? ...to its responsibility; ...to make informed decisions leveraging ... state industry, government, etc – good

...model and ... ("areas") from ... that they were ... in deepwater

- It was late in the spill when QWEST came up with some response vessels that could take out huge swaths of oil, just before the cap was applied.
- Oil industry to provide more resources and leverage their RP status to identify internal solutions and bring them to bear quicker.
- Implementing new technologies while in the marathon is very difficult.
- Need to reinvigorate the alternative technology group (funding, etc) to see what else can work – get rid of the complacency.