

From: Shaw, Neil
Sent: Thu Jun 04 11:44:41 2009
To: Lacy, Kevin
Subject: RE: Transocean Marianas Travelling Block / Crown Collision HIPO Investigation Report
Importance: Normal

Kevin

Thanks - I would like to have a meeting when I get back to review the report in detail as there are clearly some important lessons arising from this. Can you set something up and invite the wider LT aswell.

Neil

From: Lacy, Kevin
Sent: Tuesday, June 02, 2009 7:36 AM
To: Shaw, Neil
Subject: FW: Transocean Marianas Travelling Block / Crown Collision HIPO Investigation Report

FYI on the Marianas incident - we review repair schedules today and will update you.

There are several disappointing things in this investigation as regards to TO daily operations and BP audit follow up. This is a good example why I want to use our time and resources to assure effectiveness of their own systems instead of creating BP guides and layers they have to apply. It really breaks down in establishing accountability and on the lack of follow up.

TO is still very far from consistency between rigs and always has been - this was the gist of the effort I tried to get launched in 2008 that I could not get segment support for from Barbara or Haden. I hope this gets the required refocus. We can work independently with TO on this. We are on track to have the most rigs so we have the most vested interest to get it right.

Kevin

From: Frazelle, Andrew E
Sent: Tuesday, June 02, 2009 4:24 AM
To: Morrison, Richard; Waligura, Starlee S; Lacy, Kevin; Tink, Steve
Subject: Transocean Marianas Travelling Block / Crown Collision HIPO Investigation Report

The following note went out to the Global Wells Director / Wells Manager distribution for sharing learnings worldwide. This is the report that we will be discussing in the meeting this afternoon in case you want to read it in advance.


Andy

From: Frazelle, Andrew E
Sent: Monday, June 01, 2009 6:20 PM
To: G Global SPU WD/WM
Cc: Gray, George E
Subject: Transocean Marianas Travelling Block / Crown Collision HIPO Investigation Report

Attached is the preliminary Transocean Level I Investigation Report for the recent HIPO on the Transocean Marianas. Please share this report with your Team Leaders to insure similar incidents are prevented.

The root causes are listed as Lack of Management Control and Inadequate Engineering Design. Some of the key issues that were discussed in the review meeting that should be checked for in your operations are:

- Determine whether your Drilling Contractor has a standard for operating Crown / Floor Savers. Transocean does not currently have a corporate standard for the operation of this type of safety critical equipment or the requirement for a redundant / independent system that doesn't rely on the primary sensors or logic.
- Risks were being held at low levels on the rig and there was common knowledge (below the OIM level) that you had to be pulling at a high rate of speed to trip and test the system. The crews were testing it in a manner as to make it "pass" versus fully understanding what constituted a failure of the system.



- There is a cultural / behavioral issue with risk tolerance that allowed work arounds to get past equipment failures or poor engineering
- Crews on newer generation rigs do not understand their responsibility while pulling pipe in manual versus fully automatic mode. Experienced Roughnecks are responsible for "counting" tool joints and if the Driller pulled past three tool joints then warnings were shouted. On automated rigs, the responsibility of the Roughneck is to stay out of the way until there is something different or broken, i.e. the need for Management of Change.
- Full utilization and closeout of BP Rig Audits. The requirement for a redundant system was identified as a deficiency in an October 2007 audit and was never closed out. Transocean interpreted this to be a redundant encoder and an independent system was never sourced.

Additional information will be discussed in the upcoming WD/WM teleconference and forwarded when the final one pager is distributed.

If there are any questions or comments, please contact either myself or George Gray.

Andy Frazelle

Wells Ops Manager - Producing Assets GoM

<< File: MAR - KELVIN TOP SET Level 1 Investigation Final Draft 13-.pdf >>