



Interviewing Form

Interviewee Name:	Jimmy Wayne Harrell
Job Title:	OIM
Company:	Transocean
Contact Details:	Park 10
Work Address:	Park 10
Work Telephone:	
Work Cell:	
Home Address:	
Home Telephone:	
Home Cell:	
Interviewers Present:	Bob Scott
Date:	May 20, 2010
Start Time:	10:00 a.m.
Stop Time:	10:00 a.m.
Was documentation taken to the interview? Y/N	
Were photographs, drawings or other supporting materials taken? Y/N	Yes, Drawings G.A. of the Rig.
Are documents attached to this form? Y/N	No
Details of documents, drawing, photographs or other supporting materials taken to	GA drawings

interview.	
Interview Plan Probable lines of enquiry, key questions etc:	

Meeting with Jimmy Harrell

On the evening of the incident had been in a meeting with the BP and Transocean shore management visiting group from about 19:00. The discussions centered around safety and the rig operation in general. Some of the group had also gone to the bridge where they had been shown and operated the DP simulator.

This meeting lasted until about 21:15-30. Then went to the OIM office to approve a number of permits and to discuss a safety issue regarding the carrying of tools with the deck supervisor.

At about 21:40 checked in with the night pusher Randy Ezell, to see if everything was okay on the rig floor operation. He advised me the negative test had been good after being held static for 30 minutes, and they were now shut down circulating to take a sheen test. If that was okay, they would then continue with the T&A as planned .

Then went to my cabin and entered the shower at about 21:45. A few moments later a tremendous explosion ripped through my cabin and the adjacent cabins. The only structure left standing around my cabin was the shower cubicle which was attached to the next door cabin cubicle.

Jumped into my shorts and made my way to the Bridge. Could not pass down the corridor running alongside the mess room as that was blocked with debris, so was forced to walk through the area where the 2 and 4 man cabins had been and then through the corridor to the forward outside space and then entered the central control room via the outside stairs.

As I entered the Central Control Room Chris the sub sea Supervisor was at the BOP panel and confirmed that the diverter and a BOP Annular had activated, but the EDS was unable to function as the panel went inactive about that time.

Not sure of the exact time but I then moved down to the forward lifeboat deck and gathered up a pair of coveralls and beach shoes on the way down to help organize the evacuation of the rig. The Captain, Driller, and other members of the rig management team were attempting to organize the roll call and the boarding of the life boats in order to ensure every one could be taken off the rig in a safe manner.

It was very chaotic at this time with many people highly stressed and attempting to jump over the side into the sea when they saw that the lifeboats were not going to be launched immediately until everyone was accounted for. Buddy Trahhan was probably the last injured person who was taken into the lifeboat and had to sit upright inside the boat.

After we were convinced that all the injured personnel and everyone that was mustered and had made it through the explosion, and I had checked the lifeboat davits and falls for any signs of damage, we then launched the life boats. During this time my vision was bad due to being hit with the dust and fragmented insulation from the explosion.

The lifeboats then moved over to the Bankston which was nearby and we boarded the boat and attended to the injured. There was also a roll call to double check on the personnel names onboard. Some of the senior rig management had evacuated by a davit launched life boat and they along with personnel who had jumped into the sea were checked against the muster list at that time.

At this time my eyes were treated and I began to see more clearly. I had also picked up a screw in my foot some where along the way when evacuating the accommodation.

On recollection some of the things I saw or witnessed.

The emergency radios in the charging cradles in the Central Control Room did not appear to be working on any channel.

No emergency lights were working.

Can not recollect hearing any alarms being sounded.

Talking to the Tool pusher Randy Ezell, on the workboat. At about 21:45 >< he had been advised by Steve Curtis the Assistant Driller that there was a, "Well Control Situation", on the rig floor. Randy had then started for the rig floor but at that time was thrown against the outer bulkhead next to the port hole of his office by the first explosion.

Did have some concerns about the T&A procedure until a conclusive negative test had taken place, as this type of T&A had not been carried out by this rig previously. This was because the well just completed was a, 'Keeper'" and the rig had been drilling exploration wells previously.

There was a meeting by the rig and BP supervisors at 11:am the day of the incident to discuss operations. There appeared to be some ongoing discussion between the onboard BP representatives and the BP shore based engineering about certain aspects of the T&A plan. This was also a meeting to prepare for the BP and Transocean visitors that would come to the rig that afternoon.

During the time from when the visitors had arrived on the rig and cleared their safety briefing, my time had been taken up with accompanying the visitors and answering their queries etc.

When the casing from the tail pipe to the BOP and the C&K lines had been displaced with sea water. The annular was closed, however at this time mud began to leak from the riser in the well bore and up the C&K lines. This then required the pressure on the lower annulus to be

increased from 1200 to 1900 psi, after which the leak stopped. The leaked mud was circulated out before the negative test could take place.

The rig Maintenance supervisor had tried to go to the emergency generator room to start the emergency engine which did not kick in when the main power failed, but turned back when an electrician advised him the mud pump room and adjacent area was a total disaster.

There had been no indication of anything out of the ordinary during the final minutes of the rig operation just prior to the explosion. If the rig floor had raised any concerns the toolpusher would have contacted me and I would have gone to the rig floor to investigate and help manage any situation that arose.

One of the mud pumps had been shut down prior to the incident to reset a pop off valve and this had required a lock out, by the electrician in order to perform this operation.