


PRELIMINARY & TENTATIVE
As of June 2, 2010

CHRONOLOGY OF DEEPWATER HORIZON INCIDENT

Key Persons:

- Shane Albers (BP Subsea Project Engineer)
- Jason Anderson (Transocean Toolpusher)
- Daniel Barron (Transocean Floorhand)
- Douglas Brown (Transocean Chief Mechanic)
- Micah "Brandon" Burgess (Transocean Driller)
- Stan Carden (Transocean Electrical Supervisor)
- Donald Clark (Transocean Assistant Driller)
- Truitt Crawford (Transocean Roustabout)
- Stephen Curtis (Transocean Assistant Driller)
- Paul C. ("Chad") Erickson (Tidewater Marine, LLC Mate onboard the *Bankston*)
- Miles Randy ("Randy") Ezell (Transocean Senior Toolpusher)
- Andrea Fleylas (Transocean Dynamic Position Operator II)
- Jimmy Harrell (Transocean Offshore Installation Manager "OIM")
- Mark Hay (Transocean Senior Subsea Supervisor)
- Caleb Holloway (Transocean Toolpusher)
- Matthew Hughes (Transocean Floorhand)
- Lance John (Weatherford Rig System Specialist)
- Cole Jones (Transocean Roustabout)
- Gordon Lewis Jones (MI-SWACO Mud Engineer)
- Robert "Bob" Kaluza (BP Well Site Leader/Company Man)
- Joseph Keith (Sperry Sun Mudlogger)
- Yancy Keplinger (Transocean Senior Dynamic Position Operator)
- Captain Curt Kuchta (Transocean Master)
- Lee Lambert (BP Well Site Trainee)
- Alwin Landry (Tidewater Marine, LLC Captain onboard the *Bankston*)
- Leo Lindner (MI Swaco Drilling Fluid Specialist)
- J. Brent Mansfield (Transocean First Assistant Marine Engineer)
- Larry McMahan (Transocean VP of Performance & Operations)
- Paul Meinhardt (Transocean Motor Operator)
- Patrick Morgan (Transocean Assistant Driller)
- Chad Murray (Transocean)
- Mark Nunley (Transocean Floorhand)

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- Pat O'Bryan (BP VP of Drilling Completion for the Gulf of Mexico)
- Jay Odenwald (Transocean Subsea Supervisor)
- Chris Pleasant (Transocean Subsea Supervisor)
- Carlos Ramos (Transocean Roustabout)
- Dewey Revette (Transocean Driller)
- Allen Seraile (Transocean Assistant Driller)
- David Sims (BP Executive)
- Steven Stone (Transocean Roustabout)
- Murray Sopobodo (BP Company Man)
- William ("Willy") Stoner (Transocean Motor Operator)
- Brad Tippetts (BP Subsea Engineer)
- Buddy Trahan (Transocean Division Manager)
- Don Vidrine (BP Company Man)
- Wyman Wheeler (Transocean Toolpusher)
- Michael ("Mike") Williams (Transocean Chief Electronics Technician "ET")
- James Wilson (Transocean Performance Logistics Coordinator)
- Daun Winslow (Transocean Division Manager)
- David Young (Transocean Chief Mate)

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
12/09/1998	Drilling Contract No. 980249 entered into between BP's and Transocean's predecessors. Contract is for a term of 3 years, commencing on 08/01/2001. The Materials & Equipment List attached to the Contract as Exhibit B-2 appears to call for a Cameron BOP.	12/09/1998 Drilling Contract
2000	MMS issues a Safety Alert and Notice to Lessees ("NTL") highly recommending the use of back up systems for BOP stacks.	Testimony of Mike Saucier, MMS Regional Supervisor for Field Operations, Gulf of Mexico Region (Tr. 19:15 – 19:19, May 12, 2010)
2000-2003	WEST Engineering issues a report on the capabilities of shear rams. The report indicated that there were some cases where shear rams were unable to cut through the drill pipe.	Testimony of Mike Saucier, MMS Regional Supervisor for Field Operations, Gulf of Mexico Region (Tr. 23:17 – 23:25, May 12, 2010)
2001	<i>Deepwater Horizon</i> was built. The Rig was a Reading & Bates Falcon RBS8D design semi-submersible drilling unit capable of operating in harsh environments and water depths of up to 8,000 feet (upgradeable to 10,000 feet) using an 8¾ inch 15,000 psi BOP and 21 inch OD marine riser.	Transocean website, <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> Specification 5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell

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March 2001	<p>RB Falcon Deepwater Horizon BOP Assurance Analysis. The Executive Summary states, among others, as follows:</p> <p>An Integrated Project Team was convened on January 8, 2001 to provide a high level of confidence that the BOP system on the Deepwater Horizon is a reliable and safe system. The following summarizes the work completed by the RB Falcon, BP, Cameron, TSF and WEST team:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The rig specific failures were reviewed and discussed in detail. The result of the review was that several recommendations for enhanced maintenance, equipment and procedures were developed. • The industry failures that relate to the equipment on the Deepwater Horizon BOP System were discussed in detail. The results of this review were that a few recommendations were suggested for improved maintenance, testing and equipment change out or modification. • A risk assessment focused on reliability was completed. Engineering and operations personnel from RB Falcon, BP, Cameron, TSF and WEST identified 260 failure modes that could require pulling of the BOP or LMRP. It was found that malfunctions of regulators, solenoids, hoses, ST Locks, connectors, shuttle valves and autoshear circuitry were the predominant failures. Additionally, several reliability-improving recommendations were proposed. The recommendations were a combination of design modifications, equipment replacement, improved PM and procedures. 	<p>RB Falcon Deepwater Horizon BOP Assurance Analysis, TRN-HCEC-00016647 - 16794</p>
End of 2002	<p>Transocean eliminated the Third Engineer position and one of the Motorman positions from the Engine Control Room.</p>	<p>Written Statement of Douglas Harold Brown before the House Judiciary Committee, May 27, 2010</p>

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2003	<p>Transocean eliminated the First Engineer position from the Engine Control Room.</p> <p>During 2003, the Engine Control Room was left with only the Chief Engineer, Second Engineer, and (one) Motorman positions.</p> <p>Brown stated that "[w]e were told that the reason for the elimination of these positions was that we were downsizing and there was no need for so many men in the Engineering Department."</p>	<p>Written Statement of Douglas Harold Brown before the House Judiciary Committee, May 27, 2010</p>
8/29/2004	<p>Major Accident Hazard Risk Assessment <i>Deepwater Horizon</i>. This reports the findings of a Major Accident Hazard Risk assessment performed on the <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> between August 4, 2003 and August 8, 2003. The following were among the hazards analyzed and given a risk rating: (1) Reservoir blowout (at Drill Floor); (2) Shallow gas blowout (subsea); (3) Gas in riser; (4) BOP component failure; and (5) Failure of hydraulic supply.</p> <p>The "BOP component failure" was given the following risk rating: Severity – Extremely Severe (5) Likelihood – Incident known to have occurred in the industry (B) Risk Rating – High (17)</p>	<p>8/29/2004 Major Accident Hazard Risk Assessment <i>Deepwater Horizon</i>, TRN-HCEC-00015864 - 16083</p>
10/19/2004	<p>Transocean signed a letter agreement with BP to convert an existing variable bore ram ("VBR") into a test ram on the <i>Deepwater Horizon's</i> BOP. The agreement stated that the conversion would "reduce the built-in redundancy of the BOP, thereby potentially increasing [Transocean's] risk profile and corresponding cost structure."</p>	<p>10/11/2004 Letter from Christopher S. Young, Transocean Senior Marketing Representative, to Randy Roads, BP</p>

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2004 – 2005	There was a fire on board the <i>Deepwater Horizon</i>	Testimony of Adrian Rose at 5/26/2010 USCG/MMS Hearing
4/20/2005	Drilling Contract No. 980249 is extended an additional 5 years, commencing on 9/18/2005.	4/20/2005 Amendment No. 24 to Drilling Contract No. 980249
~2007	A study of the 14-day testing standard indicated that 14 days was a reasonable time frame.	Testimony of Mike Saucier, MMS Regional Supervisor for Field Operations, Gulf of Mexico Region (Tr. 25:8 – 25:15, May 12, 2010)

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
3/31/2008	Transocean Well Control Complications/Emergency Procedures	3/31/2008 Well Control Complications / Emergency Procedures, found at http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1997:hearing-on-inquiry-into-the-deepwater-horizon-gulf-coast-oil-spill&catid=133:subcommittee-on-oversight-and-investigations&Itemid=73

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
May 26, 2008	On May 26, 2008, the <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> was partially evacuated after taking on water during drilling operations for BP at the Freedom No. 2 well. At approximately 5:30 p.m., an alarm in the Starboard Forward Pump Room notified crew members to water ingress in the Pump Room and a Thruster Room, causing the vessel to list two degrees starboard forward side. As counter-balloasting measures began, 77 nonessential personnel were transferred to a standby vessel while 61 remained onboard. The USCG, among other authorities, was immediately notified of the incident. By 10:50 p.m., the vessel was stabilized and all personnel were brought back on board. An investigation immediately commenced to determine the cause of the vessel's taking on water. Subject to further ongoing review of internal documents, the cause may have been the inadvertent opening of the overboard discharge valve or a series of ballast valves as a result of routine maintenance, which allowed water to enter the pump and thruster rooms.	5/20/2010 Email From Matt Gatewood (Sutherland) to Stephanie Clouston (Jones Day) Written Statement of Steve Gordon before the House Judiciary Committee, May 27, 2010
August 7, 2008	Karl Kleppinger jumped into the Gulf of Mexico to close a valve below the water line and successfully fix the problem. On August 7, 2008, a black out condition occurred when 2 engines tripped. Capt. Kutcha stated that the incident was caused by a governor failure on #3 machine.	8/7/2008 MI-09 Form and subsequent email correspondence
End of 2008 -- Early 2009	Bertone stated that they performed the last Black-Out Drill at the end of 2008 or beginning of 2009. Bertone stated that they shut down the systems for 25-35 seconds and make sure the back-up generators work during the next Black-Put Drill.	5/5/2010 Interview of Steve Bertone

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
2009	MMS issues a Notice to Lessees ("NTL") highly recommending the use of back up systems on BOP stacks.	Testimony of Mike Saucier, MMS Regional Supervisor for Field Operations, Gulf of Mexico Region (Tr. 19:15 – 19:19, May 12, 2010)
5/22/2009	APD ("Application for Permit to Drill") was granted for the Transocean Marianas to drill Macondo 252 Well.	MMS website
July 2009	USCG conducted an inspection of the <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> . Among others, the USCG conducted a firefighting drill and abandon ship drill. The USCG "ran the prime mover for approximately 15 to 20 minutes to make sure" the electrical system performed, and reviewed the Class 8 survey to make sure a power shut down test was done and complied with. The <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> was found to be in compliance, and no discrepancies were discovered during the inspection. Everything was satisfactory. As a result the USCG issued a certificate of compliance to the <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> that was valid for the following 2 years. USCG determined that the <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> was in compliance with its safety manning certificate.	Testimony of Michael Glen Odom, National Technical Advisor, Liquified Gas Carrier National Center of Expertise (Tr. 12:22-23; 15:14-15; 16:16-24; 18:2-10; 20:14-16; 21:8-9, 22-24; 23:19-23; 25:12-19; 28:18-25; May 12, 2010)
8/10/2009	Drilling Contract No. 980249 is extended an additional 3 years, commencing on 9/18/2010.	8/10/2009 Amendment No. 38 to Drilling Contract No. 980249
10/6/2009	Transocean Marianas arrives at the Macondo 252 Well at 12:40 and begins "spud" (the drill bit breaks ground below the sea surface for the first time) at 16:25 that day.	10/6/2009 Marianas IADC Report

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October 2009	<p>Transocean added back the First Engineer position to the Engine Control Room, but for only one shift.</p> <p>Brown stated that because of the cuts in the number of Engine Control Room personnel, "we were often days, weeks, and even months behind in completing the necessary preventive maintenance requirements." Brown stated that this was documented in "our lack of completion of the PM forms which were transmitted via electronic data to the mainland." Brown stated that employees in the engineering department "complained to our supervisors and the Captain that we did not have enough manpower to keep up with the work and the preventive maintenance."</p>	Written Statement of Douglas Harold Brown before the House Judiciary Committee, May 27, 2010
1/31/2010	Transocean <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> arrives at Macondo 252 Well.	1/31/2010 IADC Report (TRN-USCG_MMS-00011510)

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2/10/2010	Transocean <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> BOP Subsea Test. States, among others, under the heading "BOP," "[p]ressure bled off due to Test Rams not being closed. Restarted test and had not [sic] issues throughout the rest of the test."	Transocean <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> BOP Subsea Test, found at http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1997:hearing-on-inquiry-into-the-deepwater-horizon-gulf-coast-oil-spill&catid=133:subcommittee-on-oversight-and-investigations&Itemid=73
3/15/2010	Revised APD for the Macondo 252 Well issued for Transocean <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> .	MMS website

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
March 2010 (Note: We need to confirm the dates of Hughes's last hitch)	<p>During Hughes's previous hitch (21 days on, 21 days off), his team began "getting high levels of gas" in the mud. Hughes believes they began seeing 1,500 units, then 2,000 units of gas, and it "just kept on going." Hughes was eventually instructed to go to the "shaker house" and help Nunley cut the mud weight back and keep the gas under control.</p> <p>While Hughes was helping Nunley in the Shaker House, the gas detectors started beeping, meaning the "LEL was 10." Hughes and Nunley left the Shaker House, "dogged the doors down," went to the mud room, called the Driller, and told him what had happened. The Driller instructed them to hang out in the mud room, and that he would let them know when it was safe to go back. The Driller called approximately 30 minutes to 1 hour later, and said they could go back.</p>	4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Matthew Hughes

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
March 2010	<p><u>Morgan's Account:</u> During testing of the BOP, Morgan "bumped the stick," causing the drill pipe "to go down 3-4 feet." Morgan stated that he could not remember if the annular was closed at this time, but that it could have been. Morgan's team continued with the BOP testing after he bumped the stick, and "got a good test." They "pulled the pipe, got in on the joint, and inspected" the annular, and that there was no damage. There was no rubber coming off of the annular, and that there were no other problems with the BOP after the incident.</p> <p><u>Williams's Account:</u> After the incident described above, pieces of rubber from the annular started coming up onto the Rig Floor. When the damaged annular was brought to Transocean's attention, Transocean said it was no big deal.</p> <p><u>Burgess's Account:</u> Burgess has explained (and Morgan has confirmed) that the drill pipe is smooth on the outside – "it's a smooth tube." You can slide the pipe up and down, even if the annular is closed, without damaging the annular, so long as no tool joint is stripped through. The lower annular, however, is a "stripping annular" and is designed to even allow a tool joint to strip through.</p> <p>It was normal to see pieces of rubber from the annular coming up to the Rig Floor. This is caused simply by the normal use of the annular. Pieces of rubber from the annular that would come up to the Rig Floor could fit "in the palm of your hand."</p>	<p>5/17/2010 Telephone Interview of Patrick Morgan</p> <p>5/17/2010 Telephone Interview of Brandon Burgess</p> <p>5/16/2010 Interview with Mike Williams on "60 Minutes"</p>
3/15/2010	BP's Application for Permit to Drill ("APD") the <i>Macondo</i> well is approved by MMS.	MMS Website

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April 2010	Stephen Stone was working up on the deck, helping pump drilling mud down into the well bore hole, and they "kept losing drilling mud, either because the underground formation was unstable, or because drilling too quickly caused the formation to crack." Stone stated that on 4 separate occasions during a 20 day period preceding the Incident, "we had to stop pumping drilling mud and pump down a heavy-duty sealant compound instead ... to seal the crack in the formation what were causing us to lose mud."	Written Statement of Stephen Lane Stone before the House Judiciary Committee, May 27, 2010 Testimony of Stephen Stone at 5/27/2010 House Judiciary Committee Hearing
Sometime prior to the Incident	The Shakers were abnormally filling up with mud for quite some time.	Written Statement of Steve Gordon before the House Judiciary Committee, May 27, 2010
April 2010	Mike Williams stated that the "control pods" lost some functionality.	Mike Williams's 60 Minutes Interview, aired on 5/16/2010
4/1/2010	Last MMS inspection of the <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> . Nothing was found that would warrant a well shut-in.	Testimony of Mike Saucier, MMS Regional Supervisor for Field Operations, Gulf of Mexico Region (Tr. 10:4 – 10:6, May 12, 2010)

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4/18/2010 – 4/20/2010	Hughes's team had no problems with the gas levels in the days leading up to the Incident.	4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Matthew Hughes
Sometime before the Incident	<i>Deepwater Horizon</i> crew are told it would take 21 days to get to oil. Mike Williams stated that they were at 6 weeks. Williams stated that BP executives told the crew to bump it up, drill faster. Williams stated that they subsequently "got stuck." Williams stated that the crew was informed during a safety meeting that BP lost approximately \$25 million.	Mike Williams's 60 Minutes Interview, aired on 5/16/2010
4/20/2010 Prior to the Incident	Halliburton did the cementing work on the <i>Macondo</i> well. Approximately 20 hours prior to the loss of well control, Halliburton had completed the cementing of the "ninth and final production casing string in accordance with the well program." Following the placement of 51 barrels of cement slurry, Halliburton set the casing seal assembly in the casing hanger. "[T]he drilling fluid conditioning program prior to cementing and the cement slurry and placement design used for the well were implemented as directed by the well owner [BP]."	5/11/2010 Testimony of Tim Probert, Halliburton President, before the Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee
Prior to the Incident	Transocean, at the direction of BP, performed one "positive test" and two different "negative tests" on <i>Deepwater Horizon's</i> BOP prior to the Incident. These tests were conducted to ensure the integrity of the casing seal assembly.	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell 5/11/2010 Testimony of Tim Probert, Halliburton President, before the Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee

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4/19/2010 Nighttime	<p><u>Odenwald's Account:</u> Odenwald conducted a "positive test" on the wellhead seal assembly. The test was formulated by BP and was conducted on the lower part of the stack every time they did a "string casing." During this particular test, Odenwald closed the upper pipe RAM and "opened valves at Halliburton's direction." Halliburton and the BP Company Men did all of the "pumping." They pumped close to 11,000 psi and "everything held."</p> <p><u>Hay's Account:</u> During the positive test, Odenwald pumped 10,000 psi on the seal assembly for 5 or more minutes.</p> <p><u>Ezell's Account:</u> During the positive test, personnel onboard the Rig test the pressure against the casing. Typically, they run 2,500 psi against the casing for 30 minutes to ensure that it holds the pressure.</p>	<p>5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell</p> <p>5/6/2010 Interview of Mark Hay</p> <p>5/6/2010 Interview of Jay Odenwald</p>
4/19/2010 – 4/20/2010	<p>Young stated that he had ordered only one cement job for the first cement plug placed either the night before the Incident or earlier that same day.</p>	5/14/2010 Interview of David Young

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4/20/2010 Morning	<p><u>Williams's Account:</u> During Williams's pre-tour meeting, there was confusion about the procedure the drill team would use for setting the seal assembly, displacing the riser, and performing a negative test. Harrell explained the "Rig-Specific Negative Test" procedure he received from BP; however, the BP Company Man believed that Harrell's procedure was incorrect and wanted to use a different procedure. Revette commented that the drill team would "just kind of go with it."</p> <p><u>Ezell's Account:</u> "Displacement of the Well" occurs when the drill team removes the mud out of the drill string and replaces the mud with seawater. Displacing a well is one of the most dangerous tasks for a driller. Ezell does not know whether BP actually required a negative test before the drill team displaced the well. Harrell, however, "would not have done a displacement without a negative test," because "years ago [Harrell] had an issue on a Rig" due to conducting a displacement without first completing a negative test.</p>	<p>4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Michael Williams</p> <p>5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell</p> <p>Testimony of Douglas Brown at 5/26/2010 USCG/MMS Hearing</p> <p>Written Statement of Douglas Harold Brown before the House Judiciary Committee, May 27, 2010</p>
	<p><u>Brown's Account:</u> At approximately 11:00 a.m., during the pre-tour planning meeting, the BP Company Man (Kaluza?) overruled Transocean Drillers, and insisted on displacing the protective drilling mud from the Riser that connected the Rig to the oil well. Brown stated that Revette was going over the work that the drilling crew would be performing when a BP representative stood up and interrupted him saying that there would be a change to the operations and that a different plan of action was going to be implemented. Brown stated that it was obvious that Revette, Harrell, and Ezell disagreed with the BP representative's plan. Brown stated that Harrell said "well, that's what they make them pinchers for," apparently referring to the annular or shear rams.</p>	

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4/20/2010 Approx. 6:00 – 10:00 a.m.	Kaluza stated the following: "Ran in hole with 4200 feet of 6-5/8" drill pipe, 3400 feet of 5-1/2" drill pipe and 821 feet of 3-1/2" tubing. Stopped above the BOPs to test the casing so closed blind shear rams and test to 250 psi low pressure and 2500 psi high pressure, but went up to 2700 psi actually. The 30 minute chart was solid and had the cement engineer put the chart in the office. Told the driller test was done."	4/23/2010 Interview of Robert "Bob" Kaluza by Telecom at BP Office
4/20/2010 Approx. 10:00 – 11:30 a.m.	The drill team performed a low and high pressure test.	4/23/2010 Interview of Robert "Bob" Kaluza by Telecom at BP Office

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4/20/2010 10:43 a.m.	<p>BP email ("To," "From," and "CC" have all been REDACTED) containing "the negative test procedure." The email states as follows:</p> <p>Quick ops note for the next few days:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Test casing per APD to 250/2500 psi 2. RIH to 8367" 3. Displace to seawater from there to above the wellhead 4. With seawater in the kill close annular and do a negative test ~ 2350 psi differential 5. Open annular and continue displacement 6. Set a 300' balanced cement plug w/5 bbls in DP 7. POOH ~ 100-200' above top of cement and drop neft ball/circulate DS volume 8. Spot corrosion inhibitor in the open hole 9. POOH just below the wellhead or above with the 3-1/2" stinger (if desired wash with the 3-1/2" / do not rotate / a separate run will not be made to wash as the displacement will clean up the wellhead) 10. POOH and make LIT / LDS runs 11. Test casing to 1000 psi with seawater (non MMS test / BP DWOP) – surface plug <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Confirm bbls to pressure up on original casing test vs bbls to test surface plug (should be less due to volume differences and fluid compressibility – seawater vs sobm) b. Plot on chart / send to Houston for confirmation. 	4/20/2010 BP email, BP-HZN-CE008574
4/20/2010 Approx. 11:30 a.m. – 3:00 p.m.	The drill team "ran drill pipe to 8317 feet."	4/23/2010 Interview of Robert "Bob" Kaluza by Telecom at BP Office
4/20/2010 During the Day	Lambert stated that, "[d]uring [the] day [the drill team] ran long string production casing and set seal assembly and tested casing and displaced choke and kill lines to sea water and from 8634 feet to above BOP had sea water. Monitor well on kill line."	4/23/2010 Phone Interview of Lee Lambert by Telecom from BP Office

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4/20/2010 Approx. 2:30 p.m.	Winslow, Trahan, Sims, and O'Bryan arrived on the <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> Rig by helicopter and receive "a safety orientation."	Written Statement of Daun Winslow 4/23/2010 Interview of David Sims by Telecom at BP Building in Houston
4/20/2010	The <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> crew had previously used a "Rig-Specific Negative Test" on the Rig's BOP. Sopobodo had developed the Rig-Specific Negative Test, and it "worked well" according to both Transocean and BP personnel. However, "a negative test is hard on the equipment," and BP would "grumble" about performing such a test.	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell
4/20/2010	On April 20, Vidrine insisted on using a different negative test than the Rig-Specific Negative Test that the drill team had used in the past. The Rig-Specific Negative Test previously used on <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> required the drill team "to displace the kill, choke, and boost lines, lock and load it with seawater, and then close the Riser so that it was completely static-free." The new negative test proposed by Vidrine differed in that it required the team to open the kill line, which they had never done before. Indeed, the drill team had not been required to open the kill line during the preceding three to four Rig-Specific Negative Tests that they had performed prior to displacing the <i>Macondo</i> well.	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell 5/6/2010 Interview of Mark Hay
4/20/2010	That day, the drill team had "already had two kicks on the well" and "may have been missing part of an element on the annular."	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell

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4/20/2010 Approx. 3:00 – 5:00 p.m.	Kaluza stated that the drill team: "displaced mud with sea water. Had 14.0 ppg mud and a 450 bbl 16.0 ppg spacer above the annular preventer. Was also pumping synthetic mud to supply boat. Got two cement engineers to calculate balanced cement plug. I went to office to make bullet point plan on cement plug. At 5:30 [p.m.] just finished getting 16.0 ppg spacer in the riser and closed the annular preventer and had 1260 psi on the drill pipe and discussed with the tool pusher. Permit had to monitor on the kill side and Randy [Ezell, maybe?] said to do it down the drill pipe. Had 1260 psi on the drill pipe. Bleed drill pipe to zero with 15 bbls. Left 5 to 10 minutes at zero."	4/23/2010 Interview of Robert "Bob" Kaluza by Telecom at BP Office
4/20/2010 Approx. 4:30 – 4:45 p.m.	Wheeler performed the First Negative Test of the day. Hay opened the kill line. The team started pressure on the annular at 1,300 psi, then increased it to 1,900 psi. It appeared as if the seal was holding, however, they were going "to wait 30 more minutes."	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell 5/6/2010 Interview of Mark Hay
4/20/2010 Approx. 5:00 – 5:15 p.m.	Wheeler closed the annular after the First Negative Test. "[A]fter you close the annular and bleed the pressure, you should [get a reading of] zero pressure.... If you don't [get a reading of] zero pressure, then you may have a leak. You should then tighten the annular and it should stop flowing."	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell
4/20/2010 Approx. 5:00 – 5:15 p.m.	The First Negative Test resulted in a problematic differential pressure reading of 1,300 psi ↔ 1,900 psi. The pressure, however, appeared to be holding. Ezell heard that the annular was leaking during the First Negative Test, which made the readings "look wacky." Wheeler believed that "everything was okay" after the First Negative Test.	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
4/20/2010 Approx. 5:30 p.m.	<u>Pleasant's Account</u> : Pleasant arrived at the drill shack. At that time, Clark, Curtis, Ezell, Hay, Harrell, Kaluza, Revette, and Wheeler were also in the drill shack. Prior to Pleasant's arrival, there had been some "Issues" with the First Negative Test that was conducted on the well. Anderson had said that he was uncertain whether the First Negative Test was any good. Wheeler told Pleasant that they lost 60 barrels of mud through the annular during the First Negative Test. Anderson, however, told Pleasant that the problem with the test was something called "U-tubing." When Pleasant arrived at the drill shack, the men were shutting down, and they were discussing whether the First Negative Test had been done according to APD, the Application for Permit to Drill, which contains drilling programs/standards that were required for the Macondo well).	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell 5/6/2010 Interview of Chris Pleasant
4/20/2010 Approx. 5:30 p.m.	<u>Ezell's Account</u> : The differential pressure reading from the First Negative Test could not have been the result of a "U-Tube Effect."	5/6/2010 Interview of Mark Hay
4/20/2010 Approx. 5:40 p.m.	Hay met with Pleasant to give him the "highs and lows." When Hay left, the kill line was open, the lower annular was closed, and there was "no flow."	5/6/2010 Interview of Chris Pleasant
4/20/2010 Approx. 5:50 p.m.	Anderson told Kaluza that the Negative Test the drill team completed was not done properly and had to be done again. This time, Anderson wanted the drill team to run the test "the way they always do it," <i>i.e.</i> , according to Rig-Specific Negative Test developed by Sopobodo. Kaluza told Anderson that he would go talk to Vidrine about the problem.	5/6/2010 Interview of Chris Pleasant
4/20/2010 Approx. 5:50 p.m.	Kaluza returned to the drill shack and told Anderson that the test would be done the way that Vidrine wanted it to be done. Kaluza further told Anderson that Vidrine would come on at 6:00 p.m., and Anderson would have to listen to Vidrine.	5/6/2010 Interview of Chris Pleasant

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
4/20/2010 Approx. 5:30 – 6:00 p.m.	While the "VIP tour" was on the Rig, the team began experiencing some "issues with the well" in that they were losing fluid in the riser. Ezell came into the drill shack while escorting the VIP tour. At the time, Ezell did not have a full appreciation of the problem with the differential pressure reading. The drill shack was crowded, with approximately 12 people standing inside (Bertone, Clark, Curtis, Ezell, Harrell, Kaluza, O'Bryan, Revette, Sims, Trahan, Wheeler, and Winslow). Winslow realized that there was some discussion regarding the First Negative Test. He therefore asked Ezell and Harrell to stay behind in the drill shack to assist while the VIP tour continued on its way. The VIP tour was subtly told to move off the Drill Floor.	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell 5/6/2010 Interview of Mark Hay Witness statement of Steve Bertone
4/20/2010 Approx. 6:00 p.m.	Kaluza stated the following: "Kill line was closed at stack, opened the drill pipe flowed to 3 to 4 bbls. Thought out of balance and closed drill pipe at Halliburton unit and open kill side at 6 p.m. [REDACTED] is coming on tower and I explained bleed some off the drill pipe and lined up to pump down the kill line and 30 psi pressure and monitor on the pressure gauge. Rig up to monitor on the trip tank with .6 bbls originally in tank. Choke came up to 30 psi so diverted flow to mini trip tank and it went fro[m] .6 bbls to .8 bbls with zero on the kill line 'open.' Opened choke with 30 psi and went from .6 bbls to .8 bbls. Next was to finish displacement."	4/23/2010 Interview of Robert "Bob" Kaluza by Telecom at BP Office
4/20/2010 Approx. 6:00 p.m.	Anderson came on to relieve Ezell. Vidrine also came on, entered the drill shack, and spoke with Anderson for approximately one hour. At this time, Ezell, Anderson, Vidrine, Clark, and Revette were all on the Drill Floor. Vidrine stated that he came on duty at 6:00 p.m. and the Rig "was in the process of doing a test and displacing riser with sea water."	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell 5/6/2010 Interview of Chris Pleasant 4/23/2010 Telecom Interview of Donald Vidrine from the BP Office in Houston

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
4/20/2010 Approx. 6:30 p.m.	Anderson and Vidrine wanted to repeat the Negative Test on the BOP. Ezell believed they were planning to repeat the test when he left the Drill Floor around 6:30 p.m. Harrell left the Drill Floor approximately 5 minutes before Ezell.	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell
4/20/2010 Approx. 7:00 p.m.	Vidrine and Kaluza left the drill shack to go "call someone." Vidrine returned and told everyone in the shack that whomever he and Kaluza spoke to said to "go ahead and get the negative test done." Vidrine told Anderson that he understood what Anderson was saying, and they arranged to run a Second Negative Test the way Anderson wanted it to be run (i.e., according to the Rig-Specific Negative Test procedure developed by Sopobodo).	5/6/2010 Interview of Chris Pleasant
4/20/2010 Approx. 7:00 – 9:00 p.m.	All the department heads, including Ezell, attended a meeting and dinner with the VIPs. During the dinner, there was no discussion of the BOP testing.	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell
4/20/2010 Approx. 7:00 – 9:00 p.m.	Christopher Haire (Halliburton Cementer) and Vincent Tabler (Halliburton Cementer) were standing by to bleed off differential pressure from the negative test and to start to set surface plug. Haire stated that he went to the Rig Floor, and was told by Dewey Revette that it would be a couple of hours.	4/21/2010 USCG Witness Statement of Christopher Haire
4/20/2010 Approx. 7:30 p.m.	Pleasant's Account: The Second (presumably Rig-Specific) Negative Test held its pressure and the drill team "got no flow." The team then bumped the annular up to 2,000 psi and "it looked like it held." Anderson asked whether, before Pleasant opened the annular, he would allow Anderson to "stroke it with" 1,000 psi. Pleasant told Anderson "no," he could not let him do that. Pleasant then opened the annular. Everyone "felt good" about the Second Negative Test.	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell 5/6/2010 Interview of Chris Pleasant
	Ezell's Account: In the galley, Vidrine told Harrell that the Second Negative Test was "fine."	

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
4/20/2010 Approx. 7:40 – 7:50 p.m.	A negative test was completed, "it was a good test."	4/23/2010 Telecom Interview of Donald Vidrine from the BP Office in Houston 4/21/2010 USCG Written Statement of Leo Lindner
4/20/2010 Approx. 7:50 – 10:00 p.m.	Vidrine stated that the drill team "[d]isplaced pill up above BOP. Have water up the choke, kill and boost lines. Continued well displacement. Went to the office. Continue to displace well. Shut down and took sheen test. Went to rig floor and doing good and had correct number of strokes. Went back to office. Had a call from the rig floor. Had a problem 'getting mud back.' Rig floor will divert to rig buster. [Vidrine] started to the rig floor and mud was everywhere. [Vidrine] tried another route to get up to the rig floor."	4/23/2010 Telecom Interview of Donald Vidrine from the BP Office in Houston

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
4/20/2010	<p>McMahan's Account: In a meeting several days after the Incident, O'Bryan told McMahan and MMS what BP "thought" had happened on the Drill Floor. According to O'Bryan, prior to the explosions, the drill team conducted an "underbalance test" of the 9-7/8 seal assembly. This test resulted in a differential pressure reading (1,400 psi on one pressure meter, 0 psi on the other). As a result of the imbalance, the drill team shut down the well for 1½ hours and tried to determine what caused the differential pressure reading. During that time, rams were closed on the well riser to isolate any hydrostatic pressure. The drill team did not make any phone calls to Transocean personnel at that time. At some point, however, the team convinced themselves that the reading resulted from "reverse ballooning," a phenomenon that McMahan has never heard of. The drill team then reopened the rams and the explosion occurred. O'Bryan claimed he based this information off of conversations he had with Ezell, Vidrine, and Kaluza, and his review of BP's SperrySun data stream.</p> <p>Ezell's Account: Ezell has never heard anyone from BP use the term "reverse ballooning" in connection with this Incident. While Ezell is not certain what the term means, he believes it may refer to a phenomenon that occurs "when the formation takes on fluid and it loses circulating density and then the line allows it to come back hydrostatic."</p>	<p>5/3/2010 Meeting with Adriane Rose and Larry McMahan</p> <p>5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell</p>

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Source</u>
4/20/2010 Approx. 8:00 – 9:00 p.m.	<p><u>Pleasant's Account</u>: After the Second Negative Test was complete, the drill team began displacing the mud in the riser with sea water using the mud and booster bumps. The drill team "got the spacer back," and the well was displaced "all the way down to the drill string." Pleasant then left the Rig Floor/drill shack and walked through the "moon pool," checking everything on his way out. When Pleasant left, the drill team was slowing down the pumps and shutting down.</p> <p><u>Newman's Account</u>: Just prior to the explosion, "drilling mud was no longer being used as a means of reservoir containment; the cement and casing were the barriers controlling pressure from the reservoir. Indeed, at the time of the explosion, the Rig crew, at the direction of [BP], was in the process of displacing drilling mud and replacing it with seawater."</p>	<p>5/6/2010 Interview of Chris Pleasant</p> <p>5/11/2010 Testimony of Steven Newman, Transocean CEO, before the Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee</p>
4/20/2010 Approx. 8:30 – 9:00 p.m.	Holloway received a call from Revette on the radio asking Holloway "to go bleed off that stand pipe." Holloway went to do this by himself. He bled the stand pipe for 10-15 seconds, and could tell "that there was a lot of pressure." Holloway called Revette over the radio and told him that there was a lot of pressure and that it was not "bleeding off like it was supposed to." Revette told Holloway told him to "shut it."	5/15/2010 Interview of Caleb Holloway
4/20/2010 Approx. 8:45 p.m.	At 8:45 p.m., BP personnel and Transocean personnel from the office came to the Bridge to get a tour and practice on simulator.	4/21/2010 USCG Witness Statement of Andrea Fleytas

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
4/20/2010 Approx. 9:00 p.m.	VIP dinner finished. After finishing dinner with the VIPs, Ezell "did a round around the deck" and headed back to his room. Sims went to the bridge. Bertone went to the smoke deck and talked with Pleasant, who told Bertone that they had just finished displacing the well and were bleeding the lines off.	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell 4/23/2010 Interview of David Sims by Telecom at BP Building in Houston 5/5/2010 Interview of Steve Bertone
4/20/2010 Approx. 9:20 p.m.	Ezell called Anderson on the Drill Floor and asked how the Second Negative Test went. Anderson responded that they "lined-up, bled-off, and watched for 30 minutes and there was no flow." Ezell has explained that this meant "it was a good [negative pressure] test." Ezell then asked how the displacement of the well was going. Anderson responded that the team would "have the spacer back in a few minutes." Ezell asked if Anderson needed him for anything. Anderson responded, "[n]o man, I got this shit. Go to bed." Ezell had worked with Anderson for a long time and if [Anderson] had a problem he would have told me. [He] thought everything was okay."	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell
4/20/2010 Approx. 9:30 p.m.	Young went to the Rig Floor to check on the status of the upcoming cement job. Young stated that Anderson and Revette were the only ones in the Drill Shack at this time. Young stated that Anderson and Revette were concerned about a differential pressure problem – they stated we are "seeing a differential." Anderson and Revette told Young that they "don't know [about the cement job]; may have to circulate," and therefore the cement job may not go as scheduled.	4/22/2010 USCG Witness Statement of David Young 5/14/2010 Interview of David Young

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
4/20/2010 Approx. 9:30 p.m.	While closing the three valves on the stand pipe, Holloway saw Young leaving the Drill Floor and joked with him, saying "this is my last night, ain't supposed to be this way." After he finished closing the valves, Holloway and Barron go to the vacuum unit on the starboard aft deck to empty/pump it out.	5/15/2010 Interview of Caleb Holloway
4/20/2010 Approx. 9:30 – 9:45 p.m.	Earlier that day, "Halliburton was instructed to record drill pipe pressure" during the Negative Tests until they were advised by BP that the tests had been completed. At approximately 9:30 – 9:45 p.m., the Halliburton mud logger called out approximately 150 units of gas, which is "really low."	4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Matthew Hughes 4/22/2010 USCG Written Witness Statement of Joseph Keith

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
4/20/2010 Approx. 9:30 p.m.	<p>Prior to the explosion, Halliburton had not set the final cement plug that would have been installed inside the production string. Young was on duty because he was part of the cementing unit. The unit set the cement plug "at 8,300 feet below the surface of the ocean floor," which is the "deepest surface cement plug" that Ezell has ever heard of. According to Ezell, most cement plugs are set at 500 feet below the surface of the ocean floor. Ezell knows that this depth was "done in the past, even with temporary abandonment wells."</p> <p>BP used "Nitrified Cement" to plug the well that night. Nitrified Cement "tricks" the formation into a foam so that it seems lighter than it really is and can move easier. For this reason, Nitrified Cement is typically used in shallow sections of the well because the "fracture gradient" is lower in shallow water.</p> <p>In addition, the cementing unit only pumped one cement plug, when "they should have pumped at least two or three [plugs]."</p> <p>Finally, a "cement bond log" ("CBL") is typically used to track the cement density behind the casing of the wellhead. That evening, however, BP "opted out of using a CBL on this well."</p>	<p>5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell</p> <p>5/5/2010 Interview of Steve Bertone</p>
4/20/2010 Approx. 9:35 – 9:40 p.m.	<p>Young went to the Subsea office on the 2nd deck and talked to Pleasant about the fact that they appeared to be having well issues. Young stated that he told Pleasant "the guys are seeing a differential." Young stated that Pleasant then began flipping through the channels on the monitor and they almost immediately heard a loud noise. Young said he heard the engines over-speeding with gas – it sounded like an engine revving – up. At that time, Young stated that the gas began to blowout and then there was the first explosion. Young thinks the first explosion occurred somewhere near the center of the Rig.</p>	<p>4/22/2010 USCG Witness Statement of David Young</p> <p>5/14/2010 Interview of David Yooung</p>

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4/20/2010 Approx. 9:40 – 9:50 p.m.	After being at the vacuum unit for about 10-20 minutes, Holloway looked up at the Rig Floor and saw mud blowing out (he stated that it was definitely coming out of the rotary). Holloway grabbed Barron and headed to the Rig Floor. They arrived at the Rig Floor via the back way, by the Halliburton shack, where they saw thick mud blowing hard and heard heavy debris falling. Holloway told Barron to get in the heavy tool room. Holloway attempted to contact Revette 3-4 times over the radio, but got no response. Holloway then went to the heavy tool room to use the phone to call into the Drill Shack, and as he was dialing, he began to smell, taste, and feel the gas all over. Holloway told Barron that they had to get out.	5/15/2010 Interview of Caleb Holloway
4/20/2010 Approx. 9:40 – 10:00 p.m.	Murray went into the GE Drive Room to lock out/tag out the #2 Mud Pump. Ten minutes later, Murray stated, he went back and de-isolated the same Mud Pump. As he came back to his shop, Murray heard a noise of high pressure, then felt the Rig vibrate, and heard "a loud boom from the direction of the Mud Pump Room area. The power then went out."	4/21/2010 USCG Witness Statement of Chad Murray
4/20/2010 Approx. 9:40 p.m.	Kcplinger and Fleytas saw mud coming out of the diverter line through a console camera to the diverter pipe. A pipe on the starboard side had opened and Fleytas saw mud "going out of the line."	5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
4/20/2010 Approx. 9:45 p.m.	Erickson was standing on the bridge of the <i>Bankston</i> when he observed "out flow under [the] Rig." Shortly thereafter, Erickson received a "radio message from [the] Rig that they had a well problem." Landry, Captain of the <i>Bankston</i> , "heard and observed a loud hissing of air/gas release and [liquid] mud ... raining down on the aft deck of the [<i>Bankston</i>]." Landry contacted the <i>Deepwater Horizon's</i> bridge on "VHF 66," who advised him that "they were having well troubles. Landry states then saw an explosion on the <i>Deepwater Horizon's</i> deck "just aft of the derrick." Landry sounded the alarm, the on duty crew was disconnected the liquid mud hose from the <i>Bankston's</i> deck fitting, and Landry moved the vessel away from the Rig.	4/22/2010 USCG Witness Statement of Paul C. Erickson 4/21/2010 USCG Witness Statement of Alwin J. Landry
4/20/2010 Approx. 9:49 p.m.	Halliburton's monitoring transmission is lost.	Last 2 Hours Before End of Transmission, found at http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1997:hearing-on-inquiry-into-the-deepwater-horizon-gulf-coast-oil-spill&catid=133:subcommittee-on-oversight-and-investigations&Itemid=73

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
4/20/2010 Approx. 9:52 p.m.	Erickson saw "material . . . issuing from the Rig Deck." The Bankston then "closed [its] wheelhouse doors," and "was showered with liquid mud."	4/22/2010 USCG Witness Statement of Paul C. Erickson
4/20/2010 Minutes prior to the first explosion	<u>Pleasant's Account:</u> Pleasant typed up a casing report in the Subsea Driller's office and went to Harrell's office to have him sign the test report. After visiting the Company Man's office twice to see if he was in (he was not), Pleasant returned to his office, and found Seraile inside. Hughes entered the room a short time after. Moments later, Pleasant, Seraile, and Hughes began hearing a rumbling sound that kept growing louder. Trahan stuck his head inside the office and asked Pleasant, "Are we taking a kick or what?" Pleasant responded, "We're not showing nothing here. It's nothing of ours. I don't know what that is." Trahan asked Pleasant if he had checked the moon pool to see if there was any damage to the diverter. Pleasant responded that he had not, but would be there in just a second. <u>Seraile's Account:</u> Seraile was watching TV in the Subsea's (Pleasant) office and turned the channel to the Rig Floor and asked the Subsea (Pleasant) what was going on because he saw a lot of water coming onto the Rig Floor. Seraile then heard a loud pressure, then a loud boom. Following the boom, the lights went out.	4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Matthew Hughes 5/6/2010 Interview of Chris Pleasant USCG Witness Statement of Allen Seraile
4/20/2010 Minutes prior to the first explosion	Trahan took off towards the galley. Seraile then pointed out that mud was leaking. Hughes turned to watch a TV that displayed images of the Rig Floor and observed that mud or water began blowing everywhere, up into the cameras and onto the derrick.	4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Matthew Hughes
4/20/2010 Minutes prior to the first explosion	From the port aft deck, Jones observed mud shooting straight up from the Rig Floor. The mud came gradually at first, and then shot all the way "up to the crown."	4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Cole Jones

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
4/20/2010 Minutes prior to the first explosion	<p>A combustible gas alarm went off. Within 2-3 minutes of seeing the mud coming out of the diverter pipe, and while the alarm was going off, Fleytas got a call from the Drill Floor. The person on the other end of the line said, "[w]e have a well control situation." Fleytas informed Keplinger of the situation.</p> <p>Fleytas also received a call from the ECR asking what was going on. Fleytas stated that she told them that they were under a well control situation, and, soon after that, the Rig blacked out and there was an explosion.</p>	<p>4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Matthew Hughes</p> <p>5/7/2010 Interview of Yancy Keplinger</p> <p>5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas</p> <p>4/21/2010 USCG Witness Statement of Andrea Fleytas</p>
4/20/2010 Minutes prior to the first explosion	<p>Williams began hearing a hissing noise and multiple alarms sounding in the ECR, which he assumed were due to a hydraulic leak. Williams went to the ECR to investigate.</p> <p>At the same time (approximately 3-4 minutes after the phone call Fleytas received from the Drill Floor), all of the combustible alarms (both fire and gas) began sounding on the Drill Floor and Shaker House. Almost immediately afterwards, the combustible alarms for the entire Rig began sounding. Williams knew that when a succession of alarms began sounding like that, there usually is a "catastrophic failure" of some system.</p>	<p>4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Michael Williams</p> <p>5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas</p>

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
4/20/2010 Approx. 9:50 p.m.	<p>At least one, and possibly two of the engines connected to the generators (Engine Nos. 3 and 6) begin "ramping up," or increasing their speed. Those engines allowed the generators to supply electricity to the Rig; they were not associated with any drilling activities. At this time, Brown, Mansfield, Meinhardt, and Stoner were inside the engine control room ("ECR") discussing what they needed to do before they "de-isolated" a spool. The ramp-up in speed indicated to Brown that "something was seriously wrong." Brown then realized that the Rig was probably headed for an "overspeed trip," i.e., once the engines reached a certain RPM, they should automatically "trip off" and shut down.</p> <p>Brown stated that the engines ramped up way beyond anything he had ever heard before. Brown estimated that they got as high as 1000RPMs.</p> <p>Brown stated that 3 trips that would have killed the engines if they exceeded certain RPMs did not work: the Mechanical Over Speed, the Electrical Over Speed, and the Rig Saver.</p> <p>Brown stated that within "a few minutes," he started hearing gas alarms. Brown stated that no one from the Bridge or Rig Floor ever communicated so he had no idea that a blowout was taking place. Brown stated that he did hear the Captain make a radio call to the <i>Bankston</i> to detach the hose and move away from the Rig.</p> <p>Bertone heard "what sounded like an engine going faster and faster." He then heard an explosion.</p>	<p>4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Douglas Brown</p> <p>4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Paul Meinhardt</p> <p>4/21/2010 Witness Statement of William Stoner</p> <p>4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Michael Williams</p> <p>5/5/2010 Interview of Steve Bertone</p> <p>Written Statement of Douglas Harold Brown before the House Judiciary Committee, May 27, 2010</p> <p>Testimony of Douglas Brown at 5/27/2010 House Judiciary Committee Hearing</p>

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
4/20/2010 Minutes prior to the first explosion	When Holloway and Barron were approximately half way across the main deck, the lights went out. Holloway turned on his flashlight, looked at the Rig Floor and saw the diverter line "blowing." At that point, nothing had ignited. Once Holloway got to the life boats, the first explosion occurred.	5/15/2010 Interview of Caleb Holloway
4/20/2010 Immediately after the generator engines began "ramping up"	According to Stoner, immediately after the engines began "ramping up," 5 ESDs ("emergency shut downs") flashed on. To Stoner, this meant that someone had pushed an EDS button from either the Rig Floor or the bridge, and was trying to shut in the well. Stoner specifically recalls the lights still being on when the ESD buttons were flashing. If the correct ESD button was pushed, Stoner has stated that the system should have sheared or severed the pipe, closed it in, and killed the well at the bottom of the seabed, right above the casing. According to Ezell, Harrell attempted to activate the EDS that night. Ezell has speculated that, if the hoses were blown off during the explosion, there would have been no connection for the BOP EDS to work with.	4/21/2010 Witness Statement of William Stoner 5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
4/20/2010 Anywhere from 10 seconds to 5 minutes prior to the first explosion	<p>The power went out; however, the engines associated with the generators that provided electricity to the Rig continued to "ramp up speed."</p> <p>Brown stated that the Frequency Trip activated, which disconnects the generators from the switchboard/control panel.</p> <p>Note: According to Ezell, Transocean never tested the BOP to ensure it would function "if there was a complete failure of power." Ezell also believed that Transocean had never tested the deadman switch.</p>	<p>4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Douglas Brown</p> <p>4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Paul Meinhardt</p> <p>5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas</p> <p>Written Statement of Douglas Harold Brown before the House Judiciary Committee, May 27, 2010</p> <p>Testimony of Douglas Brown at 5/27/2010 House Judiciary Committee Hearing</p>
4/20/2010 Anywhere from 10 seconds to 5 minutes prior to the first explosion	<p>Kuchta tried to get the engines back online, however there was no answer from the ECR. Keplinger reported the fire announcement. The Rig could not hold its location and the radios did not work. Kuchta began ringing the general alarm. At some point, Kuchta also radioed the <i>Bankston</i> and instructed the supply vessel to back away from the Rig.</p>	<p>4/22/2010 Witness Statement of Curt Kuchta</p> <p>5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas</p>

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
4/20/2010 Approx. 9:50 p.m.	<p>Ezell received a call from an Assistant Driller on the Rig Floor, who told Ezell that "the well is coming in" and "there is mud all over the windows." The Assistant Driller further informed Ezell that Anderson was "shutting [the well] in." Ezell responded that he "was on his way to help." Ezell believes that there was fire coming out of the diverter line by that point. When Ezell made it outside of his room, there was a fire in the center of the Rig. He did not make it down the hall before the explosion.</p> <p>Ezell has stated that Anderson had authority "solely on his head to make decisions based on the training that he had." He said that it takes 48 seconds to close the annular and 48 seconds to close the diverter.</p> <p>Note: During his interview, Ezell did not specify which Assistant Driller was on the other line – was it Curtis or Clark? Both men were unaccounted for after the Incident.</p>	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell
4/20/2010 Approx. 9:56 p.m.	<p>While on the bridge talking to marine crew, Sims felt a vibration around 10:00 p.m., which was "not normal." Sims then heard a hissing sound and looked out the door. Within a "few minutes," he felt an explosion. The power then went out and he "pushed EDS. Showed 21:56 on the panel on wall in bridge. Lights went red on panel."</p>	4/23/2010 Interview of David Sims by Telecom at BP Building in Houston

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
4/20/2010 Approx. 10:00 p.m.	<p>The first explosion occurred.</p> <p>The power and lights went out, according to Tippetts, Skidmore, and Albers.</p> <p>Tippetts stated that, approximately "30 seconds later there was an explosion."</p> <p>Albers stated that, "approximately 5 seconds later there was a large bang."</p> <p>Vidrine stated that an explosion occurred around 10:00 p.m. "Shortly after [the] blast the power went out." He "saw some fire," and went to the bridge to check on EDS. Vidrine stated that he found "the subsea hand and panel indicated lower annular was closed, so told them to hit EDS."</p> <p><u>Note:</u> Kuchta recalled the first explosion sounding around 9:15 or 9:20 p.m.</p>	<p>4/22/2010 Witness Statement of Curt Kuchta</p> <p>5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas</p> <p>4/21/2010 USCG Witness Statement of Brad Tippetts</p> <p>4/21/2010 USCG Witness Statement of Ross Randy Skidmore</p> <p>4/21/2010 USCG Witness Statement of Shane Albers</p> <p>4/23/2010 Telecom Interview of Donald Vidrine from the BP Office in Houston</p>
4/20/2010 Immediately after the first explosion	The explosion blew the ET Shop port side door onto Williams.	4/21/2010 USCG Written Statement of Mike Williams

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4/20/2010 Immediately after the first explosion	The first explosion blew an entire wall of the rig floor off. The drill shack and starboard crane were engulfed in flames. Ramose knew that the Crane Operator (presumably Aaron Burkeen, who was unaccounted for after the incident) was working that night, and turned to see if he could get out. Instead, the Crane Operator tired to lay the crane down into a "cradle." Moments later, Ramos saw Burkeen exit the cab and go down the spiral staircase while "smoke and flames covered him whole." Later, Keith found Burkeen facedown on the deck. Keith noticed "extensive" blood on the deck and checked to see if Burkeen had a pulse. He did not.	5/21/2010 USCG Witness Statement of Carlos Ramos 4/22/2010 USCG Written Witness Statement of Joseph Keith
4/20/2010 Shortly after the first explosion	The second explosion occurred. Lambert stated that the second explosion was approximately 1 minute after the first explosion.	5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas 4/23/2010 Phone Interview of Lee Lambert by Telecom from BP Office
4/20/2010 Immediately after the second explosion	After the first explosion blew the ET Shop port side door onto Williams, he got up and proceeded to the ECR. The second explosion blew the ECR door onto Williams.	4/21/2010 USCG Written Statement of Mike Williams
4/20/2010	The first safety mechanism for preventing gas from going up the line is the "mud weight in the line." The second line of defense is the BOP. If gas travels past the BOP, the third and final line of defense is the diverter. The diverter, however, is only rated for 500 psi and there was at least 7,500 psi at the time of the blowout because of the hydrostatic line.	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
4/20/2010 Shortly after the second explosion	Fleytas hit the distress button and sent the first "May Day" signal.	5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas
4/20/2010 Shortly after the second explosion	Kuchta screamed at Fleytas after she sent the first distress signal, and reprimanded her for not first seeking his permission. No one called off the original distress signal.	Witness Statement of Steve Bertone 5/5/2010 Interview of Steve Bertone 5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
4/20/2010 Shortly after the second explosion	<p><u>Pleasant's Account:</u> Pleasant ran to the bridge to hit the EDS button. When Pleasant arrived at the bridge, the lower annulars were closed, and Vidrine told Pleasant that the well had been shut in. Pleasant then asked Kuchta if he could hit the EDS button, and that Kuchta responded, "no." Vidrine was standing by the panel and instructed Pleasant to initiate the EDS.</p> <p><u>Bertone's Account:</u> Bertone asked Pleasant if he had activated the EDS. Pleasant responded that he needed permission. Bertone asked Winslow if they could activate the EDS, and he said "yes." At that point, someone said that Harrell must give the order. Bertone scanned the bridge, found Harrell, and obtained immediate permission. Bertone stated that it was only seconds between the time he asked Pleasant whether he had activated the EDS and when Pleasant hit the EDS button.</p> <p><u>Fleytas's Account:</u> Harrell gave permission to Kuchta to activate the EDS; however, Pleasant may have activated the EDS before Harrell spoke with Kuchta. There was no disagreement with Kuchta. Rather, the men had to scream just to hear one another.</p> <p><u>O'Bryan's Account:</u> Captain Kuchta pushed the EDS button after receiving permission from the OIM (Harrell).</p> <p><u>Harrell's Account:</u> Harrell informed Pleasant to EDS.</p> <p><u>Young's Account:</u> Young stated that Pleasant was hitting the EDS buttons to disconnect the Rig from the Stack. Young stated that he saw the BOP Panel "light up like a Christmas tree". Young did not look closely enough at the BOP Panel to see what was going on.</p>	<p>5/6/2010 Interview of Chris Pleasant</p> <p>5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas</p> <p>Witness Statement of Steve Bertone</p> <p>5/5/2010 Interview of Steve Bertone</p> <p>4/21/2010 USCG Written Statement of Patrick O'Bryan</p> <p>4/21/2010 Written Statement of Jimmy Harrell</p> <p>5/14/2010 Interview of David Young</p>
4/20/2010 Approx. 10:11 p.m.	Call from Coast Guard.	Horizon Event Log

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
4/20/2010 Approx. 10:28 p.m.	Confirmed Rig on fire and abandoned – from USCG.	Horizon Event Log
4/20/2010 10:42 p.m. Note: Kuchta recalled that Pleasant hit the EDS button at 9:56 p.m.	<p>Pleasant activated the EDS in order to free the Rig from the well. After Pleasant initiated the EDS, the system was going through its sequences as if it was working but it "never left the panel" (i.e., it did not work).</p> <p>Note: Stoner recalled hearing Pleasant state, "we're disconnected" after he hit the EDS button.</p>	<p>4/21/2010 Witness Statement of William Stoner</p> <p>4/22/2010 Witness Statement of Curt Kuchta</p> <p>5/6/2010 Interview of Chris Pleasant</p> <p>5/7/2010 Interview of Yancy Keplinger</p> <p>5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas</p> <p>4/21/2010 USCG Witness Statement of Andrea Fleytas</p>
4/20/2010 Approx. 10:44 p.m.	Daun Winslow called from Bankston Sea.	Horizon Event Log

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
4/20/2010 Sometime after the second explosion	Williams discussed with Captain Kuchta and several others the possibility of re-starting the "RI6 motors, however the "ECR was missing." They decided to try to start the Emergency Generator, however several attempts proved unsuccessful. Kuchta asked Williams if there was any way the Rig would re-gain power. Williams responded that, in his opinion, the Rig would not recover power.	4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Michael Williams 4/21/2010 USCG Written Statement of Michael Williams
4/20/2010 Sometime after the second explosion	Some personnel heard a page that the Incident was not a drill, there was a fire on the Rig Floor, and that all personnel should report to the stations, and that life boat nos. 1 and 2 would be deployed.	4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Michael Williams 4/21/2010 Witness Statement of William Stoner

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
4/20/2010 Sometime after the second explosion	Benjamin LaCroix (3rd Party Tank Cleaner) stated that there was no one at the life boats to be a leader. LaCroix stated that he did not even know where the life vests were because when they had the fire drill on Sunday, April 18, 2010, he was "exempt" because he was cleaning the columns. LaCroix stated that once people started getting into the life boats, he and the others were instructed to get back out and go inside. LaCroix stated that he does not know how long they stayed trying to persuade the reps to lower the life boat. LaCroix stated that once the life boat was full, they sat there for about 3-5 minutes. Once the life boat was in the water, LaCroix stated that they were trying to take off and the driver of the life boat did not know how to operate it. LaCroix stated that the life boat was still latched to the cable. LaCroix stated that drills and walk throughs should be revisited because "it was only by the grace of god that we didn't burn to death because it took entirely 2 long to get away from the Rig."	USCG Witness Statement of Benjamin LaCroix 4/21/2010 USCG Witness Statement of Carlos Ramos Written Statement of Douglas Harold Brown before the House Judiciary Committee, May 27, 2010 Testimony of Douglas Brown at 5/27/2010 House Judiciary Committee Hearing
4/20/2010 Sometime after the second explosion	Carlos Ramos (Roustabout) stated that it took about 30-45 minutes to load everyone in the life boats and launch them. Brown stated that he witnessed "complete chaos and mayhem," and that they "waited and watched for approximately 10 minutes." Brown also stated that, initially, the Coxswain in charge of the boat could not get the life boat's engine started. Wilson removed his handheld satellite phone and walked out to the port side of the bridge. Wilson called "shorebase" and spoke with his "opposite there," Clint Derise. Wilson informed Derise of the explosion and fire, and asked Derise to send help. Wilson went back inside and informed Captain Kuchta that there were flames coming out of the derrick. Wilson then called Derise a second time to inform him that they were evacuating the rig and to confirm that Derise had activated the Emergency System. Derise informed Wilson that they had scrambled the "[illegible] S-61" as well as three or four boats from the Thunderhorse.	4/21/2010 USCG Written Witness Statement of James Wilson

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
4/20/2010 Sometime after the second explosion	Fleytas and Keplinger tried to restart the engines and silence the alarms. Williams told Keplinger that the ECR was missing and that, at a minimum, Engine No. 3 had exploded.	4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Michael Williams 4/21/2010 Witness Statement of William Stoner
4/20/2010 Approx. 10:42 – 11:00 p.m.	Bertone obtained permission from Kuchta to go to the standby generator room and attempt to manually start the engine. Williams and Meinhardt ran with Bertone to the standby generator room. On the way, Bertone stated that he noticed the "moon pool" was gone.	Witness Statement of Steve Bertone 5/7/2010 Interview of Yancy Keplinger
4/20/2010 Approx. 11:00 p.m.	Kuchta told Fleytas to "log the time that [] Pleasant hit the EDS button at 10:52 p.m." Fleytas believed Pleasant hit the EDS button prior to that time.	5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas
4/20/2010 Approx. 11:00 – 11:30 p.m.	Fleytas sent another "May Day" signal and told the broadcast system that there was an uncontrollable fire onboard the Rig.	5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas
4/20/2010 Approx. 11:00 – 11:30 p.m.	After approximately 6-8 minutes, Bertone's attempts at manually restarting the engine were unsuccessful. When Bertone, Williams, and Meinhardt exited the standby generator room, it was "pure hell" outside. When they got to the bridge, there were 3 people left, and all the life boats were gone. Kuchta was standing at the door to the bridge calling for them to abandon ship and "get the hell out."	Witness Statement of Steve Bertone
4/20/2010 Approx. 11:30 p.m.	Fleytas sent one final "May Day" signal. Kuchta, Fleytas, and Keplinger then began running to escape the Rig.	5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
4/20/2010 Approx. 11:30 p.m.	Bertone, Meinhart, and Williams followed Kuchta to a life raft, and noticed Ezell and Carden putting a life vest on Wheeler, who was badly injured and lying on a gurney. When Bertone, Carden, Clark, Ezell, Fleytas, Keplinger, Kuchta, Meinhart, Murray, Wheeler, and Young got to the deck, all of the life boats had been deployed.	Witness Statement of Steve Bertone 5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas
4/20/2010 Approx. 11:35 p.m.	Daun Winslow +/- 15 personnel missing. Rig fully engulfed in flames. Helicopter on scene.	Horizon Event Log
4/20/2010 Approx. 11:46 p.m.	John Guide (BP) informed gas got into riser and blew out.	Horizon Event Log
4/20/2010	Bertone dragged Wheeler across to the deck to the life raft when there was another explosion. Kuchta instructed Bertone to leave Wheeler behind. Bertone ignored the order, pushed past Kuchta, and shoved Wheeler onto the only remaining life raft. Everyone on deck worked to deploy the life raft. Fleytas, Kuchta, Keplinger, Meinhart, and Williams all jumped overboard. Everyone was eventually pulled into the life raft or held onto the raft as it was hitched to a rescue vessel and towed to the <i>Bankston</i> .	Witness Statement of Steve Bertone 5/5/2010 Interview of Steve Bertone 4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Paul Meinhart 4/21/2010 Witness Statement of Michael Williams 5/8/2010 Interview of Andrea Fleytas

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
4/20/2010	While onboard the <i>Bankston</i> , Kaluza told Ezell, in the presence of Vidrine, that the Application for a Drilling Permit (APD) for the <i>Macondo</i> well required the kill line to be open during a Negative Pressure Test.	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell
4/20/2010	Crawford overheard "upper management" say that BP took "shortcuts" by displacing the well with seawater instead of mud without first sealing the well with cement plugs.	4/21/2010 USCG Written Witness Statement of Truitt Crawford
4/21/2010	Adrian Rose, Transocean Vice President of QHSE, arrived in New Orleans.	Testimony of Adrian Rose at 5/26/2010 USCG/MMS Hearing
4/21/2010 Approx. 2:04 a.m.	Call from John Keeton. BP ERC and Daun Winslow have been in contact. It looks as if Rig is getting hotter and indications show they're not disconnected. They are going to try and get an ROV boat in close to try and shut in the well.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 2:23 a.m.	BP have requested BOP drawings. Paul Johnson informed them that we would get the drawings to them.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 3:05 a.m.	Confirmed that the derrick was down and the flames are getting hotter. Believe that the Riser is still attached. BP contacting all pipeline operators in area of Rig. Working to get a live feed for subsea personnel between TOI and BP. Priority is getting all missing people accounted for. Secondary is to try and prevent any pollution and well control.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 3:27 a.m.	John Keeton said the flames were 2 ½ times as high as the derrick and the Rig has drifted 1500' to the north east. Everything still appears to be intact.	Horizon Event Log

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
4/21/2010 Approx. 3:29 a.m.	Daun Winslow called. He does not know how many people are on the Bankston. He stated the crew members wanted to make sure their family members were notified by TOI. Also wanted to make sure BP 3 rd Party families were notified as well. David Sims has taken control of the Bankston and is liaising directly with the BP ERC. Winslow said the Deepwater Horizon has drifted 1600' off of location and is at a 2-3 degree list. There is fuel in the water and sheen can be seen.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 5:24 a.m.	Paul Johnson called John Keeton to get status update. The fire is still burning on the Deepwater Horizon.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 5:31 a.m.	John Keeton called to have Paul Johnson and Mike W. conduct the Risk Assessment on shutting the well in and email it back to BP and do a conference call.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 5:37 a.m.	Keith Seilhan called to discuss details of supporting TOI in trying to shut in the well. Discussed conducting a Risk Assessment for doing this. Also mentioned continued support in helping with safety of personnel.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 6:36 a.m.	Paul Johnson called Bankston to talk to Daun Winslow. Talked with David Sims. Got clarification from David Sims that the Bankston never left the Deepwater Horizon and is in fact not at Nakika. Bankston unaware of plan forward.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 7:06 a.m.	Daun Winslow called. Did confirm with Winslow that the Rig crew tried to EDS from the Bridge. Winslow said the first incident occurred at approximately 9:30 p.m.. They attempted to EDS from the bridge, the lights functioned as expected. The lower annular was closed at the time of the incident. Winslow mentioned he saw the blocks fall right before he left the Rig.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 9:38 a.m.	Robert White called stating that the USCG and MMS wanted to land on the Ocean Endeavor and start interviewing people onboard. Cleared by TOI to land and board the Bankston and start interviewing.	Horizon Event Log

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
4/21/2010 Approx. 9:42 a.m.	BP is going to try and have a senior person onboard while interviews are being conducted. TOI confirmed Capt. Kutcha and Harrell will be onboard during the interviews.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 9:46 a.m.	Paul Johnson called the Rig to let them know the decision to have Kutcha supervise while interviews are taking place. The supervision team will be Kutcha and Ezell.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 9:49 – 10:28 a.m.	A transfer of six persons and two packages occurred on and off of the <i>Bankston</i> .	Testimony of Lieutenant Barbara Wilk (Marine Safety Unit Morgan City, Louisiana)
4/21/2010 Approx. 10:08 a.m.	Conference call with BP and USCG. USCG wants to drug test everyone dur to major event.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 10:28 a.m. – 2:09 p.m.	The <i>Bankston</i> was underway to the <i>Matterhorn</i> .	Testimony of Lieutenant Barbara Wilk (Marine Safety Unit Morgan City, Louisiana)
4/21/2010 Approx. 11:40 a.m.	Paul Johnson called the Bankston and talked with Harrell. Updated on operations prior to incident – just completed displacing the well to water when the well let go. No indication of a problem.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 12:32 p.m.	BP aligned with plan to get water curtain established to get ROV in to do remote stab to control well.	Horizon Event Log

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>
4/21/2010 Approx. 1:47 p.m.	Max Chouest and BO both on conference call. Issue is to communicate BP/TOI-aligned plan to all involved. Current procedure with risk assessment sent from Paul Johnson to BP – Ramsey Richards brought to Max Chouest same procedure 5 minutes ago – procedures being read now. No risk assessment attached. Group walking through procedures as far as RAMs being closed, etc. Procedure for ROV intervention and task risk assessment is in a final draft stage. Will be sent to TOI soon for approval. Daun Winslow stated that Max will get no closer than 1000 feet from Deepwater Horizon. Edison Chouest has given Max approval to do what we need to do, stated by Ramsey Richards.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 2:06 p.m.	Still on conference call. Ramsey is going to bridge to check on reports about the Horizon listing 30 degrees. BP will work on procedure and be complete at 3:00 p.m. Plan is to cut the open side hoses on the pipe rams first to release any trapped pressure. Pipe rams then pipe shears. If pipe rams close and shut in well, the close st locks.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 2:09 p.m.	The <i>Bankston</i> arrived at the <i>Matterhorn</i> platform.	Testimony of Lieutenant Barbara Wilk (Marine Safety Unit Morgan City, Louisiana)
4/21/2010 Approx. 2:09 – 2:39 p.m.	The <i>Bankston</i> set up and checked the dynamic positioning.	Testimony of Lieutenant Barbara Wilk (Marine Safety Unit Morgan City, Louisiana)

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
4/21/2010 Approx. 2:39 – 3:22 p.m.	The <i>Bankston</i> stood by for a "helo landing."	Testimony of Lieutenant Barbara Wilk (Marine Safety Unit Morgan City, Louisiana)
4/21/2010 Approx. 3:22 – 3:49 p.m.	Three Coast Guard personnel, two MMS personnel, and four Tidewater personnel came onboard the <i>Bankston</i> . Stephen Stone stated that "[w]e were told we had to give a written statement before we could leave the boat."	Testimony of Lieutenant Barbara Wilk (Marine Safety Unit Morgan City, Louisiana) Written Statement of Stephen Lane Stone before the House Judiciary Committee, May 27, 2010
4/21/2010 Approx. 6:20 p.m.	ROV deployed from MAX. After several attempts to close pipe rams, hydraulic pumps failed. ROV returned to deck.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 9:37 p.m.	Max Chouest ROV back in water to attempt to close pipe rams.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 10:00 p.m.	Drug testing issue debated with USCG, Steve Walker, and Paul Johnson. Issue decided – all will be drug tested in Fourchon.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010 Approx. 10:35 p.m.	ROV communicates no luck with pipe rams, attempting shears.	Horizon Event Log

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4/21/2010 Approx. 11:01 p.m.	C Express ROV arrives at stack. Attempt to cut the cord on the power shear rams in order to close the rams.	Horizon Event Log
4/21/2010	<p>Once the survivors arrived at Port Fourchon, a third-party company administered a urinalysis test on all the individuals onboard the <i>Bankston</i>.</p> <p>Upon making it back to land, Stephen Stone stated that "before we were allowed to leave, we were lined up and made to take a drug test."</p> <p>Rose met with Deepwater Horizon crew members. Rose stated that he listened to the experiences of some, and spent time comforting various people.</p>	<p>4/22/2010 Witness Statement of Curt Kuchta</p> <p>Written Statement of Stephen Lane Stone before the House Judiciary Committee, May 27, 2010</p> <p>Testimony of Adrian Rose at 5/26/2010 USCG/MMS Hearing</p>
4/21/2010	Brown stated that, rather than being allowed to go to a room and rest, he was immediately taken to a room and interrogated by two lawyers from Transocean in front of a court reporter.	Written Statement of Douglas Harold Brown before the House Judiciary Committee, May 27, 2010
Sometime after 4/20/2010	Transocean sent a Coast Guard safety alert to its United States fleet stating that it did not know the root cause of the Incident, and urging the fleet to review rig well practices and emergency evacuation procedures.	Testimony of Adrian Rose at 5/26/2010 USCG/MMS Hearing
4/22/2010 Approx. 1:39 a.m.	John K. called to inform us that Cameron says pulling the PBOF cable will make the rams fire.	Horizon Event Log

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<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>Event</u>	<u>Source</u>
4/22/2010 Approx. 1:43 a.m.	Mike W. called John K. to discuss pulling the PBOF cables.	Horizon Event Log
4/22/2010 Approx. 2:44 a.m.	Daun Winslow called. 4 PBOF cables have been pulled off.	Horizon Event Log
4/22/2010 Approx. 2:56 a.m.	John K. called. All 4 PBOF cables off. May have had dead man disarmed unintentionally..	Horizon Event Log
4/26/2010	A Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life form was submitted by Steven N. Walker, which attached a list of missing and hospitalized workers	4/26/2010 Report of Personal Injury or Loss of Life
4/27/2010	A Report of Vessel Casualty or Accident was submitted by Steven N. Walker	4/27/2010 Report of Vessel Casualty or Accident
5/1/2010	Stephen Stone stated that, in a Denny's restaurant without his lawyer present, a "Transocean representative ... asked [Stone] to sign a document stating [Stone] was not injured in order to get \$5000 for the loss of [Stone's] personal possessions." Stone stated that Transocean tried to tempt or trick him into giving up his legal rights. Stone stated that he "wouldn't sign the part saying [he] had 'suffered no injury'."	Written Statement of Stephen Lane Stone before the House Judiciary Committee, May 27, 2010
UNDATED	A Report of Marine Accident, Injury or Death was submitted by Steven N. Walker, which attached a list of missing and hospitalized workers	Report of Marine Accident, Injury or Death

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DATE/TIME	Event	SOURCE
2001	<i>Deepwater Horizon</i> began operations in 2001. Prior to the Incident, the <i>Deepwater Horizon</i> drilled over 50 wells, and all but one of them was drilled for BP.	5/5/2010 Interview of Randy Ezell
2001	MMS sends a set of draft rules concerning secondary control systems for BOP stacks to headquarters for approval. No action on the draft rules has taken place since that time.	Testimony of Mike Saucier, MMS Regional Supervisor for Field Operations, Gulf of Mexico Region (Tr. 7:23 – 8:1, May 12, 2010)