

File Note

Information regarding kick taken on Deepwater Horizon on March 8th 2010

During the BP Investigation into the blow out and subsequent loss of life and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon the Investigation Team were made aware of a kick that occurred on the same rig on March 8th 2010. The events of March 8th were reviewed to determine if there were any similarities between the two events.

*The Transocean Well Control Handbook (Manual Number HQS-OPS-HB-01, Issue Number 03, Revision Number 01, Revision Date March 31st, 2009) states the following:*

*The OIM must complete a Well Control Event Report (WCER) and send it to the Rig Manager Performance for review after any type of well control operation. The report must include an account of any equipment-related problems that may have occurred during the well control operation. Rigs equipped with a computerised kick detection system should have a printout of the recorded data from the well kick attached to the report. A copy of the report must be forwarded to the Well Operations Group and regional training centre.*

The Transocean Operations Event Report number OER-DWH-10-023 contains limited information is still "open" and states the following:

Event - While drilling 14 3/4" x 16 1/2" hole section. Driller observed increase in flow and drop in ECD. Well was flow checked and shut in.

Reason for event - Drilled into abnormal pressure.

Actions Taken to Correct Problem - Attempted to obtain shut in drill pipe pressure, unable to determine due to bottom hole assembly packed off.

Changes made to Prevent Re-Occurrence of Event - Still under review.

Total Online Downtime for Incident - 202 hours.

Hole size - 16.5      Well depth TVD - 13304      Well Depth MD - 13305


Casing size - 16.00      Casing shoe depth TVD/MD - 11585

Shut in Drill Pipe Pressure - 0 psi      Shut in Casing Pressure - 120 psi

Time allowed for pressure to stabilise - 30.00      Pit Gain Influx bbl: - 12.00

Mud Type - Rheliant      Leak Off Test - 12.50

Org Mud Weight - 11.9      MAASP - 12.5



ECD at BHA - 12.34

Kick Tolerance - 0

BOP Size - 18.75

Rating -

Expected Kick Zone -

Type of Influx - Gas

Max pressure at surface while circulating influx -

Well Kill Method - Other

Riser Size - 19.5

Barite Stock - 548

Fluids Choke Line -

Choke Line Density -

Fluids Kill Line -

Fluids Kill Line Density -

The quality of this report is seen as poor and it would appear that no in depth investigation was made to determine why an influx of this magnitude was taken and why the response to close in the flowing well appears to have taken in the region of 33 minutes.

The BP Drilling and Wells Operations Practice Section 15.2.12 states:

A well control incident report shall be completed and documented within the Tr@ction reporting system following any well control incident.

To date no report can be found which refers to the incident on March 8th.

A presentation prepared by the BP Macondo well onshore engineering team stated the following.

- Drilling w/11.9 PPG SMW 12.41 ECD / 12.3 ESD
- Started taking influx while drilling at 936pm / shut in at 10:09 pm (30 mins)
- Picked up off bottom 10ft
- Shut lower annular
- 35 - 40 bbls gas influx
- SICP = 380 / Attempted to DP float with 500 psi - no communication
- Pipe stuck - fired jars (5' movement) and took overpull again
- Shutdown and measured pressures
- Expected influx from 10' sand at 13,250

The Driller on tour when the kick was taken was Dewey Revette.

Jason Anderson the Toolpusher who was involved in the Macondo blow out was on the rig at the time but it is not known if he was on tour.

The Transocean Drillers Report completed by for March 8th states the following:

12:00 - 15:00 Continue drilling from 12575' to 12852'. Pump 80 bbl high vis pill @ 12850'. Raise mud weight from 11.8 ppg to 11.9 ppg. Control drill due to ECD 12.4 @ 12807. Drilling parameters are as follows: WOB:3/4K, Pump #3 and #4 @ 86 SPM,

boost pump #2 @ 75 SPM:830 psi (400 GPM), Pump pressure:3410 psi. Tor: 10/11K, RPM:135, Rot:514K, O/B Tor:3/4K, PU:528K, S/O509K. Monitor well on active system for gains and losses.

15:00 - 16:30 Circulate @ 12,852' to lower ECD (12.41). Pump remaining B/U from first high vis pill. Pump 100 bbls high vis pill @ 12,852. Monitor well on active system for gains and losses.

16:30 - 22:00 Continue to drill from 12,852' to 13,305'. Mud weight 11.9 ppg. Drilling parameters are as follows: WOB 3/4K, Pump #3 and #4 @ 88 SPM each (950 GPM), Pump pressure: 3600 psi. Tor:10/12K, RPM:135, Rot:522K, OB-Tor:4/5K, P/U:538K, S/O:517K. Monitor well on active system for gains and losses.

22:00 - 00:00 Observe gain of 10 - 12 bbls. Picked up off bottom. Checked for flow well flowing. Shut well in on lower annul @ 22:05 hours with estimated:35 bbl gain. Monitor pressure and record data, attempt to open float in drill pipe to establish drill pipe pressure by bring pump #4 to 2 SPM. Drill pipe pressure 480 - 500 psi. Casing pressure:380 psi. No communication established, continue to monitor pressure and record data.

The BP's Openwells Report completed by Earl Lee and Murray Sepulvado for March 8th is very similar but with the following exceptions:

22:00 - 00:00 Observed gain in flow returns and pits. PWD dropped from 12.4 PPG to 12.32 PPG. Picked up off bottoms and check for flow. Well flowing. Shut well in on lower annular @ 22:05 hrs with an estimated gain of 35 bbls. Monitor pressure and record data attempt to open float in drill pipe to establish drill pipe pressure by bringing pump #4 up at 2 SPM. Drill pipe pressure (480 - 500 psi) Casing pressure (380 psi). No communication.

Established (packed off) attempt to work pipe and fired jars. Pipe travelled 5' before taking over pull again. Still unable to communicate between drill pipe and annulus continue to monitor pressures.

The attached pressure plot provides information on what real time data was plotted at the time.

Conclusion - The quality of the investigation and subsequent report produced by Transocean is poor and does not establish why it took the time that it did to shut in the well with the resulting volume of influx.

Conclusion - No record of a BP investigation can be found in BP's Tr@ction System.

Conclusion - The Driller who was on tour during the Macondo well blow out was also on tour during the March 8th kick.

Conclusion - The Tool pusher who was on tour during the Macondo well blow out was on the Deepwater Horizon during the March 8th kick. It is not known if he was on tour at the time.