

# Deposition Testimony of:

## **Douglas Brown**

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Page 11:13 to 11:18

00011:13 Would the court reporter please  
14 swear in the witness.  
15 DOUGLAS H. BROWN,  
16 after having been first duly sworn by the  
17 above-mentioned court reporter, did testify  
18 as follows:

Page 11:20 to 11:22

00011:20 Q. Morning, Mr. Brown. My name is  
21 Scott Bickford and I represent the  
22 Plaintiffs Steering Committee, who is the

Page 14:19 to 15:08

00014:19 Go ahead and give me your name  
20 and address for the record, please.  
21 A. Douglas H. Brown. [REDACTED]  
22 [REDACTED],  
23 [REDACTED].  
24 Q. And, Mr. Brown, what is your  
25 educational background?  
00015:01 A. I graduated high school. I went  
02 on from there to take a few courses in  
03 college and then proceeded to join the Army  
04 where I took some technical vocation  
05 schools for marine engineering. After  
06 serving a -- or -- you know, in the Army  
07 for about ten years, I was hired on to  
08 Transocean.

Page 16:17 to 17:11

00016:17 Q. All right. And you said that  
18 you had some technical training in the Army  
19 toward marine engineering. What was that?  
20 A. Marine -- watercraft marine  
21 engineering courses 10 and 20.  
22 Q. All right. And what did that  
23 consist of generally?  
24 A. It consisted of training me to  
25 work on ships, repair engines and other  
00017:01 systems, winches, cranes, various  
02 mechanicals.  
03 Q. And how long were those courses?  
04 A. The first one was, I would say,  
05 about six months. The second one was four  
06 months, I believe.  
07 Q. All right. And in the course of  
08 your service in the Army, did you actually  
09 go out and repair ship engines, winches and

10 cranes?  
11 A. Yes.

Page 18:09 to 18:22

00018:09 Q. All right. And upon being  
10 honorably discharged from the Army, what  
11 did you do?  
12 A. Well, prior -- the weeks prior  
13 to actually ending my Army contract, I  
14 started sending out resumes, and R&B Falcon  
15 was the one who picked me up. And I worked  
16 for them until Transocean bought them out  
17 in 2000, I think it was.  
18 Q. All right. When you went to  
19 work for Falcon, where did you go to work?  
20 A. I first started on a rig off the  
21 -- in the Gulf of Mexico called the Sea  
22 Kirk Ryan.

Page 19:04 to 19:07

00019:04 Q. All right. And the -- what type  
05 of rig was the Sea Kirk Ryan?  
06 A. It was a non-propelled  
07 semisubmersible.

Page 19:13 to 19:16

00019:13 Q. When you went aboard the Sea  
14 Kirk Ryan, what was your rank or title or  
15 job?  
16 A. I was assistant mechanic.

Page 19:21 to 20:17

00019:21 Q. The -- how long did you stay  
22 aboard the Sea Kirk Ryan?  
23 A. It wasn't long. It was maybe  
24 nine months.  
25 Q. And from there, where did you  
00020:01 go?  
02 A. From there I went to the  
03 PATHFINDER.  
04 Q. All right. And what kind of  
05 vessel was the Pathfinder or --  
06 A. Drill ship.  
07 Q. And what was your job  
08 description aboard the Pathfinder?  
09 A. I was still assistant mechanic.  
10 Q. All right. And how long were  
11 you aboard the Pathfinder?  
12 A. About another 18 months.

13 Q. All right. And did your job  
14 title change while you were aboard the  
15 Pathfinder?  
16 A. Not until I left the Pathfinder  
17 and was promoted to chief mechanic.

Page 22:09 to 23:06

00022:09 Q. All right. When you left the  
10 Pathfinder, where did you go?  
11 A. I was promoted to chief mechanic  
12 and I was assigned to the DEEPWATER  
13 HORIZON, which was still being built in  
14 Korea.  
15 Q. And did you actually go to Korea  
16 to participate in the final construction of  
17 the vessel?  
18 A. Yes, I did.  
19 Q. Did you actually have any role  
20 in the final construction of the vessel?  
21 A. No. It was still under the  
22 control of Korea at that time, and so all's  
23 we could really do was wander around  
24 and -- and explore it.  
25 Q. Okay. And how long were you in  
00023:01 Korea wandering around and exploring the  
02 DEEPWATER HORIZON?  
03 A. For a full month. And when I  
04 came back from my next hitch after that, we  
05 were actually putting it in the water and  
06 starting to take care of it on our own.

Page 23:09 to 24:17

00023:09 From the time that the DEEPWATER  
10 HORIZON was in the shipyard in Korea until  
11 the time it sank, sometime after  
12 April -- whoa -- up until April 20th, 2010,  
13 were you always assigned to the DEEPWATER  
14 HORIZON?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. All right. And during that time  
17 period, did your job title change from  
18 chief mechanic to anything else?  
19 A. Chief mechanic to slash acting  
20 second engineer.  
21 Q. All right. And why did your job  
22 title change from chief mechanic to acting  
23 second engineer?  
24 A. At first when I came aboard, I  
25 was still a rig mechanic, is what they were  
00024:01 calling -- basically working more with the  
02 drilling equipment. And I was -- because  
03 of my background in marine engineer, I was

04 moved to the engineering department where  
05 my job basically returned to working on  
06 engines and auxiliary equipment.

07 Q. How long a period of time were  
08 you a rig mechanic associated with the  
09 drilling equipment onboard the DEEPWATER  
10 HORIZON?

11 A. Three -- two and a half, three  
12 years.

13 Q. All right. So since  
14 approximately 2004 until April of 2010, you  
15 served in the mechanic position and/or  
16 acting second engineer; is that fair?

17 A. Yes.

Page 24:23 to 25:12

00024:23 Q. Okay. I assume that, based on  
24 the certificate that we put into evidence,  
25 that between the time of -- the time that  
00025:01 you were assigned to the DEEPWATER HORIZON  
02 in April 20th, 2010, you attended a number  
03 of courses, training courses?

04 A. Yes.

05 Q. All right. And those -- those  
06 training courses and -- just generally  
07 included what kind of courses?

08 A. Engine repair, advanced engine  
09 repair, firefighting, environmental waste  
10 management, watercraft survival. There  
11 were others, but I can't recall the titles  
12 for them.

Page 25:21 to 27:19

00025:21 Q. What -- what-- when you went to  
22 work, what did you do as a rig mechanic  
23 onboard --

24 A. As rig mechanic?

25 Q. -- the DEEPWATER HORIZON?

00026:01 Yes.

02 A. I did maintenance on -- on the  
03 drilling equipment, both on the rig floor  
04 and in the shaker houses, the cranes. That  
05 was basically it.

06 Q. Okay. And the -- when you  
07 became a -- when you became an acting --  
08 when you weren't working on the drilling  
09 equipment, what would it be?

10 A. Working on the diesel  
11 generators, the diesel engines, all the  
12 auxiliary equipment such as potable water,  
13 fire systems, thrusters, gas, oil,  
14 pneumatic. Pretty much anything that's

15 going to be sustaining the rig environment  
16 and plus its power.  
17 Q. And when you were given title of  
18 acting second engineer, did your job duties  
19 change?  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. And how did they change?  
22 A. They changed from where I don't  
23 even have anything to do with the rig  
24 drilling equipment to only the engineering  
25 and power sources.  
00027:01 Q. All right. And approximately  
02 when did that -- when did that change  
03 occur? When -- when were you given the  
04 title of acting second engineer?  
05 A. I would have to say, roughly,  
06 somewhere around 2004.  
07 Q. Now, while you were aboard the  
08 DEEPWATER HORIZON, the operator of the rig  
09 was who?  
10 A. When I -- when I was onboard the  
11 DEEPWATER HORIZON, the operator was --  
12 Q. Who was leasing the rig?  
13 A. Who was leasing it? BP.  
14 Q. All right. And during your --  
15 the entire period of time that you were  
16 aboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON, did anyone  
17 else lease the rig to your knowledge?  
18 A. We drilled one well for BHP, I  
19 recall.

Page 27:25 to 28:13

00027:25 Q. All right. Fair enough. During  
00028:01 the time period that you were on the  
02 DEEPWATER HORIZON, from the time it was  
03 launched in Korea until April 20th, 2010,  
04 did the DEEPWATER HORIZON ever go into a  
05 shipyard for servicing or repair?  
06 A. No.  
07 Q. Was there any -- did you have  
08 any knowledge that the DEEPWATER HORIZON  
09 was ever scheduled to go into a shipyard or  
10 facility for repair servicing?  
11 A. It was scheduled to in 2011, was  
12 the first I've ever heard about it  
13 happening.

Page 29:20 to 33:20

00029:20 Q. Okay. Sir, did any  
21 representative of BP, while you were on the  
22 DEEPWATER HORIZON, ever question the  
23 competency of the mechanics or engineers

24 aboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON?  
25 A. Not to my knowledge.

00030:01 Q. Did anyone at -- who was a  
02 representative of BP or an employee of BP  
03 on the DEEPWATER HORIZON ever ask for your  
04 opinions or sought your advice for  
05 operations or maintenance on the DEEPWATER  
06 HORIZON?  
07 A. No.  
08 Q. Sir, I am going to direct your  
09 attention to September of 2009 and a rig  
10 audit that was done by BP on the DEEPWATER  
11 HORIZON. Are you aware of this generally?  
12 A. I heard about it. I was not  
13 onboard at the time.  
14 Q. All right. So it's fair to say  
15 that you did not participate in the audit  
16 at all?  
17 A. No.  
18 Q. Did you see any results of the  
19 audit?  
20 A. Yes. When I came back to my  
21 tour of duty, I saw a list of compromised  
22 -- compromising of deficiencies that were  
23 discovered, and which ones were allotted to  
24 us in the engineer department that we  
25 needed to fix.

00031:01 Q. Okay. Did you see a complete  
02 list or was it a partial list to your  
03 knowledge?  
04 A. Partial.  
05 Q. All right. And the -- the tasks  
06 on the particular list, where did you  
07 understand those came from?  
08 A. I don't understand.  
09 Q. I mean, did you understand that  
10 that was part of the results of the audit?  
11 A. Yes.  
12 Q. All right. The -- the items  
13 that were on there were -- when you say  
14 "deficiencies," they were things that  
15 needed to be fixed in -- in -- in my -- my  
16 terms?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. And did you all go about the  
19 task of fixing those items?  
20 A. We didn't have time at the -- at  
21 that moment.  
22 Q. Okay. And the -- that was in  
23 September of 2009?  
24 A. Yes, I believe so.  
25 Q. All right. It was prior to the

00032:01 DEEPWATER HORIZON moving to the Macondo  
02 well; would that be fair?  
03 A. Yes.

04 Q. All right. The -- prior to  
05 moving to the Macondo well, did you have  
06 time to get -- and when I say "you," did  
07 you -- you and the individuals that worked  
08 with you, have time to get to those items  
09 that were deficient?  
10 A. No.  
11 Q. Would it have been evident to --  
12 from your standpoint, would it have been  
13 evident to other people on the rig that  
14 those items had not been gotten to?  
15 MR. HAYCRAFT:  
16 Object to the form.  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. Okay. Why?  
19 A. Because we had higher priority  
20 things that we needed to fix first. There  
21 was broken down items that took priority.  
22 And so that was brought to the attention of  
23 our supervisors above us.  
24 Q. Did -- did -- with regard to the  
25 items that remained deficient, the items  
00033:01 that you weren't able to get to, were you  
02 ever questioned by any representative of BP  
03 as to why those things hadn't been done?  
04 A. No.  
05 Q. Okay. Did you have an  
06 understanding whether or not a  
07 representative from BP would have known  
08 that those items remained undone?  
09 MR. HAYCRAFT:  
10 Object to the form.  
11 A. I do not know.  
12 Q. Prior to April 20th, 2010, have  
13 those -- had you been able to get to the  
14 list of deficient items?  
15 A. No.  
16 Q. Would the fact that you hadn't  
17 been able to get to the list of deficient  
18 items been evident to other people working  
19 on the rig?  
20 A. I would believe so.

Page 34:01 to 34:13

00034:01 Q. Did anyone from BP between time  
02 the DEEPWATER HORIZON arrived at the  
03 Macondo well site until April 20, 2010,  
04 question you as to whether or not the items  
05 that were deficient in the -- from the 2009  
06 rig audit had been completed?  
07 A. No.  
08 Q. Sir, when you first started  
09 working on the DEEPWATER HORIZON, was there  
10 a full-time -- and I mean -- when I mean



11 full-time, I mean someone there on a 24 and  
12 7 basis -- from BP who was charged with  
13 overseeing safety on the DEEPWATER HORIZON?

Page 34:16 to 35:05

00034:16 A. At what time?  
17 Q. When you first started, when the  
18 ship -- when -- when the rig first left  
19 Korea on -- on to its --  
20 A. Yes. Yes, there was.  
21 Q. And what was the title of that  
22 person, in your mind?  
23 A. I don't recall his title, but it  
24 was BP safety somebody.  
25 Q. All right. And what did you  
00035:01 understand that person's duties to be  
02 onboard the vessel?  
03 A. To oversee that safety on the  
04 rig was taken -- taking place in a proper  
05 manner and under the right procedures.

Page 35:19 to 37:10

00035:19 Q. Did there come a time when  
20 the -- that person was no longer a --  
21 someone that was on every shift?  
22 A. Yes.  
23 Q. And can you tell me  
24 approximately when?  
25 A. I would say a year -- year or so  
00036:01 prior to the incident.  
02 Q. Prior to April 20th, 2010?  
03 A. Correct.  
04 Q. And at that time how did -- how  
05 did -- how did it change in terms of -- how  
06 did -- did that person -- was a person in  
07 that position, did they still come aboard  
08 the DEEPWATER HORIZON?  
09 A. From what I was told, yes, he  
10 would make periodic inspections of the rig.  
11 Q. Did you see this person anymore?  
12 A. Only once.  
13 Q. All right. And when was that?  
14 A. I would say within the couple  
15 months or so before the April 20th.  
16 Q. And why do you recall that  
17 particular instance?  
18 A. I don't know. It was just -- I  
19 was just walking down the hall and there he  
20 was.  
21 Q. Okay. Was it the same -- was it  
22 the same gentleman that had been there on  
23 previous occasions?

24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. Now, the DEEPWATER HORIZON moved  
00037:01 to the Macondo well site in or about  
02 January of 2010; is that your recollection?  
03 A. Yeah, somewhere in there.  
04 Q. All right. And even though your  
05 duties didn't directly involve drilling  
06 operations did you have an understanding  
07 between January and April of 2010, how the  
08 progress of this particular well was going,  
09 whether it was on schedule, behind  
10 schedule, in front of schedule?

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00037:25 A. I had heard just from different  
00038:01 workers on the rig during mealtimes or  
02 breaks, different times like that, how  
03 things were going and what was happening.  
04 Q. Okay. What was your  
05 understanding of how things were going  
06 during --  
07 A. Not good.  
08 Q. -- that period of time?  
09 A. Not good.  
10 Q. All right. And what was -- what  
11 was your understanding of why they weren't  
12 good?  
13 A. There were well issues with the  
14 well itself, and there were -- at different  
15 times I heard there was some little  
16 mechanical deficiencies. But mostly it was  
17 about the well itself. That the well was  
18 doing this or the well's doing that. The  
19 rig, or the -- the rig -- the well ate our  
20 -- our drill and it's stuck in there now.  
21 Just different things.  
22 Q. And -- and you, obviously, have  
23 been on other well sites over the -- the  
24 ten -- the 8 or 9 years that you have been  
25 drilling on the DEEPWATER HORIZON. Was  
00039:01 this well any different than other wells  
02 that you had been on?  
03 MR. HAYCRAFT:  
04 Object to the form.  
05 A. Yes.  
06 Q. How so?  
07 A. Well, we termed this the well  
08 from hell. Out of all my years I have seen  
09 gas levels maybe get up to a thousand units  
10 before, but this one was the first one I  
11 have ever been on that -- that the gas  
12 levels in units rose all the way up to  
13 about 3,000.  
14 Q. All right. And when you say gas

15 levels, just for someone who doesn't really  
16 understand what you're talking about, what  
17 -- what are you talking about?  
18 A. Gas that was coming out of the  
19 mud as they were drilling.  
20 Q. All right. And how were those  
21 gas levels measured?  
22 A. I do not know how they're  
23 measured.  
24 Q. All right. How did you know  
25 what the -- what the measurement was?  
00040:01 A. Because they've always called it  
02 out over the PA system.  
03 Q. Okay. And so -- so as you're --  
04 as you're in the course and scope of your  
05 work onboard the -- the rig, they're  
06 calling out what the gas levels are on the  
07 PA system?  
08 A. Yes.  
09 Q. All right. And you had never  
10 heard gas levels that had been announced as  
11 high as the ones on this particular well?  
12 A. Correct.

Page 41:07 to 42:10

00041:07 Q. All right. And where did you  
08 work during this period of time while the  
09 DEEPWATER HORIZON was at the Macondo well?  
10 Where -- where was your principal base of  
11 operation onboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON?  
12 A. In the aft area of the rig where  
13 the diesel engines and other power systems  
14 were at.  
15 Q. All right. And were you ever  
16 assigned to what's known as the ECR?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. All right. And what is -- what  
19 is that?  
20 A. Engine control room.  
21 Q. All right. And outside of being  
22 in the engine control room, did you work in  
23 other places on the rig?  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. And when you did so, what were  
00042:01 you doing generally? And I'm talking about  
02 this three months -- four-month period  
03 between January and April of 2010.  
04 A. Mostly repairs. But when we had  
05 time, maintenance.  
06 Q. All right. And they were  
07 repairs on the -- on the mechanical aspects  
08 of the -- of the rig, the engines and the  
09 thrusters and that type of thing?  
10 A. Yes.

Page 42:16 to 46:23

00042:16 Q. Can you tell me in terms  
17 of -- in the ERC, what type of controls or  
18 monitoring are in the -- I'm sorry -- in  
19 the ECR?  
20 A. We had a Simrad system where we  
21 can, with our screens, we can control  
22 various functions of the -- of the engines  
23 and other rig systems and auxiliary  
24 equipment.  
25 Q. All right. And could you  
00043:01 actually steer the DEEPWATER HORIZON from  
02 the ECR?  
03 A. There is that capability.  
04 Q. All right. And when you said  
05 the Simrad system, is this the same Simrad  
06 system that they have in the bridge?  
07 A. Yes.  
08 Q. All right. And does the Simrad  
09 system in the ECR illuminate, for instance,  
10 alarms for high combustible gas?  
11 A. Yes, it can.  
12 Q. All right. And does the Simrad  
13 system within the ECR have the capacity for  
14 what's called emergency shutdown?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. All right. Let me ask you a  
17 couple of questions about the engines.  
18 Now, you worked directly on the engines?  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. Okay. And they were Wartsilla  
21 engines?  
22 A. Yes.  
23 Q. All right. And you actually had  
24 been to classes to learn how to maintain  
25 and operate Wartsilla engines?  
00044:01 A. Yes.  
02 Q. All right. And the -- were the  
03 engines that were aboard the DEEPWATER  
04 HORIZON equipped with governors or  
05 automatic shut-offs for emergency  
06 situations?  
07 A. Yes.  
08 Q. All right. Can you explain to  
09 me what emergency shut-offs and governors  
10 were in place on those engines?  
11 A. They had quite a number of them.  
12 They had two different overspeed trips on  
13 them, a high frequency shutoff. A lobe --  
14 a low lube oil pressure shutoff. A  
15 low -- a low -- I should say -- that's  
16 correct. A low oil level shutoff. Charge  
17 air, charge air high temperature shutoff.

18 Let's see. And a charge air shutoff for  
19 low pressure. And I believe there's a  
20 -- yeah, a fuel shutoff alarm. That's all  
21 I can recall right now.

22 Q. Okay. And let's -- let's  
23 just -- and just so that I'm clear, the low  
24 lube oil shutoff and the low oil level  
25 shutoff are two different things?

00045:01 A. Yes.

02 Q. All right. The -- the two  
03 overspeed trips, what are those,  
04 specifically?

05 A. One was a mechanical, which  
06 basically does -- works on a droop system.

07 Q. Okay. You have to tell me what  
08 a droop system is.

09 A. Basically it's a mechanism by  
10 the camshaft that spins, and if the RPMs  
11 rev up too high, that spin will cause these  
12 droop balls to spread apart. And if they  
13 get to a certain point that they're set at,  
14 they will shut-off the fuel and the air and  
15 basically kill the engine.

16 Q. All right. So they -- the --  
17 the -- if the droop balls get too far  
18 apart, they trigger a mechanism  
19 which -- which shuts the fuel off, correct?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. All right. And then when you  
22 say, shuts the air off, what air intake?

23 A. The air intakes to the -- from  
24 the turbo, turbo charges.

25 Q. Okay. Directly on the engine --

00046:01 A. Yes.

02 Q. -- versus air intake in the  
03 room?

04 A. Correct.

05 Q. And you said there were -- and  
06 what is the second overspeed trip?

07 A. That one is electrical, and the  
08 electronic technicians basically set that  
09 one. They had to go into the control panel  
10 behind the engine and set it electrically.

11 Q. All right. And what is your  
12 understanding of what that does?

13 A. Yes, if RPMs get too high,  
14 again, basically same -- same thing. It's  
15 sensed electrically what the RPMs are at  
16 and shuts the engine down.

17 Q. And how does it go about  
18 shutting the engine down?

19 A. Basically the same thing as the  
20 mechanical one.

21 Q. Okay. It would shut the fuel  
22 off and it would starve the engine of air?

23 A. Correct.

Page 47:12 to 49:11

00047:12 Q. All right. So if the frequency  
13 of electricity on the rig exceeded some  
14 level above 60 hertz, the engine would shut  
15 down?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And this is basically to save  
18 electrical components --

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. -- and things from being  
21 damaged?

22 A. Sure.

23 Q. And how -- what is your  
24 understanding of how the high frequency  
25 shutoff would work on a Wartsilla engine.

00048:01 A. I only know really one thing  
02 that it does and it -- it disconnects the  
03 breaker from the engine to the -- or from  
04 the generator to the main bus of the rig.

05 Q. Okay. And what effect would  
06 that have on the engine? How does --

07 A. The engine would probably keep  
08 running, but it wouldn't be connected  
09 power-wise to the rig.

10 Q. Okay. So the engine could keep  
11 running, but the rig won't be feeding any  
12 power into it?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. I -- I -- I take it that the low  
15 lube oil and the low oil level shutoffs  
16 would be there to safeguard against --

17 A. Damage.

18 Q. -- the lack of lube or oil?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. All right. And then the -- I  
21 assume that the high temperature shutoff,  
22 and please correct me if I'm wrong, would  
23 shut the engine down if the temperature and  
24 the engine exceeded some level?

25 A. Yes.

00049:01 Q. All right. And does the high  
02 temperature shutoff work in the same manner  
03 as the overspeed trips --

04 A. Yes.

05 Q. -- to your knowledge?

06 A. Yes.

07 Q. Okay. If -- on -- directing  
08 your attention to April 20th, 2010, at the  
09 time of the incident, what engines were  
10 running to your knowledge?

11 A. Engine 3 and 6.

Page 49:24 to 50:02

00049:24 When you were onboard-- you were  
25 onboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON on April  
00050:01 20th, 2010, correct?  
02 A. Yes.

Page 52:04 to 53:02

00052:04 Q. All right. Then  
05 directing -- what -- was there any --- in  
06 the days leading up to April 20th, 2010,  
07 were there any significant instances aboard  
08 the DEEPWATER HORIZON that you recall,  
09 not -- leaving out April 20th.  
10 A. I remember the pipe got stuck at  
11 one point and after trying everything to  
12 get it free, they ended up having to -- I  
13 don't want to say cut. I think they sent  
14 down a charge and blew the pipe section  
15 apart.  
16 When I came back for another  
17 hitch, I remember hearing something about  
18 an incident with a rubber piece  
19 that -- that came up out of the well that  
20 they determined it was nothing to worry  
21 about, and the constant gas problems we  
22 had, little minor kicks, and gas coming out  
23 of the mud.  
24 Q. And had you experienced those  
25 constellation of problems on other wells  
00053:01 that you had --  
02 A. Yes.

Page 53:07 to 55:11

00053:07 Q. All right. Directing your  
08 attention to April 20th, 2010, when did you  
09 come on tour?  
10 A. On the 20th?  
11 Q. Yes.  
12 A. At 12 o'clock.  
13 Q. All right. And was there a  
14 pre-tour meeting?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. And was that a pre-tour meeting  
17 a regularly occurring meeting?  
18 A. Yes.  
19 Q. And on the morning of April 20,  
20 2010, was there anything out of the  
21 ordinary which occurred at that meeting?  
22 A. Yes.  
23 Q. What was that?

24 A. I -- okay. Well, first off, I  
 25 don't really deal anymore with the drilling  
 00054:01 side of things, so I would basically go to  
 02 the pre-tour meetings to kind of just get  
 03 an idea of what the daily rig jobs were  
 04 going to be for that day. So I just kind  
 05 of had an inkling of what was going on  
 06 elsewhere. And at the time the driller,  
 07 Dewey, was -- was relating to everyone on  
 08 what the -- what they were going to be  
 09 doing on the drill floor that day. And  
 10 then at some juncture the BP company man  
 11 interjected saying, no, there's been some  
 12 changes to that. And so they started going  
 13 back and forth about that.

14 Q. Okay. When you say "they"  
 15 started going back, who was they?

16 A. They, the BP representative and  
 17 the driller.

18 Q. And the driller was who?

19 A. Dewey, Dewey --

20 Q. Revette?

21 A. Revette. And -- let's see, the  
 22 senior tool pusher.

23 Q. And who was that?

24 A. That was Randy Ezell and Jimmy  
 25 Harrell, the OAM.

00055:01 Q. All right. And can you describe  
 02 to me what you witnessed or heard?

03 A. They were talking about -- or  
 04 going back and forth about the change to  
 05 the plan, which was going to be displacing  
 06 the pipe with seawater.

07 Q. And what did you understand that  
 08 to be? What -- what -- what did you --  
 09 when I say what did you understand that to  
 10 be, what do you -- what do you mean,  
 11 displacing the pipe with seawater?

Page 55:14 to 56:12

00055:14 A. Well, from what I know, that's  
 15 the point where they are going to pump out  
 16 the drilling fluid or drilling mud and  
 17 replace it with seawater.

18 Q. From the drill string?

19 A. Correct.

20 Q. All right. Okay. And so what  
 21 happened?

22 A. I was -- I was catching from the  
 23 driller, the OAM, and all them, that they  
 24 felt this was too premature, that some --

25 Q. What was too premature?

00056:01 A. The displacement, and  
 02 that -- I'm trying to think of the term.



03 Well, it's more testing and other things  
04 needed to be looked at first before they  
05 proceeded with that. And I definitely do  
06 recall the company man saying, well, sorry  
07 that's the way it's going to be.  
08 Q. And -- and how -- how would you  
09 describe the tenure of the conversation?  
10 Was it a calm conversation versus --  
11 A. No. It was a little heated,  
12 tense.

Page 56:18 to 57:17

00056:18 Q. And what occurred after the BP  
19 representative said, well, that's the way  
20 it's going to be?  
21 A. Pretty much Dewey said, well,  
22 we'll iron all this out up on the drill  
23 floor, and the meeting broke up then. And  
24 as the -- as everyone was leaving, I heard  
25 Jimmy mumble to himself, well, that's what  
00057:01 we have those pinchers for. And, of  
02 course, I know -- I know what he was  
03 talking about. He was talking about the  
04 shear rams and the BOP.  
05 Q. And what did you -- what was  
06 your understanding of why he would be  
07 referring to the shear rams and the BOP?  
08 MR. HAYCRAFT:  
09 Object to the form.  
10 A. That the possibility of  
11 something going wrong could happen.  
12 Q. Did anything else occur after  
13 you heard Mr. Harrell make those remarks?  
14 A. No. From there I went on back  
15 to the ECR and we started work and I had no  
16 thought about it again until things went  
17 south.

Page 58:06 to 58:13

00058:06 Q. Mr. Brown, before the break we  
07 had discussed the issue of the pre-tour  
08 meeting that you were at on April 20th and  
09 the remarks of the BP company men at that  
10 meeting. Was there any question in your  
11 mind at the end of that meeting who was  
12 making the final drilling decisions on the  
13 DEEPWATER HORIZON that day?

Page 58:16 to 58:17

00058:16 A. How it sounded to me, the BP

17 company man.

Page 59:02 to 59:03

00059:02 (Exhibit 1722 was marked  
03 for identification.)

Page 61:04 to 61:09

00061:04 Q. Okay. And when you finished the  
05 work, what did you do?  
06 A. I came back up into the ECR and  
07 assigned my two motormen to fill out the  
08 work permit and proper paperwork to unlock  
09 the equipment and -- so we could test it.

Page 61:12 to 63:14

00061:12 Q. Okay. And approximately what  
13 time was that?  
14 A. Around 9:15, 9:30.  
15 Q. P.M.?  
16 A. P.M.  
17 Q. All right. And what happened  
18 then?  
19 A. Well, at that time I sat down at  
20 my desk and computer and I started to do  
21 the nightly log and logbook.  
22 Q. Okay. And up until that time  
23 during -- during your -- during your tour,  
24 had you noticed anything peculiar going on  
25 on the rig?  
00062:01 A. Nothing whatsoever.  
02 Q. All right. You started doing  
03 your logbook. Then what happened?  
04 A. I recall that we started -- it  
05 started with hearing. We started hearing  
06 like a venting sound, something stronger  
07 than just air, a broken air line escaping.  
08 It was pretty darn loud and enough to know  
09 that -- make you feel that's odd. Never  
10 heard that before. And all -- and also we  
11 started getting some gas alarms.  
12 Q. When -- when this venting  
13 started, was it an abrupt incident?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. And from the time that  
16 this -- that you heard this venting noise  
17 until you got -- started getting gas  
18 alarms, approximately how much time passed?  
19 A. It was under five seconds. It  
20 was really quick?  
21 Q. The -- when you said you start

22 getting gas alarms, how did you get a gas  
23 alarm in the ECR?  
24 A. We have back there what is  
25 called the ESD panel, which is basically  
00063:01 emergency shutdowns for each one of the  
02 engines and other auxiliary compartments.  
03 And also on that board are -- is gas -- gas  
04 alarm. It's --  
05 Q. Okay. And is this -- there has  
06 been some testimony previously that there  
07 is gas alarms in the ESD panels and the  
08 bridge. Is this the same system?  
09 A. Yes.  
10 Q. In fact, isn't it an identical  
11 system to what's in the bridge?  
12 A. They have an ESD panel same as  
13 mine, but they -- they also have a more  
14 sophisticated console for it, too.

Page 64:01 to 65:23

00064:01 Q. So what do you see or hear in  
02 terms of gas alarms?  
03 A. The ESD panel was lighting up on  
04 one compartment. The gas was sensed there  
05 and then just one by one all the rest  
06 started -- started flashing.  
07 Q. Okay. When you say started  
08 flashing, you were actually looking at a  
09 kind of map of the rig?  
10 A. No. It's -- it's listed.  
11 Q. Just by compartment?  
12 A. It may outline the compartments  
13 and then it will explain what compartment  
14 it is, and then there's a light or a couple  
15 of lights for the gas.  
16 Q. All right. And so what you  
17 started to witness was what?  
18 A. Well, what I was seeing with  
19 those alarms is that there is explosive gas  
20 in that compartment.  
21 Q. Okay. In what compartment?  
22 A. All of them. Everything but  
23 the -- well, could have been the engine  
24 rooms too, because everything was just  
25 lighting up.  
00065:01 Q. Okay. I mean, are we talking  
02 about 2 lights, 5 lights, 10 lights, 20  
03 lights?  
04 A. Each compartment has its own  
05 light or lights. One is for -- one is for  
06 hazardous and the other one is for  
07 critical.  
08 Q. And what -- what -- what lights  
09 were going on?

10 A. Critical.  
11 Q. And how many lights are we  
12 talking about on the panel?  
13 A. In the ballpark, around 10.  
14 Q. The -- is there an audible and a  
15 visual or it's just -- just a visual?  
16 A. Yes, there is both. The audible  
17 is just a little beeper on the panel that  
18 will just start giving off an electronic  
19 beep.  
20 Q. And so how long a period of time  
21 after the first light comes on does -- does  
22 -- does this whole cascade of lights start  
23 happening?

Page 66:01 to 66:02

00066:01 A. Split seconds.  
02 Q. And what happens then?

Page 66:15 to 68:16

00066:15 A. We were confused, what was going  
16 on, we didn't understand it. So I asked  
17 Brent to call the bridge to ask them, what  
18 was -- hey, what's going on?  
19 Q. And who is in the ECR at this  
20 point?  
21 A. It was all four of us at the  
22 time: Brent Mansfield, Willy Stoner, Paul  
23 Meinhart and me.  
24 Q. All right. And so does Brent  
25 call the bridge?  
00067:01 A. Yes.  
02 Q. What -- what does he learn?  
03 A. I recall him saying that they  
04 told him they were having a well condition  
05 and hung up on him.  
06 Q. Okay. How much time now has  
07 passed since you first heard this kind of  
08 gas venting or venting noise that you  
09 mentioned?  
10 A. A minute.  
11 Q. And are the alarms still going  
12 on?  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. Do any other alarms come on or  
15 does anything else happen in this --  
16 between the time of the -- that you heard  
17 the venting and the time he gets off the  
18 phone?  
19 A. Well, yes. Everything started  
20 going south real quick. I would say right  
21 after Brent made the phone call, we started

22 hearing the two engines, 3 and 6, ramping  
23 up in their RPMs. It was a gradual climb,  
24 but it just kept going and going and it  
25 never stopped.

00068:01 Q. And had you ever experienced  
02 that before --

03 A. No.

04 Q. -- the engines ramping up like  
05 that?

06 A. No.

07 Q. And normally what RPM are the  
08 engines run at?

09 A. They run at about 720 RPMs,  
10 constant.

11 Q. Okay. And what is your  
12 understanding of when the engine governors  
13 would trip in -- in terms of high RPM?

14 A. I believe the mechanical is set  
15 for 800. I can't quite recall, but it's in  
16 the low 800s.

Page 69:04 to 69:20

00069:04 All right. The -- when you  
05 heard this ramp up, how long a period of  
06 time are we talking about that this ramp up  
07 occurred?

08 A. It actually continued all the  
09 way to the first explosion.

10 Q. All right. And how long from  
11 the time that -- that Brent got off the  
12 phone until that first explosion,  
13 approximately how much time goes by?

14 A. Well, actually -- in between  
15 that, the power went out.

16 Q. Okay. So how long between the  
17 phone call and the power going out?

18 A. Seconds, up to -- up to about 45  
19 seconds, somewhere in there. I can't  
20 really quite recall.

Page 70:08 to 72:08

00070:08 Q. All right. When the power went  
09 off, did anything occur with the power  
10 going off?

11 A. To us in the ECR, the power just  
12 went off. From what I heard later, lights  
13 were exploding, TV screens and computer  
14 screens were blowing, and by blowing I  
15 means exploding. That's basically it.

16 Q. Okay. But just in terms of the  
17 -- the ECR, the power, you just went dark?

18 A. We just went dark.

19 Q. Okay. Now, do you have  
20 emergency lighting that comes on in the ECR  
21 when the power goes out?  
22 A. Yes.  
23 Q. Did it?  
24 A. No.  
25 Q. All right. So you're sitting  
00071:01 there in the dark. What's happening?  
02 A. Well, we still heard the venting  
03 going on. There's actually only two sounds  
04 we heard. It was the venting going and the  
05 two engines continuing to rev up higher.  
06 Q. And what are you doing at this  
07 point?  
08 A. Standing pretty much in the  
09 center of the room, just rock solid,  
10 because I knew at this point that something  
11 was seriously wrong. And so I didn't know  
12 what to do.  
13 Q. Do you have any understanding  
14 either then or in hindsight as to why you  
15 believe the power went out at that point?  
16 A. At that time, I assumed it was  
17 the high frequency trip that went off.  
18 Q. Okay. In -- in other words, the  
19 generator was producing so much power that  
20 the frequency changed, so it tripped the --  
21 A. Yeah.  
22 Q. -- the shutoff?  
23 A. Right.  
24 Q. And in -- in -- in laymen's  
25 terms, this would be a fuse blowing or a  
00072:01 circuit breaker tripping in a house?  
02 A. Yes.  
03 Q. Did the -- to your understanding  
04 either then or now, did the power go off  
05 rig-wide at that point?  
06 A. Yes, from my training and what I  
07 know about the functions of the rig, I was  
08 pretty sure the whole rig was black.

Page 74:03 to 75:01

00074:03 Q. Do you still hear the engines  
04 revving at that point?  
05 A. They -- I stopped hearing them  
06 just extreme split seconds before the  
07 explosion occurred, and it was basically  
08 because they were ramped up so high you  
09 couldn't hear them anymore.  
10 Q. Do you believe that the  
11 governors on the engines were functioning  
12 in the manner that they were supposed to?  
13 A. I don't know if they tripped.  
14 Right now, I'm going to have to say they

15 didn't if they were still able to rev up  
16 that high.  
17 Q. The -- based upon your  
18 experience, do you believe that the engine  
19 had revved beyond 820 or 850 RPMs at that  
20 point?  
21 A. Way beyond it.  
22 Q. So the explosion occurs. I  
23 mean, was it an explosion such that it was  
24 so loud that it hurt your ears kind of  
25 explosion?

00075:01 A. Yes.

Page 75:18 to 75:24

00075:18 Q. -- thing like that? When -- how  
19 long a period of time between the first  
20 explosion and the second explosion do you  
21 believe went by? More than a minute, less  
22 than a minute?  
23 A. I would say almost a minute, but  
24 more than likely under a minute.

Page 85:12 to 85:14

00085:12 Q. Did you, again, see any  
13 emergency lighting on or any lighting on?  
14 A. Nothing.

Page 89:03 to 90:10

00089:03 Q. What did you do upon immediately  
04 entering the bridge?  
05 A. I went up to the captain and I  
06 really don't know how much he really heard  
07 from me, but I told him -- I told him the  
08 ECR is gone. There's no way to run --  
09 start anything, stop anything. There's  
10 nothing that can be done back there.  
11 Q. What -- what's the -- first of  
12 all, what is the physical atmosphere like  
13 in the bridge at that time?  
14 A. Smoky, very dark.  
15 Q. Is there any lighting at all on  
16 the bridge?  
17 A. I don't remember any, no.  
18 Q. And how -- how good is the  
19 ambient lighting, the lighting coming in  
20 from outside?  
21 A. Pretty good because of the fire.  
22 Q. Okay. So that was kind of  
23 lighting up the -- that was the light  
24 source, primary light source inside the

25 bridge?  
00090:01 A. I would say it was the majority  
02 of it.  
03 Q. The -- how would you -- when you  
04 entered the bridge and started reporting to  
05 the captain, how would you describe what  
06 was going on as a whole in the bridge?  
07 A. Chaos, mayhem.  
08 Q. What were you hearing?  
09 A. I was hearing shouts, directions  
10 being yelled that weren't being enacted.

Page 90:18 to 90:24

00090:18 Q. All right. When you spoke to  
19 the captain, you -- you said you weren't  
20 sure whether he was hearing you or not.  
21 Why was that?  
22 A. Because his attention kept being  
23 directed elsewhere in different places  
24 while I was addressing him.

Page 91:09 to 93:06

00091:09 Q. Okay. Up till this point had  
10 you heard a -- any type -- I understand  
11 that you heard gas alarms that were on your  
12 panel. Had you heard any kind of general  
13 alarm that was sounded throughout the rig?  
14 A. No.  
15 Q. All right. Now, I understand  
16 from prior testimony that the alarm system  
17 onboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON consists of  
18 both audible alarms and visual alarms; is  
19 that correct?  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. All right. And the visual  
22 alarms I understand can show whether  
23 there's combustible gas or whether there's  
24 hazardous or poisonous gas and/or -- and/or  
25 fire; is that fair?  
00092:01 A. Yes.  
02 Q. All right. Did you see any  
03 visual alarms at any point during -- from  
04 the start of this incident until you got to  
05 the bridge?  
06 A. All's I saw was the gas, the gas  
07 alarms on the panel; and after that,  
08 nothing.  
09 Q. Okay. The gas alarms that were  
10 on your panel, would they show up anywhere  
11 else on the rig?  
12 A. Yes.  
13 Q. Where?



14 A. They would show up on the bridge  
 15 and the drill floor.  
 16 Q. All right. In the driller  
 17 shack?  
 18 A. In the driller shack.  
 19 Q. All right. Other than those  
 20 three locations, would those alarms be  
 21 either audible or visual to -- to -- to  
 22 anyone not in those locations?  
 23 A. I believe they would. As bad as  
 24 it was, I thought there would be rig-wide  
 25 audible and visual.  
 00093:01 Q. Okay. But did you ever see a  
 02 rig-wide audible or a visual?  
 03 A. Only during testings.  
 04 Q. But I'm talking about this  
 05 night.  
 06 A. No.

Page 113:21 to 114:08

00113:21 Q. Did you have any discussions  
 22 once you got aboard the DAMON BANKSTON as  
 23 to what might have been the cause of this?  
 24 A. At this time, yes, and there was  
 25 different ones saying it was a blowout.  
 00114:01 Q. Right. And who -- who were you  
 02 talking with specifically?  
 03 A. Different ones of my buddies who  
 04 were -- either worked on the bridge -- like  
 05 I talked to Yancy. I talked to some of the  
 06 other off-tour rig -- drill floor hands and  
 07 drilling. Yeah, they told me basically  
 08 what happened was a blowout.

Page 118:05 to 118:19

00118:05 Q. Okay. At some point, did you  
 06 fill out an investigative form for the  
 07 United States Coast Guard, a statement  
 08 form?  
 09 A. That came much later, but, yes.  
 10 Q. All right. And this is tab  
 11 number 3 in your book. I'm going to mark  
 12 that as Exhibit Number 1723.  
 13 (Exhibit 1723 was marked  
 14 for identification.)  
 15 Is this a United States Coast  
 16 Guard witness and investigate --  
 17 investigator's statement form that you  
 18 filled out, Mr. Brown?  
 19 A. Yes.

Page 120:10 to 120:15

00120:10 Q. All right. And is that when you  
11 filled out Exhibit Number 1723?  
12 A. Yes.  
13 Q. And that's your signature on the  
14 bottom of it, sir?  
15 A. Yes, it is.

Page 120:21 to 123:01

00120:21 Q. What occurred when you met with  
22 the Coast Guard? Did they just ask you to  
23 fill the statement out or did they ask you  
24 other questions?  
25 A. They -- yes, they asked me to  
00121:01 fill out the statement and then they ran  
02 some questions.  
03 Q. All right. After they finished  
04 running the questions, what happened?  
05 A. Immediately finishing with them,  
06 I was introduced to some lawyers from  
07 Transocean and I was taken into another  
08 room to be questioned by them.  
09 Q. You had no break, no sleep in  
10 between?  
11 A. Nothing.  
12 Q. All right. And when you were  
13 taken into another room by the Transocean  
14 attorneys, what happened?  
15 A. They questioned me on what I  
16 saw, what had happened, in my opinion.  
17 They asked me about my injuries. That's  
18 kind of all what I can remember.  
19 Q. Was their questioning  
20 transcribed --  
21 A. Yes.  
22 Q. -- in -- in any manner?  
23 A. Yes.  
24 Q. Okay. There was a -- was there  
25 someone like this -- the court reporter  
00122:01 here?  
02 A. Yes.  
03 Q. All right. Were you placed  
04 under oath?  
05 A. Yes.  
06 Q. And did you get a copy of that  
07 transcript?  
08 A. No.  
09 Q. After -- how long did the  
10 questioning by Transocean take?  
11 A. Hour perhaps, 45 minutes, an  
12 hour. It might have been longer. I was at  
13 this point really fuzzy and hazy, and they  
14 had me on pain medication.

15 Q. This was pain medication you  
16 received at the hospital as a result of  
17 your injuries?  
18 A. Yes.  
19 Q. And after you concluded your  
20 statement with the Transocean attorneys,  
21 what happened then?  
22 A. After that was concluded, I was  
23 allowed to go to a room or bedroom. Me and  
24 Paul Meinhart were in the same room and we  
25 were allowed to sleep, and they would get  
00123:01 back with us later with our flights home.

Page 130:09 to 131:01

00130:09 Q. Okay. Now, you talked about how  
10 when you first got to the DEEPWATER HORIZON  
11 it was actually in transit on its -- or in  
12 Korea and then ultimately you were -- you  
13 were with it in transit until it arrived in  
14 the Gulf of Mexico. Do you recall at what  
15 point the blowout preventer apparatus  
16 joined the vessel, you know, came to the  
17 rig or joined the vessel?  
18 A. It was there from the beginning  
19 even in Korea, when I first arrived.  
20 Q. And do you know if it was the  
21 same one --  
22 A. Yes.  
23 Q. -- essentially the same  
24 apparatus the whole time up through --  
25 through April 20th?  
00131:01 A. Yes.

Page 131:09 to 131:22

00131:09 Q. And as -- in your work with --  
10 as the chief mechanic or with mechanical  
11 maintenance, did you work on or with the  
12 BOP, the blowout preventer, or its  
13 components?  
14 A. Never. It was not my department  
15 at all.  
16 Q. And who -- which department  
17 handled BOP maintenance?  
18 A. Subsea.  
19 Q. And so you were not apprised of  
20 any alterations, modifications made to the  
21 blowout preventer or --  
22 A. No, I was not.

Page 133:23 to 134:09

00133:23 Q. Do you recall any discussions  
24 involving drilling ahead in order to avoid  
25 having to set contingency liners?  
00134:01 A. I vaguely remember something  
02 about that.  
03 Q. What -- what, if anything, do  
04 you remember hearing?  
05 A. Basically what I heard was,  
06 okay, it's -- everything is behind  
07 schedule. We need to pick up our rate, our  
08 rate of penetration, so we can catch up  
09 where we're supposed to be.

Page 136:08 to 137:10

00136:08 Q. On the evening of the explosion,  
09 you described how you could hear the  
10 engines revving up in terms of RPMs higher  
11 and higher, progressively higher. And you  
12 said that you inferred that the governors  
13 didn't trip because the engines just  
14 continued to rev; is that correct?  
15 A. Yes, they continued to rev.  
16 Q. Is it possible, just from your  
17 knowledge of -- of the engines, how they  
18 function, how the governors function, that  
19 the governors may have tripped, but the  
20 engines were getting fuel from an alternate  
21 source?  
22 MR. KALLAM:  
23 Object to the form.  
24 A. Yes, that is possible.  
25 Q. Because the governors function  
00137:01 by cutting off fuel and air to the engines?  
02 A. Yes, well, what -- what I'm  
03 saying is, if they did trip, I feel they  
04 would have shut down the engines. But if  
05 they did trip and they didn't do their job,  
06 then I'm assuming there was an outside  
07 factor to overrule that, which would be,  
08 yes, possibly gas. If it mixed with the  
09 fuel going into the engine at that time, it  
10 could form a more volatile mixture.

Page 139:07 to 139:15

00139:07 Q. Did you see Jimmy Harrell on the  
08 BANKSTON, on the cargo deck or anywhere  
09 else?  
10 A. Yes, I did.  
11 Q. At what point did you see him?  
12 A. I passed him once on the, the  
13 back cargo deck area and then I saw him one  
14 other time up on the Bankston's bridge

15 through their window.

Page 144:09 to 144:10

00144:09 Q. I'm Joe Hassinger. I represent  
10 the State of Louisiana in this case. And,

Page 145:12 to 152:15

00145:12 Q. You were asked several questions  
13 about the 2009 audit. Do you remember  
14 that? Yes?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And you told us that you weren't  
17 there at the time, I believe, but when you  
18 came back on the rig, you were shown a  
19 list -- and I think your lawyer has it  
20 there -- a list of conditions that needed  
21 to be addressed, right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And you explained somewhat, but  
24 I want to ask you to give us a little more  
25 information on this. The gist of what you  
00146:01 said, and tell me if I'm wrong, was we  
02 had -- we didn't have time by April 20th to  
03 address the conditions that were set out as  
04 a result of that 2009 audit; is that  
05 accurate?

06 MR. KALLAM:

07 Object to the form.

08 A. Yes.

09 Q. Yes?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Explain to us, tell us why you  
12 did not -- and I don't mean you personally,  
13 I mean the rig -- why wasn't there enough  
14 time to address those problems.

15 A. Because currently we were at a  
16 point where we had larger, more important  
17 breakdowns that were going on that needed  
18 repair.

19 Q. Like what?

20 A. Well, like saltwater system. We  
21 had very many pipes that were eroded and  
22 needed to be replaced. In fact, that's  
23 what we were mostly concentrating on since  
24 I had arrived there for that hitch. And  
25 then there were some other miscellaneous,  
00147:01 important engine repairs that needed to be  
02 addressed, too. And basically we were  
03 focusing on fixing the higher priority  
04 repair jobs first, and if we had extra time  
05 we would fall back on the maintenance  
06 issues.

07 Q. That was what you have described  
08 as the decision-making process that was  
09 used.  
10 What do we do as a result of  
11 this 2009 audit?  
12 We need to address these more  
13 important, larger concerns and then get to  
14 these maintenance items; is that right?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. Who was involved in that  
17 discussion?  
18 A. Basically, that was my -- my  
19 supervisor and the chief engineer above  
20 that.  
21 Q. And their names?  
22 A. Steve Bertone was maintenance  
23 supervisor and Brent Mansfield was the  
24 first engineer.  
25 Q. Were you part of that  
00148:01 discussion?  
02 A. Only with the first engineer,  
03 Brent.  
04 Q. Did you disagree at all with the  
05 plan that they came up with; that is, do  
06 these larger, more important things first,  
07 and then when we can -- we'll get to the  
08 maintenance issues identified in the 2009  
09 audit?  
10 A. I'm good at following orders.  
11 He told me this is what we're going to do  
12 first and we'll get to this when we can  
13 and -- yes, sir.  
14 Q. In a perfect world that would  
15 not have been the way you would have  
16 approached it?  
17 MR. KALLAM:  
18 Object to the form.  
19 BY MR. HASSINGER:  
20 Q. Is that right?  
21 A. In a perfect world, can you --  
22 Q. Well, if you had the time and  
23 the people and the resources to address the  
24 larger, more important things and the  
25 maintenance problems identified in the 2009  
00149:01 audit, your preference would have been to  
02 address all those problems timely?  
03 A. Yes, if we had the proper  
04 manpower, yes.  
05 Q. Let me ask you a few questions  
06 about manpower, because you tell me that if  
07 you had had the proper manpower, maybe the  
08 process for addressing these conditions  
09 would have been different.  
10 Did you have the proper manpower  
11 on that rig in, let's say, April -- well,

12 let's say the first quarter, January to  
13 April, 2010? Was there the proper manpower  
14 on that rig to adequately address  
15 maintenance and repair issues?  
16 MR. KALLAM:  
17 Object to the form.  
18 A. No.  
19 Q. No?  
20 A. No.  
21 Q. Explain what you mean by that.  
22 A. Over the -- over the years, we  
23 actually lost the amount in manpower that  
24 was back there in the engine control room,  
25 and it became too few to do so much. And  
00150:01 so we just had to take it as we could,  
02 usually with the most important items  
03 first.  
04 Q. So there has been a decrease in  
05 the manpower in the engine control room  
06 over time?  
07 A. Yes.  
08 Q. From what level to what level?  
09 A. When we left Korea, we had a  
10 full crew in the engine room consisting of  
11 chief engineer, a first engineer, a second  
12 engineer, a third engineer and two  
13 motormen.  
14 Q. And as of the first quarter, the  
15 first part of 2010, what had that staff  
16 been reduced to?  
17 A. As of -- as of January we  
18 actually had gained a first engineer again.  
19 But prior to that, it was just a  
20 second -- second engineer and a motorman.  
21 Q. Well, let's back up, because I  
22 want to make sure the record is clear. In  
23 the last quarter, the end of 2009, what was  
24 the staffing?  
25 A. At that point it was one first  
00151:01 engineer, one second engineer, and one  
02 motorman.  
03 Q. And then in the first quarter of  
04 2010, you added a --  
05 A. Another motorman.  
06 Q. I'm sorry. Another motorman?  
07 A. Yes, another motorman.  
08 Q. Even with the addition of  
09 another motorman in the first part of 2010,  
10 that was not adequately -- that was not  
11 adequate to timely address the maintenance  
12 and -- the maintenance and repair issues,  
13 was it?  
14 MR. KALLAM:  
15 Object to the form.  
16 A. No, it was not.

17 Q. How so?  
18 A. It was -- well, when we first  
19 came out of the yard, everything's brand  
20 new, so it doesn't break down that much.  
21 You don't have to do too much maintenance  
22 on it. But over time, as things get older,  
23 they tend to break down more and they need  
24 more maintenance, more repair, and at this  
25 stage in the HORIZON's life, it was  
00152:01 constantly breaking down now. So we had to  
02 spread ourselves thin. And even with the  
03 first engineer rejoining us and a new  
04 motorman, it was still far too much for us  
05 to be able to handle.  
06 Q. You realized by the end of 2009  
07 that, the fact that you were spread thin  
08 and that things were constantly breaking  
09 down, that presented a serious safety issue  
10 for the DEEPWATER HORIZON?  
11 MR. KALLAM:  
12 Object to the form.  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. Did you discuss with your  
15 superiors that concern?

Page 152:18 to 153:09

00152:18 A. Yes.  
19 Q. Who did you talk to about that?  
20 A. I believe in the chain of  
21 command, so I consulted my first engineer  
22 or the mechanical supervisor.  
23 Q. And by name, who did you talk to  
24 about that?  
25 A. It's changed over the years.  
00153:01 There's been quite a few.  
02 Q. Is it true that over the years  
03 you have brought that concern to different  
04 supervisors in your chain of command?  
05 A. Yes.  
06 Q. In other words, as your chain of  
07 command has changed, you have brought that  
08 concern repeatedly to the people as it's  
09 changed?

Page 153:12 to 153:15

00153:12 A. Yes.  
13 Q. Did anybody -- any of your  
14 superiors listen to your concerns?  
15 A. Yes, they did.

Page 153:18 to 154:20



00153:18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. Did any superiors implement  
 20 procedures to satisfy your concerns?  
 21 A. I was told that they did.  
 22 Q. Did you ever, you know, see  
 23 anything, touch anything that made you know  
 24 that those concerns were, in fact,  
 25 addressed?  
 00154:01 A. No. It was all verbal.  
 02 Q. And we certainly know by the  
 03 first part of 2010 that those concerns were  
 04 not fully addressed, were they?  
 05 MR. KALLAM:  
 06 Object to the form.  
 07 A. I don't know if that's the  
 08 reason why we received a first engineer and  
 09 additional motorman. I wasn't told why  
 10 they were added on, if it was because of  
 11 that or not.  
 12 Q. Even with the addi -- the first  
 13 engineer and the additional motorman, the  
 14 fact is that in the beginning of 2010, up  
 15 through April 20th, 2010, you were still  
 16 spread too thin and equipment was still  
 17 constantly breaking down; isn't that true?  
 18 MR. KALLAM:  
 19 Object to the form.  
 20 A. Yes.

Page 155:06 to 156:16

00155:06 Do you know what conditions  
 07 based maintenance is?  
 08 A. I'm not really sure.  
 09 Q. I think that means when it  
 10 breaks, you fix it. Have you ever heard  
 11 that language in the Transocean culture?  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. What does it mean in the  
 14 Transocean culture?  
 15 A. In the Transocean culture, it  
 16 was run it until it breaks.  
 17 Q. In your experience working on  
 18 the DEEPWATER HORIZON, was there any  
 19 equipment on that rig that was exempt from,  
 20 excluded from, the run till it breaks  
 21 mindset?  
 22 MR. KALLAM:  
 23 Object to the form.  
 24 A. I really don't know.  
 25 Q. In other words, in your  
 00156:01 experience, all of the equipment on the rig  
 02 was dealt with with that mindset: run it  
 03 till it breaks --

04 MR. KALLAM:  
05 Object to the form.  
06 Q. -- true?  
07 A. Basically, what we were told  
08 when something would come up and it broke  
09 or it needs some maintenance, it was: We  
10 can't do that at this time.  
11 Q. So run it till it breaks?  
12 MR. KALLAM:  
13 Object to the form.  
14 BY MR. HASSINGER:  
15 Q. Yes?  
16 A. Yes.

Page 157:05 to 158:03

00157:05 Q. You told us earlier about a  
06 discussion at the pre-tour meeting on April  
07 20th that the company man and others  
08 participated in.  
09 A. Yes.  
10 Q. You were there for that  
11 conversation?  
12 A. Yes.  
13 Q. You described it earlier on in  
14 questioning as a heated, a tense  
15 conversation, true?  
16 A. Yes.  
17 Q. That dynamic that you saw  
18 happening that morning with the driller  
19 saying I think it should be done this way  
20 and the company man saying that it won't  
21 be, in this -- this tense discussion, had  
22 -- did you see conversations like that at  
23 previous pre-tour meetings? In other  
24 words, can you recall other incidents where  
25 Transocean is saying we need to do it this  
00158:01 way and BP saying, no, we're going to do it  
02 another way?  
03 A. Yes, in the past.

Page 159:10 to 160:15

00159:10 Q. I think this is what you said,  
11 but correct me if I'm wrong. You were  
12 asked questions about, I think, being  
13 interviewed by the Coast Guard after this  
14 incident?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. Let me turn to my notes where  
17 that is. The Coast Guard asked you about  
18 the course of events on April 20th?  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. And they asked you what you

21 thought had happened, what caused this; is  
22 that right?  
23 A. Yes, that was discussed.  
24 Q. What did you tell them?  
25 MR. KALLAM:  
00160:01 Object to the form.  
02 A. First, I told them what happened  
03 and then I told them is in my -- in my  
04 learning and skills and what I knew -- I  
05 know about engines -- after piecing it  
06 together it -- that was, my explanation of  
07 what triggered things was possibly the gas  
08 coming off the main deck area from the  
09 drill floor and being sucked into the  
10 engine rooms from the intakes, which are  
11 right under the drill floor. And that gas  
12 was sucked into the engine rooms and just  
13 followed course into the engines from there  
14 and it formed a volatile mixture, which  
15 caused the engines to do what they did.

Page 164:10 to 167:23

00164:10 Q. Did Transocean employ someone  
11 who had the job title Rig Safety and  
12 Training Coordinator on the DEEPWATER  
13 HORIZON?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. RSTC for the acronym?  
16 A. Yes.  
17 Q. And was the rig safety and  
18 training coordinator for Transocean always  
19 stationed on the DEEPWATER HORIZON?  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. Was that on every hitch as well  
22 as every tour?  
23 A. Yes -- not every tour. I'm  
24 sorry.  
25 Q. Was that a day tour then?  
00165:01 A. Yes.  
02 Q. Did the RSTC -- did you -- did  
03 he conduct training activities that you  
04 yourself participated in?  
05 A. Yes.  
06 Q. And you and the motormen and  
07 other people in the maintenance department  
08 participated in?  
09 A. Yes.  
10 Q. Do you recall testifying before  
11 Congress before the House of  
12 Representatives Committee?  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. I'm going to show you -- if  
15 you'll turn in your binder to tab 5, and  
16 we'll mark it as the next numbered exhibit,

17 which will be 1724.  
18 (Exhibit 1724 was marked for  
19 identification.)  
20 Turn to tab five in the binder,  
21 sir?  
22 A. Uh-huh.  
23 Q. Are we looking at the same  
24 thing? -- I'm sorry. I said tab 5. It's  
25 tab 3. My apologies. Could you take a  
00166:01 look at that and see if that exhibit is  
02 your congressional testimony.  
03 MR. BICKFORD:  
04 Tab 3? I'm sorry.  
05 MR. HAYCRAFT:  
06 Tab 3.  
07 MR. BICKFORD:  
08 I have a statement.  
09 Q. Is that your congressional  
10 testimony, sir?  
11 A. Yes, it appears to be.  
12 Q. And did you present this to the  
13 House Judiciary Committee on May 27, 2010?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. Did you swear to tell the truth  
16 when you gave your congressional testimony?  
17 A. I do not recall.  
18 Q. Okay. Did you mean  
19 everything -- is there anything in this  
20 statement of Douglas Harold Brown presented  
21 to the Congress that you believe today is  
22 untrue?  
23 MR. KALLAM:  
24 Object to form.  
25 A. I would have to read it all  
00167:01 through again, but to the best of my  
02 knowledge, no.  
03 Q. In other words, you worked hard  
04 to make sure every sentence in this  
05 statement was a true statement to the U.S.  
06 Congress?  
07 A. Yes.  
08 Q. When you were with Reading and  
09 Bates Falcon, before that company became  
10 part of Transocean, was the OIM and the  
11 master, were they one in the same person?  
12 A. No.  
13 Q. Were they separated out?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. And was the master in charge of  
16 the vessels for Reading and Bates Falcon?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. At all times?  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. The captain had the ultimate  
21 authority, decision-making authority,

22 onboard Reading and Bates -- Reading and  
23 Bates Falcon vessels?

Page 168:01 to 170:12

00168:01 A. As I understand it, yes.  
02 Q. In the first part of your  
03 statement given to the House Judiciary  
04 Committee, you'll see it says manning  
05 requirements on the DEEPWATER HORIZON. You  
06 see that, sir?  
07 A. Yes.  
08 Q. And you see that you testified  
09 that, originally, there was chief engineer,  
10 first engineer, a second engineer, a third  
11 engineer and two motormen aboard DEEPWATER  
12 HORIZON through the year 2002?  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. Was that true?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. And then after -- beginning in  
17 2003, there were over the course of some  
18 period of time, positions were eliminated  
19 in the maintenance department by  
20 Transocean; is that correct?  
21 A. Yes.  
22 Q. And there was a period of time  
23 when the maintenance department consisted  
24 of the chief engineer, the second engineer  
25 and one motorman?  
00169:01 A. Yes.  
02 Q. And then at some point, a first  
03 engineer was added back into the engine  
04 room in October 2009?  
05 A. Yes.  
06 Q. That was just for the day tour?  
07 A. Yes.  
08 Q. Did that reduction in  
09 maintenance department personnel lead to  
10 the situation you described of deficiencies  
11 going uncorrected?  
12 MR. KALLAM:  
13 Object to the form.  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. In your Congressional testimony,  
16 again, in that same section but over on the  
17 second page of the transcript -- of the  
18 statement, there's a paragraph that talks  
19 about the flagging change from Republic of  
20 Panama to the Republic of the Marshall  
21 Islands. You see that, sir?  
22 A. Yes.  
23 Q. Was that something as a crew  
24 member aboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON that  
25 you knew about; that is, what the

00170:01 flag -- the flag of the vessel was?  
02 A. I knew we were Panamanian at  
03 first and when Marshall Islands took over,  
04 I -- I really wasn't aware of it until  
05 later.  
06 Q. Until after April 20th?  
07 A. No.  
08 Q. You knew when you were onboard,  
09 say, for your last hitch on the DEEPWATER  
10 HORIZON, that she was Marshall Island  
11 flagged, correct?  
12 A. Yes.

Page 170:22 to 171:03

00170:22 Q. Okay. We're going to mark the  
23 Panamanian safe manning certificate as  
24 1725, and we'll mark what's at tab 8, the  
25 Marshall Islands safe manning certificate,  
00171:01 as 1726.  
02 (Exhibits 1725 and 1726  
03 were marked for identification.)

Page 171:15 to 174:23

00171:15 Q. In your congressional statement,  
16 you said that, quote, It is my belief,  
17 which is supported by discussion I have had  
18 with other crewmen, that the minimum safe  
19 manning requirements of the Marshall  
20 Islands is far less in number than the  
21 United States Coast -- Coast Guard  
22 requirements. Thus, my belief is that the  
23 reductions were due to cost saving  
24 measures, end quote.  
25 First, did I read that  
00172:01 accurately?  
02 A. Yes.  
03 Q. And when you, in your statement  
04 to the House Judiciary Committee, what  
05 discussion -- what -- what were you  
06 referring to when you said you'd had  
07 discussion with other crewmen? Is that  
08 other crewmen aboard the DEEPWATER HORIZON?  
09 A. Yes.  
10 Q. Would that include -- would that  
11 include discussion with people in the mari  
12 -- in the marine department of the vessel  
13 as opposed to the maintenance or drilling  
14 department?  
15 A. I don't recall. It was just  
16 sort of general rig discussion.  
17 Q. Okay. So you can't attribute  
18 any such statements to a captain or a first

19 mate or a chief mate, in particular?  
20 A. No.  
21 Q. Just general discussion?  
22 A. Yes.  
23 Q. Thank you. Let's -- at the time  
24 of April the 20th, you were working a  
25 21-day-on/21-day-off hitch --  
00173:01 A. Yes.  
02 Q. -- arrangement? At some point  
03 prior to that, were you working 14 and 14?  
04 A. Long time ago.  
05 Q. Did a switch from 14 and 14 to  
06 21 and 21 of your hitch schedule make any  
07 difference as far as you were concerned in  
08 the maintenance of the DEEPWATER HORIZON?  
09 A. I have been 21/21 for several  
10 years. I remember when they -- if you're  
11 talking about when they switched over  
12 everyone on the rig to -- from 14/14 to 21;  
13 I recall that.  
14 Q. Okay. Did -- did the  
15 switch -- you -- so you in your department,  
16 you were 21 and 21 for a long time?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. Others on the rig had a 14 and  
19 14 schedule?  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. And then at some point in late  
22 2009, the company switched them to a 14 and  
23 14 --  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. -- excuse me -- to a 21 and 21?  
00174:01 A. Yes.  
02 Q. Did you hear any, as you say,  
03 general rig discussion about that change?  
04 MR. KALLAM:  
05 Object to the form.  
06 A. Yes.  
07 Q. What was the -- to the extent  
08 you can attribute it to anybody in  
09 particular, do so, but tell me generally  
10 what you do recall about that.  
11 MR. KALLAM:  
12 Same objection.  
13 A. That they're making a big  
14 mistake. It's -- we're already worn out  
15 and tired enough as it is on a 14/14 hitch.  
16 Now, they are make us go 21/21. Someone's  
17 going to get hurt because that's too  
18 much -- too much of a tour for us. Basic  
19 things like that.  
20 Q. Were any of those persons known  
21 to you to be in the drilling crew as  
22 opposed to the maintenance crew?  
23 A. Yes.

Page 176:02 to 177:08

00176:02 Q. -- of the people onboard are  
03 Transocean crew members, of those 70 or 80  
04 Transocean crew members, how many of them  
05 had been on a 14-and-14 schedule, but now  
06 in the preceding months before April the  
07 20th were on a 21-and-21 schedule?  
08 A. I would say about 25 percent of  
09 them.  
10 Q. 25 percent went from 14 and 14  
11 to 21 and 21?  
12 A. Yes. There were already some  
13 others, too, that were already on 21/21.  
14 Q. Was it the drilling crew that  
15 had the biggest change or the biggest  
16 percentage of that particular change from  
17 --  
18 A. Yes.  
19 Q. Okay. Do you know what Time Out  
20 for Safety is at Transocean?  
21 A. Yes, I do.  
22 Q. Did you believe that you had the  
23 authority to, if you saw an unsafe activity  
24 or an unsafe practice by -- by someone in  
25 your department or someone outside of your  
00177:01 department, that you, as an Transocean  
02 employee, had the ability to call a time  
03 out for safety?  
04 A. Yes, I believe I did.  
05 Q. Did you ever use the time out  
06 process in your company?  
07 A. I did in my department for some  
08 small issues. That's about it.

Page 178:19 to 181:08

00178:19 Q. I believe today you said you  
20 think the first out-of-normal, abnormal  
21 thing you sensed was the loud venting or  
22 hissing sound?  
23 A. Yes.  
24 Q. Is that -- today that's your  
25 best memory of, that's what the first  
00179:01 indication you had of something being  
02 wrong?  
03 A. Yes.  
04 Q. While we're on the subject of  
05 the gas, you saw and heard -- I think you  
06 said you heard the beeping and you saw the  
07 panel, the fire and gas, the Simrad. Is  
08 that the Simrad panel or is this the --  
09 A. ESD panel.  
10 Q. Say again?



11 A. The ESD panel.  
12 Q. ESD panel. You saw the lights.  
13 You described -- I think you said ten, ten  
14 lights were on. Did they come on all at  
15 once or was it one here, then another  
16 section, and another section sort of, till  
17 there was a total of 10 lights?  
18 A. Yes, one here, one there, until  
19 finally they're all lit up.  
20 Q. And -- and those -- and you know  
21 those lights from prior experience to be,  
22 among other functions, but those lights  
23 were combustible gas illuminations?  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. And the beeping was a  
00180:01 combustible gas beeping audible tone?  
02 A. Yes.  
03 Q. And is that device part of  
04 the ES -- I think you told me this -- the  
05 emergency shutdown system of the vessel?  
06 A. Yes, it is.  
07 Q. And there's a panel such as that  
08 on the bridge, correct?  
09 A. Yes.  
10 Q. And there's a panel such as that  
11 in the driller's station or shack?  
12 A. Yes.  
13 Q. So three redundant panels with  
14 the combustible gas alarms, audible and  
15 visual, as well as an ESD button?  
16 A. Each compartment had its own ESD  
17 button. We had like six engine rooms, for  
18 example. Each engine room had its own ESD  
19 panel or ESD button.  
20 Q. Were you as chief -- did I --  
21 what was your job title on April 20th?  
22 A. Chief mechanic/second assistant.  
23 Q. Okay. So I'll -- I'll -- for  
24 short, I'll just say chief mechanic. As  
25 chief mechanic onboard DEEPWATER HORIZON on  
00181:01 April 20th, did you have authority to ESD?  
02 A. I don't know.  
03 Q. Did you receive any training on  
04 what to do if combustible gas lights and  
05 audible alarms go off?  
06 MR. KALLAM:  
07 Object to the form.  
08 A. No training.

Page 182:08 to 184:02

00182:08 Q. Had you ever received any drill  
09 or training from Transocean about what to  
10 do as far as the emergency shutdown for any  
11 of the six engine rooms if combustible gas

12 detectors illuminate or send an audible  
 13 signal to your panel there in the ECR?  
 14 MR. KALLAM:  
 15 Object to the form.  
 16 A. No, I haven't.  
 17 Q. I take it from what you have  
 18 told me that when these lights went off,  
 19 you did not push any of the ESD buttons --  
 20 if that's the right word -- but switches or  
 21 button, or toggles, or whatever the device  
 22 was, you didn't do that; is that correct?  
 23 A. That is correct.  
 24 Q. And, in fact, as you sit here  
 25 today and -- and even going back in time, a  
 00183:01 year, it's your belief that the number 3  
 02 engine ramped up and eventually destructed  
 03 and probably provided the ignition source  
 04 for the gas, correct?  
 05 MR. KALLAM:  
 06 Object to the form.  
 07 A. Yes, that is my opinion.  
 08 Q. And that's based on -- well,  
 09 I'll just ask you an open question. That's  
 10 based on what? What perception, sounds,  
 11 visual observations that you experienced  
 12 while there with your -- with your  
 13 nine-year experience on DEEPWATER HORIZON  
 14 and the engine department, what sources do  
 15 you have for that opinion as --  
 16 MR. KALLAM:  
 17 Object to form. I don't believe  
 18 this witness has been tendered as an  
 19 expert.  
 20 MR. HAYCRAFT:  
 21 You can answer that question.  
 22 A. I ba -- I basically say that it  
 23 came from number 3 engine, from the  
 24 direction the explosion came. And  
 25 everything that blew up in that area, it  
 00184:01 all came from engine room 3 side of the  
 02 rig.

Page 184:24 to 185:12

00184:24 Q. The -- do you remember giving  
 25 your testimony to the Marine Board of  
 00185:01 Investigation in May --  
 02 A. May 26th, 2010.  
 03 Q. May 26th. You remember that  
 04 well?  
 05 A. Yes, I remember it.  
 06 Q. Okay. We're going to go ahead  
 07 and mark as an exhibit tab 5, which I will  
 08 represent to you is portions of your MBI  
 09 testimony on May 26, 2010, and we'll mark

10 it as Exhibit 1727.  
11 (Exhibit 1727 was marked  
12 for identification.)

Page 185:19 to 186:23

00185:19 Q. My first question is: After May  
20 26, when you gave this testimony and after  
21 it was transcribed, have you ever read it  
22 since?  
23 A. No.  
24 Q. I take it then there's no way  
25 for you to judge the accuracy of the  
00186:01 transcript in the abstract, because you  
02 haven't seen it?  
03 A. Correct.  
04 Q. Okay. Well, let me ask you a  
05 few questions that I'm taking from the  
06 transcript, and I'll probably ask you to  
07 read -- read portions of it. And we'll  
08 just see whether -- whether it was  
09 accurately transcribed back on May 26th.  
10 The first page is page 93. And  
11 down toward the bottom, it says: I really  
12 don't follow too -- and this is referring  
13 to pre-tour noon, April 20th meeting.  
14 And you say: I really don't  
15 follow too strenuously what they discuss  
16 that's going to be happening on the drill  
17 floor because it's not part of my  
18 department. But I recall a scrimmage  
19 taking place between the company man, the  
20 OIM, and the toolpusher and driller  
21 concerning the events of the day.  
22 First, did I read that sentence  
23 accurately?

Page 187:01 to 187:05

00187:01 A. Yes.  
02 Q. And do you recall that you  
03 characterized the discussion as a  
04 scrimmage?  
05 A. Yes.

Page 187:25 to 188:20

00187:25 Q. And I'm -- I'm now going again  
00188:01 with your testimony on May 26. If you turn  
02 to the page, to the next page, and I'll  
03 read close to the top of the page.  
04 Quoting: I really didn't pay  
05 attention to what he was saying -- and

06 there you're referring to what the BP  
 07 company man had been saying.  
 08 They had to do with displacing  
 09 the riser for later on that tour. And the  
 10 OIM and the driller and the toolpusher had  
 11 a disagreement with that.  
 12 There was a -- I remember there  
 13 was a slight argument that took place and a  
 14 difference of opinions and the company man  
 15 was basically saying, well, this is how  
 16 it's going to be, end quote. And the  
 17 toolpusher and the OIM reluctantly agreed,  
 18 period, end quote of your quote.  
 19 Was that accurate testimony on  
 20 May 26?

Page 188:23 to 189:14

00188:23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Now, I think you said that you  
 25 -- you -- when you're -- when you're in  
 00189:01 your department and something is being  
 02 talked about having to do with the drill  
 03 floor, you're not intimately involved with  
 04 that discussion; is that fair?  
 05 A. That's fair.  
 06 Q. And same was true on April the  
 07 20th, correct?  
 08 A. Correct.  
 09 Q. You paid some attention and it  
 10 made an impression on you, otherwise you  
 11 wouldn't be relating it months later. But  
 12 that's all it did, it made an impression on  
 13 you?  
 14 A. Yes.

Page 193:20 to 193:25

00193:20 Q. I will stop it there. What I  
 21 heard you say was: I had no clue what was  
 22 going on down there on the drill floor or  
 23 -- on the rig floor or with drilling  
 24 operations.  
 25 Does that sound accurate to you?

Page 194:03 to 194:03

00194:03 A. Yes.

Page 196:02 to 196:06

00196:02 Q. Did you hear where the  
 03 interviewer asked you if what was going on

04 that day was normal operations, and you  
 05 said just standard procedures. Did I hear  
 06 that correctly?

Page 196:09 to 196:13

00196:09 A. Yes.  
 10 Q. Is that what you said to the  
 11 Coast Guard interviewer on May 21?  
 12 A. If that's what I said on the  
 13 recording, then, yes.

Page 196:24 to 198:05

00196:24 Q. Did -- did -- let's talk about  
 25 the overspeed governors on the engines.  
 00197:01 Let's talk first -- let's just think about  
 02 engine number 3, that Wartsilla. What's  
 03 the model name of that Wartsilla?  
 04 A. It was a 32 VASA.  
 05 Q. Spell that, please.  
 06 A. V-A-S-A.  
 07 Q. VASA, okay. And on that number  
 08 3 engine, did it have its own separate  
 09 governor, mechanical and electrical?  
 10 A. Yes.  
 11 Q. And were they independent of  
 12 each other?  
 13 A. The mechanical governor was  
 14 actually controlled by the electrical one.  
 15 Q. I guess -- and you're -- you're  
 16 the mechanical person here. Explain to me  
 17 if one worked with that -- or if one  
 18 failed, does that mean the other one  
 19 necessarily failed or vice versa?  
 20 MR. KALLAM:  
 21 Object to the form.  
 22 A. Not necessarily. The electrical  
 23 one failed, then I'm pretty sure the entire  
 24 engine would stop.  
 25 Q. So the failure of the electronic  
 00198:01 shutdown, its failure would the stop the  
 02 air and fuel intake into the diesel engine?  
 03 MR. KALLAM:  
 04 Object to the form.  
 05 A. Yes, I think -- believe so.

Page 198:16 to 204:09

00198:16 Q. You do understand the mechanical  
 17 overspeed governor?  
 18 A. Yes.  
 19 Q. Let's talk just about the

20 mechanical overspeed governor on the number  
21 3 engine. And you explained this morning  
22 mechanically with the cam and the droop  
23 -- I think you called them droop balls. Is  
24 that D-R-O-O-P?

25 A. I'm not sure of the spelling.

00199:01 Q. It's pronounced droop, though?

02 A. Yes.

03 Q. And that -- that -- that  
04 mechanical system is designed such that  
05 when the shaft turns more than "X" RPMs,  
06 then it mechanically shuts off the air and  
07 the fuel flow into the engine?

08 A. It will mechanically throw the  
09 fuel rod into the off position. But a  
10 signal will be sent from it to the control  
11 panel and the control panel will activate  
12 the rig savers.

13 Q. Rig savers, is that different  
14 from the overspeed governor?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. That's a third -- we have an  
17 electrical governor, overspeed governor; we  
18 have a mechanical overspeed governor; and  
19 then we have something called a rig saver,  
20 right?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Those are three systems whose  
23 purpose is to shut down the engine when it  
24 goes into an RPM that's preset as too fast  
25 for that engine to withstand, correct?

00200:01 A. Yes. The rig savers have that  
02 function, but they are also designed for  
03 other functions to shut down, too.

04 Q. But at least one of their  
05 functions is to shut down when -- when an  
06 overspeed condition is reached?

07 A. Correct.

08 Q. And then another rig saver  
09 function is when there's gas ingestion into  
10 the air intakes of the engine itself, the  
11 rig saver is supposed to shut down the  
12 engine in that condition as well?

13 MR. KALLAM:

14 Object to the form.

15 A. If -- I really don't know if it  
16 was to do that or not.

17 Q. Tell me -- tell me what a rig  
18 saver is on a Number 3 Wartsilla?

19 A. It's a flapping valve placed  
20 between the turbo intakes and what we call  
21 the charge air box. And what it was  
22 designed to do, if there's a problem with  
23 the engine, it basically would get an  
24 electrical signal from the control panel

25 board and it would release those flaps to  
00201:01 close, thereby stopping airflow to the  
02 charge air box.  
03 Q. And the purpose of stopping the  
04 engine from going much beyond its normal --  
05 well, let me first ask you. You said 720  
06 RPM is your constant RPM that those engines  
07 operate on when they're operating?  
08 A. Yes.  
09 Q. Constant speed, diesel engine,  
10 yes?  
11 A. Yes.  
12 Q. And what -- do you recall what  
13 percentage of overspeed is within the  
14 tolerance of any of those mechanical,  
15 electrical or rig saver systems?  
16 MR. KALLAM:  
17 Object to the form.  
18 A. It was in the low 800s. I'm not  
19 quite sure exactly.  
20 Q. Okay. And tell me the  
21 mechanical reasons for having those three  
22 different devices set to stop the engine if  
23 the RPMs reach in the low 800s.  
24 MR. KALLAM:  
25 Object to the form.  
00202:01 A. Can you expound on that question  
02 a little more?  
03 Q. Yeah. What's the reason for  
04 having a preset value of say, 815, just  
05 picking that particular number? What is  
06 the reason, mechanically, for setting the  
07 electrical, mechanical and/or rig saver  
08 device -- safety devices for doing  
09 something to the engines at that particular  
10 -- at a particular RPM such as 815 as an  
11 example?  
12 MR. KALLAM:  
13 Object to the form.  
14 A. Well, I know we had the two  
15 different mechanical and electrical, and  
16 that was because if one didn't work, the  
17 other one would.  
18 Q. Okay. They are meant to be  
19 fail-safe?  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. And why do you not want the  
22 engine to go, as a mechanic as a person  
23 extremely familiar with these Wartsilla  
24 engines, why mechanically do you not want  
25 the engines to go past, say, 815 RPM?  
00203:01 MR. KALLAM:  
02 Object to the form.  
03 A. Because damage could happen.  
04 Q. And what, damage to the engines?

05 A. Damage to the engines.  
 06 Q. Can the engines in overspeed  
 07 create ignition sources for combustible  
 08 gas?  
 09 MR. KALLAM:  
 10 Object to the form.  
 11 A. Yes, I would, in my opinion, I  
 12 would say it could.  
 13 Q. And based on your diesel engine  
 14 experience, what happens -- or maybe you  
 15 haven't experienced it -- but what do you  
 16 understand to happen when a diesel engine  
 17 air intake inhales or ingests a mixture of  
 18 air and say methane gas, what -- what  
 19 happens in that combustion process within  
 20 the engine?  
 21 MR. KALLAM:  
 22 Excuse me. I didn't mean to cut  
 23 you off. Object to form.  
 24 A. Well, it would probably form a  
 25 more extremely volatile mixture, thereby,  
 00204:01 probably increasing the explosions in the  
 02 cylinders and -- well, anything could  
 03 happen with that.  
 04 Q. Throw -- throw -- throw a rod?  
 05 A. Yeah.  
 06 Q. Blow up the engine?  
 07 A. Blow up the engine, throw a rod.  
 08 Q. Create a massive spark?  
 09 A. Exactly.

Page 204:12 to 209:03

00204:12 Q. In your congressional testimony  
 13 -- congressional statement given to the  
 14 Congress late last year on page 3, if you  
 15 will turn to tab -- tab 3 again, Exhibit  
 16 Number 1724. And I'm looking at the top  
 17 half of the page where you -- where you're  
 18 telling the Congress about, you are  
 19 expecting the trips to shut the engines  
 20 off. You recall telling that to Congress?  
 21 MR. KALLAM:  
 22 Object to the form.  
 23 A. I don't recall telling them  
 24 that.  
 25 Q. Do you recall giving this  
 00205:01 written statement to the Congress?  
 02 MR. KALLAM:  
 03 Object to the form.  
 04 A. Yes.  
 05 Q. And do you recall giving the  
 06 written -- written statement, quote, I  
 07 waited for and expected the trips to shut  
 08 the engine off; do you recall giving that



09 statement?  
10 MR. KALLAM:  
11 Object to the form.  
12 A. Yes, I do.  
13 Q. And you listed four systems:  
14 mechanical overspeed, electrical overspeed,  
15 the rig saver, and you've -- we've just  
16 gone over that, correct?  
17 A. Correct.  
18 Q. And you -- you told the Congress  
19 in this statement that anyone of those  
20 three should have killed the engines when  
21 they reached an overspeed condition,  
22 correct?  
23 MR. KALLAM:  
24 Object to the form.  
25 A. Yes.  
00206:01 Q. And then you said that a fourth  
02 trip is the frequency trip or the hertz  
03 trip that you, I think, described this  
04 morning where, when the engine runs too  
05 fast and generates too much electrical  
06 power, there's a trip system to disconnect  
07 the engine from the electrical system,  
08 correct?  
09 MR. KALLAM:  
10 Object to the form.  
11 A. Connect the generator from the  
12 rig, yeah, the rig electrical system.  
13 Q. The engine still runs, but the  
14 electrical generating power is  
15 disconnected?  
16 A. Correct.  
17 Q. And that's to prevent the surge  
18 of power from damaging the electrical  
19 system on the rig, itself?  
20 A. Correct.  
21 MR. KALLAM:  
22 Object to the form.  
23 Q. So that -- that -- that item in  
24 these four safety equipment items, that  
25 item did work. It shut off the electrical  
00207:01 power to the rig, correct?  
02 A. I don't really know to be honest  
03 with you.  
04 Q. You know the rig went dark?  
05 A. Yes.  
06 Q. And your experience tells you  
07 that that's probably because the frequency  
08 trip did -- did get employed?  
09 MR. KALLAM:  
10 Object to the form.  
11 A. That's what I believed at the  
12 time, until I heard others talk about  
13 screens blowing up and the lighting above

14 blowing out and --  
 15 Q. Those would be counter to that  
 16 theory?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. But the mechanical, electrical  
 19 governor -- overspeed governor and the rig  
 20 savers to your experience, your perception  
 21 that evening, did not -- any one of those  
 22 three did not engage, correct, did not kill  
 23 engine number 3 or engine number 6?  
 24 MR. KALLAM:  
 25 Object to the form.  
 00208:01 A. I don't know if they tripped or  
 02 not, but I do know that the engine kept  
 03 going way beyond the capacity.  
 04 Q. Did you ever hear a general  
 05 alarm?  
 06 A. On that night?  
 07 Q. Correct.  
 08 A. No.  
 09 Q. Did you ever hear any PA  
 10 announcement about a well control  
 11 situation?  
 12 A. No. The only thing I heard was  
 13 the Captain calling the DAMON BANKSTON just  
 14 before everything blew up, saying  
 15 that -- to move away. We were having a  
 16 well control situation.  
 17 Q. You never heard a similar  
 18 announcement to -- announcing to the  
 19 DEEPWATER HORIZON crew what was going on?  
 20 A. No.  
 21 Q. You told Congress, and I'm  
 22 looking at page 2 of your congressional  
 23 statement, bottom paragraph, and that's tab  
 24 3, quote, no one ever communicated to us  
 25 from the bridge or the rig floor, so we had  
 00209:01 no idea that a blowout was taking place,  
 02 period, end quote. Did I read that  
 03 accurately?

Page 209:06 to 209:10

00209:06 A. Yes, you read it accurately.  
 07 But at the -- at the time, there was a  
 08 phone call made and basically, all's we  
 09 heard from them was, yes, we're having a  
 10 well control situation.

Page 209:19 to 211:07

00209:19 Q. Back to the ESD, did anyone from  
 20 the bridge either in that phone call or any  
 21 other phone call, radio call, or other

22 communication tell you to shut off fuel or  
 23 air to engine number 3 or engine number 6?  
 24 A. No.  
 25 MR. KALLAM:  
 00210:01 Object to the form.  
 02 Q. Did anyone from the bridge call  
 03 or otherwise communicate with you or Brent  
 04 or others in the ECR that -- that the ESD  
 05 for the engines needed to be engaged?  
 06 MR. KALLAM:  
 07 Same objection.  
 08 A. No.  
 09 Q. When you were hearing the  
 10 engines ramp up, did you or your colleagues  
 11 in the ECR discuss or in any way -- well,  
 12 I'll ask it simply. Did you or your  
 13 colleagues discuss the possibility of  
 14 manually shutting down either engine 3 or  
 15 engine 6?  
 16 A. No, we did not.  
 17 Q. And why -- why is that?  
 18 A. Because we didn't know what was  
 19 going on.  
 20 Q. If you had known that gas was  
 21 escaping and that a well -- a well was  
 22 blowing out, would that have influenced  
 23 your decision-making in the ECR?  
 24 MR. KALLAM:  
 25 Object to the form.  
 00211:01 A. It could have. But I would  
 02 still call the bridge or the captain or the  
 03 OIM to get permission.  
 04 Q. Okay. Who did you consider to  
 05 be in charge of the DEEPWATER HORIZON while  
 06 you were on your tour during the day on  
 07 April the 20th?

Page 211:10 to 211:14

00211:10 A. At that time I would say, had to  
 11 be Jimmy, the OIM.  
 12 Q. Okay. What about Curt --  
 13 Captain Curt Kuchta, did you consider him  
 14 to be in charge of the vessel?

Page 211:17 to 211:23

00211:17 A. Yes. We were under the  
 18 understanding that when the ship was -- or  
 19 the rig was connected to a well that Jimmy,  
 20 the OIM, was the authority. And under  
 21 emergencies or we were transiting and not  
 22 connected to the -- a wellhead anywhere,  
 23 that the captain was the one in charge.

Page 212:25 to 214:05

00212:25 Q. Turn to the tab 6, which has  
00213:01 already been marked in the deposition  
02 record as Exhibit 591. And, again, I'm not  
03 going to ask you a whole lot of detailed  
04 questions, but I just want you to -- to  
05 look at it. First, it says across: RMS-2,  
06 morning report, rig, DEEPWATER HORIZON, 19  
07 April, 2010. In the right-hand column it  
08 says, date, 20, April 2010, time, 7:10  
09 A.m., and then page 1 of 128.  
10 And just tell me, is this  
11 something that you as chief mechanic would  
12 see on either April the -- well, I guess on  
13 April the 20th, this, either on a screen or  
14 in some device or on hard copy? Would you  
15 see this report generated?  
16 A. Yes.  
17 Q. And RMS-2 refers to the software  
18 system for the maintenance of systems on  
19 the vessel?  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. The RMS-2 is the overall program  
22 into which maintenance chores were printed  
23 out, maintenance action items were printed  
24 out or compiled and then hours spent and --  
25 and who did it, and just basically a  
00214:01 detailed log of maintenance activities,  
02 both done and to be done?  
03 MR. KALLAM:  
04 Object to the form.  
05 A. Yes.

Page 215:14 to 216:05

00215:14 Q. Okay. All right. I'll -- I'll  
15 -- we'll have to figure out for the marking  
16 of the exhibit, but I'm looking at Bates  
17 Number TRN-MDL-00077324. And see if you  
18 can tell us what -- what job deferral  
19 request means generically.  
20 A. Job deferral request is when  
21 the -- that particular job or maintenance  
22 issue becomes overdue. It's allotted a  
23 certain amount of time or days, and if you  
24 can't get that job done by that date, it  
25 becomes overdue. And the longer it's  
00216:01 overdue will depend on the deferral. And  
02 the deferral pretty much is writing --  
03 writing a statement on why it's not being  
04 done, and then it either gets accepted  
05 under those conditions or rejected.

Page 216:19 to 216:20

00216:19 Q. Okay. Did BP turn wrenches on  
20 the DEEPWATER HORIZON?

Page 216:23 to 219:16

00216:23 A. Not that I am aware of, no.  
24 Q. Was there any BP person who  
25 worked with you, under you, over you, in  
00217:01 directing how to do your maintenance  
02 activities on the DEEPWATER HORIZON?  
03 A. Absolutely not.  
04 Q. Did -- you were asked some  
05 questions about the -- about the -- about  
06 the BP audit done in September of 2009.  
07 Remember those questions this morning?  
08 A. Yes.  
09 Q. And you were shown a spreadsheet  
10 that had some, you know, had identified  
11 items on there, some of which had not been  
12 completed by April the 20th, 2010. You  
13 recall that, those couple of questions this  
14 morning?  
15 A. Yes.  
16 Q. And I think you said you didn't  
17 get that -- TO, Transocean in your  
18 maintenance department didn't get to them  
19 because you didn't have enough time to get  
20 to all of them, correct?  
21 MR. KALLAM:  
22 Object to the form.  
23 A. Yes.  
24 Q. And I think you said that that  
25 was in part because -- in part caused by  
00218:01 the fact that you had to do the higher  
02 priority items before you could get to the  
03 lower priority items, right?  
04 A. Yes.  
05 Q. And the higher priority items  
06 you -- you called out an example of piping  
07 that carried saltwater from place to place  
08 on the rig?  
09 A. Yes.  
10 Q. Is that ballast piping?  
11 A. It's everything. It's seawater  
12 systems for entire the rig. It's, yes,  
13 ballasting. There is thruster cooling.  
14 Q. So a lot of rig systems depended  
15 on piping that carried as part of its  
16 intended function seawater?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. And so based on the manpower

19 that your maintenance department had, and  
 20 the time available to the man-hours that  
 21 you had, not every item on the BP audit was  
 22 able to be put at the front of the list; do  
 23 I hear that correctly from you?  
 24 MR. KALLAM:  
 25 Object to the form.  
 00219:01 A. I am not aware at this point  
 02 about that.  
 03 Q. Well, if you didn't get to some  
 04 of the items on the BP audit that had been  
 05 called out to Transocean as deficiencies --  
 06 you do recall that you said that was  
 07 because you did the higher prior -- higher  
 08 priority items first and deferred the lower  
 09 priority items. Have I got that right?  
 10 A. I wouldn't say deferred.  
 11 Q. Put off until later --  
 12 A. Yes.  
 13 Q. -- as manpower allows?  
 14 MR. KALLAM:  
 15 Object to the form.  
 16 A. As manpower and time allows.

Page 220:22 to 222:04

00220:22 And next I'm going to jump back  
 23 to your Marine Board of Investigation  
 24 testimony, which is tab 5, Exhibit 1727,  
 25 and direct your attention to the bottom of  
 00221:01 page 102. And I am just going to read over  
 02 it starting with the question:  
 03 While they are setting that up,  
 04 is there any type of safety device on an  
 05 air intake system that will prevent gas to  
 06 flow into the engine control room?  
 07 And then an answer at the bottom  
 08 of the page 102 says: There are the rig  
 09 savers. They -- and then turning to page  
 10 103 --  
 11 They are just after the turbo  
 12 intake in between what we call the charge  
 13 air box.  
 14 Question: And that prevents  
 15 flow from --  
 16 Yes.  
 17 Question: In your opinion, did  
 18 those function properly?  
 19 Your answer then was: No.  
 20 BY MR. HAYCRAFT:  
 21 Q. You see that, sir?  
 22 A. Yes I do.  
 23 MR. KALLAM:  
 24 Object to the form.  
 25 Q. Was that -- was that accurate on

00222:01 May 26, 2010?  
02 MR. KALLAM:  
03 Object to the form.  
04 A. It was accurate then.

Page 223:18 to 224:05

00223:18 Q. Fair for me to say that on the  
19 evening of April the 20th, the mechanical  
20 and electrical overspeed controls failed to  
21 keep the engine from overspeeding?  
22 MR. KALLAM:  
23 Object to the form.  
24 A. I'm going to have to -- yeah.  
25 I'm going to have to say yes.  
00224:01 Q. Did you have -- did your  
02 department have functions with the  
03 maintenance of the watertight doors  
04 throughout the rig?  
05 A. Yes.

Page 224:20 to 226:02

00224:20 Q. Were all of the watertight doors  
21 watertight on the evening of April the 20th  
22 based on your knowledge of the doors and  
23 the maintenance of those doors?  
24 MR. KALLAM:  
25 Object to the form.  
00225:01 A. I actually do not know. I know  
02 the majority was either automatically or  
03 manually. There were some issues with some  
04 of them that needed repairs and needed some  
05 maintenance. We shared that responsibility  
06 with the electricians and the marine  
07 department.  
08 Q. Okay. So the marine department,  
09 the electrical department, and the  
10 maintenance department all had certain  
11 responsibilities for the maintenance of all  
12 the watertight doors on the DEEPWATER  
13 HORIZON?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. And you know there were issues  
16 with some of the watertight doors on  
17 DEEPWATER HORIZON as of April 20th?  
18 MR. KALLAM:  
19 Object to the form.  
20 A. Yes.  
21 Q. And some watertight doors that  
22 at least were designed to be operated  
23 remotely from the bridge had to be manually  
24 controlled, manually closed?  
25 MR. KALLAM:

00226:01           Object to the form.  
02           A.     Yes.

Page 234:01 to 234:05

00234:01           Q.     I don't know if the question --  
02     if the MBI asked you exactly, but on April  
03     the 20th, 2010, were you familiar with the  
04     Transocean safety management systems?  
05           A.     At that time, no.

Page 234:17 to 234:22

00234:17           Q.     Thank you, Mr. Brown. My name  
18     is Bruce Bowman. We haven't met, I don't  
19     believe, have we?  
20           A.     Not that I remember.  
21           Q.     Okay. I represent Halliburton  
22     in this case, and I am going to ask you a

Page 235:02 to 237:22

00235:02           Q.     Do you know anything about what  
03     Halliburton did on the rig?  
04           A.     As far as their job function?  
05           Q.     Right.  
06           A.     I know they did our cementing.  
07           Q.     Right.  
08           A.     And I know they did some of the  
09     pressure testing down in the well. That's  
10     about all I really know.  
11           Q.     Okay. Did you talk to anyone  
12     from Halliburton on the rig that you know  
13     of?  
14           A.     No.  
15           Q.     No. Now, as far as the  
16     cementing, sitting here today, do you know  
17     anything of your own knowledge that they  
18     supposedly did wrong on the cementing?  
19           A.     That's what I have my lawyer  
20     for.  
21           Q.     No, I understand that. And I'm  
22     asking for personal knowledge of any facts,  
23     okay?  
24           A.     Huh-huh.  
25           Q.     I believe you are suing  
00236:01 Halliburton, you understand that? Or do  
02     you know?  
03           A.     Yes.  
04           Q.     But if you are, is it because of  
05     something that you've been advised as  
06     opposed to your personal knowledge? That's  
07     all I'm trying to get at, okay?



08 A. I guess basically what I just  
 09 heard on the news and the tabloids.  
 10 Q. That's fine. So you personally  
 11 didn't observe anything that they did  
 12 right, wrong, or indifferent on the cement;  
 13 is that fair?  
 14 A. Not personally, no.  
 15 Q. Okay. Excluding your lawyers,  
 16 has anyone told you that Halliburton did  
 17 anything wrong on the HORIZON?  
 18 A. Once again, only what I read in  
 19 the tabloids.  
 20 Q. Just what you read. So that  
 21 means --  
 22 A. Read or heard on the News.  
 23 Q. Right. As opposed to someone  
 24 telling you, like, someone comes up and  
 25 says, Doug, did you hear what just  
 00237:01 happened? Anything like that? That did  
 02 not happen; is that fair?  
 03 A. That's fair.  
 04 Q. Okay. And when I say  
 05 Halliburton, it includes mudlogging. I  
 06 don't know if you know that Sperry is part  
 07 of Halliburton and they did mudlogging.  
 08 A. I knew about that.  
 09 Q. Okay. Same set of questions.  
 10 Do you have any personal knowledge about  
 11 anything that Sperry or any of the  
 12 mudloggers did wrong?  
 13 A. (Witness nods negatively.)  
 14 Q. You're shaking your head yes or  
 15 no?  
 16 A. No.  
 17 Q. Okay.  
 18 A. Not to my knowledge.  
 19 Q. That's fine. Did anyone tell  
 20 you that Sperry did anything wrong or any  
 21 of the mudloggers did anything wrong?  
 22 A. No.

Page 240:02 to 240:05

00240:02 Q. How about explosion, do you  
 03 think the second explosion could have been  
 04 near or in engine room number 3?  
 05 A. The first explosion, yes.

Page 248:06 to 248:23

00248:06 Q. Do you recall any discussions  
 07 about the centralizers coming up? You may  
 08 have read about them in the paper. I'm  
 09 talking about while you were on the rig

10 before the 20th or during the 20th.  
 11 A. Prior, yes.  
 12 Q. Okay. What -- what did you  
 13 hear?  
 14 A. I heard that they were not using  
 15 the amount of centralizers that they were  
 16 supposed to be using.  
 17 Q. Okay.  
 18 A. And there were a few upset  
 19 people about that.  
 20 Q. Okay. You can guess now I'm  
 21 going to ask: How did you hear that and  
 22 who told you that?  
 23 A. It was just word on the rig.

Page 255:24 to 256:08

00255:24 Q. Have you had any communication  
 25 at any time with a company by the name of  
 00256:01 MOEX concerning either the DEEPWATER  
 02 HORIZON or the Macondo well?  
 03 A. Not personally, no.  
 04 Q. Do you have any information  
 05 about any role, if any, that either of  
 06 those companies played with respect to the  
 07 DEEPWATER HORIZON or the Macondo well?  
 08 A. No.

Page 260:06 to 262:11

00260:06 Q. You testified earlier about a  
 07 comment that was made by, I believe you  
 08 said, Mr. Harrell who said something to the  
 09 effect that that's what we have those  
 10 pinchers for?  
 11 A. Yes.  
 12 Q. Do you recall giving that  
 13 testimony?  
 14 A. Yes.  
 15 Q. Do you know what he meant by use  
 16 of the word pincher?  
 17 MR. KALLAM:  
 18 Object to form.  
 19 A. Yes.  
 20 Q. What do you think he meant?  
 21 A. I'm pretty sure he's referring  
 22 to the shear rams.  
 23 Q. On the BOP?  
 24 A. Yes.  
 25 Q. How is it that you're pretty  
 00261:01 sure of that?  
 02 MR. KALLAM:  
 03 Object to the form.  
 04 A. It's sort of just like a gossip

05 thing around rig. They're in slang  
06 referred to as the pinchers.  
07 Q. Had you heard him use that word  
08 pincher on other occasions?  
09 A. Not him, no.  
10 Q. Had you heard other people use  
11 the word pincher on the rig -- on other  
12 occasions?  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. And did you somehow acquire the  
15 conclusion that by pincher they were  
16 referring to the shear rams on the BOP?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. How is it that you acquired that  
19 conclusion as a result of the context in  
20 which that word was used?  
21 A. I just know from gossip that  
22 that's what the pinchers are referred to  
23 as, the shear rams, and it's just sort of a  
24 slang term. So if anyone on the rig would  
25 say there's -- this or that about that  
00262:01 pinchers, then I would know they are  
02 talking about shear rams.  
03 Q. Based on your experience in the  
04 industry, was the term pincher used to  
05 describe the shear rams on the BOP as a  
06 specific slang term specific to the  
07 DEEPWATER HORIZON, or based on your  
08 experience was it a slang term used  
09 throughout the industry.  
10 A. No. I have only heard of it on  
11 the HORIZON.

Page 263:01 to 263:03

00263:01 Q. Mr. Brown, good afternoon. My  
02 name is Robert Kallam, and I represent  
03 Transocean. And I just have some questions

Page 263:15 to 266:22

00263:15 Q. Mr. Brown, you have been  
16 employed by Transocean or its predecessors  
17 for nearly ten years, correct?  
18 A. Yes. It was 12 years actually  
19 this last January.  
20 Q. Over -- over -- over 10 years?  
21 A. Yes.  
22 Q. At any point in time, did you  
23 ever feel like you were not properly  
24 trained or equipped to perform the job  
25 responsibilities and duties that were put  
00264:01 on you by Transocean?  
02 A. There were times.

03 Q. At those times when you were  
04 given additional training by the company  
05 either in-house, correct --  
06 A. Yes.  
07 Q. -- or sent out for training  
08 courses like those that you were shown  
09 today, correct?  
10 A. Yes.  
11 Q. All right. And through that  
12 process you developed experience and  
13 expertise and knowledge in certain areas,  
14 correct?  
15 A. Absolutely.  
16 Q. All right. At the time of this  
17 hitch in April of 2010, you would agree  
18 with me, sir, that you felt as though you  
19 were properly trained and qualified to do  
20 your job as a chief mechanic?  
21 A. Yes.  
22 Q. All right. Now, when you came  
23 onboard the rig on Friday, I think it was  
24 April 16th, were you advised of any  
25 out-of-the-ordinary safety or mechanical  
00265:01 issues that were ongoing insofar as the  
02 mechanical department is concerned, or was  
03 it just business as usual, so to speak?  
04 A. It was pretty much business as  
05 usual.  
06 Q. Just so we are clear, your sole  
07 area of responsibility is related to  
08 the -- the engines and their related  
09 component parts; is that correct?  
10 A. Pretty much. There was also the  
11 thrusters, the seawater system, ballast  
12 systems, pneumatic systems, the potable  
13 water, the lube oil systems. Basically,  
14 anything that was used to keep the rig  
15 functioning.  
16 Q. All right. Now, when you came  
17 onboard on April 16th of 2010, did anybody  
18 tell you or did you see any reports that  
19 indicated to you any out-of-the-ordinary  
20 safety issues associated with those pieces  
21 of equipment that you have just named?  
22 A. I do not recall.  
23 Q. All right. Now, you mentioned  
24 earlier in response to some testimony that  
25 at the pre-tour meeting you overheard this  
00266:01 -- this discussion that's been  
02 characterized, I think, as heated, correct?  
03 A. Yes.  
04 Q. You were also asked whether you  
05 had ever overheard any other discussions  
06 similar to that on other occasions. Do you  
07 recall that?

08 A. Vaguely.  
09 Q. Okay. And I think you testified  
10 that -- that although you could not recall  
11 them in particular, there were one or two,  
12 quote, other times?  
13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. Is that fair to say?  
15 A. That's fair.  
16 Q. All right. Did you leave those  
17 other encounters, so to speak, with the  
18 same impression you left that pre-tour  
19 meeting on April 20th, with a belief that  
20 in your mind, the BP company man has the  
21 final say aboard the rig, and particularly  
22 in relationship to drilling issues?

Page 266:25 to 266:25

00266:25 A. Yes.

Page 268:08 to 268:16

00268:08 Q. Do you agree with me that there  
09 was a preventive maintenance program?  
10 A. Yes.  
11 Q. Do you know what I mean by that?  
12 A. Yes, I do.  
13 Q. All right. You understand the  
14 distinction between preventive maintenance  
15 and corrective maintenance, correct?  
16 A. Yes.

Page 269:02 to 269:05

00269:02 Q. All right. In fact, on April  
03 20th you had spent your day doing, in some  
04 respects, preventive maintenance, correct?  
05 A. You can say that, yes.

Page 270:01 to 270:14

00270:01 Q. All right. But my question is:  
02 There were times and there are times when  
03 you engage as a chief mechanic in  
04 preventative maintenance as opposed to  
05 merely fixing things that are broken; isn't  
06 that true?  
07 A. Oh, yes.  
08 Q. And, in fact, there are times  
09 when you perform inspections of the rig to,  
10 in fact, look for things that perhaps need  
11 attention now; although they are not  
12 broken, you want to prevent a problem down

13 the road; is that correct?  
14 A. That was part of my job, yes.

Page 271:01 to 271:21

00271:01 Q. All right. Now, in addition to  
02 the preventive maintenance program,  
03 Transocean also employs third-party  
04 inspectors who come out and inspect certain  
05 aspects of rig, correct?  
06 A. I'm aware of that.  
07 Q. There's also governmental  
08 agencies that come out and inspect the rig,  
09 correct?  
10 A. Yes.  
11 Q. There are contractors or  
12 customers who hire contractors to come out  
13 and inspect the rig, are there not?  
14 A. I believe so, yes.  
15 Q. All right. Now, particularly in  
16 connection with these engines and the  
17 overspeed safety devices that you talked  
18 about, isn't it true, Mr. Brown, that those  
19 engines and those safety devices had been  
20 inspected and certified as functional and  
21 working as recently as February of 2010?

Page 271:24 to 271:24

00271:24 A. Yes.

Page 272:19 to 272:25

00272:19 Q. Now, as part of those  
20 inspections, were you made aware as of  
21 April 20th of 2010 of any condition  
22 associated with the engines or its safety  
23 equipment that was in need of repair that  
24 may have caused any of the explosions that  
25 have been speculated about here today?

Page 273:03 to 273:03

00273:03 A. None.

Page 274:08 to 274:20

00274:08 Q. All right. Now, thinking back,  
09 I know you had -- you had finished your  
10 daily work and you were back at your  
11 station at your computer beginning your  
12 nightly report; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.  
14 Q. As you're sitting there and  
15 before the venting -- that was the first  
16 thing you heard, correct?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. The venting and the gas alarms  
19 were about at the same time?  
20 A. Yes.

Page 284:17 to 284:22

00284:17 Q. Can you point to a single item  
18 that in your mind the maintenance  
19 department or the mechanical department did  
20 not perform either because of an inspection  
21 or repair that you know based on your  
22 experience had a direct impact?

Page 284:25 to 285:02

00284:25 A. On the event?  
00285:01 Q. Yes.  
02 A. No.

Page 288:16 to 289:03

00288:16 Q. All right. Did you ever put in  
17 writing any complaints to Transocean or any  
18 concerns that you had insofar as -- as this  
19 manpower issue is concerned?  
20 A. Unfortunately, no. It was  
21 mostly verbal. I used the chain of command  
22 and talked to my supervisor and many other  
23 supervisors over the years, and they took  
24 it up higher.  
25 Q. Okay. And perhaps as a result  
00289:01 of some of that, that changes were, in  
02 fact, made and additional help was brought  
03 in; do you know?

Page 289:06 to 289:06

00289:06 A. No, I don't know.

Page 289:22 to 290:14

00289:22 Q. But you are aware of the safety  
23 policies and procedures that govern your  
24 work as a chief mechanic aboard the HORIZON  
25 on April 20th; is that correct?  
00290:01 A. Pretty much, yes.  
02 Q. And -- and you were an

03 individual, in fact, who had taken time  
04 outs for safety in the past, correct?  
05 A. Minor ones. It was always  
06 in-house, just in our engine room area.  
07 Q. All right. In fact, even if it  
08 was a minor problem that you saw, you  
09 didn't hesitate to bring that to someone's  
10 attention and say, let's time out -- take a  
11 time out and do this right; although, you  
12 may think it's insignificant or minor, I  
13 think it's important, and we need to  
14 correct it; is that correct?

Page 290:17 to 290:17

00290:17 A. Yes.

Page 291:25 to 293:08

00291:25 Q. All right. Now, those  
00292:01 individuals who worked in the chief  
02 mechanic role dealing with the mechanics of  
03 the rig, had you formed an opinion as to  
04 their abilities and their level of  
05 conscience -- well, level of skill?  
06 A. One of them, yes.  
07 Q. Who was that?  
08 A. That was the new guy that had  
09 been there for a while. His -- gosh. I  
10 don't recall his name now, but I had been  
11 working and observing him for probably six  
12 months or longer and he was catching on,  
13 doing real good.  
14 Q. All right. You felt as though  
15 he was -- he was hard working and  
16 conscientious?  
17 A. Yes.  
18 Q. You felt he was safety oriented?  
19 A. Yes.  
20 Q. Can you say the same for those  
21 who worked alongside of you on your tour,  
22 specifically those in the mechanical  
23 department? Did you feel they were hard  
24 working, conscientious, and  
25 safety-oriented?  
00293:01 A. Those who worked with me, yes.  
02 Q. If you had any hesitation about  
03 their abilities and their skill level, I  
04 presume that's something you would have  
05 reported your superiors, correct?  
06 A. Or dealt with it myself, yes.  
07 Q. And you never did that, correct?  
08 A. No.



Page 294:08 to 294:14

00294:08 Q. Are you aware, Mr. Brown, that  
09 at any given time on this rig, BP had  
10 absolute authority to shut it down if they  
11 felt for whatever reason it was not  
12 operating safely? You're aware that, are  
13 you not?  
14 A. I believe so, yes.

Page 295:11 to 295:21

00295:11 Q. Mr. Brown, my question that came  
12 out poorly was: At no point in time from  
13 January 1 of 2010 to April 20th of 2010 --  
14 that's the timeframe I'm talking about --  
15 A. Uh-huh.  
16 Q. At no point in time during those  
17 months did BP ever exercise a right to shut  
18 down this rig for any safety concerns; is  
19 that right?  
20 A. I did not see any.  
21 Q. Okay.

Page 295:25 to 296:02

00295:25 Q. At any point in time between  
00296:01 January and April, did BP exercise their  
02 authority to shut down this rig?

Page 296:05 to 296:05

00296:05 A. No.

Page 297:02 to 299:07

00297:02 Q. Okay. You talked about a  
03 conversation that you had with Jimmy  
04 Harrell, I think an emotional conversation  
05 on the 21st at a hotel in the New Orleans  
06 area; is that right?  
07 A. Yes.  
08 Q. Was Jimmy shaken up at the time?  
09 A. Very. He very emotional at that  
10 time.  
11 Q. And I think you told us  
12 initially that what he said was that he and  
13 his crew did not do anything wrong. Is  
14 that what you said?  
15 A. Yes, he was saying that over and  
16 over again.  
17 Q. And that they had done

18 everything they could to try to maintain a  
 19 safe rig, in essence; is that right?  
 20 A. Yes.  
 21 Q. All right. You have known Jimmy  
 22 a long time?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. Don't you?  
 25 A. Yes.  
 00298:01 Q. You felt he was sincere in that  
 02 comment?  
 03 A. Yes. I have known Jimmy quite a  
 04 while and he's a very, very controlled and  
 05 thorough man. And, yes, with him it was a  
 06 -- the safe way or no way.  
 07 Q. Right. What about Jason  
 08 Anderson? You worked with Mr. Anderson a  
 09 long time?  
 10 A. I first met him when the rig was  
 11 being built.  
 12 Q. Dewey Revette?  
 13 A. I knew Dewey somewhat pretty  
 14 good.  
 15 Q. You worked with him a long time  
 16 as well?  
 17 A. Yes.  
 18 Q. All right. Both of those men  
 19 you had a lot of respect for?  
 20 A. Absolutely.  
 21 Q. You felt they were both  
 22 conscientious in their job?  
 23 A. Yes.  
 24 Q. They performed their job safely?  
 25 A. Yes.  
 00299:01 Q. Weren't risk-takers?  
 02 A. No.  
 03 Q. Is there any doubt in your mind  
 04 that Mr. Anderson and Mr. Revette did  
 05 everything they knew and they were trained  
 06 to do, properly?  
 07 A. I believe so.

Page 299:23 to 299:24

00299:23 Q. Hey, Mr. Brown, we're almost  
 24 done. Scott Bickford again. I just have a

Page 301:07 to 301:11

00301:07 Q. And you had I take it been in  
 08 the ECR before when the -- a general alarm  
 09 had been sounded either in a real situation  
 10 or a drill situation?  
 11 A. Yes.

Page 301:19 to 303:11

00301:19 When that light goes off and --  
20 and -- and when a general alarm is  
21 triggered, what is it like inside of the  
22 ECR? Is it -- how does it appear?  
23 A. Well, the audible alarm is  
24 extremely loud. There's no missing it. In  
25 the ECR, it would be quite loud.

00302:01 Q. Would it have been loud enough  
02 to hear over the revving of the engines  
03 that you described?  
04 A. Not quite, but close, close  
05 enough.  
06 Q. All right. And what about the  
07 visual alarm?  
08 A. Visual alarm, it -- actually  
09 wouldn't change. Once it started, it would  
10 keep on flashing its signal.  
11 Q. Okay. But how -- how bright is  
12 it? How evident is it in the room? Is it  
13 something you could miss?  
14 A. No, you can't miss it.  
15 Q. Was there anything on  
16 your -- and -- and -- just so that we're  
17 clear, up until the -- up until the time  
18 when the power went out and even after the  
19 power went out, did you ever see the  
20 general alarm light go on indicating that a  
21 general alarm had been sounded?  
22 A. No, not visual or audible.  
23 Q. All right. And then the next  
24 question I have for you is: During -- from  
25 the time that you left the ECR after the  
00303:01 series of explosions and went through the  
02 rig, did you ever see evidence or hear  
03 evidence of a general alarm being sounded  
04 thereafter?  
05 A. Me, no. I never saw anything or  
06 heard anything.  
07 Q. All right. And that was from  
08 the time that you crawled out of the ECR,  
09 went up the stairs to the bridge, and down  
10 to the muster area near Lifeboat 1?  
11 A. Yes.