

1 DEEPWATER HORIZON have a close-captioned
2 television system where you can monitor
3 certain things on the rig?

4 A Yes, it does.

5 Q Do you know if that information is
6 transmitted real-time to the beach?

7 A No, I do not.

8 Q At this time, could you give us a
9 synopsis of what actually took place the day
10 of the incident and up to the incident and
11 after the incident on board the HORIZON?

12 A At 11:00, there is a pre-tour
13 meeting, which basically you go over what is
14 going to be taking place for the day on the
15 rig and on the drill floor.

16 I really don't follow too
17 strenuously what they discuss that's going
18 to be happening on the drill floor, because
19 it's not part of my department, but I recall
20 a scrimmage taking place between the company
21 man, the OIM and the toolpusher and driller
22 concerning the events of the day.

23 The driller was outlining what was
24 going to be taking place. Whereupon, the
25 company man stood up and said, "No, we have

1 some changes to that."

2 I really didn't pay attention to
3 what he was saying. They had to do with
4 displacing the riser for later on that tour.

5 And the OIM and the driller and
6 the toolpusher had a disagreement with that.
7 There was a -- I remember there was a slight
8 argument that took place and a difference of
9 opinions, and the company man was basically
10 saying, "Well, this is how it's going to
11 be," and the toolpusher and the OIM
12 reluctantly agreed.

13 Q Okay. After that incident had
14 taken place, can you tell me what happened?
15 And I assume you went directly to the engine
16 control room or something?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Can you please tell me what you
19 were doing after that transpired?

20 A After that, I went about my normal
21 duties, which is to make engine room and
22 thruster rounds. And following that, we
23 started our daily work, which for that day
24 was to repair a salt water pipe down in one
25 of the pontoons.

1 Q Could you please give me your best
2 assessment on what happened in the engine
3 room, what engine maybe revved up first or
4 if they revved up in conjunction with each
5 other, what engine you thought possibly
6 could have revved up first.

7 A I'm going to say both of them
8 revved up at the same time and we had
9 engines three and six on line at the same
10 time, and in my opinion, I'm going to say
11 that engine three most likely blew up simply
12 because the explosion came from the port
13 side, which engine three was pretty much
14 located right next to the engine control
15 room, down one level, and I really can't say
16 which one revved up first, because to me it
17 sounded like both of them did.

18 Q Were there any engines that were
19 non-operational at that time?

20 A Yes. One, two, four and five were
21 not in operation.

22 Q So the only options remaining were
23 three, four and six?

24 A No, four was operating.

25 Q So three, five and six?

1 A Three and six, right.

2 MR. GORDON:

3 Excuse me. Your question, you
4 mean running at the time?

5 MR. MATHEWS:

6 Up and able to run at the time.

7 MR. GORDON:

8 And able to run?

9 MR. MATHEWS:

10 Yes.

11 THE WITNESS:

12 All of them were able to run at
13 that time.

14 EXAMINATION BY MR. MATHEWS:

15 Q Were there any safety devices to
16 prevent engine overspeed on those pieces of
17 equipment?

18 A Yes, there were.

19 Q Which types?

20 A There was a mechanical overspeed
21 and an electrical overspeed.

22 Q Could you elaborate on how those
23 safety devices are set to prevent engine
24 overspeed?

25 A The engine normally runs at about

1 720 RPM's and the engine overspeed for the
2 mechanical basically operates about
3 15 percent higher than that, somewhere
4 around 800 RPM's or just over that, and once
5 the engine RPM's achieves that set rating,
6 it will trip the engine and basically shut
7 it down, shutting down the fuel going to it
8 and shutting down the air flow to it.

9 Q I would like to show you an
10 exhibit, if we could put it up, of the main
11 deck. But while that's being done, did
12 those safety devices work?

13 A I do not think so, no.

14 Q In the engine control room, are
15 you aware of any gas alarm system that may
16 also shut power to the engine control room?

17 A No.

18 Q So there is none?

19 A There is none.

20 Q Can you please put it up?

21 While they're setting that up, is
22 there any type of safety device on an air
23 intake system that will prevent gas to flow
24 into the engine control room?

25 A There are the rig-savers. They

1 are just after the turbo intakes, in between
2 what we call the charge air box.

3 Q And that prevents flow from --

4 A Yes.

5 Q In your opinion, did those
6 function properly?

7 A No.

8 Q Do you know if any of the safety
9 devices that we have just gone over were
10 inspected?

11 A We test those on, I think it is a
12 yearly basis, and I believe they were tested
13 back in January or February, and they had
14 functioned fine.

15 Q I don't know if you can see it,
16 but are you familiar with where the engine
17 control room is in relation to the air
18 intake near the rig floor?

19 A Yes.

20 Q Can you please point out the air
21 intake or mark it on the board?

22 MR. GORDON:

23 With your permission, may I just
24 take it down and show him?

25 MR. MATHEWS:

1 Yes, sir.

2 EXAMINATION BY MR. MATHEWS:

3 Q Please mark where the engine air
4 intake is.

5 A No. 3 is going to be right about
6 here (indicating).

7 Q Okay.

8 A And No. 6 is right over here
9 (indicating).

10 Q Okay. So in relation to where you
11 just indicated, could you please explain how
12 close relatively in feet the air intake is
13 to the rig floor?

14 A No. 3 would be pretty much within
15 15 feet, 20 feet of the rig floor. No. 6 is
16 off to the starboard side a little more, but
17 I would say that one would be about 25,
18 30 feet from the starboard corner of the rig
19 floor.

20 Q So the air intake nearest the rig
21 floor that is the air intake for the No. 3
22 engine, in your opinion, failed, and then
23 the safety devices on the No. 3 engine later
24 failed as well once overspeed began?

25 A Yes.

1 A Yes, it was.

2 Q Let's back up a little bit again.
3 Earlier in your testimony, you had said you
4 heard communication with someone to the
5 DAMON BANKSTON in regards to they were
6 having a well control incident, correct?

7 A Yes.

8 Q So obviously, there was some line
9 of communication that you heard from someone
10 in charge on that vessel to the engine
11 control room?

12 A I heard it over the radio, but it
13 wasn't directed at me.

14 Q Okay. But there is a radio in
15 your possession where you can be given
16 direction if need be of some type?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Is there an emergency shut-down
19 system in the engine control room that you
20 were operating in?

21 A Yes.

22 Q Were you given any direction from
23 anyone on that rig to shut down the engines?

24 A No, I was not.

25 Q Would you please give me your best

1 opinion on what would have happened if you
2 shut down those systems, the engine systems?

3 A If I were to shut down those
4 engines, it could have stopped as an
5 ignition source.

6 Q Do you not have the direct
7 authority yourself to activate the emergency
8 shut-down system?

9 A No, I do not.

10 Q Who gives you that authority or
11 who directs you to do that?

12 A That really has never been
13 discussed. I have never read any proper
14 procedures. So under an assumption, I would
15 say the captain or the OIM.

16 Q In the almost 10 years you were on
17 the DEEPWATER HORIZON, did you ever in a
18 well control incident shut down the system
19 and stand by or any type of procedures that
20 might have been happening without any
21 written document of procedures?

22 A No.

23 Q Backing up to the air intake
24 system, if a sudden influx of gas would have
25 come from the well near -- I think you said

1 were provided with all the necessary
2 personal protective equipment that you
3 needed to perform your job, such as gloves,
4 hard hats, safety glasses, steel-toed boots?

5 A Yes.

6 Q Prior to the event, were you aware
7 of any type of concerns or pressures from
8 either Transocean or BP personnel concerning
9 completion of this particular drilling
10 project?

11 A Yes.

12 Q What were those?

13 A I didn't really hear anything
14 verbal. It was just passed around via other
15 people that this well was taking too long
16 and they were in a hurry to complete it, so
17 they can move on to the next.

18 Q Could you be any more specific
19 about the information you received and where
20 it came from?

21 A No, I cannot.

22 Q Preceding the incident, were you
23 aware of the fact that there were senior BP
24 personnel management on board the DEEPWATER
25 HORIZON?

1 abilities to deal with firefighting
2 situations?

3 A Pretty much, yes.

4 Q And then the last topic I wanted
5 to touch upon was the safety management
6 system. Were you familiar with the safety
7 management system on board the HORIZON?

8 A Such as -- Can you define that a
9 little more?

10 Q For example, if there was an
11 incident that occurred concerning some type
12 of a safety-related issue, were you familiar
13 with the processes for reporting those and
14 who did it go to?

15 A The process that I basically knew
16 from my position was to go to my immediate
17 supervisor for any type of safety issue.

18 Q And who was that, sir?

19 A It varied while I was out there,
20 but Steve Gratoni, who was our maintenance
21 supervisor, or my first engineer or the
22 mechanic's supervisor.

23 Q Are you familiar with any of the
24 systems for documenting those occurrences
25 and how solutions are rendered?

1 A Not really.

2 MR. WHEATLEY:

3 Thank you, sir. I have no further
4 questions at this point.

5 EXAMINATION BY MR. DYKES:

6 Q Mr. Brown, I'm just trying to
7 clean up my notes here. You came on duty at
8 12:00 p.m. that day?

9 A Yes.

10 Q Your normal hitch is 12:00 p.m. to
11 12:00 a.m.?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Backing up to the gas alarms, the
14 gas alarms that you heard going off when you
15 were in the engine control room, those are
16 alarm only, correct?

17 A Yes.

18 Q They have no shut-in capability?

19 A No.

20 Q You mentioned that during the
21 pre-tour meeting at 11:00 that day, you saw
22 a disagreement between Transocean
23 representatives and BP representatives?

24 A Yes.

25 Q Who were those individuals for

1 CAPT. NGUYEN:

2 Thank you very much.

3 Mr. Brown, any questions that we
4 didn't ask you or any information that you
5 think the Board should be aware of that you
6 want to offer at this time?

7 THE WITNESS:

8 I think the only thing I would
9 really like to add is I would like to see
10 the cause of this incident, instance,
11 incident found out and corrected, so that
12 our personnel out there can go to work
13 feeling safe and be safe.

14 That's all I have.

15 CAPT. NGUYEN:

16 Thank you for your testimony. And
17 will you make yourself available if the
18 Board needs for you to appear to provide
19 additional information?

20 THE WITNESS:

21 Yes, sir.

22 CAPT. NGUYEN:

23 Thank you very much. You are
24 dismissed.

25 We will take a 10-minute break at

